would comply with the statute, which could cities not to exceed 5,000 population with a not have been intended. Cities and towns of certain capital stock, and in all cities, vilcertain population necessarily refer to in- lages, or incorporated towns of not to exceed corporated cities and towns, and the natural 10,000 population with a greater capital presumption is that in adding villages refer- stock, but made no provision whatever for ence was made to incorporated villages. The the organization of banks in places of a word "village" has different meanings, and greater population than 10,000. Charles A. the sense in which it is employed must be Dupee and others filed a petition in this court determined from other sources than diction- for a writ of mandamus against the auditor ary definitions. In Hebert v. Lavalle, 27 Ill. of public accounts to compel him to issue a 448, where the question was as to the right permit to organize a bank in Chicago. The to the use of the "commons" under ancient auditor refused upon two grounds: First, grants by the French, English, and colonial that the act did not apply to cities having governments, it was held that the commons a greater population than 10,000; and, secwere made appurtenant to the village lots, and ond, that the provision of the act in regard to a village was defined as "any small assem- the liability of stockholders was unconstitublage of houses occupied by artisans, labor- tional. The court held that neither reason ing people and farmers-in French villages, was sufficient and awarded the writ. Dupee also by farmers." In Toledo, Wabash & v. Swigert, 127 Ill. 494, 21 N. E. 622. Counsel Western Railway Co. v. Spangler, 71 Ill. 568, for relators say that the decision in that case where the question was whether the railway led to the amendment of the act, which is un; company was compelled by the statute to doubtedly true, but the decision of the court fence its road and make suitable cattle did not cause the omission of the word "inguards at a highway crossing in a village, it corporated" in the act as amended. Counsel was decided that a railroad station where understand that the court declared section 11 there was a station house, warehouse, one to be in violation of the Constitution, but that store, a blacksmith shop, post office and five is a misapprehension. Mr. Justice Magruder or six dwelling houses, was a village. In one in his opinion declared that the classification, case the meaning was determined by the whether of banks or of towns, cities, or vilsense in which the word was used in the an- lages, was unconstitutional, but four justices cient grants, and in the other from the appar- dissented from that conclusion and it was not ent legislative intention concerning the par- the opinion of the court. Mr. Chief Justice ticular subject. It cannot be said that the Craig and Mr. Justice Shope dissented generLegislature intended to provide for the loca- ally, and Mr. Justice Bailey dissented as to tion of banks at such places as Sangamon that proposition, although he concurred in Switch or Sangamon Station because that the conclusion that the general intent of the place was regarded as a village in determin-act was to permit the organization of banks ing whether the railroad company was oblig-in cities having a population of more than ed to fence its track. The banking business 10,000. Mr. Justice Baker concurred in the is one that in its nature and uses is connect- dissenting opinion. The opinion of Mr. Jused with places of reasonable population, and tice Magruder and the two justices who did while the Banking Act prescribes the maxi- not dissent was that any classification whatmum population and no minimum, the Cities ever was purely arbitrary and had no foundaand Villages Act fixes a minimum of 300 in- tion in reason, and that the only sort of act habitants for the organization of a village, that would be constitutional would be one and if incorporated villages were intended that contained no classification and would there was no necessity for fixing the mini-permit the organization of a bank at any mum. If incorporated villages were not intended, banks could be located at any locality where there is a collection of a few houses, which would not correspond with the uses of banks or the banking business. A very forcible reason for limiting the meaning of the act to incorporated villages is found in the provisions concerning population, which imply some lawful and legitimate means of ascertaining population, which in the case of an incorporated village is shown by the federal census, of which the courts take judicial notice, while an unincorporated village has no specified boundaries and there is no official method of determining the number of inhabitants.

