The assignment was a contract of sale of a promissory note without indorsement, bona is not liable in law or in equity. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the fide, for a valuable consideration. The vendor United States for the District of Columbia. The case is stated by the Court. Mr. George M. Bibb for the appellants: 1. The sale and purchase of the lots and buildings as charged in the bill and set up in the answers of Fendall and Harper, made Oct. 21, 1847, were unauthorized by the deed of trust and ought to be set aside. 2. The deed of trust cannot be altered and the powers of the trustee enlarged, by parol. 3. However honest the circumstances of this particular sale may be, it falls within those general rules established for the purposes of justice, whereby trustees, agents, commissioners of bankrupts, assignees of bankrupts, so licitors to the commission, auctioneers, &c., are laid under certain incapacities and disabilities. The trustee cannot purchase the estate him self; he cannot buy as the agent of another; he cannot employ the auctioneer to bid for the estate on behalf of Harper. Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves., 393; Coles v. Tre cothick, 9 Ves., 248; Ex parte James, 8 Ves., 345, 348, 350; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves., 625; Lister v. Lister, 6 Ves., 631, 632; Twining v. Morrice, 2 Bro. Ch. Cas., 326; York Build. Co. v. McKenzie, 8 Bro. Par. Cas., Appen., 42; Davue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch., 254, 257, 270. Such a sale as this cannot stand in a court of equity. Messrs. P. R. Fendall, Joseph H. Bradley and Tracy, for appellees: It is denied that the complainants were entitled to notice of the intended sale. But it is a fair inference from the evidence, that in point of fact they had notice of it in Aug., 1847. The sale was advertised according to the terms of the deed, and on terms advantageous to all parties concerned. The trustee did not bid at all; Harper's bid was regular. His rights as a creditor, whose only security for his whole for tune was the property advertised for sale, stood on grounds as strong at least as that of the owner of it. Though it is not lawful for an owner to employ an agent "to take advan tage of the eagerness of bidders," to screw up the price, yet as a "defensive precaution," "a bidder may be privately appointed by the owner, to prevent the estate from being sold at an undervalue." 1 Sug. Vend., 26, 27, 9th Ed.; Fonbl. Eq., Bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 4, note 10; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr., 324, 325; Smith v. Clarke, 12 Ves., 477; Steele v. Ellmaker, 11 Serg. & R., 86; Jenkins v. Hogg, 2 Const., 821; Wolfe v. Luyster, 1 Hall, 146; Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met., 384. Harper made only one bid, that being for" defensive precaution." The bid was made through the auctioneer, the agent of both parties. Smith's Merc. Law, 301, and cases there cited; Connelly v. Parsons, 3 Ves., 625. The price was not inadequate; but even if it very inadequate," the inadequacy would be no ground for annulling the sale. were 1 Fonbl. Eq., 128; 1 U. S. Dig., 344, pl. 33, and cases there cited. It is contended that the sale was in all respects regular; and that if were not so the complainants cannot avail themselves of the imputed irregularities. Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R., 757; Ex parte Shuttleworth, 3 Ves., 368; Fydell v. Clark, 1 Esp., 446: Bank of England v. Newman, 1 Ld. Raym., 442; Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 7; Hornblower v. Proud, 2 B. & A., 327. The note was long past due when complainants purchased it. They took it without indorsement. The deed of trust authorized a sale at the maturity of the note. They took it with notice. Fowler v. Brantley, 14 Pet., 321. Mr. Justice Curtis delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. The appellants filed their bill in that court to set aside a sale, made to satisfy a prior incumbrance on land, upon which they claimed to have a second incumbrance. In the court below some question appears to have been made concerning the priority of the incumbrances; but none is made here, it being conceded, that though that claimed by the complainants was the earliest in date, the other was first recorded, and takes precedence. The sale in question was under a deed of trust, whereby Holmes, the debtor, conveyed to the defendant, Phillip R. Fendall, in trust, to secure the payment of a promissory note, bearing date May 1, 1846, payable in two years from date, for $2,800 and interest, payable annually. It is objected that the sale, which was