the reissued and corrected patent. By the de- | the facts in the case whether the specifications, fects provided for in the statute, nothing passes including the claim, were so precise as to ento the public from the specifications or claims, able any person skilled in the structure of within the scope of the patentee's invention. machines, to make the one described. This And this may be ascertained by the language the statute requires, and of this the jury are to he uses. judge. In the case of Stimpson v. The West Chester The jury are also to judge of the novelty of Railroad Co., 4 How., 380, it was held, that the invention, and whether the renewed patent "where a defective patent had been surren- is for the same invention as the original patent; dered, and a new one taken out, and the pat- and they are to determine whether the invenentee brought an action for a violation of his tion has been abandoned to the public. There patent right, laying the infringement at a date are other questions of fact which come within subsequent to that of the reissued patent, proof the province of a jury, such as the identity of of the use of the thing patented, during the the machine used by the defendant with that interval between the original and renewed of the plaintiff's, or whether they have been patents, will not defeat the action." In the constructed and act on the same principle. same case it was also held, that the proceed- The judgment is reversed, and the cause is ing before the commissioner, in the surrender remanded to the circuit court, for further and reissue of a patent, is not open for investi-proceedings. gation except on the ground of fraud. The patent of 1843 was not surrendered on the obtainment of the patent of 1844. That was intended to be a new invention of arranging and combining the toothed rollers, which, the patentee says, was not made the subject of a claim in the patent of 1843. The patent of 1844 was canceled, but not reissued, when the patent of 1849 was issued. At that time, the patent of 1843, and the improvement thereon, dated January 20, 1844, were surrendered and canceled, and new letters patent were issued on an amended specification. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. Cited 9 Wall., 795, 796; 11 Wall., 544; 14 Otto, 749; 1 Cliff., 6:32; 2 Cliff., 222, 374, 376, 387, 535: 4 Blatchf., 496; 5 Blatchf., 141, 148:11 Blatchf., 319; 13 Biatchf., 301; 2 Bond, 72, 73: 1 Biss., 308; 2 Biss., 478; 6 Biss., 496; 10 Biss., 416; 2 Abb., N. S., 406; 1 Holmes, 55. App'ts, THE GALLIOTE VENELIA, EDDES, Master, her Tackle, Apparel and Furniture. The cause of the surrender of the patent of SAMUEL MAYER AND HENRY MAYER, 1843, as stated in the charge to the jury, was the ruling of the court in the case of Battin v. Clayton, and that the amended patent of 1849 was consequently obtained. That ruling is not now before us, nor is it necessary to inquire whether the patent of 1843, on the specifica tions and claim, was sustainable. The plaint. iff, by a surrender of that patent, and the procurement of the patent of 1849, with amended specifications, abandoned his first patent and relied wholly on the one reissued. The claim and specifications in this patent, as Argued Dec. 18, 1854. Decided Dec. 18, 1854. amendatory of the first, were within the 13th section of the Act of 1836. It is said with entire accuracy in the charge, in regard to the amended specification of the patent of 1849, that it described essentially the same machine as the former one did, but claimed, as the thing invented, the breaking apparatus only." And this the patentee had a right to do. He had a right to restrict or enlarge his claim, s0 as to give it validity and to effectuate his in vention. Appeal dismissed with costs by court because neither party was prepared to argue at second term. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Mr. H. M. Phillips for appellants. Messrs. Kane and Fallon for appellees. Mr. Chief Justice Taney made the following order in this cause, Dec. 18, 1854: In the argument, the counsel very properly This cause came on to be heard on the tranconsidered the patent of 1844, as not in the script of the record from the Circuit Court of case. It was designed to secure a new com- the United States for the Eastern District of bination, not included in the first patent, and Pennsylvania, and it occurring to the court as the patent of 1844 was surrendered and here that this is the second term at which this canceled and not reissued, it being equally dis-case has been called for argument, and that connected with the patent of 1843, and the reissued and corrected patent of 1849, it can have no effect on the claim of the plaintiff. We think the court also erred in saying to the jury, "We instruct you that your verdict, in each case, must be for the defendants." This, as well as the two instructions above noticed, took from the jury, facts which it was their province to examine and determine. It was the right of the jury to determine from neither party is now prepared to argue the same, it is considered by the court that this appeal should be dismissed at the costs of the appellants, pursuant to the 55th rule of this court; whereupon, it is now here ordered aud decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, to be proceeded in according to law and justice. THE NORWICH AND NEW LONDON | ther proceedings to be had therein in conformSTEAMBOAT COMPANY, a Corporation, ity to law and justice, the said appeal notwith&c., owners of the Steamboat WORCESTER, standing. her Engines, Tackle, &c., Libelants, App'ts, THE STEAMSHIP OHIO, her Tackle, &c., (See S. C., 17 How., 17-19.) Where the amouut claimed in a libel does not exceed $2,000, this court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal will be dismissed, although if proper interest to time of the trial be added it will exceed $2,000. The practice of ascertaining the damages in the Appeal dismissed, &c., with costs, on certificate Circuit Court, cannot affect the question of jurisof clerk that no return had been tiled. Argued Dec. 18, 1854. Decided Dec. 18, 1854. