ion; and it might, therefore, well be questioned whether it could be nsidered as foreign to any one State or Territory. The practice, hower, seems to be settled to admit the authority of letters testamentary in demands on the government, in whatsoever State or Territory such int may have been made. And this point being settled, I do not think it the government has any authority to look beyond the letters testantary into the propriety of the grant, unless in a case of manifest ud. Whatever, therefore, we might be disposed to think of the sufficiency insufficiency of the proof by which the lost will of Scan was set up, it has been set up by the competent and regular tribunal, and adnistration granted under it, I think that such grant must be respected, the administrator regarded as rightfully in the possession of his thority. The documents are returned. I remain, sir, with very great respect, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. WM. WIRT. THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GEORGIA. ere is no law which renders the decision of the circuit court of Georgia, upon a claim of he marshal of that State for supporting negroes taken from a vessel brought in for adjudiation under the laws prohibiting the slave-trade, binding on the Executive department, so s to make it the duty of that department to pass an account which it considers unreasonble and unjust. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY General, SIR: I received yesterday your letter of the 29th instant, with its acmpanying documents, to wit: the copy of a record from the circuit urt of Georgia, presenting a claim of the marshal of that State for the pport of negroes, constituting the cargo of the Spanish vessel Ramirez, id brought in for adjudication under our laws prohibiting the slave trade; d the draught of a report on the merits of that claim, prepared by you, be submitted to the President. The question which you submit for y opinion is, whether there be any law of the United States which enders the decision of the circuit court on that claim binding on this overnment, so as to make it the duty of the Executive to pass an account hich it considers unreasonable and unjust? In reply to which, I have e honor to state that there is no such law. The 4th section of the act f the 8th May, 1792, for regulating processes, &c., (2d vol. Laws U. S., age 301,) does not reach the case; and the 2d section of the act of the id March, 1819, in addition to the acts prohibiting the slave trade,' under which act I understand the proceedings in this case to be going n,) seems to place the support of the slaves under the peculiar direction of the President. I have the honor to remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient WM. WIRT. servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMPTROLLER. The President cannot interpose in the settlement of accounts before the Comptroller, and require that officer to allow a credit to an individual in the settlement of his accounts. SIR: The petition of Joshua Wingate prays that you will direct the Comptroller of the Treasury to allow him a credit in the settlement o his accounts for his proportion of a fine incurred by one Phineas Varney for which suit was instituted by the petitioner, as collector of the distric of Bath, Maine; judgment obtained in May, 1809; the defendant arrested and committed to jail under execution on that judgment; and the fin afterwards remitted by the President. He contends that the Presiden had no constitutional or legal power to remit his proportion of the fine the right to which had vested by the institution of the suit. I presum that it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon the correctness of thi position: 1. Because, if it be correct, the act of remission by the Presi dent being wholly inoperative as to that portion of the fine claimed by the collector, his legal right to recover it remained in full force, notwith standing the remission; and it is his own fault if he has not enforce his right at law. 2. If his position be wrong, and the remission acte upon the whole fine, the act of remission has done him no injury 3. Whether his position be right or wrong, my opinion is, that the Presi dent has no right to interpose in the settlement of accounts, for the reasons detailed at large in my opinion in the case of Major Wheaton, o the 20th October last. I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedien servant, To the PRESIDENT OF THE United StaATES. WM. WIRT. SURETIES OF AN OFFICER APPOINTED DURING A RECESS. The Supreme Court having decided that the sureties of a collector of taxes and duties ar pointed during a recess of the Senate are bound only for acts done under the President' commission, the opinion heretofore given by the Attorney General is reconsidered, and the decision of the court formally communicated. The subsequent nomination to and confirmation by the Senate of an appointee during a reces is not a continuation of the first commission, but is a new appointment, and requires a nev bond for the performance of its duties. Where an officer appointed by the President during a recess of the Senate falls in arrear with the government during his first commission, but after his nomination to and confirmation by the Senate makes payments into the treasury, yet continues in arrear for current dues to the government, for which a suit is brought, it is competent for the jury to apply the pay ments in exoneration of the balances for which the sureties under the first commission wer bound. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: The Supreme Court decided a case yesterday, in which certain principles were established that may affect the interests of the United States in relation to other individuals, and may require measures to be immediately taken to guard against extensive mischief. In a case against Kirkpatrick and others, sureties of Samuel M. Read, leceased, a collector of direct taxes and internal duties in the 18th colection district of Pennsylvania, it has been settled by the Supreme Court, hat when an official bond with surety has been given on an appointment ade by the President in the recess of the Senate, the sureties are bound nly for acts done under the President's commission, that is-till the end f the next session of the Senate, and no longer; and that, although the ime person shall be nominated to the Senate, and appointed by them, at this is not a confirmation and continuation of the first commission; ut that a new commission, issued by and with the advice and consent of le Senate, is an original and separate commission, with which the surees on the former bond have no manner of connexion, nor with the acts f the oflice done under it. They have decided also, in the same case, that where an officer circumanced as Read was has gone on to make quarterly payments, leaving, evertheless, a balance against him at the end of every quarter, it is cometent in the jury to apply the subsequent payments in exoneration of the alances for which the sureties stand bound. Read was appointed in the ecess of the Senate, and on the 4th December gave bond, with surety, he condition of which referred to his commission and appointment by the 'resident, and that commission was on its face to continue (as usual in uch cases) until the end of the next session of the Senate. He was ominated to the Senate at its next session; was appointed by them; and n the 24th January, 1814, received a new commission, by and with the dvice and consent of the Senate. No new bond was taken from him inder this new commission. He went on to act till 1818. Balances vere found against him at the end of every quarter; these balances were ransferred at the end of every quarter to the account of the next quarter, he delinquencies added to it, and