3

years, being regularly admitted in open court; second, in the case of an alien coming to this country before he is eighteen years old, he may dispense with the declaration and become naturalized in open court at any time after arriving at the age of twenty-one years;1 third, children of parents who have been duly naturalized, under any law of the United States, before such children attain their majority. In cases where new territory is admitted by treaty, as was the case of the Louisiana purchase, the Florida purchase, the admission into the Union of Texas, the Mexican purchase, and the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, all inhabitants of the territory so acquired become citizens. In this case all of the authorities on this subject are carefully collected and discussed, and for a further discussion and examination of the subject the reader is referred thereto. That case, however, did not turn on the collective naturalization, but upon the fact that the father of Boyd had once declared his intention to become a citizen, and upon information and belief Boyd alleged that he had completed his citizenship and that the record was lost. The fact being well pleaded was held on demurrer to be sufficient, so that much of the discussion, while interesting and instructive, was not necessary to the decision of the case.

$248. Purposes of the foregoing- Who may locate mineral lands-Citizens of the United States - Purposes of the statute.-The statute provides that the mineral deposits in the public lands shall be open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such citizens. To those familiar with the history of the times and with the evil the statute was intended to correct, namely, that of

1 R. S. U. S., § 2167.

2 R. S. U. S., § 2172.

3 Boyd v. Nebraska, supra.

4 Act of May 10, 1872, July 4, 1866,

R. S. U. S., §§ 2319 et seq.; Providence G. M. Co. v. Burke (Ariz.), 57 Pac. Rep. 641.

alien acquisition and ownership of mineral lands, the object of this statute is perfectly plain. It is doubtless equally true that to such men as Senator Wm. M. Stewart and Judge Wm. H. Beatty, who were instrumental in securing its passage and explaining the necessity for such legislation, the construction placed upon the statute in later years by the supreme court of the United States, by some of the federal courts and by the Colorado supreme court has been somewhat disappointing. Be that as it may, the reading

of the statute discloses the purpose of congress to correct the evil of alien claim and ownership of mines. The language is plain, and, except for the failure to provide any means of escheat, or denial of the rights acquired, by some proceeding in the nature of inquest of office other than the denial of patent, the means employed were adequate.? While the decisions in nearly all the mining states are uniform in saying that citizenship is an essential qualification to take and hold mineral land, there has been considerable contrariety of opinion as to when, where and how that question could be properly raised. We will discuss these matters in the succeeding sections of this work.

§ 249. Qualifications elsewhere-Canada and Canadian provinces. In the preceding pages of this work we have noted that the holding of a free miner's certificate is essential in some portions of British North America in order to acquire title or right of possession to mineral lands. No

1 Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505; Billings v. Aspen M. & S. Co., 2C. C. A. 252, 51 Fed. Rep. 338; on rehearing, 3 C. C. A. 69, 52 Fed. Rep. 250; Justice M. Co. v. Lee, 21 Colo. 260, 40 Pac. Rep. 444.

Tesh, 68 Cal. 43; Ferguson v. Neville, 61 Cal. 356; Anthony v. Jillson, 83 Cal. 296; Bohanon v. Howe, 2 Idaho, 417, 17 Pac. Rep. 583; Rosenthal v. Ives, 2 Idaho, 244, 12 Pac. Rep. 904; Tibbitts v. Ah Tong, 4

2 See authorities in the last pre- Mont. 536; Ducie v. Ford, 8 Mont. ceding note.

3 North Noonday M. Co. v. Orient M. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 522; Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Sawy. 28, 5 Fed. Cas. 497, No 2610; Lee Doon v.

233; Golden Fleece M. Co. v. Cable Cons. M. Co., 12 Nev. 312; Strickly v. Hill, 22 Utah, 257, 62 Pac. Rep. 893.

4 See post, this part, ch. III.

other discrimination is made or qualification anywhere required, and any person or corporation, upon payment of a fee, may acquire the free miner's certificate. A list of the statutory provisions and orders is subjoined in the note.'

In Mexico, any person or corporation, upon satisfying the department of financial ability to properly open a mine, may acquire a concession.

CHAPTER II.

CERTAIN CORPORATIONS CITIZENS SUB MODO, AND HEREIN OF PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP.

253. Early doubt as to corporations' rights.

254. Courts decide in favor of locations by corporations.

255. Proof of citizenship, and herein of presumption as to citizenship. 256. Proof of citizenship continued - Extreme cases

ship-Trustees.

Acts of citizen

§ 253. Early doubts as to corporations' rights.— The statute1 provides that the mineral lands are open to occupation and purchase by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, and does not restrict to individuals, but is permissive of being exercised by any combination of persons answering that description, and this appears to be the plain contemplation of the law. Since there is no limitation upon the number of persons that may locate a mining claim, and since corporations are but aggregations of persons," it follows that a mining claim may be located by a corporation. The law provides for corporations owning and securing patent to mining claims in the same manner that individuals or firms secure title. But notwithstanding this provision it was doubted for many years whether a corporation could make a valid location, and in an early case the defendants requested the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff, being a corporation, was not entitled to the privilege of making a mineral location, and the court so charged. The supreme court of Idaho dodged the question by using this language: "Without deciding whether this was error or not, we can safely

IR. S. U. S., § 2319.

4 Stemwinder M. Co. v. Emma

2 McKinley v. Wheeler, 180 U. S. and Last Chance M. Co. (Idaho), 21 630. Pac. Rep. 1040.

3R. S. U. S., § 2333.

say that it was not such error as would justify a reversal." This case was appealed to the supreme court of the United States and was affirmed by a divided court, no opinion being written.'

254. Courts decide in favor of locations by corporations. In a later case, however, the supreme court of the United States, in reviewing many of the decisions on the question of citizenship, decides squarely the question that locations may be lawfully made by corporations, but in such case the corporation must be treated as a single entity, locating its claim in its corporate name; moreover, to entitle it to locate mining claims, it must be chartered by some one of the states or territories of the United States.3

Mr. Justice Field ably reviews the situation in this language: "It will be observed that no prohibition is here made against citizens of the United States uniting together for the occupation and purchase of public lands containing ‘valuable mineral deposits.' Nothing is said of partnerships or associations or corporations; it is to citizens that the priv ilege is granted, and that they may unite themselves in such modes as in all other pursuits was, as a matter of course, well know to those who framed, as well as to those who passed, the statute. There was no occasion for special reference to the subject to give sanction to these modes of uniting means to explore for mineral deposits, and to develop them when discovered. . . ." And after reciting the manner in which corporations are formed, he continues, speaking of corporations: "They are little more than aggregations of individuals, united for some legitimate business, acting as a single body, with the power of succession in its members without dissolution. We think, therefore, that it would be a

1 Stem Winder M. Co. v. Emma and Last Chance M. Co., 149 U. S. (not officially reported), L. ed. 37, p. 941.

2 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U. S. (5 Cranch), 61, 3 L.

ed. 38. See also Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 455.

3 McKinley v. Wheeler, 130 U. S. 630; Dahl v. Mont. Copper Co., 132 U. S. 264; Thomas v. Chisholm, 13 Colo. 105, 21 Pac. Rep. 1019.