Counsel for relators draw an inference in favor of their position from the history of the legislation on the subject. The Banking Act enacted in 1887 provided for organization of banks in incorporated towns, villages, or

place in the state with any capital, regardless of whether there were any inhabitants there or not. The opinion concurred in by the majority of the court was that the general scope and purpose of the act permitted the organization of a bank in a city of more than 10,000 inhabitants, although no provision was, in terms, made therefor. The statute as amended retained a classification for localities and added a provision for the organization of banks in cities or towns of 50,000 inhabitants or more, which was the evident purpose of the amendment. The decision in that case illustrates the necessity of determining the legislative intention by the scope and purpose of the act.

[2] It is true that where a statute is amended and a part omitted there is a presumption of an intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal the omitted provision, but that presumption ought not to prevail as

against the manifest intention of the whole act. The omission of the word "incorporated" in the amended act is of very little significance in this case, because in the original act, while the first words of the section referred to incorporated towns, villages, or cities of a certain population, the further provision in the same sentence related to "all cities, villages or incorporated towns," with a greater limitation of population. In the later provision, while the word "town" was qualified by the word "incorporated," the language embraced all cities and villages, without qualification. The amendment was not induced by the opinion of the court in the case referred to so far as any limitation to incorporated villages is concerned, and it did not conform in any particular to the opinion of the minority of the court. Considering the nature of the banking business and the requirements of the public for banks, and all the reasons we have stated, we conclude that the legislative intention was to confine the organization of banks to incorporated cities, towns, and villages.

[3] The second ground alleged for refusal to issue the permit is, that the auditor is invested with a discretion to determine whether it will be for the public good to permit the organization of a bank in a particular place. The act does not give him any discretion, but the Legislature has itself fixed the conditions upon which those preparing to organize a bank may obtain a permit.

The writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ denied.

Suit by the People, on the relation of Newton E. Matter, against the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee, for the sale of property to pay special assessments. From a judgment and order of the sale, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 261 Ill. 392, 103 N. E. 997, and 266 Ill. 224, 107 N. E. 198.

George A. Mason, and Wm. J. Donlin, both
A. B. Snow, of
of Chicago, for appellant.
Chicago, for appellee.

DUNCAN, J. This is an appeal from a judgment and order of sale entered by the county court of Du Page county June 9, 1915, directing sale of "lot 3 in county clerk's 'subdivision of part of the A. C. Ducat estate on the S. E. 4 of Sec. 7, T. 38 N., R. 11 E.," to pay for the seventh and eighth delinquent installments of Downer's Grove special assessment No. 25, and the annual interest on said unpaid installments, due and payable January 2, 1914, and January 2, 1915, "for an improvement consisting of the grading, draining, paving with brick, and otherwise improving Maple avenue from the west village limits to the easterly line of Blodgett avenue produced." Said installments, with accrued interest, amount to $1,216.14. Appellant entered its special and limited appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court, and in support thereof alleged: (1) That the notice of the application for judgment and order of sale has not been given pursuant to law; (2) that there is a variance between the tax notice and the

FARMER, C. J., and DUNN, J., dissenting. delinquent list. The entry of appearance was

(273 Ill. 203)

in writing and signed "Chicago Title & Trust PEOPLE ex rel. MATTER v. CHICAGO TI- Company, trustee of the estate of Arthur C. TLE & TRUST CO. (No. 10232.) Ducat, deceased." (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 20, 1916.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1916.)

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 553-PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS- - SPECIAL ASSESSMENT-ACTION FOR SALE-EVIDENCE-OWNERSHIP.

On an application for a judgment of sale of lots to pay delinquent special assessment, evidence held not to show that the trust company named as owner was owner as trustee, or that the collector had knowledge thereof.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1262; Dec. Dig. 553.]

[1] The sole ground for reversal of the judgment argued in this court by appellant is that in the notice of the application for judgment and order of sale the collector stated the owner's name as Chicago Title & Trust Company, and that the proof in the record shows that said property is owned by the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee of the estate of Arthur C. Ducat, deceased, and that the collector knew that the owner's name was not simply Chicago Title & Trust Company, as by him stated. As a matter of

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 550-PUBLIC
IMPROVEMENTS SPECIAL ASSESSMENT-NO-fact, there is no direct proof in this record
TICE OF APPLICATION FOR JUDGMENT-NAME
OF OWNER.