the payment for the new quarter delucted from the aggregate amount. The court decided that, although when a debtor made general payments, without directing the application, it was competent to the creditor to make the application, yet this privilege in behalf of the creditor ceased on the institution of suit; at least that the application made of these payments by the United States was no discriminating application to any especial balance; and that in this case, therefore, it was competent to the jury to apply the payments to any balance that might have arisen against the collector for the twenty-four days during which alone they held the collector's sureties liable under this bond; because the laws laying the taxes of duties took effect only on the 1st January, 1814, and on the 24th day of that month the commission, under which alone the sureties were bound, was superseded by the new commission, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, under which the sureties were not bound. I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 27 WM. WIRT. CASE OF THE LATE COLLECTOR AT SAVANNAH. The late collector at Savannah being indebted to the government, and the amount of such in debtedness being reported by the district attorney below that standing against him on the treasury books, an action at law should be brought against him for the apparent balance due the government. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, March 31, 1824. SIR: I have examined with attention the documents transmitted from your department, by direction of the President, in relation to the case of A. S. Bullock, late collector of Savannah, for the purpose of obtaining my opinion whether it be necessary and proper to bring a suit in order to investigate and recover any sum that may be found legally due from the collector by the decision of the court. The sum reported by Mr. Habersham, the district attorney of Georgia, being avowedly founded on an imperfect view of the case, from his want of many documents material to a full and conclusive settlement, and that sum being, in the estimation of the Comptroller, below the sum probably due from Mr. Bullock-certainly far below the sum appearing due from him on the treasury books—I can see no other course which can be pursued, consistently with justice either to the government or to Mr. Bullock, but that which you have suggested in your letter to the President of the 24th February last, to wit: the institution of an action at law against Mr. Bullock for the apparent balance; on the trial of which he will be allowed all credits which have been refused at the Treasury Department, and which he can support by satisfactory proof. I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, WM. WIRT. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. SALES OF PUBLIC LANDS IN OHIO. It is competent for the Secretary of the Treasury to deduct the expenses of surveys of the lands of the United States lying within the State of Ohio, before computing the three per cent. to which that State is entitled under the act of 3d March, 1803, and to calculate the per centage for Ohio on the balance. Although the act of 3d March, 1803, was the affirmance of a compact between the United States and the State of Ohio, it must have been within the contemplation of the contracting parties at the time, that Congress should retain the power of regulating the terms of the sales to be made. Compacts are to be construed in reference to the subject-matter and the nature of the cases on which they are to operate. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SIR: I have, according to your directions, examined the report of a committee of the legislature of Ohio, appointed to examine into the state of the three per cent. fund, and complaining of a decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, by which the expenses of surveying the public lands are deducted from the amount of sales, and the three per cent. calculated on the net balance then remaining. The facts are these: By the act of the 3d March, 1803, it is enacted, "that the Secretary of the Treasury shall, from time to time, and when ver the quarterly accounts of the receivers of public moneys of the seveal land offices shall be settled, pay three per cent. of the net proceeds of he lands of the United States lying within the State of Ohio, which, since he 30th of June last, have been, or hereafter may be, sold by the United itates, after deducting all expenses incidental to the same, to such person r persons as may be authorized by the legislature of the said State to eceive the same," &c. At the date of the passage of this law, the legisative regulations then in force for the sale of the public lands charged the xpenses of surveying on the purchaser; but, by the act of the 26th March, 804, it was enacted that "the fees payable by former laws for surveying xpenses, shall, after the first day of July next, be no longer demandable rom, and paid by, the purchaser;" so that, after this last law, the surveyng expenses fell on the United States. The question is, whether, after the passage of the act of the 26th March, 804, the surveying expenses are to be deducted from the amount of sales, nd the three per cent. to be paid to Ohio is to be calculated on what will emain after such deduction? or whether the three per cent. is to be calulated on the amount of sales, without such deduction? The Secretary of the Treasury has adopted the former opinion; the reort of the committee of Ohio adopts the latter. The report vindicates this atter opinion, on the ground that the act of the 3d March, 1803, is a comact between the United States and the State of Ohio; that this compact vas founded on the state of things existing at the time; that, according to he state of things existing at that time, the expenses of surveying constiuted no charge upon the funds on which the three per cent. was to be calulated; that neither of the parties to the compact can change the terms of t without the consent of the other party; that the act of the 26th March, 804, exempting the purchasers from the payments of the expenses of surreying, was the act of the United States, one of the parties to the compact only, which can have no effect on the other party; and, consequently, that he State of Ohio has the right to insist that the three per cent. shall be calculated now, as it was calculated at the date of the compact-to wit, on the amount of sales, without deducting the expenses of surveying. That the act of the 3d March, 1803, was a compact, or the affirmance of a compact, between the United States and the State of Ohio, seems to be unquestionable; and the argument is conclusive, if the other proposition on which it rests be true-that this compact was founded on the existing state of things, and contemplated that this state of things should remain immutable. But if, on the other hand, it was within the contemplation of the contracting parties at the time, that the power to regulate the terms of sale should remain in Congress, then the parties will be considered as contracting with reference to the exercise of this continuing power, and its exercise can work no breach of the contract. On the supposition that the existing state of things was to remain immutable, so far as this compact was concerned, then Congress had no power to introduce any change into the existing regulations for the sale of the public lands in Ohio. If, for example, the organization of the offices engaged in those sales should have been found so wholly insufficient as to put a total stop to those sales, Congress could not introduce another system somewhat more expensive, without a violation of the compact with Ohio. So, again, at the time of the compact the minimum price of the public lands was two dollars per |