HOPKINS,

AND

OTHERS.

This same writer, however, all men a natural conscience, unimpaired by the fall, which enables them to judge between right and wrong. Emmons, Ser. 8. "If we were not capable of judging of his treatment of us, we should not be the proper subjects of his moral government."

says, when speaking of infants, "persons may be moral agents, and sin without knowing what the law of God is, or of what nature their exercises are; and while they have no conscious ness that they are wrong."

Syst. Vol. 1. p. 339.

3. Natural inability, however produced, releases the subject of it from moral obligation.† Syst, Vol. 1. p. 341. et passim.

M. M. Mag. Vol. 3. p. 347.

3. "If men were not moral agents, or were destitute of natural ability to keep the divine commands, they would be incapable of moral action. It is not possible for men to be disobedient, except they have the natural ability to be obedient. For the commands of God never exceed the natural ability of man."*

Spring's Disquisitions, p. 11.

* See note B. at the end of this chapter.

t "It is not of creation but of the corruption of nature that men being made bond-slaves to sin, can will nothing but evil. From whence cometh this want of power which the wicked would gladly pretend, but upon this, that Adam of his own accord made himself subject to the tyranny of the Devil? Hereupon, therefore, grew the corruption, with the bonds whereof we are holden fast tied, for that the first man fell from his Creator." Inst. B. 2. ch. 5. sec. 1. The Calvinists say, that although man has lost his power to obey, yet God has not lost his right to command; any more, than a creditor loses his right to demand payment and hold the written obliga tion, because the voluptuous debtor has actually become a bankrupt, and has not a dollar in the world.

In opposition to this representation, Dr. Smalley, who is very far from yielding assent to all the extravagant notions of Dr. Emmons, but who does not accord with Calvin, says, "it is to be observed for clearing up this

"Wherefore let this proportion of our strength with the commandments of God's law be no more enforced, as if the Lord had measured the rule of justice, which he purposed to give in his law, according to the rate of our weakness." "The Lord commandeth those things that we cannot do, that we may know what we ought to ask of him." "Faith obtaineth that which the la commandeth, yea, the law therefore commandeth that faith may obtain that which was commanded by the law." "Again let God give what he commandeth, and command what he will."

B. 2. ch. 5. sec. 7.

4. Before the fall man had, not merely the capability of béing the subject of volitions, but the power of choice, in relation to both good and evil.

Since the fall man has the power of willing evil only, until God by the supernatural

OTHERS.

4. "Man by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good."

Before the fall he had power to will and to do both good and evil. Since the fall he has only the power of willing and doing evil, until he is enabled by grace. Say. Plat. Con. C. Scot. and Con. P. C. U. S. ch. 9.sec. 1, 2, 3, 4. Also, Con. R. D. C. Art. 14. The same doctrines are taught in the Confessions of England, France, Helvetia, Basil, Bohemia, Belgia, and Aus-` purge.

subject, that there are two very different kinds of inability; so different that the one, however great, does not lessen moral obligation in the least; where, as the other, so far as it obtains, destroys obligation, and takes away all desert of blame and punishment entirely. These two kinds of inability, as I hinted, have commonly been distinguished, by calling one a natural, and the other a moral inability. Which distinction may be briefly stated thus : Moral inability consists only in the want of a heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing. Natural inability, on the other hand, consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or whatever may prevent, our doing a thing, when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed and inclined to do it. Or in fewer words, thus: whatever a mar

HOPKINS,

Moral action consists in voluntary exercises, or choice. Whoever has choice, without any reference to the cause or efficient agent of that choice, is a moral agent. Herein consists man's freedom that his choice is a choice; or his will is a will. Although he be not the cause, original mover, or efficient agent of the choice, yet it is his, being produced in him. Syst. Vol. 1. ch. 4.

4. "A moral action is an exercise of the will, or heart of man. For the heart of man is' the only source of moral exercise. It is the heart of man which God requires; and with the heart we obey or disobey the divine commands." "In other words, a moral action is a volition of a moral agent; and not any animal, intellectual, visible or external motion. For the law of God, which is the only standard of moral exercise, requires the heart."

Spring's Disquisitions, p. 54. "The heart consists in volun→ tary exercises; and voluntary exercises are moral agency."