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Mr. Lord for appellees. No opposing coun sel on motion to dismiss. diction. The amount claimed must be sufficient on the face of the pleading. Amendment to the pleading, stating the interest, will not be allowed in this court. Argued Dec. 2, 1854. THE Decided Jan. 3, 1855. HE case is fully stated by the court. Mr. Chief Justice Taney made the follow-diction. Mr. E. C. Benedict for appellant, ing order: Dec. 18, 1854. Mr. Lord, of counsel of the appellees, having filed and read in open court the following certificate, to wit: Messrs. Donohue and Cutting for appellees. of the court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of U. S. Circuit Court, Southern District of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The Norwich and New London Steamboat Company, Corporation, etc., Owners of the Steamboat Worcester, her Engine, Tackle, &c., Libelants, Appellants, v. The Steamboat Bay State, her Steam Engine, Boiler, &c., Richard Borden, Jefferson Borden, Nathan Durfee, Fidelia B. Durfee, Joseph B. Durfee, James S. Warner, Mary B. Durfee, Walter Paine, Joseph Butler, David S. Brown, William S. Tisdale, William Borden, Robert H. McCurdy, Herman L. Aldrich, and William Spencer, Claimants and Respondents. I, John W. Nelson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, do hereby certify that the above cause in admiralty was heard and a decree entered in favor of the claimants on the 8th day of October, 1853; that an appeal was taken in the cause, and allowed on the 27th of the same month and year, and that no return has been made to the same. JOHN W. NELSON, Clerk." And having stated that the appellants had altogether failed to file the record of said cause in this court, or in any way to prosecute said appeal, now here move the court in pursuance of the 63d rule of this court to have this appeal docketed and dismissed; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that this appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York be, and the same is hereby docketed, and dismissed with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to said Circuit Court, for fur42 The libel was filed in the District Court, which stated that in the years 1847 and 1848, the steamship Ohio, then being in process of construction by Bishop and Simonson, the libelant furnished, at the City of New York, for the building of said vessel, a large quantity of materials, timber and tree-nails. That said articles, at a fair price, amounted in the whole to the sum of $2,973.57, of which sum there is still due $2,159.28, less tree-nails, which not having been used were to be received back by the libelant, amounting to the sum of $468. That the balance of $1,691.28, the owners, or those in charge of said vessel, have refused to pay, &c. The appeal states the claim to be at the time of the trial in the Circuit Court, interest included, $2,164.86. The libel was dismissed in the District Court, and the case was appealed to the Circuit Court. In that court the decree of the District Court was affirmed, from which an appeal was taken to this court. A motion is now made to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. It is stated by the counsel opposed to the motion, that it is the uniform practice in the Southern District of New York, to establish on the hearing only the liability of the defendant, and to have the amount of the damages ascertained on a reference to a commissioner, as the proofs in the record are not the fuli proof, as to the amount of the damages. It is not perceived how the practice in the Circuit Court can affect the question of jurisdiction. The decree of the District Court which dismissed the libel, having been af firmed by the Circuit Court we must look to the claim of the appellant in his libel whether it exceeds the sum of $2,000. The balance of the account claimed, only amounts to the sum of $1,691.86. But it is insisted that if the interest on this sum be computed, up to the time of trial in the Circuit Court, the sum would exceed the amount required to give jurisdiction. Where the claim is founded on dollars and cents, whether it be a libel, a bill in chancery, or an action at law, the damages must appear to give jurisdiction on the face of the pleading on which the claim is made. No computation of interest will be made to give jurisdiction, unless it be specially claimed in the libel. If not intended to be included in the claim of damages, it should be specially stated. This would certainly be the case in an action at law, and no reason is perceived why the rule should be relaxed in a case of libel. Under the 24th admiralty rule of this court, it is suggested, the libel may be amended at any time as of course, on application to the court. And if this be necessary, the counsel now moves to amend the libel by inserting "together with the interest to the time of