(a.) They have been resorted to, to secure redress for an offence at international law, in cases in which reparation has been demanded, but refused or unnecessarily delayed, and which, in former times, would have given occasion for hostilities amounting to public war.

(b.) There has been a decided difference in the military and naval strength of the states interested, the blockading power being, as a rule, very much stronger in a military sense than the alleged offender; and the blockades have, in general, been resorted to with a view to secure adequate redress without a resort to war.

(c.) The exercise of the right of pacific blockade can affect only the commercial intercourse of the states immediately concerned. This for the reason that the ordinary peaceful relations of other powers with the blockaded ports or coasts, including their commercial intercourse, cannot be interrupted or abridged, without their consent.

(d.) In recent instances of the exercise of the right the tendency has been to regard the practice as a measure of international police, in which several powers have concurred as to the justice of the proceeding and the necessity for its exercise; and the blockade has been raised, or discontinued, and normal commercial relations have been resumed, so soon as reparation has been made by the offending state.

(e.) Although called "blockades" the interruptions to com

land and France, in 1833, at the Dutch ports on the North Sea; by France, in 1838, at the port of Vera Cruz; by France and Great Britain, in the same year at certain ports of the Argentine Republic, a state of affairs which continued for ten years; by Great Britain, in 1850, in the ports of Greece; in 1860 the Neapolitan ports of Sicily were blockaded by a Sardinian fleet, in connection with that of the revolutionists in Naples; in 1862 the port of Rio Janeiro was blockaded by Great Britain; in February, 1879, the coast of Bolivia was blockaded

by Chili; in 1880 the Turkish port of Dulcigno was blockaded by vessels of war representing Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, and Italy. -III Dig. Int. Law, § 364; Lawrence, Int. Law, § 159; Walker, Int. Law, p. 157; Snow, pp. 79, 80; Geffcken, Revue de Droit Int. vol. xix. pp. 377-383; Perels, Ibid. pp. 245, 252, 360; Woolsey, Ibid. 1875, p. 611; Hall, pp. 369–372; II Ferguson, pp. 240, 241; Walker, Manual, pp. 97-107; Woolsey, § 119; vol. xxix. Revue de Droit Int. pp. 474-491; Heffter, § 111; Risley, p. 62: III Calvo, §§ 1832-1859.

merce which have passed by that name have, in fact, been measures of reprisal in the nature of embargoes. If the practice becomes general, the rules regulating the exercise of the right will be assimilated to those controlling reprisals in the nature of embargoes, rather than to those respecting the establishment of blockades, properly so called, in time of public war.1

The latest pacific blockade is that instituted by the United States at Tampico and Vera Cruz on the Mexican coast in 1914; Vera Cruz itself was occupied by a brigade of the United States army and placed under military government. An accompaniment was the generous proposition of mediation on the part of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the A. B. C. Powers.

Under The Hague arbitral organization of 1899-1907, fifteen cases have been determined. In his Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague and The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, Prof. James Brown Scott has given us a classical presentation of The Hague foundation work. The Hague decisions themselves are thoroughly edited in a work prepared by way of memorial (Festgabe) on the occasion of the dedication of The Hague Peace Palace, under the editorship of Prof. Walther Schücking, of Marburg, Das Werk vom Haag, Zweite Serie, die gerichtlichen Entscheidungen; the decisions, also, with compromis and other documents, have been brought together by Professor Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases (Boston, 1915).. In the first decided case, October 14, 1902, brought under the Convention of 1899 (as were

The following resolutions respecting pacific blockades were adopted by the Institute of International Law at its session at Heidelberg in 1887:

(1.) Foreign vessels may enter freely, despite the blockade.

(2.) Pacific blockades are to be officially declared and notified, and

must be maintained by a sufficient force.

