the assumption that every part of the territory upon the American continent formed a part of, or was embraced in, the territorial limits of some then existing state, and that, as a consequence, no territory remained in the western hemisphere which could be made the subject of occupation, or colonization, without invading the territory of a sovereign state. Such an attempt to plant colonies in any portion of the western hemisphere would, therefore, be met and resisted by the state whose territories were invaded, and the European power making the attempt might, or might not, incur the disapprobation, or active opposition, of the United States. The question whether the United States would interfere, or refrain from interference, in a case of attempted colonization, is one which would be determined by that government in accordance with the peculiar circumstances of the case.'

The doctrine has never been interpreted to mean, however, that the United States would lend its aid in every case of dispute between a Spanish American republic and a European state. Nor has it been regarded as a dormant treaty of alliance, to come into operation upon the occurrence of war between an American state and a European power, to which the United States is bound to become a party against its judgment, or in opposition to its will; it is only when something in the nature of coercion has been undertaken, when some attempt has been made on the part of a European power" to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere," or when there has been "interposition for the purpose of oppressing an American republic" that a case calling for interference may be said to arise.

Case of Yucatan. This is illustrated by the case of Yuca

'Two years later, at the suggestion of some of the Spanish American states, a congress was called at Panama to take into consideration the means of carrying the Monroe Doctrine into effect. The United States Government sent two representatives to this con

gress, but declined to commit itself to any particular line of policy, or to accept, in advance, any conclusions which might be adopted, or favored, by the conference.See the Panama Congress of 1826, vol. iv. of the Int. Amer. Conf. of 1890.

tan, in 1848. In his annual message to Congress for that year President Polk announced that the sovereignty of Yucatan had been offered to Great Britain, Spain, and the United States, and recommended that steps be taken to prevent the absorption of Yucatan in the dominions of any European power. No action was taken by Congress looking to the adoption of the policy recommended by the Executive, upon the ground, as stated by Mr. Calhoun, that the case was one to which the Monroe Doctrine did not apply.'

The French Occupation of Mexico. The most striking application of the doctrine, however, is to be found in the resistance offered by the United States to the project of the Emperor Napoleon III. to place Maximilian, an Austrian prince, upon the throne of Mexico. The constitutional government of President Juarez, which had been established by the people of Mexico, refused, in 1861, to recognize the validity of certain debts, contracted in Europe by an insurrectionary government under Miramon, which had been recognized by certain European powers as the de facto government of Mexico. England, France, and Spain, acting in behalf of their subjects, who were creditors of Mexico, agreed to take joint possession of certain Mexican ports, and to collect and apply the revenues to the liquidation of these claims. It was a condition of the undertaking that none of the parties to the agreement should make any acquisitions of territory, or exercise any influence upon the internal affairs of Mexico that was calculated to prejudice the right of the people to choose and constitute freely its form of government.

As soon as the troops landed at Vera Cruz the designs of the French Government became apparent, and England and Spain withdrew. Although the United States was then entering the most critical period of her history, her resources being taxed to their utmost in quelling a rebellion at home, she immediately demanded an explanation of France, and received the assurance that the sole purpose of the invasion was to enforce the settle.

1 Woolsey, § 48; I Dig. Int. Law, §§ 57, 72.

ment of the just claims of French subjects. In 1863, however, as a consequence of the armed intervention of France, Maximilian was placed upon the throne of Mexico, and was supported in that position by the French army of occupation.

The United States continued to recognize the government of President Juarez, and urged France, in the strongest terms, to withdraw her troops from Mexico, but, by reason of her own war, was unable to insist upon their removal. So soon as peace was restored, however, the United States insisted upon the removal of the French army of occupation, and concentrated a large force of troops on the Rio Grande frontier in support of her demand; as a consequence of such insistence, the French troops were withdrawn from Mexico.'

The Venezuelan Boundary. Another illustration of the application of this doctrine is afforded by the recent controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela in respect to a disputed question of boundary between the latter state and British Guiana. The official cause of difference in this case arose more than sixty years ago, and the constant endeavor of Venezuela has been to secure an amicable settlement of the difficulty. Arbitration has been proposed, and the United States has, on several occasions, tendered its good offices, and has urged upon Great Britain the propriety of such a settlement of the controversy, but without result. All attempts to obtain an honorable settlement having failed, Venezuela, in 1887, recalled her minister from London.

