Sawed boards and plank, planed on one side and grooved, or tongued
and grooved, should be classified under the tariff act of August 28,
1894, 28 Stat. 508, as dressed lumber, and admitted free of duty.
United States v. Dudley, 670.
1. In this action of ejectment, the evidence of adverse possession contained
in the bill of exceptions, and set forth in the opinion of this court, is
sufficient to justify the action of the trial court in submitting the
question to the jury. Davis v. Coblens, 719.
2. By the terms of the statute in force in the District of Columbia, the
time of limitation of this action commenced to run against Lucy T.
Davis, one of the plaintiffs in error, on the death of her mother, and as
her mother's death took place more than ten years after the cause of
action accrued, the term against the plaintiff in error expired in ten
years after it accrued, and no disability on her part arrested its
running. Ib.
3. It is the general practice to permit tenants in common to sue jointly or
separately in ejectment; but if they sue jointly it is with the risk of the
failure of all, if one of them fail to make out a title or right to
possession. Ib.
4. When a cross-examination is directed to matters not inquired about in
the principal examination, its course and extent are very largely subject
to the control of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the
exercise of that discretion is not reviewable on a writ of error. Ib.
5. The plaintiff requested the following instruction: "The jury are
instructed that there is no testimony in this case tending to rebut the
testimony of the witness John H. Walter that he never conveyed lot
10, in controversy in this case, to any person other than the conveyance
by the deed to plaintiffs Charles M. N. Latimer, Lucy T. Davis and
others, and the jury would not be justified in finding to the contrary.”
The court struck out the words in italics, and inserted instead, "and
the weight to be given his testimony is a proper question for the jury."
Held, that this was not error. Ib.
A court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill by a corporation praying that
its guaranty on a great number of negotiable bonds may be cancelled,
and suits upon it restrained, because of facts not appearing on its face.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Louisville Trust Co.,
552.
See NATIONAL Bank, 3;
TAX AND TAxation, 5.
The appellant, a Canadian, was extradited from Canada under the extra-
dition treaty between Great Britain and the United States, and, being
brought before a police court of Detroit was charged with larceny,
gave bail for his appearance at the trial, and returned to Canada.
Returning from Canada to Detroit voluntarily before the time fixed
for trial, he was arrested on a capias issued from the District Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan before his ex-
tradition, charging him with an offence for which he was not extra-
ditable, and was taken into custody by the marshal of that district.
He applied to the District Court of the United States for a writ of
habeas corpus, which was allowed. After hearing and argument his
application for a discharge was refused by the District Court. On
appeal to this court it is Held, That under the circumstances the
appellant retained the right to have the offence for which he was ex-
tradited disposed of, and then to depart in peace, and that this arrest
was in abuse of the high process under which he was originally
brought into the United States, and cannot be sustained. Cosgrove v.
Winney, 64.
FRAUD.
See CONTRACT, 1;
RAILROAD.
Under a statute authorizing the board of directors of a railroad corporation,
upon the petition of a majority of its stockholders, to direct the execu-
tion by the corporation of a guaranty of negotiable bonds of another
corporation, a negotiable guaranty executed by order of the directors,
and signed by the president and secretary and under the seal of the first
corporation upon each of such bonds, without the authority or assent
of the majority of its stockholders, is void as to a purchaser of such
bonds with notice of the want of such authority or assent; but is valid
as to a purchaser in good faith and without such notice. Louisville,
New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 552.
There was no proof in this case to overcome the denials in the original an-
swer, and to show that the property seized by the Collector of Internal
Revenue had been forfeited to the United States. United States v.
One Distillery, 149.
Congress may provide for a review of the action of commissioners and
boards created by it and exercising only quasi judicial powers, by a
transfer of their proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for
examination and determination de novo. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
445.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURt.
1. From the statement of this case made by the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana in its opinion, quoted in the opinion of this court, it is manifest
that no Federal question was passed upon by that court, but that its
decision was put upon an independent ground, involving no Federal
question, and of itself sufficient to support the judgment below; and
this court therefore dismisses the writ of error. White v. Leovy, 91.
2. If the petition of a woman, claiming to be the widow of a man sup-
posed to have died intestate, for the revocation of letters of adminis-
tration previously granted to his next of kin, and for the grant of
such letters to her, is dismissed by the surrogate's court upon the
ground that a decree of divorce obtained by her in another State
from a former husband is void; and she appeals from the judgment
of dismissal to the highest court of the State, which affirms that judg-
ment, and, pending a writ of error from this court, it is shown that
a will of the deceased was proved in the surrogate's court after its
judgment dismissing her petition, and before her appeal from that
judgment; the writ of error must be dismissed. Kimball v. Kimball,
158.