(3.) Vessels of the blockading power which do not respect the blockade may be sequestered. The blockade having ceased, they are to be restored to their owners, without compensation of any sort. -Rev. de Droit Int. vol. xix. p. 361.

the three subsequent cases), Mexico was adjudged to pay to the United States $43,050.99 annually in execution of a donation (Pius Fund) made to the Roman Catholic Church in California prior to American possession. The latest case, brought under the Convention of 1907, determined the Netherlands-Portuguese boundary in the island of Timor, one of the Sunda group in the far-eastern Pacific. The case ranking as No. 14 on The Hague docket-seizure on January 25, 1912 (by an Italian torpedo boat) of the French vessel Tavignano and a simultaneous attack on two Tunisian coasting-boats-was at first referred to a Commission of Inquiry, and then to The Hague; it was subsequently adjusted through diplomatic channels.

CHAPTER X

WAR: DECLARATION, EFFECTS, THE RULES OF WAR, MARITIME WAR

"The choler and manhood that you have, score it, in God's name, upon the fronts of your enemies, but stain not the honor of a soldier by outraging unarmed innocence. Live upon your means like soldiers, and not by pilfering and spoiling like highway robbers. This, if you do not, you shall ever be infamous, and I with such help shall never be victorious." -GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

The Right of Redress. As there is no superior authority to which a state can appeal for redress when any of its sovereign rights have been trespassed upon, denied, or impeded in their exercise, it is compelled, as a last resort, to redress its own injury or wrong. This it does by a suspension of all friendly relations with the offending state, and by a resort to such acts of hostility as are authorized by the laws of war. Again, in the performance of its duty of protecting its citizens and their property from acts of domestic violence, a government sometimes finds its ordinary legal machinery inadequate to the purpose, and is compelled to make use of the public armed force in order to compel obedience to the law, to quell insurrection and rebellion, or to enforce respect for its neutral obligations. In one case the state uses force against another state; in the other its force is directed against a portion of its own population and the military operations are carried on within its own territory.

War may therefore be defined as an armed contest between states or parts of states." It is undertaken by one state

'Lawrence, Essays on Modern International Law, p. 178.

"War is defined by Grotius as 'the state or situation of those

who dispute by force of arms" (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, book i. chap. i. par. 2). It is defined by Vattel as that state in which we prose

against another, for the purpose of compelling an offending state to fulfil its obligations as a party to international law. It is undertaken against persons within its territory for the purpose of compelling obedience to its municipal laws. When its object is attained, in either case, war becomes unlawful and must cease.

Rightfulness of War. With the inherent rightfulness of war international law has nothing to do. War exists as a fact of international relations, and, as such, it is accepted and discussed. In defining the law of war, at any time, the attempt is made to formulate its rules and practices, and to secure the general consent of nations to such modifications of its usages as will tend towards greater humanity, or will shorten its duration, restrict its operations, and hasten the return of peace and the restoration of the belligerent states to their normal relations.'

Causes of War. Although it falls within the province of international law to determine how war between civilized states shall be carried on, and with what formalities it shall begin and end, it is impossible to deduce from the history of international relations any precise rule for determining what fact, or facts, shall constitute a just cause for war. It has been said that a perfect right of a sovereign state can be invaded, or denied, only at the risk of war, and, in so far as international law is concerned, a state is legally justified in regarding the denial of such a right as a sufficient cause for war. The question of

cute our right by force" (Vattel, Law of Nations, book iii. chap. i. §1). It is defined by Bynkershoek as “a contest carried on between independent persons for the sake of asserting their rights" (Bynkershoek, Law of War, p. 128); by Wheaton as "a contest by force between independent sovereign states" (Wheaton, part iv. chap. i. § 6). "Every contention by force between two nations in external matters,under the authority of their respective governments, is not only

war, but public war."-Bas vs. Tingy, 4 Dallas, 37: Creasy, pp. 360, 361; Field, Int. Code, 467-469; II Ferguson, §§ 169–172; III Phillimore, p. 77; Woolsey, §§ 114, 115; Boyd's Wheaton, $ 290; Risley, p. 67; II Twiss, pp. 43-49; Lawrence, $155: IV Calvo, §§ 1860-1865.

I Halleck, pp. 439, 440; Boyd's Wheaton, § 290; Snow, pp. 82, 83; Risley, pp. 68, 69; II Twiss, pp. 54, 55; Creasy, pp. 361-367; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. i. §§ 3. 4; III Phillimore, pp. 54-84; Woolsey, § 116.