Great Britain having subsequently evinced a disposition to enforce her claim to the territory in dispute, correspondence with the British ministry was renewed, and President Cleveland, in his annual message to Congress in 1895, suggested a method by which an amicable settlement of the question could be brought about. This correspondence resulted in the execution of a treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela by which the question of disputed boundary was referred to a board of arbitration and the questions at issue adjusted.

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1 Dig. Int. Law, § 58; III Ibid. § 318.

See also the articles by J. B. Moore, in vol. xxviii. Revue de

IMPERFECT RIGHTS.

Nature and Character. The term "imperfect rights" has already been explained. The distinction between perfect and imperfect rights has chiefly to do with their sanction, or obligatory force, and can be best explained, perhaps, by a comparison with the corresponding provisions of municipal law. A perfect right, from the point of view of municipal law, is one which is enforced by the state; either by the imposition of a penalty for its violation, or by withholding its sanction, or approval, of an act which is not in conformity to its terms. Imperfect rights, on the other hand, are those prescribed by usage, or sanctioned by considerations of politeness, civility, or good-will, and are enforced, or their observance is made general, by the rules of polite society or the requirements of good breeding. The person and property of the citizen, for example, are protected from assault, injury, or spoliation by the enactment and enforcement of appropriate criminal laws; these, therefore, correspond to perfect rights at international law. The obligation to return a salute, or a social visit, or to give a polite answer to a question, is one for which municipal. law fails to provide a sanction; it is a "duty" to return salutes or social visits, but it is a duty which is not enforceable at law; so, too, one who tenders a salute, or makes a social visit, has a "moral claim" to a return of the civility in either case, but he has no cause of action for which the courts of the state will provide a remedy. These last correspond to imperfect rights, or, as they are sometimes properly called, "duties" or "moral claims" at international law.'

Droit International, pp. 301-329; and by Th. Barclay, in vol. xxviii. Ibid. pp. 502-525; Foreign Relations U. S. 1895, pp. 542-546, 14801491; Ibid. 1896, p. 254.

Vattel classifies state rights into internal and external; the latter into perfect and imperfect rights.

The perfect right is that which is accompanied by the right of com

pelling those who refuse to fulfil the correspondent obligation. The perfect obligation is that which gives to the opposite party the right of compulsion; the imperfect gives him only a right to ask."Vattel, prelim. chap. p. Ixii. § 17; liv. ii. chap. i.; Woolsey, §§ 22-25; Hall, § 13 Lawrence, Ínt. Law, § 72; I Halleck, pp. 47, 156,

Imperfect rights are reciprocal in character and are said to rest upon the comity of nations. Although they derive their support from considerations which are rather moral than legal, or political in character, they are none the less obligatory upon states in their intercourse with each other. While, as has been seen, the denial of an imperfect right, or a failure to recognize a moral claim, does not constitute a just cause for war, a state declining to recognize them and to be bound by their requirements in its relations with other states would suffer seriously in reputation as a consequence of such neglect.

The following are some of the more important of these imperfect rights or duties:

(a.) The Duty of Humanity. A state, in the performance of this duty, has chiefly to do with individuals who are obliged to seek shelter in its territory from acts of hostility or from the perils of the sea. The cases of the crews of wrecked vessels, or those of ships-of-war or merchant vessels seeking refuge from a superior force of the enemy, and of bodies of defenceless troops fleeing across a neutral frontier to escape capture, are illustrations of the performance of this duty.

The duty of humanity, however, is not of exclusive application to individuals. "If a nation is suffering under a famine, all others having a quantity of provisions are bound to relieve its distress, yet without thereby exposing themselves to want."1 "The like assistance is due whatever be the calamity by which a nation is afflicted. Whole sections of countries are sometimes devastated by floods, and cities and towns destroyed by fires and earthquakes, leaving vast numbers of people destitute of the means of shelter and subsistence. It is, first, the duty of their own government to provide for these wants; but not infrequently the calamity is so great that the government is unable to give its aid to the extent, and within the time required, to render its aid efficacious. In such cases the laws of humanity would impose a duty on others. In many instances of this kind, however, the active charity of individuals and

9

'I Halleck, p. 406; Vattel, liv. ii. chap. i,