made on the 21st of October, 1847, after one year's interest had become due, but before the principal sum was payable, was premature. This depends upon the meaning and effect of the power of sale contained in the deed. It was competent for the parties to agreee to a foreclosure by sale for non-payment of interest, and the question is, whether they did so agree. The event in which the trustee is empowered to sell, is thus described in the deed: "But if the herein before-described promissory note, with the interest legally due thereon, shall not be fully paid off and discharged when said note shall be due and payable, and payment of the same shall be demanded, or if any note or notes given in substitution for or renewal of the hereinbefore described promissory note shall not be fully paid off and discharged according to the tenor and effect of the said substitute or new note or notes, together with the interest legally due on such substitute or note or notes, so that any default be made in payment of any part of the aforesaid debt of $2,800 and interest, then so soon after such default, &c." The omission to pay the first year's interest was a default within the express words of this power. That interest was part of the interest secured by the note, and a failure to pay it was a “default in payment of part of the aforesaid interest." The deed authorizes the trustee to sell for any such default, and consequently the sale was not premature. It was argued that the trust deed does not describe the note as bearing annual interest, and consequently, that the subsequent incum brancer has a right to insist that, as against him, there was no power to sell for non payment of such interest. It is true the deed does not purport to describe the interest which is to become due on the note; but it clearly shows that it bore interest at some rate, and payable at some time or times, and this was sufficient to put a sub sequent incumbrancer on inquiry as to what the rate of interest, and the time or times of its payment were. The deed, in effect, declares, and its record gives notice to subsequent purchasers, that its purpose is to secure the payment of such interest as has been reserved by the note; the amount, and date, and time of payment of which are mentioned. We do not think the mere omission to describe in the deed what that interest was to be, is a defect of which advantage can be taken by the complainants. The complainants further insist that the property was not duly advertised. The provision in the deed of trust upon this subject is as follows: "It shall be the duty of the said Philip R. Fendall or his heirs to enter upon the herein before-conveyed piece or parcel of ground and appurtenances, and sell the same at public auction to the highest bidder, or at private sale, for cash or credit, according to his or their discretion, after having given public notice of such sale, by advertisement, at least thirty days previously thereto, in the National Intelligencer, or in some other newspaper printed or published in the City of Washington aforesaid." first day, of which thirty days' notice was given, he could not on that day adjourn the sale. But we consider that a power to a trustee to sell at public auction, after a certain public notice of the time and place of sale, includes the power regularly to adjourn the sale to a different time and place, when, in his discretion, fairly exercised, it shall seem to him necessary to do so in order to obtain the fair auction price for the property. If he has not this power, the elements or many unexpected occurrences may prevent an attendance of bidders, and cause an inevitable sacrifice of the property. It is a power which every prudent owner would exercise in his own behalf under the circumstances supposed, and which he may well be presumed to intend to confer on another. This power of sale does not undertake to prescribe the particular manner of making the sale. It is to be at public auction, and after having given public notice of such sale by advertisement at least thirty days;" but it assumes that the sale will be conducted as such sales are usually conducted. A sale regularly adjourned, so as to give notice to all per sons present of the time and place to which it is adjourned, is, when made, in effect, the sale of which previous public notice was given. The courts of several States have gone further in this direction than we find necessary, though we do not intend to intimate any doubt of the correctness of their decisions. They have held that a public officer, upon whom a power of sale is conferred by law, may adjourn an advertised public sale to a different time and place, for the purpose of obtaining a better price for the property. Tinkom v. Purdy. 