never sanctioned, and when undertaken by a state is equivalent to a declaration of war against the state within whose territory the rebellion exists. Not only is armed interference in behalf of insurgents not justifiable, but the furnishing of any assistance, direct or indirect, or even a failure to strictly observe neutral obligations, is a just cause of offence. In cases of interference in behalf of a central government, the initiative cannot be taken by the interfering state. Assistance may only be furnished on the request of the belligerent government, and then only in accordance with the terms of the invitation:' Intervention in Behalf of an Oppressed Population and Against the Government of a State. From the definition of a state it is clear that any interference between a state and its subjects is opposed to the fundamental principle of international law. It should be an event of the rarest occurrence, and would be justified only in cases of the greatest emergency. As a matter of fact, it has occurred but too frequently, and has rarely been warranted by existing circumstances. A rule deduced from the experience of nations would, therefore, express the conditions under which the law of nations had been disregarded and set at defiance, or evaded, rather than obeyed. It is possible, however, for a case to exist in which a part of the people of a state may be so oppressed, or persecuted, as to warrant other states in interfering upon grounds of humanity. Such a case would be likely to occur when a part of the population of a state was of a different race, or religion, from the great majority of their fellow-subjects; the acts of oppression originating in race or religious prejudice. The mere fact that a people belonging to a particular race, or professing a particular religious belief, are placed at some disadvantage by the law or policy of a state, constitutes no valid ground for remonstrance, still less for interference. To justify acts of positive interference one or more of the following conditions must be fulfilled: 1 Wheaton, §§ 63, 64–73; Woolsey, § 46; I Phillimore, $$ 400, 401, 409415; Heffter, § 45; Creasy, § 297; Lawrence, Int. Law, § 84; Westlake, pp. 122-125; Vattel, liv. ii. chap. iv. §§ 54-56. (1.) A remedy for the wrongs complained of must first be sought in the way of protest or remonstrance. (2.) The oppression or persecution must be so serious in character, and so great in amount, as to incur the condemnation of the civilized world; and the act of interference must be participated in, or sanctioned by, all the states of Christendom. (3.) The interference must be limited to the application of a remedy to the wrong complained of, and should cease so soon as substantial guarantees are furnished that the wrongful acts will not be repeated.1 One of the most recent cases of interference in behalf of an oppressed population was that undertaken by the United States in the island of Cuba, in the execution of a formal Declaration which was adopted by Congress on April 25, 1898. The intervention so undertaken, which will be discussed elsewhere, resulted in the establishment of the present Cuban republic.3 Interference in Behalf of the Balance of Power. The term Balance of Power is applied to a rude equilibrium of political forces, which was established at an early date. among the different states of Europe, and originated in an instinctive exercise of the right of self-defence, and is justified, apart from the considerations of self-preservation that are involved, by the fact that it has powerfully contributed to preserve the general peace of Europe on numerous occasions when that peace has been threatened by the selfish schemes of ambitious states. Its right to exist cannot be deduced from any principle of international law, unless the state system of Europe be regarded as a kind of alliance or confederation, having for its purpose the maintenance of peace and the prevention of useless and unnecessary wars. The first wars waged in its behalf were those Heffter, § 45; Woolsey, § 51; I Phillimore, §§ 400, 401, 409-415; Klüber, § 51, note; Creasy, § 308; Lawrence, Int. Law, $$ 79, 80; I Dig. Int. Law, §§ 45, 47a; Mackin tosh, Review of the Causes of the Revolution of 1688, chap. x.; Vat. tel. liv. ii. chap. iv. § 56. 2 30 Statutes at Large, 364. carried on by Francis I. of France, in the first half of the sixteenth century, to resist the dangerous and increasing power of the Emperor Charles V., whose control of the almost unlimited resources of Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands was a constant menace, not only to the peace of Europe, but to the sovereignty and independence of the other European states. From that epoch until 1815, a period of more than two hundred and fifty years, wars were of such frequent occurrence, and were so long continued, as to cause a state of permanent peace to be regarded as a highly desirable, but extremely unlikely, contingency. Whether the greater number of these wars were due to attempts to overthrow or to defend the principle, and whether wars would have been more or less frequent had the principle never been asserted, need not be discussed here. For the forty years succeeding the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the peace of Europe was certainly