Revenue Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 120) § 182, providing that the collector's notice shall contain a list of the delinquent lots on which special assessments remain unpaid and the names of the owners, if known, requires the name of the owner of the legal title to be given, and, where such owner holds in trust for another, he need not be named as trustee.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1259; Dec. Dig. 550.]

as to the ownership of the lot in question. No witness testified concerning the ownership of the lot and no deed or instruments in writing were introduced to prove title in the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee of the estate of Arthur C. Ducat, deceased, or in any other person. The only proof offered in the record tending to prove title and tending to prove that the collector knew the name of the owner of the property in question was certain exhibits showing that in 1912 and trustee of the estate of Arthur C. Ducat, de

Appeal from Du Page County Court; S. L. 1913 the Chicago Title & Trust Company, Rathje, Judge.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

ceased, appeared in the lower court and re-pany, and not Chicago Title & Trust Comsisted judgment and order of sale for the pany, trustee, etc. The vesting of the equifirst, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and table title in any person as the cestui que seventh installments, and that the delinquent trust would not serve to change the name of list was amended to show that the Chicago that person, and if such title happened to Title & Trust Company, trustee as aforesaid, be vested in one John Jones, his name would was the owner of said lot, and that judgment still be John Jones, and not John Jones, ceswas given against it for said assessment and tui que trust, etc. As the statute only rethat an appeal bond was signed by said com- quires the collector to state the name of the pany as said trustee; also volume 266, p. 224 owner of the legal title when known, the col(107 N. E. 198), and volume 261, p. 392 (103 lector, according to the showing in this recN. E. 997), of the Supreme Court Reports of ord, correctly stated the name of the owner Illinois were introduced to prove the owner's of the lot in question. name and knowledge of the collector thereof. The latter volume shows that an appeal was, prosecuted in the name of the Chicago Title & Trust Company, and in the former that a writ of error was prosecuted by the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee, and in neither volume is there a finding as to the owner of the property, and no statement or reference to ownership thereof. Appellee introduced in rebuttal his tax warrant book of the general taxes of 1914, town of Downer's Grove, showing that the Chicago Title & Trust Company, Chicago, Ill., paid the taxes on the said lot. We do not think that the foregoing evidence, when considered as a whole, warrants our finding that the presumption that the collector's certificate correctly stated the owner's name as Chicago Title & Trust Company was overcome, and that the proof also shows that the collector knew that the owner's name was Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee, etc. There is not a particle of proof to show what knowl-| edge, if any, the collector had concerning any of the foregoing exhibits.

[2] It is stated in the briefs and argument of the appellant that the owner of the legal title of said lot is the Chicago Title & Trust Company, trustee of the estate of Arthur C. Ducat, deceased. By what means or instrument it became said owner or for what purpose it became a trustee to manage or dispose of said land, if it did become such a

The purpose of describing the land in the delinquent list and in the publication notice and of stating the owner's name is that the owner may be furnished with all the necessary means for the identification of his property. The description of the land found in this record, which is partly quoted in the fore part of this opinion, is such that appellant would have been bound to know what specific property was referred to, and that it was notified, as the owner of said property, for the purpose of protecting itself against costs, judgment, and sale of said land, etc., for taxes, and, being the legal owner thereof, the record does not furnish a single excuse for complaint against the ruling of the court. The judgment is therefore affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(273 Ill. 309)

SUTHERLAND v. LONG et al. (No. 10325.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 20, 1916. Rehearing Denied June 8, 1916.)

1. MORTGAGES 596, 597- FORECLOSURE RIGHTS OF PURCHASER-REDEMPTION.

The certificate of purchase from a master appointed on foreclosure of a mortgage was not til the holder accepted the redemption money, or extinguished by an attempted redemption, ununtil the redemption proceeding culminated in a deed, and the holder would be entitled to a deed at the expiration of 15 months from the

date of sale.

