the old gnomic poet, whenever we speak of Pompey: again, velit nolit scire difficile est *: and, you know how slow and how silent he is.'t To Cicero he seems a perfect treasure-house of haute politique, carefully and deliberately shrouded by him in silence. The cynical Caelius takes a much lower view of this sphinx, when he writes to Cicero +

'If you have met Pompey, let me know what impression he gave you, how he spoke, what views he expressed-his real feelings are of course quite different from what he expresses; but then he has not sufficient adroitness (neque tantum valere ingenio) to conceal his thoughts.'

Probably the real reason why he never disclosed his opinions was that he had no opinions to disclose. But such was not the belief of his contemporaries in general, few of whom were so irreverent as Caelius. To Cicero, as I have said, the Triumvirate mainly meant Pompey. He does not use the words Triumvirs and 'Triumvirate' at all: the nearest approach is Prov. Cons. 41, quoted on p. xii. (note †). Nor have they any consistent solidarity for Cicero. Sometimes he calls them illi qui tenent, or qui tenent omnia, or populares, or dynastae; sometimes the primacy of Pompey is more clearly expressed, as when he calls the Triumvirs dominus (Pompey) and advocati (Caesar and Crassus).§ Anon he speaks of the Triumvirate as if it were the autocracy of Pompey. Writing to Atticus (154, 2), he says: I feel no concern at seeing all the powers of the State in the hands of one man. Why? Because it is breaking the hearts of those who could not bear to see any power at all in mine.' Of course in process of time the coalition begins to look more like a party. Cicero speaks of it as res in 119, 1, and writes as if it were likely to be indefinitely prolonged, as, indeed, it might have been but for the deaths of two not very eminent people, Julia, the wife of Pompey, and the Triumvir Crassus, than whom, at this crisis, Rome could certainly have better spared a better man. His feelings towards the several members of the coalition are quite different. He speaks of Crassus in his private letters in the language of dislike and † 104, 2 nosti hominis tarditatem et taciturnitatem.

159, § 4.

Fam. viii. 1, 3 (192). § Att. ii. 19, 3. It is most probable that this is the meaning of the passage.

contempt. O hominem nequam* are the words which dismiss him on his journey to the province from which he was never to return. We have seen that he professes, at least, to enjoy carrying out the behests of Pompey; but he feels that the palinode in praise of Caesar looks a little ugly' (subturpicula). Yet he is repelled by the unsympathetic arrogance of Pompey, and fascinated by the generous courtesy of Caesar, from whom, however, he recoils as the natural enemy of the Constitutionalists. The coalition had not any such solidarity as would have justified Cicero in looking on it as a permanent Party; it was not much more than a temporary Cave. It was, indeed, a coalition which never fully coalesced. Cicero might himself have made it a Quattuorvirate, as he expressly tells us in the speech De Provinciis Consularibus.† The ties which held together the champion of the democracy, the leader of the aristocracy, and the great capitalist, were at different times drawn very tightly and almost entirely relaxed. It was a conspiracy of Genius, Position, and Capital, against the Law, which places bounds to all these three. How the ideal of Cicero became impossible, and how Pompey drifted into the lawless. designs of Caesar, is excellently told by a careful student and brilliant exponent of this epoch of Roman history.‡ When Pompey returned, the idol of his victorious army at the conclusion of the Mithridatic War, he might have seized Rome and established a military despotism, as Caesar did afterwards. As we know, he refrained from such a treacherous and criminal act. The sequel is thus described in the essay to which we have referred :

'Pompey believed that the highest place would be freely granted to him as soon as he had proved his loyalty by refusing to seize on it. He appealed to the honour of his countrymen not at least to refuse that which a few weeks before he could have commanded-the confirmation, namely, of his arrangements respecting his Asiatic conquests, and the redemption of his promise of grants of

* 130, 2. The letter to Crassus (131) is a somewhat official composition, and is not to be taken as a perfectly accurate expression of opinion.

† § 41 me in tribus sibi coniunctissimis consularibus esse voluit. Observe the vagueness of the words which mean the Triumvirate. For other proofs leading in this direction, see Att. ii. 1, §§ 6 and 7 (27); ii. 3, 3 (29). See also vol. 13, p. 29, note ‡. Mr. J. L. Strachan-Davidson in The Quarterly Review, No. 296, October, 1879.

land to his victorious soldiers. With a short-sighted perversity of ingratitude the Senate refused both these requests. Pompey's disappointment was bitter; he was called to act in a situation where right and wrong were no longer so clear, and in which his want of political capacity and political training led him into fatal errors. A year and a half elapsed from Pompey's landing in Italy, and still the confusions of the situation showed no signs of clearing. The union of Senate and Equites under the leadership of Pompey, the ideal combination of which Cicero dreamed, failed to realize itself, owing to the selfishness and impracticability of the parties. At length, about the middle of the year 694 (60), Caesar, who had been absent for some months as pro-praetor in Spain, returned to Rome; and a very different solution presented itself in the famous coalition of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. Caesar promised, if he were made consul, and were duly backed up by his confederates, that he would obtain for them, legally or illegally, the measures which each desired. The Equites, with whom Crassus was leagued, were anxious for a remission of their contracts for the collection of the taxes; and this claim was now to be satisfied. Pompey's acts in Asia were to be confirmed, and his soldiers were to have their lands. Caesar in return bargained for a province and an army. The bribe was too tempting to be resisted. The patience of Pompey was worn out. He had not the magnanimity to submit to vexation and discomfiture rather than swerve from the straight path. He had virtue enough not to break the law himself, when he might have reaped all the advantages of the crime; he had not firmness enough to refuse to take advantage of the breach of the law by another, who professed himself willing to act in his behalf. In his short-sightedness he probably hardly recognized that his compact with Caesar was treasonable. This compact is the turning-point of Pompey's life. Henceforth he is no longer master of his own course; he is driven to a succession of forced moves. He, who would fain be the champion of legality, is obliged to defend the illegal acts of Caesar. He, who refused to bear arms against the State, provides with an army a rival who has no such scruple. In the interest of the coalition to which he has bound himself, he is obliged to undertake the task for which he is least fitted, that of guiding the turbulent politics of the city. His warlike achievements grow pale beside the fresh glories of Caesar. His efforts to obtain a compensating power elsewhere fail. In spite of misgivings, he is forced to renew the Triumvirate at the conference of Luca. He is doomed to work at building up, stone by stone, the edifice of his rival's greatness, only to find out too late that he has created a power which aims at the destruction of the Republic, and to perish at last in a desperate effort to undo the work of his own hands.

