this final cause of thunder, whose material and efficient cause, with its properties, they were not ignorant of, they did acknowledge an higher guide or governor of these natural effects than nature herself. We may perhaps rectify this notion by saying, The thunder was created by this guide or governor of nature, rather to terrify such as live here on earth, that they come not into these infernal prisons.' And to avoid or prevent their coming into them, nature herself, which taught Pythagoras this philosophy, might teach all,

That there can be no means so safe, or so compendious, as the making of our peace with that Divine Power, who speaks to men in this terrible language.' The thunder of his power, saith Job, xxvi. 14, who can understand? But the less we understand it in particular, the better we understand him to be a terrible Judge. That this notion which the thunder did suggest to the Pythagorean philosophers of the Divine Power, as avenger of evil, was not a philosophical fancy, but implanted by nature in the heart, may be further evinced; for that the thunder did imprint the like fear in such as in words or opinion did deny the Divine Providence, or sought to shake off all conceit of future judgment. Witness the emperor Caligula, who so demeaned himself in his empire and tyranny over others, as if he never looked to be called to any account for his regency; and yet this man (as Suetonius tells us) would rise from the table when it thundered, and ofttimes for fear run under his bed; he knew himself exempt from the censure or control of man, and had enough about him to instruct him in the natural causes of thunder; and yet by this strange fear he did acknowledge a superior Judge, from whose presence or apprehension he sought to hide himself, as

malefactors do themselves from the eyes or hands of earthly judges, or from the ministers of civil justice.

2. But might not this strange fear arise rather from some peculiar disposition in Caligula, than from any instinct of nature, universal to all such as he was, upon the like or equivalent summons or admonitions? From whatsoever disposition we can imagine this servile or slavish fear should proceed, it was a timorous disposition, and could not have wrought or inclined such men as he was unto such manifest documents of imminent fear, but from a feeling consciousness of a foul and beastly life; for he was a man that in other cases had gotten as full a conquest over his conscience, 378 as any man, prince or subject, in this life can possibly get. He had with much care and cost lulled his conscience with variety of all pleasures, incident to sense or earthly affections, into so dead a sleep, that no voice of man, though ambassador from God, no voice of God, (known to men,) besides this terrible voice of his thunder, could have awaked it. But amongst ten thousand such as he was, that is, of such as for the most part have lived as beasts, and for this reason could desire to die like beasts, without any account or reckoning how they had spent their lives, it will be hard to find one, that in some or other particular did not give a true crisis or proof of this truth, which now we teach, (that is, of a judgment after this life,) by nature implanted in their hearts; albeit most of them in words would not confess it-albeit many of them used their own and their parasites' wits by natural reasons to overthrow or enervate the force of it. But as in cases of civil justice, the unwitting acknowledgment of some material or pertinent circumstances, drawn from such as otherwise seek to conceal or smother the main truth, (upon which they are directly

examined,) is, with intelligent judges, of more force than one or two voluntary testimonies of men suspected to be accessaries in the business, or partial favourers of the principal actor; so in this controversy betwixt God and our own consciences, the unwitting practices (or passionate expressions made in some extremity) of such heathens, as either denied or knew not the truth of a final judgment, do give more powerful and more authentic testimonies for it, than either the authority or express testimony of other heathens, which did expressly or directly affirm it, (save only so far as their testimony was grounded upon the like instinct of nature, or implanted notion, which did move the others to confess it indirectly or in practice, although in words they did deny it, or not confess it,) do for it, or than the avowed denials of any more debauched heathens in their jollity do against it.

3. "In many cases, as well natural and moral as divine, there may be a real and solid truth, or ground of truth in the practice, without any apprehension of it in the practitioner; ofttimes with opposition to it in his conceit or opinion." Most men, when they desire to call things forgotten to mind, will rub or scratch the back part of their head. The ground or reason of their practice is from nature herself, which hath placed the faculty of memory in that part of the brain, or at least in some other part, betwixt which and that which they so handle there is special intercourse. Howbeit most men observe this practice or custom by mere instinct of nature, without so much as once questioning or thinking whether their faculty of memory be seated in the brain or in the breast. And some perhaps do use this custom, being of a contrary opinion, viz., that the memory is seated in the forepart of the brain. But their manifest conformity to others in this custom,

will, in any indifferent moderator's judgment, prevailingly prescribe against their opinion. Few there be again so destitute of natural reason, but would be able, as occasion requires, or exigents impel, to give warmth to some things that were cold, and to cool other things that be hot, by blowing or breathing upon them. Yet this custom is practised by most out of mere instinct of nature, without thought or question how two such contrary effects as heat and cold could possibly issue from one and the same mouth or breath. There is a true and real cause of this diversity or contrariety in the effects, and a true reason in nature how they are wrought, albeit this cause or reason be neither in whole nor in part apprehended by such as 379 practise it with success. Yea, of such as have their senses exercised in the study of philosophy, scarce one of five there is, but if he should on the sudden be put thus to practise by rule of art, would fail of his purpose, more than such as thus practise by mere instinct of nature; or would be as far to seek, if he were put to give the true reason of it, as the poor pilgrim in the fable was, who, being kindly entertained by a satyr, which had found him blowing his fingers for extremity of cold in the woods, was unkindly thrust out of his house, only for seeking to cool his broth with the same breath wherewith he had warmed his fingers.

4. But in what practices or resolutions in the heathen was this divine truth of a judgment after this life necessarily included? The particulars are many; but most of them may be reduced unto this general: As many of the heathens as either esteemed the love of virtue, honesty, or godliness, more dear than this mortal life with its appurtenances temporal; or as many of them as did abhor the practice of any villainy or impiety more than death; whatsoever they themselves did

expressly say or think concerning this article of final judgment in particular, did by these practices or resolutions give authentic testimony unto it.' Now that virtue or honesty were to be more esteemed than this mortal life, with all the commodities of it, the most part of heathen philosophers (besides the sect of Epicures) did grant and maintain. The Stoicks went further in the esteem of moral virtue than any wise Christian will do in practice, than any good Christian ought to do in opinion: but of their errors or hyperboles anon. Aristotle, the prince of philosophers, grants, that there is anλws ayalóv; that some things be absolutely good, so good that a man ought to love them more than life, or rather to abandon life than their practice. Some things, again, he grants absolutely evil; so evil, that a man ought rather to choose death than adventure upon them; such are treason against our native country, incest, perjury, &c. This great philosopher, in expressly granting thus much, is necessarily concluded by his own principles to grant a life after this life ended much better than this; and a death, or an estate of life much worse than death, to such as have lived and died dishonestly. Nor is he thus far concluded only by his own principles, but by the very principles of nature, whose chief secretary he For every thing that hath being doth by an indispensable law of nature desire the continuance of such being as it hath; but most of all of its well-being, or bettering of its present estate. Now if man's hopes or fears were terminated in this life, (as needs they must with this life be terminated, unless we grant a judgment after death, or an award of the evils which men fear, or of the good things which they hope,) every man were bound in reason and by nature to seek the preservation or continuance of his own life

was.