the final decree in this court or any appellate court.' It has not been the practice of this court to allow amendments, except by the consent of parties; though, in the case of Kennedy v. Ga. State Bank, 8 How., 610, this court say: there is nothing in the nature of an ap pellate jurisdiction, proceeding according to the common law, which forbids the granting of amendments, &c., but the practice has been to remand the cause to the lower court for amend ment. If amendments be allowed so as to give jurisdiction to this court, where there was no jurisdiction when the trial was had and the appeal taken, parties would be taken by surprise, and litigation would be encouraged. The plaintiff, under such circumstances, would never fail to sustain the jurisdiction of this court, on his appeal. On the ground that the matter in dispute does not appear on the face of the libel to exceed $2,000, the appeal is dismissed. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Cited 16 Wall., 345; 35 Ill., 174. JAMES N. OLNEY, Libelant and Appellant, v. THE STEAMSHIP FALCON, her Tackle, &c., AND GEORGE LAW AND MARSHALL O. ROBERTS, Claimants. (See S. C., 17 How., 19-22.) Jurisdiction-amount necessary-interest, when not to be included in. Where the amount claimed in a libel is "eighteen hundred dollars and upwards," although these terms were intended to embrace the interest, which to the time of trial would increase the sum to over NOTE.-See note to Shields v. Thomas, 17 How., 3. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Messrs. Benedict and Bradley for appellant. Mr. Cutting for appellee. Mr. Justice McLean delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, in admiralty. A motion is made by defendants' counsel to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. In the libel, the shipment of a box of merchandise which was not delivered to the consignee, &c., is alleged, and that the libelant is entitled to recover of said vessel the damages by him sustained, which amount to the sum of $1,800 and upwards, &c. The District Court dismissed the libel, from which decision an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, and that court affirmed the decision of the District Court. From this last decision an appeal has been taken to this court. On the part of the appellant it is stated, that the claim was for $1,800 and upwards, besides the interest; that, on the hearing, the libelant claimed the said principal and interest, amounting to $2,250, and that he was entitled to recover on his proofs and allegations that sum. That this was the claim at the time of the ap peal, and that another year's interest has since accrued, and it is contended that the sum sworn to, being $1,800 and upwards, was intended to cover the accruing interest. The right of appeal from the Circuit to the Supreme Court is given "where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of costs." The defendant can ap peal where the judgment or decree against him exceeds the sum or value of $2,000; but an appeal may be taken by the plaintiff where his claim of damages, in the declaration or libel, exceeds the above sum, or where the value of the thing claimed exceeds it, as this is held to be the matter in dispute. The appellant in this case claims in his libel, which is sworn to, $1,800 and upwards. The words "and upwards "it is said were intended to embrace the interest, and that if this be calculated from the time of filing the libel up to the time of the trial, the sum would exceed $2,000. The interest in an action of this kind, if taken into view, is considered as a part of the damages, being merged in that claim, and is not estimated as a distinct item. The claim of more than $1,800 is too indefinite to give jurisdiction under the Act of Congress; and the interest not being specially claimed, for the reason stated, cannot be computed. The appeal is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Gordon v. Ogden. 3 Pet., 34; Scott v. Lunt's Administrator, 6 Pet., 349. Cause dismissed. Cited 16 Wall., 345. ROBERT WICKLIFFE, App't, v. THOMAS D. OWINGS. (See S. C., 17 How., 47-53.) Jurisdiction properly averred, how denied-of chancery decree on reversal, for affirmative relief. Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court dependent on residence of the parties,appears by proper averments on the record, the defendant can only impugn it by a special plea. See equity rule 39. A court of chancery has jurisdiction upon general principles (and also in this case by a statute of Kentucky), to grant perpetual injunctions for quicting titles, after the right has been settled at law. Imputations of fraud in this case not sustained, nor the allegation of a prior action. This court on reversal render such decree as the court below ought to have have rendered. Argued Dec. 15, 1854. Decided Jan. 3, 1855. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky. Wickliffe filed his bill in chancery in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky against Thomas Deye Owings, to be quieted in the possession and right to certain tracts and parcels of land of which he alleges he is seised in fee and holds in actual possession. The relief is sought under general principles of equity, but more particularly under the Connecticut Statute of 1796, which gives the owner of the legal title who is in possession, a right to quiet his title against claimants. 