5 Johns., 345; Russell v. Richards, 11 Me., 371; Hughes v. Longworth, 4 Barr., 153; Warren v. Leland, 9 Mass., 265. If such a power is implied where the law, acting in invitum, selects the officer, a fortiori it may presumed to be granted to a trustee selected by the parties. The remaining objection is, that the defendant Harper, the creditor for whose benefit the sale was made, through the trustee, requested the auctioneer to bid from him the sum of $2,500; that the auctioneer did so, and there being no higher bid the property was struck off to Harper. It is insisted that this renders the sale void. Inasmuch as the trustee was empowered to sell at private sale, as well as at public auction, his power extended to a private sale made at any time after thirty days' notice. Having given notice for the space of thirty days that he was about to sell the property, he might, at any time after the expiration of that thirty days, have proceeded to sell it at private sale. But this notice should be such as to call for purchasers at private sale. The notice given was of a sale at public auction. This did not call for purchasers, except at the time and place mentioned in the notice. No sale was made at the time and place designated in the thirty days' notice, published in the National Intelligencer. At that time and place the attendance of bidders was so small that the trustee believed an attempt to sell for a fair price would be fruitless; and he adjourned the We do not deem it necessary to examine the sale for the space of fourteen days, giving no- numerous and somewhat conflicting decisions tice of such adjournment in the same newspa upon the subject of by-bidding, or bidding by per of the next day. At the time and place persons standing in fiduciary capacities. This thus fixed for the adjourned sale, another post-case stands clear of those decisions and of the ponement took place, for the same reasons, for one week; and the place of sale was changed from the premises to the rooms of the auction eer. Of this postponement, also, public no tice was given on the next day, in the same newspaper. There is no reason to suspect the least un fairness on the part of the trustee, or any one concerned. His conduct seems to have been dictated solely by an honest desire to obtain the best price for the property. Nor is there any ground for believing that either of these postponements prejudiced the interest of the complainants. They stand upon the objection, that though the trustee might have sold on the principles upon which they rest. No decision lays down a positive rule that such sales, though affected by such bidding, are, per se, and as between all persons, void. They may be avoided by parties whose just interests have been injuriously affected by such misconduct, provided the rights of innocent third persons are not thereby disturbed. It was for the advantage of these complainants, as subsequent incumbrancers, that this property should sell for the best price which could be obtained. Even improper practices to enhance the price, if any such had been resorted to, could not be complained of by them. It is only some practice to prevent bidding, or procure a sale for less than the property would | sale which might be made by any party under have otherwise brought, which can be relied any title to the premises, but only to assure on by them to avoid the sale. We have no the priority of payment of the note assigned, doubt the creditor, for the satisfaction of whose in preference to the other note, out of any sale debt the sale was made, had a right to compete made under the particular title to the premises fairly at the sale; but whether he had or described in the deed of assignment. not, his doing so could not be injurious to the complainants. The covenant that the note assigned is due, is shown to have been kept by the note itself, in the absence of other evidence. The answer admits the receipt of moneys from the maker on account of other debts, but denies any payment on account of this note; and there is no evidence to the contrary. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs. It is true he employed the auctioneer to bid for him; but this fact alone could not depreciate the price. Such an authority may be used for fraudulent purposes; but, if fairly used, its tendency is to enhance the price; and in this case there is no evidence that it was intended to be, or in fact was, unfairly used. On the contrary, there seems to be no room for doubt that the price bid by the auctioneer for Harper was more than any other person was willing to give. It must be remembered, that the auctioneer was not employed as the agent of the creditor to purchase the property for him at the least price at which it could be obtained. Such an agency an auctioneer should not undertake. It is inconsistent with his relation to JOHN B. BOGERT, ABRAHAM MYER the seller, and with the faithful discharge of his duty to the seller. But an agency simply to bid a particular sum for a purchaser, amounting to no more than receiving from the purchaser, before the auction, a bid which is to be treated as if made there by the purchaser himself, is not necessarily inconsistent with any duty of the auctioneer, and does not enable anyone to avoid the sale. And the same remark applies to the trustee. It was his duty to obtain for the property the best price he could by the use of due diligence in a fair sale. It would have been improper for him, in behalf of the creditor, to employ the auctioneer to buy at anything short of that best price. But there was no impropriety in his employing him to bid a particular sum for the creditor, to prevent a sacrifice of the property. We have considered all the objections to this sale made by the complainants, and finding neither of them valid, the decree of the court below is, in that respect, affirmed. As to so much of the complainants' bill as seeks relief against their assignors, in the event of not obtaining satisfaction from the land, we are of opinion that these assignors are under no such liability as is asserted by the complainants. The complainants purchased a negotiable note which was overdue. The assignors did not indorse it, but simply assigned it by deed. They entered into certain specific covenants concerning the subject matter assigned; and their liability depends exclusively on these covenants. Neither of these covenants appears to have been broken. The only one concerning which any doubt has been raised is the following: JOSIAH SIDDONS GRIFFITH, JAMES S. v. AND THADDEUS SMITH. (See S. C., 18 How., 158-165.) Time, how reckoned-state construction of state statute conclusive-judicial sale not questionable collaterally. In reckoning time the day from which an act is to be done, the terminus a quo, should generally be included. Where a state statute as to time has been con strued by courts of the state, in a suit between the parties, their construction will prevail, as to the parties in that suit. In Missouri and elsewhere a judicial sale and title acquired under proceedings of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be questioned collaterally, except for fraud in which the purchaser was participant. Argued Jan. 7 and 8,1856. Decided Jan. 15, 1856. A further statement appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. J. J. Crittenden and J. B. Thompson, for the plaintiffs in error: The whole merits of the case, is involved in the question presented by the instruction asked by the defendants, and given by the court, namely: whether the plaintiffs were devested of their title by the deed of the sheriff to C. S. Hempstead. The plaintiffs contend that they were not so devested of their title, and that said deed was null and void. 64 "And we do in like manner covenant, promise and agree, that the said note of $3,000 hereinbefore assigned, shall be, and is entitled NOTE.-Computation of time. Days. *After the to payment out of any sale of the premises expiration." "Before." Sundays. "Within." Fracconveyed in and by the deed of trust afore-tims of a day, when regarded and when not. said, before the other note therein specified, and shall have a prior lien on the said premises, or the proceeds thereof." We think the purpose and effect of this covenant was, not to secure payment out of any There is no general rule in computing time from an act or event that the day is to be inclusive or exclusive. It depends on the reason of the thing according to the circumstances. Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves., 248. Generally, in computing time, one day is included 1. Because the judgments themselves were | Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C., 232; Arvoid so far as they related to or affected the nold v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 104. lands, tenements or hereditaments of the intestate; or if not, that the executions issued thereon, under or in virtue of which the sheriff sold the land in question, were illegal, null and void, because issued before the expiration of eighteen months from the date of the letters of administration of the estate of said intestate. and were therefore issued in direct violation of the express provisions of the Act of Jan. 25, 1817. 8 Met., 502. 