Emmons, p. 337.

could not do, if he would, in this, he is under a natural inability; but when all the reason why one cannot do a thing, is because he does not choose to do it, the inability is only of a moral nature."

"Some account for God's suspending our salvation upon impossible conditions, and condemning men for not doing what it is not in their power to do, by observing, that we lost our power by the fall. Our present weakness and blindness was brought upon us as a righteous punishment for the disobedience of Adam; and God, they say, has not lost his right to command, because man by his own folly and sin, has lost his ability to obey. That is, we ought, it is our present real duty to exert, not only all the strength we actually have but all we should have had, had it not been for the original apostacy. But to this it will be objected, that we never reason and judge in this manner, in any other case. We do not think those who have lost their eyes, are still to blame for not seeing; or those who have lost their reason for not understanding."

.66

"It must, I think, be granted, that we do generally suppose a man's present duty cannot exceed his present strength, suppose it to have been impaired by what means it will." Smalley on moral inability, Ser. 1.

God, say the opposers of this last representation, has not suspended man's salvation upon any condition which he can, or ever will perform. The atonement is the only condition on which is suspended the sinner's sal

CALVIN,

influences of his spirit, gives

him ability to choose good.

AND

OTHERS..

5. Holiness consists in en

tire conformity to the image of

B. 1. ch. 15. sec. 8. B. 2. ch. 2. God. Larger Cat. Q. 17. and sec. 6,7, and 8.

5. 6. and 7. Whatever constituted that image of God, which Adam possessed before the fall is called holiness. B.

3. ch. 3. sec. 9. This is not restored to us at once. Ibid. Sin is any want of conformity to, or opposition of the will of God; and does not always imply advised malice and frowardness. .B. 2. ch. 2. sec. 25. "There never was any work of a godly man, which if it be examined by the strict judgment of God, but will be condemn

Con. C. Scot. Con. P. C. U.S.

Say. Plat. ch. 4. sec. 2. " Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God." Larger Cat. Q. 24. Shorter, Q. 14. Sin is either original or actual. Larger Cat. Q. 25. Shorter, Q. 17 and 18.

6. Every action of an unrenewed man is entirely sinful; and the best actions of a believer, "are defiled and mixed with so much weakness and imperfection, that they cannot endure the severity of God's judgment."

Con. C. Scot. Con. P. C. U. S. Say. Plat. ch. 16. sec. 7 and 5. "We can do no work but what is polluted by our flesh, and also punishable." Con. R. D. C. Art. 24.

ed." B. 3. ch. 14. sec. 11. "The best work that can be brought forth by them, is alway sprinkled and corrupted with some uncleanness of the flesh, and hath as it were some dregs mingled with it." B. 3. ch. 14. sec. 9. and B. 4. generated person is this; he is a sinner by nature and practice: of a saint this; he is a sinner saved by grace, whose very

ch. 15. sec. 10.

The natural man is wholly corrupted in all the faculties of

7. The character of an unre

vation. It is God who gives the principle, the ability, the exercise of faith and promises that those who receive this gift, who believe, who are made alive, shall be saved.

Fallen man has the power of sinning, and for the exercise of it, he will be punished; while it still remains true, that grace alone gives the ability to please God." Can the Ethiopian change his skin? or the leopard, his spots ? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil." "Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." "Can the fig-tree bear olive berries?"

Syst. Vol. 1. Part 1. ch. 4. the same volition? If this is and Part 2. ch. 4.

not demonstration, I will thank Mr. T. to point out the fallacy." Spring's Disquisitions, p. 179,

* "As the law requires love, and nothing but love, it may be determined with great certainty that sin consists in that which is contrary to that love which the law requires, be it what it may. There can be no neutral moral exercises, which are neither conformable to the law of God, nor contrary to it; therefore every exercise of the heart of a moral agent, which is not agreeable to the law of God, is contrary and opposed to it. It must also be observed, and kept in mind, that sin, as does holiness, consists in the motions or exercises of the heart or will, and in nothing else. Where there is* no exercises of heart, nothing of the nature of moral inclination, will or choice, there can be neither sin nor holiness." Syst. Vol. I. p. 344. Of course, it is as suitable to speak of a sinful horse, as of a sinful human nature, or of the criminality of wanting original righteousness,

*

Hopkins' System abounds with such violations of the laws of the English language, for which the writer of the Contrast is not accountable.