Cent. Dig. 88 1742-1752; Dec. Dig. 596, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, 597.]

2. MORTGAGES 534 - FORECLOSURE SALE―

RIGHTS OF PURCHASER.

The purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale acquires no interest in the land, which during the entire redemption period remains in right either to receive the redemption money, the mortgagor, but does acquire the alternative which might be paid by the mortgagor, should he redeem, or by the mortgagor's judgment creditors after the expiration of 12 months and before the expiration of 15 months, and in case no such redemption is made within 15 months the right to a sheriff's deed.

trustee, does not appear in this record. If the Chicago Title & Trust Company was vested with the legal title of said land by the will or other instrument in writing executed by Arthur C. Ducat for the purpose of executing certain trusts therein named, the collector properly stated the owner's name of said property as Chicago Title & Trust Company. Section 182 of the Revenue Act provides that the collector's notice shall contain a list of the delinquent lands and lots upon which the taxes or special assessments remain due and unpaid and the names of the owners, if known, etc. The owner of [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, the legal title is the owner referred to in Cent. Dig. § 1555; Dec. Dig. 534.] this section. The making of the Chicago Title 3. MORTGAGES 596, 597 FORECLOSURE & Trust Company a trustee for any purpose SALE-RIGHTS OF MORTGAGOR-REDEMPTION. and vesting the legal title of the land in it The right of a mortgagor to redeem from a for the purposes of the trust would not change of 15 months, and thereafter he had no rights foreclosure sale terminated on the expiration its existence or change its name. Its name which he could exercise to prevent the purchaswould still be Chicago Title & Trust Com-ler from obtaining a deed to the premises, so

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

that he could not complain of that which could not possibly affect him.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 1742-1752; Dec. Dig. 596, 597.1

4. MORTGAGES 624 (2)-FORECLOSURE SALE -REDEMPTION-RIGHTS OF PARTIES.

If, after the expiration of the 12 months, the premises sold on a mortgage foreclosure are redeemed by one not a judgment creditor, the acceptance of the redemption money by the holder of the certificate of purchase relieves the legal title of the debtor from the lien of the certificate, even though the one redeeming cannot enforce his claim by a resale of the land. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 1880; Dec. Dig. 624(2).] 5. MORTGAGES 624(2) REDEMPTION BY CREDITOR-EFFECT. A redemption by a judgment creditor entitled to redeem under the statute does not relieve the legal title from the burden created by the sale, in order to subject the property relieved of such burden to a resale under the redeeming creditor's execution, and a creditor's redemption transfers to him all rights belonging to the original purchaser at the time of such redemption.

6. MORTGAGES TION-EFFECT.

R. D. Robinson and Moreland & Moreland, all of Galesburg,' for appellant. M. J. Daugherty and Roy M. Marsh, both of Galesburg, for appellees.

COOKE, J. David J. McMullen owned lots 1 and 2, in block 105, in the Second Southern addition to the city of Galesburg. He and his wife mortgaged these premises, and having defaulted in the payment of the debt the mortgage was foreclosed. At the foreclosure sale, on September 9, 1911, William A. Sutherland, appellant, a stranger to the mortgage, purchased the property for the sum of $1,900 and received a certificate of purchase from the master in chancery. McMullen did not redeem within the year allowed by the statute. In the meantime appellant had redeemed the property from two tax sales, one for the general taxes and another for a special assessment, and had paid the general taxes for two years and two special assessments. The receipts for these payments were not deposited with the master or sheriff.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Prior to the foreclosure of the mortgage the Cent. Dig. § 1880; Dec. Dig. 624(2).] Canton Coal Company had secured a judg586-REDEMPTION-LIMITA- ment against McMullen for the sum of $312.If there is no redemption, and the certifi-89, which judgment had been assigned to John cate of purchase becomes void by virtue of the Scripps. After the expiration of 12 months statute of limitations or otherwise, the mort- from the date of the foreclosure sale Scripps gagor is then the absolute owner of the premises, paid to the sheriff of Knox county the not by any new title, but by the title which he amount necessary to redeem, sued out an exalways had. ecution on his judgment, and the property was advertised for sale. The sheriff also filed a certificate of redemption with the re

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 1684; Dec. Dig. 586.]