2. Because the sale, in virtue of which said deed purports to be executed, was made on May 1, 1821, and before the expiration of eight een months from the date (November 1, 1819) of the said letters of administration, contrary to the express terms of the said Act of 1817, and was therefore illegal and void. The only questionable part of this proposition is, whether May 1, 1821, is a day after the expiration of eighteen months from the 1st November, 1819, or included in and part of the period. The reasonable and legal rule of computation of time in such cases is to exclude the first day. This is believed to be the rule as now judicially settled in Missouri. Gantley v. Ewing, 3 How., 707; Kimm v. Osgood, 19 Mo., 60; The Mary Blain v. Beehler, 12 Mo., 477. 3. Because, before the sale by the sheriff, the court had ordered and directed the administrator to make a sale of the real estate of the intestate, and had thereby assumed the control of said fund. The sale and deed were therefore null and void. 14 How., 52. Wiswall v. Sampson. Mr. H. S. Geyer, for defendants in error: It has been laid down in many cases, as a general rule, that where time is to be computed from an event or an act, the day of the event or the performance of the act is to be included. Norris v. Gautry, Hob., 139; King v. Adderley, Doug., 463; Castle v. Burditt, 3 T. R., 623; Glassington v. Rawlings, 3 East, 407; Priest v. Tarlton, 3 N. H., 93; Thomas v. Afflick, 16 Pa., 14; Robinett v. Compton, 2 La. Ann., 856; and one excluded. 2 Browne, Pa., 18; 4 Monr., 464: 26 Ala. N. S., 547; 2 Harr., 461; 5 Blackf., 319; 16 Ohio, 408; 10 Rich. (S. C.), 395. Excluding the day on which an act is done, when computation is to be made from such an act. Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves., 248; 1 Ball & B., 193: Homan v. Liswell, 6 Cow., 659; 11 Mass., 204; 1 Pick., 485; 1 Metc., 127; 3 Denio, 12; 1 Mod., 8; 27 Ala. N. S., 311; 19 Mo., 60; 18 Conn., 18; Campbell v. Internat. L. Ins. Soc., 4 Bosw., 298: including it. Doug., 463; Hob., 139; 3 Term, 623: 3 East, 417; 2 Browne, Pa., 18; 15 Mass., 193; 4 Blackf., 320. There is an exception where the exclusion will prevent forfeiture. Hob., 139; 2 Camp., 294; Cowp., 714; 4 Me., 298. Time from and after a given day excludes that day. 1 Pick., 485; 7 Marsh., 202; 1 Blackf., 392; 4 N. H., 267; 3 Penn., 200; 1 Nott & McC., 565; and includes the last day of the specified period. Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall., 177. Where the statute says "after the expiration" of a time named, that time must fully expire before the act can be legally performed. Marvin v. Marvin, 75 N. Y., 240; Commercial Bank v. Ives, 2 Hill, 355; Butts v. Edwards, 2 Denio, 164. When two periods are fixed within which an act may be done, it is a general rule that it may be done on any intervening day, unless some day be expressly excluded. Russell v. Ostrander, 30 How. Pr., 93. When a computation of time is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is in In some cases the rule has been held to be, to exclude the day of the act or event from the computation; in others, the day has been included without laying down any general rule. King v. Cumberland, 4 Nev. & M., 375; Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb., 117; Wing v. Davis, 7 Me., 31; Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow., 605; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Den., 12; Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow., 518; The Mary Blaine v. Beehler, 12 Mo., 477; Kimm v. Osgood's Administrators, 19 Mo., 60. It has been denied that there is any general rule; that it depends upon the reason of the thing, the context and subject matter. Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves., Jr.,248; Dowling v. Foxall, 1 Ball. & B., 196; Windsor v. China, 4 Me., 298; Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick., 485; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass., 193; Jones v. Planters' Bank, 5 Humph., 619; O'Connor v. Towns, 1 Tex., 107. In the computation of time in promissory notes and bills of exchange, the day of the date has generally been excluded; in other instances it is held to be inclusive or exclusive, according to the context and subject matter. Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp., 714, and cases there cited and reviewed; Rand v. Rand, 4 N. H., 267; Moore v. Bond, 18 Me., 142; Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend., 346. It appears to have been very generally agreed, that either the first or the last day shall be included in the computation, and in no case are both to be excluded or included, unless the contract or statute upon which the question arises will admit of no other construction. Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow., 605; Thomas V. Afflick, 16 Pa., 14; Sanders' Heirs v. Norton, 4 Mon., 474. Upon a review of the cases, it appears that there is no general rule on the subject; but according to the adjudged cases, whether the day in either case is to be included or excluded, depends upon the reason of the thing, the subject matter and the context. The intention of parties to a contract and of the Legislature in case of a statute, is to govern. cluded. Arnold v. U. S., 4 Cranch, 104, aff'g 1 Gall., 248; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash., 232; Er parte Farquhar, 1 Mont. & McA., 7; Cowie v. Harris, M. & M., 141; S. C., 22, E. C. L., 270; Godson v. Sanctuary, 4 B. & Ad., 255; S. C., 24, E. C. L., 53; 1 Nev. & M., 52. The only exception is, that the day on which a bill of exchange payable at so many days after sight is accepted, is excluded. Pearpoint v. Graham, supra. Where the statute requires an act to be done so many days at least before a given event, the time must be reckoned excluding both the day of the act and that of the event. Reg. v. Shropshire Justices, 8 A. & E., 173; Reg. v. Middlesex Justices, 2 New Sess. Cas., 73; 3 D. & L., 109; 9 Jur., 758; 14 L. J. M. C., 139; Mitchell v. Foster, 4 P. & D., 150; 12 A. & E., 472; 9 D. P. C., 527; Reg. v. Abedare Can. Co., 14 Q. B., 854; 14 Jur., 735; 19 L. J. Q. B., 251. In England the general rule of law is that "days" mean "consecutive days," except Sunday is the first or last day. Brown v. Johnson, Car. & M., 440; 10 M. & W., 331. Sunday included. Niemann v. Moss, 6 Jur. N. S., 775: 29 J. L. Q. B., 206: Peacock v. Reg., 4 C. B. N. S., 264; 27 L. J. C. P., 224: Wynne v. Ronaldson, 13 W. R., 899; 12 L. T. N. S., 711. Under Nuisances Removal Act Sunday reckoned in, though it falls on the last day. Simkin, ex parte, 6 Jur., N. S., 144; 29 L. J. M. C., 23; 2 El. & El., 392. Excluded under Bills of Exchange Act in days for appearance, if last day. Lewis v. Calor, 1 F. & F., 906. If act is to be done by court and last day falls on Sunday, it may be done on next practicable day. laterally. Such construction is to be adopted, if admissi- The proceedings of a court of competent ble, as will prevent an estoppel, save forfeiture jurisdiction cannot be called into question color avoid penal consequences; a construction most beneficial to the party entitled to favor, to secure his rights rather than destroy them, or to save a right intended to be favored by law. Dyer, 218; Hatter v. Ash, 1 Ld. Raym., 84; Seignorett v. Noguire,2 Ld. Raym., 1241; Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp.,714; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. Jr., 248, and cases there cited and reviewed: Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick., 485; Wilcor v. Wood, 9 Wend., 346, and cases above cited. The policy of the law which favors the rights of purchasers at judicial sales, not only author izes but requires a construction of the statute favorable to the purchasers. There being nothing in the statute requiring a different construction, such mode of computation is to be adopted as will give validity to the sale. Robinett v. Compton, 2 La. Ann., 856; Pear point v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C., 232; Lytle v. Williams, 15 Serg. & R., 136. The title of a bona fide purchaser at a judicial sale, is not affected by any irregularities in the proceedings of the officer, or in the process under which he sold. All that is necessary to support the title of a purchaser in an action of ejectment, is the judgment, execution, levy, and sheriff's deed. Jackson v. Sternbergh, 1 Johns. Cas., 153; Jackson v. Bartlett, 8 Johns., 361; Jackson v. Rosevelt, 13 Johns., 97; Jackson v. De Lancy, 13 Johns., 535; Jackson v. Robins, 16 Johns., 537; Brown v. Miller, 3 J. J. Marsh., 439; Lawrence v. Speed, 2 Bibb, 401; Webber v. Cox, 6 Mon., 110; Day v. Graham, 6 Ill., 435; Swiggart v. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Ware v. Bradford, 2 Ala., 676; 19 Ala.,132; State Bank v. Noland, 13 Ark., 299; Newton v. State Bank, 14 Ark., 9: Byers v. Fowler, 12 Ark., 218: Wheaton v. Sexton, 4 Wheat., 506; Hart v. Rector, 7 Mo., 531; Reed v. Heirs of Austin, 9 Mo., 722; Landes v. Perkins, 12 Mo., 254; Draper v. Bryson, 17 Mo., 71; Carson v. Walker, 16 Mo., 68; Robinett v. Compton, 2 La. Ann., 856. Hughes v. Griffiths, 13 C. B. N. S., 324; 32 L. J. C. P., 47. Where judge ordered money paid on 25th of each month and it fell on Sunday. Held that the defendant had the whole of Monday to pay the money in. Morris v. Barrett, 7 C. B. N. S., 139; 6 Jur. N. S., 609; 29 L. J. C. P., 102. Statute