induce us to depart from the meaning of the terms used, and give them a construction more limited and narrow than the language of the law imports. The law was passed in the midst of the Indian hostilities, when, from the character of the enemy and the distance of the scene of action, it was well understood that the neighboring States and Territories might find it necessary for their own safety to act without waiting for the previous sanction of the general government; and the danger might pass away, and the militia return to their homes, before the proper officer of the general government could either approve or disapprove of what had been done. If, however, the President now deems the circumstances to have been such as to justify the measures of defence taken by the States and Territory above mentioned, he would unquestionably have given them his sanction in advance, if an opportunity had been afforded him. There could be no just reason to induce Congress to provide for payment in the one case, and to refuse it in the other. And if the language of the law were ambiguous in this particular, I should infer, from the circumstances under which it was passed, that Congress intended to provide for the payment of the militia properly called out upon the sudden exigency by the State or Territorial authority. Certainly there is nothing in the circunstances and occasion that should induce us to narrow the meaning of the words used by the legislature. 99.66 The policy of the government, also, as indicated by former laws, corresponds with the construction I have given. The act of April 5, 1832, section 2, provides for the payment of militia "called out by competent authority,' or received into the service of the United States, by a general officer of the United States army." The payment authorized by this law was not confined to militia called out, in the cases there mentioned, by the competent authority of the United States; but extended to militia called out by any competent authority, and embraced those who were called out by a State when in imminent danger of invasion, and therefore authorized to make war in its own defence. The act of April 20, 1818, (vol. 6, p. 315,) still more clearly shows the usual policy of the general government in this particular; for, by this law, the payment of militia called out by State or Territorial authority 1s, in express terms, provided for in cases where such calls had been, or should be approved by the President. It does not require that they should be actually received into the service of the United States, or that the President should have given his sanction to the call before it was made by the State or Territory. And it manifests, in plain words, the policy which I suppose to have governed Congress in passing the law on which you have asked my opinion. Looking, therefore, for the meaning of the legislature to the words used in the act of Congress, to the circumstances under which it was passed, and to the usual policy of the general government in such cases, I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the construction which I have given to it, as above stated. To the SECRETARY OF WAR. R. B. TANEY. PENSIONS. The first section of the pension act of June 7, 1832, embraces all surviving officers, musicians soldiers, and Indian spies, who served in the continental line, State troops, volunteers, and militia, irrespective of their places of residence, except foreigners, who held commissions in the American army. If an applicant has served in different grades for a time sufficient to entitle him to a pension, it must be graduated by the respective terms of service in each grade. The act of July 14, 1832, does nothing more than repeal the law of March 3, 1819, whereby the necessity of adducing proofs of continued disability is dispensed with; it does not restore to the pension roll any one who had been dropped from it. It is not obligatory on the Secretary of War to issue new pension certificates where the parties have pledged them for debt, and creditors refuse to deliver them without payment. The law does not require them in such cases to be renewed; nor ought the refusal of creditors to redeliver certificates to pensioners to prevent the payment of such pensions. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, October 27, 1832. SIR: I proceed to state my opinion upon the several questions you have proposed to me, on the construction of certain acts of Congress relating to pensions. 1. The act of June 7, 1832, granting pensions for revolutionary services, is not confined to resident American citizens. The 1st section gives the pension to "each of the surviving officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, soldiers, and Indian spies, who served in the continental line, or State troops, volunteers, or militia," for the periods of time mentioned in the law; and the only persons excepted from the general description given in the 1st section are the foreign officers mentioned in the 3d section. The words "foreign officers" were used in the proceedings of the old Congress to designate the foreigners who held commissions in the American army; and they must, I presume, be regarded as used in the same sense in the law before me. They are the only persons excepted from the benefit of the law; and all other persons, whether residents or not residents of the United States, who are embraced by the description contained in the 1st section, are entitled to avail themselves of its pro visions. 