7. MORTGAGES 554- FORECLOSURE SALE-corder. On the day set for the sale under the RIGHTS OF PURCHASER-DEED.

Plaintiff, a stranger to a mortgage, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and received a certificate of purchase. The mortgagor did not redeem within the time allowed by the statute; but thereafter the assignee of a judgment against the mortgagor paid the sheriff the amount necessary to redeem, sued out an execution on his judgment, and had the property advertised for sale, and, on the day of the sale, the purchaser, who had not accepted the redemption money paid to the sheriff, informed the sheriff that he wished to redeem from the judgment, and gave the sheriff his check for the amount of the judgment and costs, and took the sheriff's check for the amount of the redemption money, which had been paid the sheriff, and indorsed it, whereupon the sheriff delivered both checks to the assignee's attorney and executed receipt to plaintiff in full of the redemption money and the judgment, and also returned the execution satisfied, and plaintiff thereafter received an assignment of the judgment. Held, that the purchaser was entitled to a deed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 1582-1591; Dec. Dig. 554.] Dunn, J., dissenting.

Scripps execution appellant came to the office
of the sheriff and in the presence of the at-
torney for Scripps informed the deputy in
charge that he wanted to pay off the Canton
Coal Company's judgment-that he wanted
to redeem from that judgment. It is appar-
ent that the purpose of appellant was to sat-
isfy the Canton Coal Company's judgment,
and thus remove that judgment as a basis
for redemption from the sale at which he had
purchased the premises. The Scripps re-
demption money had not been paid to appel-
lant. It had been retained by the sheriff and
was then in his possession. Acting upon the
advice of the deputy sheriff as to the proper
method to accomplish his purpose, appellant
thereupon gave to the sheriff his check for
the amount of the Canton Coal Company's
time the sheriff executed his check, payable
At the same
judgment, interest, and costs.
to appellant, for the amount of the redemp-
tion money which had been paid by Scripps.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County; This check was handed to appellant, with the Geo. W. Thompson, Judge.

Bill by William A. Sutherland against James C. Long and others. Decree for defendants, dismissing for want of equity, and complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions to enter a decree awarding plaintiff the proceeds of the condemnation of the property.

direction that he indorse his name on the back. This he did, and the check executed by the sheriff and the one executed by the appellant were then delivered by the sheriff to the attorney for Scripps. The sheriff thereupon executed a receipt to appellant for the sum of $2,425.66, which recited that it was in full of the redemption money and interest,

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

and of the Canton Coal Company's judgment, a valid redemption was not made, but that, interest, and costs. The sheriff also released even if it be held that the redemption was the levy and returned the execution fully complete before he paid off the Canton Coal satisfied, stating in the return thereon that Company's judgment, equity will afford rehe had received from appellant the full lief and will at least require the repayment amount of the redemption money and inter- of the amounts he has expended. If, as apest, and judgment, interest, and costs, mak- pellee contends, McMullen, although he had ing a total of $2,425.66. Scripps thereafter failed to redeem and had lost all interest in executed and delivered to appellant a written the property, except the right to have it assignment of the Canton Coal Company's pay as much of his indebtedness as possible, judgment. After the expiration of the full and as the holder of the naked title pending period for redemption appellant presented his the making of a deed by the master or shercertificate of purchase to the master in chan-iff, could reap the full benefit of this transcery and demanded a deed. The master refused to issue a deed upon the ground that the record disclosed that a redemption had been had from the sale to appellant and that his certificate of purchase was therefore void.