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von Bubenburg; but it had been forgotten to fore pocketing their allowance the Council of ask previously whether he would accept it. BeBerne repealed the regulation under which the statute against bribes was read yearly at the opening of their proceedings. For this act we cannot but commend them. When a new god is to be set over the altar, it is but decent that the liturgy be changed.

This charge, it seems to us, Mr. Kirk four hundred, less conspicuous persons, sums fully makes out; and he makes it out from ranging from two hundred down to twenty the contemporary correspondence, which francs. All these sums were granted in the shows with the utmost clearness and sim- form of yearly" pensions." One, of three hunplicity what were the motives and proceed-dred and sixty francs, was designed for Adrian ings of the Swiss, and their relations to the King of France. Berne was the leading State of the Confederation, and it was with Berne that Louis's intrigues were carried on. Louis bought Berne and its leaders; and Berne took care of the other Cantons. French gold, indeed, was necessary for them all; the system of pensions, which makes such a figure in all the transactions between the King and his allies, and which was the mainspring of the war, extended through the Confederation. But Berne was paid at a very different rate from the Forest Cantons; and the leaders of Berne, who were the managers and agents with Louis, at a very different rate from the common citi

zens:

It was commonly understood that the gold sent by Louis amounted to thirty thousand francs equal to a million and a half at the present val

uation. Ten thousand belonged to Austria, but

Thus two influences were at work in Switzerland. In Berne, the leader of the Confederation, the most influential State, and the one most in contact with the Powers of the world without, the war had its origin in the violent and unscrupulous use of an opportunity for making money, and increasing the consequence of the State, by contracting for a war to be carried on by the Swiss for the objects of the King of France. In the other Cantons the love of fighting, the hope of plunder, the sense of force, the were stopped by Berne for the promised wages various proportions with a nobler motive, attraction of pensions, were combined in of the soldiers in the Héricourt expeditionSigismund's "intentions not being doubted," the strong and deep sense of brotherhood and his quittance being demanded and given. between the little democracies, which gave The remainder was assigned in equal portions to the crafty intriguers of Berne such an adthe Eight Cantons with Freyburg and Solothurn. vantage in working upon the sympathies of In the royal letters authorizing this disburse- their ruder brethren, and which made an apment, its object was stated to be "the mainte- peal in the hour of apparent danger irresistnance of the Swiss in the service of the King ible. Berne had often some trouble to in his wars and otherwise," and the payments keep its allies up to the mark. They liked were made continuable" so long as they should fighting, plunder, and pensions; but they be so engaged in his service." Berne, express- cared nothing for schemes of policy or for ing the same idea in different language, gave a the objects which made Berne so inveterate general receipt for the whole amount, as intended in urging on the war; and when the fight"to meet the expenses which the Confederates had incurred, or might incur, in doing the pleasing had been sufficiently done, and the penure of the said King." But these twenty thou- sions were behind their time, it required sand francs were not all which the liberal Louis much patience and skill to pacify the grumdesigned for "servants" who were so regardful blers and stimulate the reluctant. But of his "pleasure." Those who had borne the Berne, with its Diesbachs and Jost von heat and burden of the day were engaged Silinen and Scharnachthal, was equal to the Berne had taken care to remind him—at a very task:different rate from the labourers for an hour. He had sent, therefore, another twenty thousand francs, leaving the distribution to Diesbach and Favre, by whom a schedule was drawn up, and prefaced with the statement that this was a matter "not requiring to be made public, but to be kept secret." Of this sum six thousand francs were assigned to Berne, three thousand to Lucerne, two thousand to Zurich; to the other Cantons and the two allies, nothing. Nine thousand were thus left for particular individuals, and of this residue all but the merest trifle was absorbed by citizens of Berne and Lucerne, chiefly by those of the former State. The two Diesbachs and Jost von Silinen received one thousand francs each; Scharnachthal and a brother of Silinen,

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Thus the Swiss people, which had so long held princes at arm's length, refusing to become entangled in their alliances or their disputes, had so widely departed from its traditional principles as to consent to be henceforth "maintained in the service" of a foreign monarch.