'Pompey's great fault is, that he aspired to a political career without any political creed or political principle. He belongs to no party; he represents no consistent idea. He never seems to have come to any conclusion on the main question of the day, the alternative of an aristocratical or a despotic government. In his youth his sword had helped Sulla to set up the authority of the Senate; and he drew the sword again in his old age in vain defence of that authority; yet, by

his restoration of the tribunician power in his first consulship, he struck a deadly blow at the polity which Sulla had established; and in his extraordinary commands and offices he traversed every rule of the aristocratic régime, and gave precedents for almost all the arrangements of the imperial system. Dean Merivale has some justification for beginning his "History of the Romans under the Empire" with the return of Pompey from the conquest of Mithridates. Throughout a long political life Pompey hardly ever ventured to initiate a policy or to originate a reform. He wished to be the leader of Roman politics, but had not the wit to see that a leader must needs accept responsibility. Because he is virtuous, Rome is to tolerate a physician who has no idea what is the disease of which the State is sickening, or what the remedy which he will prescribe.'

All credit is due to Pompey for refraining from the crime which Caesar committed when he made himself master of Rome

by force of arms. Yet it may be doubted whether the face of history would have been greatly changed if Pompey had won the Battle of Pharsalia. The use which he made of his position as the sole remaining Triumvir on the departure of Crassus for Syria (the other, Caesar, being absent in Gaul) was certainly far from constitutional. His first design seems to have been to gain the dictatorship; but his characteristic tarditas et taciturnitas made him dissemble his ambition, hoping apparently that the greatness would be thrust on him which his flat unraised spirit' forbade him to achieve for himself. His first act was to seek the support of Cicero. We must take a very brief retrospect, to show in what position the great orator now stood.

When Cicero returned from exile, he enjoyed an unmixed triumph in his reception by Rome and Italy. It is an incident unique in Roman history, and justifies the words in which he speaks of his return as an ascent into heaven, rather than a restoration to his country' (Pro Dom. 75). Indeed the glories of his return for a while eclipse in his mind, and supersede in his words, the triumphs of his consulate. Three days after his return

*A fine phrase of Pindar's excellently describes Pompey: There is whom, overmuch mistrusting his strength, a faint heart, dragging him back by the hand, hath robbed of his guerdon due'

τὸν δ ̓ αὖ καταμεμφθέντ' ἄγαν

ἰσχὺν οἰκείων παρέσφαλεν καλῶν

χειρὸς ἕλκων ὀπίσσω θυμὸς ἄτολμος ἐών.—NEM. xi. 30.

he proposed the investment of Pompey with the Commissionership of the corn-supply. This was merely a mark of gratitude for the part which Pompey had taken in his restoration; and no one looked upon it as a bid for the favour of the Triumvirs. The extraordinary warmth of his reception, the acquittal of Sestius, and many other circumstances, made Cicero hope for a revival of the Optimate party. The consuls for the year were boni. The Triumvirate seemed to be falling to pieces. Cicero began to think he might resume his old position as champion of the aristocracy. He was bold enough to announce on April 5, 698 (56), his intention of calling on the Senate to review, on May 15, the legislation of Caesar's consulate in 695 (59), especially the allotment of the Campanian land under the agrarian laws of that year. This was a direct challenge to Caesar, and would have revived the Optimate party by giving them a banner round which to rally. But Cicero ought to have perceived that his former position was not to be regained. The attacks made on the workmen who were engaged in rebuilding his house on the Palatine showed him that he had many active and bitter enemies (cp. especially Ep. 92). The aristocracy, for whom he had suffered so much, were offended by the enthusiasm displayed at the restoration of the novus homo ; and the scurra consularis had a biting way of putting a grumbling aristocrat in the wrong. The light of his genius quenched the embers of Optimate enthusiasm, as the rays of the sun seem to extinguish a dying fire. They petted Clodius (153, 19),* and

* Mr. A. C. Clark, in his admirable Introduction to his edition of the Pro Milone, has an interesting sketch of Clodius. He says (pp. xvi, xvii) :—'The story of Roman anarchy is inseparably connected with the name of Clodius. It is not here to the point to inquire what degree of credence should be given to the various charges brought against his private character. Our information largely comes from Cicero, who is a prejudiced witness. The orator was a good hater; and it was a necessity of his nature to have an enemy. Clodius may not have been so black as he is painted. ... The Roman nobles, who were always ready to overlook peccadilloes in an aristocrat, petted Clodius, and evidently looked on him as an amusing person, not quite responsible for his actions. However, after making all possible allowances, it cannot be doubted that he was devoid of all conscience, and paraded his contempt for law, order, and morals in an unblushing manner. . . . As a politician his chief object was s'encanailler, and so successful was he in this that he is known to history, like bis equally famous and more brilliant sister, not by his patrician name of Claudius, but by the popular pronunciation of the name. He had no serious end in