forbidding an act to be done on a particular day means the natural day of 24 hours, from midnight to midnight. Pulling v. People, 8 Barb., 384. Till" includes the day to which it is prefixed, but "between" is intermediate. Bunce v. Reed, 16 Barb., 347. "Within." Where an act is to be done within a specified number of days, the day on which the notice is given and the day on which the act is to be done are considered, the one inclusive and the other exclusive, indifferently. So held, of return of process. Gillespie v. White, 16 Johns., 117; of notices in suits. Charles v. Stanbury, 3 Johns., 261; of time fixed by statute. Hoffman v. Duel, 5 Johns., 232; Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow., 605; Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow., 518; Homan v. Liswell, 6 Cow., 659; Col. T. Co. v. Haywood, 10 Wend., 422; Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How. Pr., 193; where a specific number of days is designated by rule of court. Irving v. Humphreys, Hopkins Ch., 364. "Within" 30 days, first day excluded and party has whole of thirtieth; "after" 30 days, act cannot be done till thirty-first day. Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb., 117. 1 Baldwin, 246, 266; 6 Ben., 254; 1 S. & R., 101; 8 S. & R., 397. Errors and irregularities are to be corrected by some direct proceeding, either before the same court or in an appellate court. Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 157; Voorhees v. Bank of U. S., 10 Pet., 473; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How., 343; Lessee of Adams v. Jeffries, 12 Ohio, 272; Lessee of Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio, 443; Reed v. Austin's Heirs, 9 Mo., 722; Landes v. Perkins, 12 Mo., 254. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiffs claim the land which is the subject of controversy in this suit, as heirs of Isaac W Griffith, who died seised of the same in 1819. His estate was insolvent. Judgments were obtained against his administrators in 1820, executions were issued thereon, and the property sold by the sheriff. The defendants claim under the purchaser at this sale. On the trial, the court below instructed the jury "that the sheriff's deed, read in evidence under the judgments and executions also in evidence, was effectual to devest the title of the heirs of Isaac H. Griffith to the land mentioned in said deed." It is admitted, that in the State of Missouri the lands of a deceased debtor may be taken in execution, and sold by the sheriff, in satisfaction of a judgment against the administrator. And also that such deed vests in the purchaser all the estate and interest which the deceased had in the property at the time of his death. But it is alleged that this sale is "without authority of law and void," because the execution was issued and sale made before the time limited for stay of execution against the real estate of a decedent. The law and the faets on which this objection to the validity of the sale is founded are as follows: By an Act of 1817, it is provided that "all lands, tenements and hereditaments shall be "Within:" day of the act included. People v. Wood, 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs., 61. Contra, day of the act excluded. People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 28 Barb., 284. The manner of computing time is settled in New York by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 788 Fractions of a day are not regarded except for the purpose of guarding against injustice. Blydenburgh v. Cotheal, 4 N. Y., 418; S. C., 5 How. Pr., 200; 3 Code R., 216; Jones v. Porter, 6 How. Pr., 286; Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 1 El. & Bl., 816; 1 C. L. R., 192; 17 Jur., 551; 22 L. J. M. C., 109. Sunday and fractions of a day not regarded. McGill v. Bank of U. S., 12 Wheat., 511; Col. T. Co. v. Haywood, 10 Wend., 422; Hughes v. Patton, 12 Wend., 234; Rush v. Van Benschoten, 1 How. Pr., 149. The doctrine that in law there is no fraction of a day, is a mere legal fiction, and is true only sub modo, and in a limited sense, whenever it will promote the purposes of substantial justice. Matter of Richardson, 6 Law Rep., 392; S. C., 2 Story, 571. Where it is necessary to show which of two events first took place, the court may enter into the question of the fractions of a day; therefore the court will regard the particular hour at which a defendant dies, so as to see whether execution issued previously to his demise. Clinch v. Smith, 8 D. P. C., 337. The law will take notice of fractions of a day when the precise hour becomes material, as in ascertaining the priority of liens. Haden v. Buddensick, 49 How. Pr., 241. |