And this, we are told, was commendable on their part, or, at the least, justifiable and politic. Their independence, it is said, was threatened, and, resolving to anticipate the danger they foresaw, they wisely accepted the aid that was offered in the form in which it was needed.

How far such representations accord with the facts, every reader of the preceding pages has the means of judging for himself.. There had

been, on the part of the Swiss, no manifestation of jealousy or hostility towards the Duke of Burgundy that did not emanate from Berne. Why Berne had laboured to create such an enmity appears from its own acknowledgments. Even now its efforts to spread this feeling had been utterly fruitless. It had secured the adoption of the treaty with France, but it had not succeeded in exciting any popular hatred of Burgundy. It had prevailed over the opposition of the other Cantons, in part by appealing to the same base motives which had influenced itself, in part by the employment of artifices and by working upon that spirit of unity and mutual concession which had always been a conspicuous virtue of the Swiss character. But it had long since abandoned as hopeless the attempt to excite unfounded apprehension. Bugbears had no place in the Swiss imagination. They had none in that of Berne itself. Intimations of danger from the " triple alliance" were received by the Council of that State with characteristic and befitting scorn. "A handful of Swiss," they replied, " is a match for an army. On our own soil, with our mountains behind us, we defy the world."

That the ruling motives with the Confederates were their German sympathies and their treaty with Austria, Mr. Kirk refuses to believe, for the very good reason that what the Germans called on them to do they steadily declined. They would not join the Imperial army; they would not help Basel and Strasburg, and the defenders of Alsace. Berne itself was the first to make excuses for not co-operating with the Germans. The energy which it directed was reserved for another war, made, not for German, but for French objects:

In all this we do not consider the Swiss as chargeable with duplicity, except in so far as double speaking and double acting were necessary results of the position in which they were placed. That position they themselves had accurately defined. They had entered into the war as the auxiliaries of Austria, but at the instance and for the benefit of France. Therefore, the real measure of their assistance must be, not the necessities of the Emperor or of Sigismund, but the condition of their agreement with Louis. Let us look, then, at the treaty, now finally ratified, and try to understand its precise meaning and import.

As we have before said, the treaty did not bind the Swiss to prosecute a war against Burgundy. It provided only that, in the event of their becoming involved in such a war, the King was to join in it, and that, if they were menaced with an attack, he should come to their assistance, unless, indeed, he were prevented by some immediate danger at home, in which contingency-hardly to be apprehended - he was to pay a forfeit of eighty thousand francs.

Their agreement with Louis was one ostensibly for mutual help. Each was to this was not what Louis meant; and though move when the other was in danger. But it was what the more distant and less wellinformed of the Cantons understood, it was not what Louis's pensioners at Berne meant either :

What could be safer than such an arrangement? The Swiss were not going to bear the brunt of the conflict, to take upon themselves the risks and the charges. If ever the harassed enemy should turn upon them, Louis would interpose to secure them against harm. But they It was agreed in the diet that the Emperor had yet to fathom the policy of the man with ought not to be treated with disrespect; that whom they were dealing. They were not comhonourable means should be sought for evading monly aware that, in addition to the general recompliance with his oppressive request. An tainer, he was paying a special retainer, of embassy might be sent, explanations offered, a equal amount, of which the larger portion went promise given to take the subject into further to Berne, while most of the Cantons received consideration. In this manner, it was suggested not a fraction of it, His immediate object had by Berne, the matter might be protracted until been gained when the Swiss consented to become the occasion had passed. Two or three Cantons, auxiliaries in the war. His profounder design, though strongly disinclined, would consent to go that of converting them into principals, slipping if the majority were so minded, and provided out of his own engagements, throwing upon the Emperor would pay them for their trouble. them the burdens and the dangers, was to be The majority voted emphatically to stay at effected by the operation of those additional home. It included those Cantons in which, if grants which "did not require to be made pubanywhere, the German sentiment had a real ex- lic, but to be kept secret.' It was the "duty" istence. But there was a difference-as the of Berne to render the Swiss "more amenable Swiss, at least, could see-between being Ger- to His Majesty," to spread assurances of his mans and being Imperialists. They instinct-"entire good faith," to "keep alive the practice ively discerned, what the correspondence of the against the Duke of Burgundy," and to urge time reveals, that the Austrian Emperor still its Confederates forwards by "the road in which looked upon them with the same eyes as ever. it had first led them." "Let him confirm our liberties!" said Unterwalden, and others echoed the cry; "until he does so, we are not bound to help or to obey him."