1 Morehead & B., Ky. Stat., 294. The answer denies the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the defendant is a citizen of Connecticut; and alleges that if Wickliffe has any legal title, he obtained it by fraud; and also sets forth that the defendant had filed a bill in chancery, to be let in to redeem in the Circuit Court of the County of Bath, State of Kentucky, before the institution of this suit, which he informally alleges as ground to abate this suit. The court below dismissed the bill. Complainant appealed to this court. A further statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. C. A. Wickliffe and Preston, for appellant, contended: That the court has jurisdiction, because the defendant is a resident of Texas; that the suit of Wickliffe was first pending: that the charge of fraud is not sustained by the proof; that the compromise with Bascom will be favored in equity. Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Leggett's Heirs v. Ashley, 5 Littell, 178; Fisher v. May, 2 Bibb., 448; Mills v. Lee, 6 Monroe, 98; Bates v. Todd, 4 Littell, 177; see, also, Elmendorf v. Tay lor, 10 Wheat., 152; Fenwick v. Macey, 1.Dana, 279. The legal title to the lands in controversy, being in Wickliffe, coupled with the possession. he should have his title quieted. Mr. A. H. Lawrence, for appellees: The bill in this case was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky against Thomas Deye Owings, to be quieted in the possession and right to sundry tracts and parcels of land enumerated in the bill, of which he alleges he is seised in fee, and holds in actual possession. The bill further alleges that the defendant Owings had set up title and claim to the land in question without any right in him whatever, and had thus injured the title of the complainant. The relief sought is under general principles | of equity, but more particularly under the Kentucky Statute of 1796, which gives the owner of the legal estate who is in possession, the right to quiet his title against claimants. 1 Morehead & Brown, Ky. Stats.. 294. To this bill the defendant has filed an answer, denying the jurisdiction of the court, and deny ing that he was a citizen of the State of Texas, but stating that he was residing in Kentucky at the time this suit was brought. The answer admits the possession of Wickliffe, and does not directly traverse the allegation that Wickliffe is vested with the legal title, but alleges that if said Wickliffe has any legal title he obtained it by fraud. The answer also sets forth that he, the defendant Owings, had filed a bill in chancery, to be let in to redeem in the Circuit Court of the County of Bath, State of Kentucky, before the institution of this suit, which he alleges as ground to abate the suit. The court below dismissed the bill, whereupon the complainant took an appeal to this court. The case is further stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Justice Campbell delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky, against Thomas Deye Owings, by which he assumes to be the owner, and in the lawful possession, of a number of tracts of land, lying in different counties of that State, which had at one time been the property of the defendant, but of which he had been legally devested, and notwithstanding claims, by the instigation and advice of other persons, to the prejudice and vexation of the plaintiff. The object of the bill is to establish the title and to quiet the possession of the plaintiff. The facts disclosed by the record are: that in the years 1817 and 1818, the defendant was possessed of a very large estate in lands, but was indebted beyond his means of payment. During those years, two of his creditors (Luke Tiernan and Samuel Smyth) respectively recovered, in the Circuit Court of the United States for Kentucky, judgments for the aggre gate sum of $25.000 and upwards; the one by default, the other by confession. Immediately thereafter, the defendant adopted a system of legal proceedings, to postpone the day of payment of those judgments, which terminated in the augmentation of the debt, and the introduction of other persons, in the character of sureties, to share in the entanglements of the debtor. By the interposition of injunctions, replevin, and stay bonds, and for the want of bidders at execution sales, the defendant withstood his creditors until 1824. In November, 1824, Tiernan purchased a number of the tracts in dispute, and others in 1827 and 1834, under the executions, and for which he has the deeds of the Marshal. In 1820. Samuel Smyth assigned his judg ment to Ellicott and Meredith, in trust for creditors, and these persons, between 1826 and 1829, purchased nearly, if not all, of the tracts for which Tiernan had acquired a title. In 1824, before any of these sales, Owings had conveyed the lands to the suretics whom he had involved upon the bonds before referred to in these and other cases, for their indem nity, and delivered to them the possession of the property, and ceased to have any control of it. He gave to them authority to "sell, dis pose of, and convey any of the estate, whenever it might be necessary for their protection,' and in such cases as a majority of them might consider as most beneficial to all concerned, in case their principal was in default. Tiernan and Meredith and Ellicott, in 1827, commenced suits for various parcels of the lands they had purchased at the marshal's sales, in the Circuit Court of the United States, and recovered judgments. The questions involved in the issues, appear to be the regularity of the sales by which they acquired title. In 