due to a constant and successful observance of the principle-a result in every way memorable as the first instance in which peace had been maintained on the continent of Europe for so long a time since the beginning of modern history. It is as obvious, however, that most of the great wars that have occurred since the Peace of Paris, in 1856, have been due to the non-observance or abuse of the principle. The maintenance of peace in Europe during the greater part of the first half of the present century was not obtained without corresponding sacrifices. The principle of the balance of power during this period was not simply recognized, or passively acquiesced in, as a desirable fact; on the contrary, it was vigorously asserted, and to a great extent maintained, by an alliance, or concert of action, on the part of the great powers. This organization was conservative in character, and seems to have originated in an agreement of the crowned heads at Paris, in September, 1815, which has become known in history as the Holy Alliance. The concert thus established was maintained and perpetuated by the various congresses which were held during the decade next ensuing. These alliances were intended, not only to maintain the equilibrium as established at the Congress of Vienna, but to discountenance revolutionary movements, and, by a resort to measures of a repressive and reactionary character, to prevent the general adoption of even desirable constitutional reforms. At present, owing to the great increase in military strength which has taken place in some of the more powerful states of Europe, and to a corresponding diminution in the importance of other states which were formerly powerful, the existence of the equilibrium is in constant danger, its permanent guarantee is impossible, and the balance is maintained from day to day with great and ever-increasing difficulty.' De Martens' Statement of the Principle of the Balance of Power. Every state has a natural right to augment its power, not only by the improvement of its internal constitution and the development of its resources, but also by external aggrandizement, provided that the means employed are lawful; that is, that they do not violate the rights of another. Nevertheless, it may so happen that the aggrandizement of a state already powerful, and the preponderance resulting from it, may, sooner or later, endanger the safety and liberty of the neighboring states. In such case there arises a collision of rights which authorizes the latter to oppose by alliances, and even by force of arms, so dangerous an aggrandizement, without the least regard to its lawfulness. This right is still more essential to states which form a general society than to such as are situated at a great distance from each other; and this is the reason why the powers of Europe make it an essential principle of their political system to watch over the balance of power in Europe. It is clear, also, that it is not always the extent of the acquisition that ought to determine the danger. Everything here depends on circumstances. The annihilation of a state, which at present serves as a counterpoise, may become as dangerous to the general safety of the neighboring states as the immediate aggrandizement of another state."' The subjoined rules are based upon the exhaustive discussion of the subject by Vattel. (1.) "The mere fact that a state has acquired, and is acquiring, power greatly preponderant over its neighbor, does not of itself justify other states in making war upon it for the purpose of reducing its power. (2.) "Under such circumstances other states are justified in watching the preponderant state with cautious vigilance, and in forming leagues with each other for mutual defence from it. (3.) "If the preponderant state commits acts of injury against its neighbors, or any of them, or, by the arrogance of its pretensions, the tone of its public despatches and manifestoes, or by any other course of conduct, beyond the mere increase of its strength, it clearly threatens to attack or oppress its neighbors, then other states are justified in combining together and in making war upon it, so as to prevent it from committing disturbance of the general security of the commonwealth of civilized nations, or of the security and independence of any of them." These are to be accepted, however, with certain limitations: (1.) The internal development of the resources of a country has never been considered a pretext for such an intervention, nor has its acquisition of colonies or dependencies at a distance from Europe. It seems to be held, with respect to the latter, that distant colonies and dependencies weaken, and always render more vulnerable, the metropolitan state. (2.) Although the increase of the wealth and population of a country is the most effectual means by which its power can 'Creasy, "First Platform of International Law," pp. 279, 280, citing De Martens, §§. 122-124. See also La Théorie de l'Equilibre Européenne, by Ernest Nys, vol. xxv. Revue de Droit Int. pp. 34-58; Westlake, pp. 120-122; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. iii. §§ 42-49. Creasy, p. 285; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. iii. §§ 42-50; Lawrence, Int. Law, § 85; Dana's Wheaton, §§ 6368; Klüber, § 42. |