For the accomplishment of this object the main resource lay in that spirit of concord and mutual helpfulness on which Berne had already drawn so freely and effectually. Let danger

hover over one community, and the others would of the time with anything of the professional fly to its support. An indirect aid would spring spirit and organization which all armies out of the craving for booty and the readiness were soon to find necessary. So he apfor adventure which were also among the na-peared for a while. Every one knew that tional characteristics, and which Berne had recently taken pains to foster.

the Swiss would fight well. In their mountains and defiles, taking the invaders at an advantage, they might strike a heavy blow. But to meet in the open field disciplined troops, superior numbers, variety of arms

This view is not conjectural. The Council records of Berne, the letters and despatches of their leaders and of their agents-cavalry, field artillery, English archers with Louis, their communications with the other Cantons, are still extant; and Mr. Kirk refers to them, and quotes them in their rough German, at every step. They are better authorities even than the shrewd reports of the Italian ambassadors to their masters at Venice and Milan, by which Mr. Kirk checks and confirms them. Read by the light of these records, the war of the Cantons against the Duke of Burgundy was not a war for the independence of Switzerland, but a series of perfidious and horribly ferocious inroads, ultimately to further the objects of the crafty hirer of the Swiss spearmen, directly to bring the neighbouring territories—the Jura, Vaud, Lausanne, and other parts of Savoy-under the yoke of Berne and its Swiss confederates. It was a war of conquest, by which the limits of Switzerland were extended; and, as a further result, the Swiss turned for centuries into a nation of foreign pensioners at home, and invincible mercenaries abroad.

- soldiers with temper as high as their own, and with a renowned leader like the Duke of Burgundy, seemed to all lookers-on a very hopeless effort. The meeting came, on ground chosen by Charles. The course of an hour made it evident that Charles's supposed strength, matched with the Swiss, was the most hollow of deceptions. Granson was no hard fought and dangerous victory, but the ready collapse, before resolution and strength, of an imposing show. Suddenly, to the wonder of all the world, Charles found that the military strength in which he had trusted, and which the world had feared, had simply vanished away. Naturally enough, in spite of the tremendous overthrow, he could not believe it; but Morat only repeated more emphatically the same proof. He woke, as one in a dream, from the dreadful and incredible surprise. There was little time for meeting the change. One shock followed quick on the track of the other. Almost before the world had realized the great reverse which had altered the position of one of its most dreaded potentates, Nancy had finished the work of ruin. The rapidity of the catastrophe was as extraordinary as its completeness.

The military history of the last years of Charles's rule is told at length, with clearness and spirit, and, as far as we can judge, with thorough knowledge. Mr. Kirk is fully sensible of the tragic aspects of the war, and of its remarkable and thoroughly un- Mr. Kirk's details of the great battles expected course. For it is difficult to are distinct, and his topographical descripconceive anything more tragic than the tions of the ground careful and interesting. unconsciousness of the tremendous power What strikes the reader of them is, that he awaiting him, with which Charles marched does not explain sufficiently the character to punish the aggressors who had dared of the component parts of the Burgundian to ravage his frontier, the paid mechan- army. Granson and Morat appear to have ics and herdsmen of rude mountain re- been lost because Charles had no inpublics, whom their needy and intriguing fantry of the slightest value for steadichiefs had stirred up against him, to serve the purposes of his cunning enemy at Paris. He thought himself, others thought him, as strong as ever he had been. He had foiled the Emperor, and, if only half successful himself, he had sent him back with a buffet not soon to be forgotten. He had completed the continuity of his own dominions by conquering Lorraine under the eyes and in the teeth of Louis. His army was as strong as it ever had been, and his military preparations were carefully made. When he descended the Jura, he led what was, in the eyes of all around him, the most formidable army in Europe; the only army, indeed,