1829, after a portion of these trials, the sureties and assignees of Owings executed a deed to Ellicott and Meredith, for the tracts of land described in the bill, upon a general compromise" with with them, by which the debt to samuel Smyth, with the various bonds taken to secure it, were surrendered to be canceled. The record shows that Owings was advised of this settlement, and expressed approbation of it. Some time after this settlement with the assignees of Owings, an arrangement was concluded between Tier nan, Ellicott and Meredith, and the Bank of the United States, by which the bank agreed to reimburse Tiernan for his debt and advances, and to cancel an indebtedness of Smyth, and to take the title to the property they had acquired by these proceedings. This arrangement was carried into effect by a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States, in which a sale was or dered, at which in 1834 and 1835, the bank became the purchaser. In 1836, the bank sold its title to the plaintiff in this suit. In order to free the title from any imperfections, a bill was filed in the Circuit Court of Bath County, Kentucky; and in that suit, the titles of Tiernan, Ellicott and Meredith, and the bank, were, in 1848, conveyed to him. In the course of these proceedings, a number of confirmatory deeds were taken from purchasers of portions of the property at the marshal's sales, that it is unimportant to describe. To appreciate fully the case of the plaintiff, it is proper to notice a transaction between him and Mr. Bascom, the son in law and attorney in fact of Owings, in 1837. The plaintiff, after the acquisition of his titles from the bank, instituted suits for the recovery of the family residence and other lands of the defendant, in the courts of Kentucky. At the trial term of these suits, a proposal for an adjustment was submitted to the plaintiff, by Mr. Bascom (under the advice of counsel), which was accepted by him. He agreed to convey to Mrs. Bascom the family residence and other lots, a balance due on the judgment of Tiernan, to release the claim for mesne profits, and to dismiss the suits pending, each party to pay costs. Owings and Bascom were to confirm the title acquired by the plaintiff, to the lands described in the bill. This settlement was executed by the de livery of the proper evidences of title. Those in the name of Owings were executed by Bascom as his attorney in fact. The land conveyed to Mrs. Bascom has remained in the family till this time, and in 1847 was divided among the children of Owings, in a suit to which he was a party. The validity of the conveyance of Wickliffe to her, was asserted in that suit, and admitted in the decree of the court, as the basis upon which it was founded. Owings, in 1836 or 1837, left the United States for Texas; during the interval, from 1837 to 1849, the plaintiff was in the open possession of the property. Before the departure of Owings, the plaintiff had offered to reconvey to him the whole of his purchases, upon an extended credit and a reduced rate of interest, for the consideration of the debts and costs they represented; which proposal Owings acknowledged his inability to accept, and fulfill the obligations he would thus incur. In 1849, he was induced to return to the United States, and to renew the controversy which had been so long pending, by the asser tion of pretensions hostile to the title of the plaintiff, and prejudicial to his useful and peaceful enjoyment. The evidence shows that the lands are in the possession of the plaintiff, occupied by a numerous body of tenantry; that sales have been obstructed and rents diminished by the assertion of these claims. The right of the plaintiff to relief is rested upon the general principles of equity, as well as a statute of Kentucky, to the effect "that any person having both the legal title to, and the possession of land, may institute a suit against any other person setting up a claim thereto, and if the complainant shall establish his title the defendant shall be decreed to release his claim." (1 Bro. and More, Stat., 429.) The jurisdiction of a court of chancery to grant perpetual injunctions for quieting inheritances, after the right and matter in question has been fairly settled by concurring verdicts, has been long established; and in addition to this general ground for equitable interference, this case presents a strong claim for the interposition of the court, arising from the settlement between Bascom, as the attorney in fact of the defendent, and the plaintiff. The consideration of that settlement has been enjoyed for many years, by the family of Owings. We conclude that this arrangement, embracing the fact that a confirmatory deed to the plaintiff had been executed in his name, under the letter of attorney to Bascom, was communicated to him, and that it received his approbation. If additional assurances were, therefore, required to perfect the title of the plaintiff, and to maintain his quiet enjoyment, it is the duty of the court to exact them. But if a question might arise upon the facts of this case, upon this branch of it, there will be none when we connect it with the statute of Kentucky: "When the nature of our conflicting titles," says the Supreme Court of that State, whether derived from the laws of Virginia or of this State, are considered, there is an apparent necessity of permitting the holder of the legal estate to call his adversary to the test when it cannot be otherwise reached. This act ought |