2. If an applicant has served in different grades for a time sufficient to entitle him to a pension, it must be graduated by the respective terms of service in each grade. His pension is to be "according to his rank"that is, according to the rank in which the service was rendered; not according to the rank he may have held at the termination of the service: for it might happen that, in the latter, he had served only a few days. And the service for which the law intends to remunerate him, is the service he performed during the prescribed period of time; and it measures the compensation by the rank in which the service was rendered. 3. The act of July 14, 1832, does nothing more than repeal the law of March 3, 1819; and thereby dispenses with the necessity of adducing the proofs of continued disability. It does not restore to the pension-roll any one who had been dropped from it, but authorizes the payment to those who were then on the list of pensioners. The latter would have been entitled to receive their pensions upon adducing proof of disability only, without offering the other evidence which was necessary upon the original application for the pension; and the repealing law merely dispenses with the proof of disability, and allows those who were at that time recognised as pensioners to receive payment without it; but it does not restore pensions to persons who, by former omission of the required proof, had lost the character of pensioners, and were no longer acknowledged to be such by the competent authority. 4. It is not obligatory on the Secretary of War to issue a new pension certificate, where the party has pledged it for a debt, and the creditor refuses to deliver it without payment. The law does not require the certificate in such a case to be renewed; and there are many obvious and weighty objections, which will readily occur to you, against renewals of the certificate in such cases. But, as the law intended to prevent the pensioner from selling or mortgaging his pension, it would defeat its ob. vious policy, if the creditor, by withholding the certificate, could deprive the party of his pension, and thereby compel him to appropriate a part of it to the payment of his debt. The act of the creditor, therefore, ought not to prevent the payment of the pension; and if satisfactory proof is offered that the certificate is in the hands of the creditor, or any other person, and that it has been demanded by the pensioner, and the delivery refused; and if sufficient evidence is also adduced of the identity of the applicant for the pension, I think he is entitled to payment without the production of the certificate. The analogies in law, in the instances of deeds, or other instruments, which are out of the reach of the party, and which it is not in his power to produce, justify the admission of such evidence in this case; and, in my opinion, it ought to be received and deemed sufficient to entitle him to payment. To the SECRETARY OF WAR. R. B. TANEY. GRADUATION OF STREETS IN WASHINGTON. The power to graduate the streets in the city of Washington resides in the corporation, not in the Commissioner of Public Buildings, and can be exercised only under its authority. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: In the case presented by the Commissioner of the Public Buildings, I beg leave respectfully to report that, in my opinion, the corporation of the city of Washington possess the power to establish the grade of the streets, under the act of May 15, 1820. The location of the streets, avenues, &c., was fixed by the plan of the city; and when the power was afterwards conferred on the corporation to open and keep them in repair, the power of graduation appears to me to be necessarily implied in the power given. This construction of the charter to the city is confirmed by the 15th section of the act of incorporation above-mentioned; for, in this section, the person appointed to superintend the United States disbursements in the city of Washington is directed to reimburse the corporation a just proportion of the expense that might thereafter be incurred "in laying open, paving, or otherwise improving" any of the streets or avenues in front of or adjoining to, or which may pass through or between, any of the public squares or reservations. The language of this section obviously indicates that the "laying open, paving, or otherwise improving" any of the streets, was to be done by the corporation, and the expenses thereto incident were to be incurred by them in the first instance, and to be reimbursed by the United States. And the words "otherwise improving," in this section, include grading, and show that the power to grade was supposed and intended to have been given to the corporation. Indeed, the power to pave would seem to carry with it the power to grade; for it is impossible to execute the one without having power over the other. Entertaining this view of the subject, I think the Commissioner of the Public Buildings is not authorized to establish the graduation of the streets, &c.; but that the power resides in the corporation, and can be exercised only under their authority. To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. R B. TANEY. PENSIONS TO DISABLED OFFICERS, &c. The word "disabled" in the act of Congress of April 23, 1800, means any degree of personal disability which renders the individual less able to provide for his subsistence. The act of July 10, 1832, devolved upon the Secretary of the Navy the duty of deciding whether the disability is such as to entitle applicants to admission on the roll of navy pensioners, and what amount they shall receive. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: In the case of Captain Duncan, the question appears to me to turn on the meaning of the word "disabled," in the act of Congress of April 23, 1800. Does it mean that the officer, seaman, or marine, must be dis abled from performing the duties of his station before he can receive a pension? or does it mean any degree of personal disability which renders him less able to provide for his subsistence? I think the latter interpretation of the word "disabled" is most consonant to the spirit and object of the law; and, indeed, it is the only one consistent with that provision in the statute which directs that the pension shall be graduated according to the nature and degree of his disability," not exceeding one-half of his monthly pay. The act of 1804, March 26, gave to the commissioners of the navy pension fund the power to make such regulations as they might deem expedient for the admission of persons on the roll of navy pensioners. Under the law, the commissioners had the power to define what extent of injury would constitute a disability within the meaning of the law, and to prescribe the rules by which the amount of pensions should be regu. lated in different degrees of disability. For example: a wound might have diminished the strength of a limb, without having in any degree impaired the capacity of the officer to discharge the duties of his station, or subjected him to any additional expense in the performance of his duties. Or, while it left him fully competent to discharge the duties of his station, it might still subject him to additional expense, by rendering the assistance of others necessary in performing those offices about his person, which, before the injury, he could perform for himself. Or the wound might be such as to disable him altogether from performing the duties of his station, and thereby compel him to leave the service. In the first of these cases, it would have rested with the commissioners to decide whether the party was entitled to any pension while he continued in service, inasmuch as the injury did not diminish his means of subsistence. In the second case, it would have rested with them to graduate his pension between the lowest and highest sum, having reference to the additional burdens to which his ordinary pay and emoluments were subject by reason of his wound, and having regard also to any other circumstances which the commissioners might deem it just to consider in determining on the amount to be allowed. And, in the third case, the highest amount would seem to be the sum contemplated by law. As Captain Duncan is still in service, and fully competent to discharge the duties of his station, his case comes within either the first or second classes above stated. And as all the powers and duties of the commissioners of the navy pension fund have, by the act of July 10, 1832, been devolved upon the Secretary of the Navy, I think it now rests exclusively with yourself to decide upon the principles above stated, and the facts which are in evidence before you, whether Captain Duncan is entitled to admission on the roll of navy pensioners; and if he is so entitled, for what amount of pension. I have not thought it necessary to refer in this opinion particularly to the provisions of the act of April 16, 1816, because it provides for a peeuliar class of cases, differing altogether from that of Captain Duncan. R. B. TANEY. To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. APPEALS FROM ACCOUNTING OFFICERS. An appeal does not lie to the President from the decision of accounting officers, acting in the sphere of their duties; nor can the President interfere with their decisions.-(See opinion of April 5th, in case of General Taylor.) ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: In the case of Mr. Hogan, which you referred to me in July last, with directions to report my opinion on it by the 1st of October, I have the honor to state that Mr. Hogan requested me to delay acting on the case until he could have an opportunity of communicating with me on the subject. And conceiving it to be my duty to hear any thing he might desire to allege in his behalf before I formed an opinion, I forbore to examine the papers until he requested me to proceed. Mr. Hogan having now expressed his desire that I should act on the case without further delay, I have read the papers referred to me, and find that he has appealed to you from certain decisions given by the accounting officers in the settlement of his accounts; and that he seeks to obtain, through your interposition, and by your order, the allowance of certain claims against the United States, which the accounting officers have disallowed. In this state of things, the first question to be decided is, whether an appeal will lie to the President in such a case-whether you can legally interfere with the decisions which have been given. The same question was presented in General Taylor's case, in April last; and the subject at |