3. O'Brien being arrested in the State of New York for larceny, Nelson
induced Moloney to join him in becoming O'Brien's bondsman, and
gave Moloney a mortgage on his (Nelson's) real estate in New York to
the amount of $10,000, to indemnify him. O'Brien having defaulted
in his appearance for trial, Moloney was sued upon the bond, and a
judgment was recovered against him, which was wholly paid by him.
Before paying it he brought suit against Nelson to recover the amount
for which he was so liable, and obtained a judgment in his favor in
VOL. CLXXIV-52
the trial court, which was reversed in the courts above on the ground
that as, at that time he had paid nothing on the forfeiture, no re-
covery could be had. In appealing from the trial court in that case
he entered into the usual stipulation that, if the judgment appealed
from should be affirmed, judgment absolute might be rendered against
him. He then brought this suit to foreclose the mortgage. Mean-
while Nelson had transferred the property mortgaged to one Adams.
The defendant contended that the stipulation given by the plaintiff
on the appeal to that court in the prior action was a bar to the re-
covery in this action; and that the bond and mortgage having been
given to indemnify bail in a criminal case, they were void because
contrary to public policy. But the Court of Appeals Held: (1) That
the contention that the stipulation operated to prevent a recovery was
without support in authority or reason; and (2) That it was not a
part of the public policy of the State of New York to insist upon per-
sonal liability of sureties, and forbid bail to become indemnified.
Held: (1) That these conclusions involved no Federal question;
(2) That under the circumstances described in the opinion of the
court, the proceedings in relation to the removal of the cause afforded
no ground for the issue of the writ of error; (3) That, following
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, the state court
having proceeded to final judgment in this case, its action is not re-
viewable on writ of error to such judgment. Nelson v. Moloney, 164.
4. It appearing on the face of the bill in this case that all the parties to
this suit are citizens of Iowa, and the court being of opinion that the
allegation in the bill that this is a controversy and a suit of a civil
nature arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
is not only not supported by the facts appearing in the bill, but is so
palpably unfounded that it constitutes not even a color for the juris-
diction of the circuit court, the decree below, dismissing the bill for
want of jurisdiction, is affirmed. McCain v. Des Moines, 168.
5. On its face the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case is
not a final judgment, and the appeal must therefore be dismissed.
United States v. Krall, 385.
6. The statute conferring jurisdiction upon this court to consider and act
upon the Indian cases was intended to operate retrospectively, and is
not thereby rendered void. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 445.
7. The validity of remedial legislation of this kind cannot be questioned
unless it is in violation of some provision of the Constitution. Ib.
S. The appeals to this court granted by the act extend only to the consti-
tutionality or validity of the legislation affecting citizenship or the
allotment of lands in the Indian Territory, and the limitation applies
to both classes of cases mentioned in the opinion of the court, viz. :
(1) citizenship cases; (2) cases between either of the Five Civilized
Tribes and the United States. Ib.
9. The distribution of jurisdiction made by the act of March 3, 1891,
c. 517, is to be observed in these cases; but the whole case is not open
to adjudication, but the appeal is restricted to the constitutionality
and validity of the legislation. Ib.
10. This legislation is not in contravention of the Constitution; on the
contrary, the court holds it all to be constitutional. Ib.
11. The judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, does not con-
template several separate appeals or writs of error, on the merits, in
the same case and at the same time to two appellate courts, and there-
fore the writ in this case in this court, which was taken while the case
was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals, is dismissed. Columbus
Construction Co. v. Crane Co., 601.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
The provision of the act of 1891, c. 517, § 3, that no judge before whom
a cause or question may have been heard or tried" in a District or
Circuit Court shall sit "on the trial or hearing of such cause or ques
tion" in the Circuit Court of Appeals, disqualifies a judge, who has
once heard a cause upon its merits in the Circuit Court, from sitting
in the Circuit Court of Appeals on the hearing and decision of any
question, in the same cause, which involves in any degree matter on
which he had occasion to pass in the Circuit Court. Moran v. Dil-
lingham, 153.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky has
jurisdiction of a suit brought by a corporation, originally created by
the State of Indiana, against citizens of Kentucky and of Illinois, even
if the plaintiff was afterwards and before the suit made a corporation
of Kentucky also, and pending the suit became a corporation of both
Indiana and Illinois by reason of consolidation with a corporation of
Illinois; but the court cannot, in such a suit, adjudicate upon the
rights and liabilities, if any, of the plaintiff as a corporation of Ken-
tucky, or as a corporation of Illinois. Louisville, New Albany & Chi-
cago Railway Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 552.
D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. Under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, giving the Court of Claims ju-
risdiction over claims for property of citizens of the United States
taken or destroyed by Indians no jurisdiction is given to the court
over a claim for merely consequential damages resulting to the owner
of property so taken by reason of the taking but not directly caused
by the Indians. Price v. United States and Osage. Indians, 373.
2. Under the act of July 28, 1892, c. 313, conferring jurisdiction on the
Court of Claims "to hear and determine what are the just rights in
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