ness or vigour. He had Italian bands, from whose treachery he suffered at last; he had a brilliant and gallant cavalry; he had cannon, and light troops for skirmishers. It would have been worth while to make out, if it were possible, what was the composition and organization of his foot soldiers, who must have formed the bulk of the army, but were on all occasions so useless. It is difficult, however, to resist the conclusion that Charles himself was a poor general, and that, if he knew how to animate a cavalry charge, he did not know how to manage an army or repair a mistake or a disaster. The last scenes of this im

pressive history, the glee, and the mixture the strange disease which leads people to of cunning with shameless candour, the seek notoriety of any kind at any price. subtle play of amusement, anxiety, and Their failure can therefore hardly be reckgrim hatred in Louis, the sinking deeper oned as instances of the extreme difficulty and deeper into confusion and hopelessness of the performance. But the diabolical of his doomed antagonist, the horrors of the attempt at killing the Duke of Edinburgh Swiss victories, are powerfully told. Per- was carried out with the most deliberate haps Mr. Kirk allows himself sometimes to resolution, and, indeed, came far nearer to be carried away beyond the gravity of the success than most crimes of the kind. Yet, historian into the sentiment and passion with the exception of the murder of Presiwhich properly belong to tragedy. But he dent Lincoln and it must be admitted that may plead an excuse in the awful character they do some things better in America — of what he relates, and in his thorough com- no assassination of the ruler of any country prehension of its significance, and his sym- has been successfully executed within our pathy with its solemn and affecting vicissi- time. Are we to put down this curious imtudes. To the last, he is equal to the great munity to a providential interposition which demands of his task, and he keeps his hold perhaps does not extend to the President of on the attention of his readers with unfailing a Republic, or can we account for the phemastery over the story, and sustained abil-nomenon on simpler principles ? It is the ity in telling it.

From the Saturday Review.
KILLING KINGS.

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necessity of all royal persons to appear frequently in public, and to give the fullest notice of time and place. An indefinite number of people have some fancied interest in removing them; or, if they have no conceivable interest, many persons, as is unfortunately obvious, are fascinated by DE MAISTRE argues that kings differ the suggestion of doing something the crimifrom ordinary men as trees differ from nality of which is only equalled by its stushrubs, and that royal families do not pos- pidity. Why should not any resolute man sess royal qualities in virtue of their posi- take a knife or a pistol, and make certain tion, but are elevated by Providence to of bringing down an unarmed adversary their position because they possess royal to whom he has unrestrained opportunities qualities. He supports his theory by an of access? There is no one who cannot, argument derived, after a very questionable by taking a little pains, get within a few method, from the average length of reigns, feet of any reigning monarch intended to prove that kings live longer that, if the king were a partridge, he might than other people because they possess a count with certainty on bagging his victim. greater inherent vitality. His facts and Considering the cheapness of revolvers, it figures are probably as fallacious as is gen- seems really surprising that so easy a mark erally the case with those most accommo- is not more frequently hit. There are the dating articles; but he might have derived precedents of Ravaillac and of Balthazar an additional argument from the extraordi- Gérard, and if the fate of those heroes of nary difficulty of killing a king. Nothing assassination is rather discouraging, their is at first sight more easy than to perform imitators may at any rate reflect that the such a feat, and no feat in practice is more worst criminals are not at the present day rarely brought to a successful conclusion. torn to pieces by horses, nor are pieces of History swarms with plots for assassinating their flesh wrenched off with red-hot pinkings, and a large number have lived for cers. The gallows or the guillotine is the years in daily dread of a murderer; yet worst evil to be anticipated; and of course the number of successful murders is so a man who wishes to kill a king must have small as scarcely to justify an insurance of-made up his mind to a speedy termination fice in demanding a higher premium. The of his own career. Whatever may be last and present rulers of France have been urged theoretically in favour of tyrannithe object of most elaborate and well-con- cide, as distinguished from murders prompttrived plots; but though no precaution ed by more purely selfish motives, it is at which prudence could have suggested was least desirable that the actors should give neglected by Fieschi, Orsini, and their imi- this proof of sincerity. If they are to have tators, the only result of their attempts was the credit of bloodthirsty fanaticism, they the slaughter of a certain number of inno- must show that they carry it to the point of cent people. The attempts against our own self-sacrifice. Assuming, however, that a Queen were apparently less serious, and man is heated to the required pitch, and is may probably be regarded as symptoms of prepared to pay the necessary price, why

is it that he so seldom succeeds? O'Farrell of the wrong side of the stuff. Meanwhile must have been quite conscious that his historians concur with touching unanimity chances of escape were next to nothing, in fostering the pleasant belief. A battle, and would therefore concentrate his whole according to the Duke of Wellington, may mind on carrying out his crime successfully; be described from as many different points indeed it seems to have been a singular of view as a ball; each man knows the piece of good fortune that he failed. Still, series of incidents which happened within one would give very little for the life of a his notice, and knows little more. Conseman placed at a few feet from the barrel of quently it is very easy for the historian to an assassin's pistol, and totally unprepared; place himself mentally at that precise point and another step would probably have made from which the heroism of his own troops the probability of success into a certainty. comes out most conspicuously. Even when How was it that, with such chances in his there is no contradiction of facts, it is easy, favour, he contrived to wound instead of by selecting the proper foreground for the killing? picture, to give prominence to any desired set of figures. So English painters always place themselves on the left of the allied army in representing the battle of the Alma, and their French rivals go with equal unanimity on the right. And thus, by a little judicious manipulation, we are encouraged to the pleasant faith that a battle is always remarkable for marvellous displays of courage. If the varnish could be stripped off the facts they would probably be too disagreeable to look at. The boasting is as useful as the smoke of a modern battle, in concealing partially the brutality and cowardice of the ordinary fighting animal. A plain narrative would explain to us why it takes so many bullets to hit a single man; it would show what proportion of the troops is really in an efficient state at critical moments, and how many people get credit for a heroic charge simply because they are afraid to be the first to run away. One main advantage of discipline is that it makes cowardice useful, and, as in the new machinery for elevating guns, turns to account the force generated by the recoil. When a man is in such a state of mind that he does not know whether he is on his head or his heels, he trusts to the bare instinct which in a disciplined force naturally carries him forward. What proportion of an army is really brave, and what proportion is merely carried on by the momentum of a disciplined mass, we shall never know, because people will never speak the truth. But it is safe to assume that the superlative epithets in general use cover a great deal that will hardly bear telling. A picture cannot be accurate in which the darkest shadows are high lights. The test is to be found by observing any of those cases in which the steadiness of a man's nerve is exposed to a real trial. Even in the vulgar test of a street row, it is curious to remark how few disputes between the roughs who form the raw material of the gallant British soldier get beyond the use of foul language; and how seldom, in the rare cases where a

Probably the simplest explanation is the true one-namely, that nine-tenths of mankind are at bottom undeniable cowards, especially if cowardice means unsteadiness of nerve under excitement. We are in the habit of carefully concealing the fact from ourselves and each other; and history, which is said to be the result of a general conspiracy to conceal the truth, is probably less trustworthy on this than on any other point. Every nation in Europe has succeeded in boasting itself into a belief of its own superlative courage. The French, we know, are amongst the bravest of the brave; the name of German has been said to be synonymous with courage; the bravery of the Spaniard is proverbial; and even the Italians, who have insisted upon this quality less than most nations, are said to be amongst the bravest soldiers in Europe under good guidance. It is unnecessary to dilate upon the national bravery of the Russians or of the Scandinavian races; and Englishmen, whilst they call themselves stupid, obstinate, and bigoted, and subscribe heartily to the truth of every criticism of their enemies, never for a moment doubt their own admirable courage. We have not quite settled whether the English, the Scotch, or the Irish are pre-eminent; but it is known that they each excel in some particular branch of the virtue. The different races of Europe seem to be like boys in certain private schools, where a prize is given to every boy from the top to the bottom; and it may be inferred that the testimonial is about of equal value. To call everybody brave is much the same as to call nobody brave, for it is only by comparison with others that the epithet can have any particular value. It is true that different nations select by preference different shades of the virtue. One has more dash, and another more solidity; and perhaps if we inverted the terms, and said that one was more apt to run away and the other less willing to advance, we might get a glimpse

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