money then in use, viz., 16 times as many grains in each silver dollar as

in the gold dollar. The platform

further demanded that the mints should be opened without waiting for the aid or consent of any foreign nation.*

The opposition denied that the hard times were caused by an insufficient volume of money. They claimed that the falling prices were due to improved methods, and they refused to recognize that there was such a thing as an average of prices. They did this in the face of the measurement of the price level by Sauerbeck in England and by a committee of United States Senators, and others. To defeat the bimetallists a denial of these patent facts was necessary. The McKinley forces had to deny that there was any connection between the volume of money and prices. They ridiculed the idea that

the volume of money had anything to do with prices or with prosperity.

The position of the bimetallists was so thoroughly misrepresented, owing to the $16,000,000 campaign fund of the party of Hanna, that a sufficient num. ber of people were deceived to defeat the ticket which demanded more money. A change of 20,000. votes, however, properly distributed would have elect ed Mr. Bryan; and it is claimed besides, that many election frauds were perpetrated through the use of money, and it is a fact that many bankers and employers coerced those over whom they exercised power.

From the foregoing it is clear that in 1896 the bimetallists were right in claiming that the depression could be ended by an increase in the volume of money. The fallacy in the present claims of the Administration is set

FREE SILVER PLANK or 1896.

We declare that the Act of 1873 demonetizing silver [thereby shutting off an important source of money supply] without the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people [and therefore] a heavy increase in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad; the prostration of

forth at pages 4, 6 and preceding paragraph.

Let us next consider the existing industrial conditions in order to ascertain which of the parties should be continued in power.

industry and impoverishment of the people. ***

We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender equally with gold for all debts, public and private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent in future the demonetization of any kind of legal tender money by private contract.

I. Falling Price Level. The high point in the price level was reached last April. The rise was 34 per But cent above the low point in 1897. since last April there has been a fall amounting to 7 per cent (page 7 above), AND AS A RESULT THERE IS, OF COURSE, A GROWING STAGNATION IN PRODUCTION AND TRADE, as set forth in a succeeding section. The additional cause of the industrial depression is as follows:

2. Competitive Prices Are Abol

ished--Monopoly Prices Exist. Monopoly prices in production and trade are also tending to cause depression. The tremendous development of monopoly prices has exerted a widespread evil effect. The trust magnates have put their selling prices above the competitive level and have kept below the competitive level the prices they pay for raw products and labor. THE RESULT IS THAT THE PEOPLE'S INCOME IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO BUY ALL THE THINGS PRODUCED, THUS LEAVING A SURPLUS. This surplus is the talk of the day. The

trust magnates are frantic in their efforts to secure a foreign market for it. And this is one of the causes of the policy of seeking foreign markets with 13-inch guns.

The tendency of the surplus is to reduce the number of hands employed, and this further reduces the people's purchasing power, thus tending to cause other hands to be discharged. THIS TENDENCY TOWARD A DISCHARGE OF HANDS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNTIL PRICES ARE AGAIN FIXED BY COMPETITION OR REGULATED BY A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OR THE GOVERNMENT OWNS AND OPERATES THE PLANTS, THUS THUS CONTROLLING PRICES, OR A COMBINATION OF THESE REMEDIES MAY BE EMPLOYED. Only these four lines of remedy are open. It is either the restoration of competitive prices, government regulation of prices, government ownership and operation, or a combination of these systems.

Depression Was Foretold.

More than a year ago the writer foretold the industrial depression that must invariably result from the existence of monopoly prices; and he found that

the same ideas prevailed quite generally, but that they were not being expressed publicly. June 16 of last year the following letter was addressed to the leading commercial journal in New York City:

NEW YORK, June 16, 1893. Editor of the Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin:

The Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin has performed a great service in collecting the statistics as to the development of trusts, and it has raised several questions as to what will be the effect of this tremendous change. I wish to raise the further question, Will it result in an industrial depression and one that will grow in intensity in proportion to the length of time that the particular prices are THUS FIXED BY

BOARDS OF DIRECTORS INSTEAD OF BY THE LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND? I believe that such a depression will ensue, and the reasons for my belief are as fol-lows:

When there was competition among the business firms engaged in buying and selling produce there were industrial depressions only when the price level fell, while with a rising price level the reverse occurred; but with the abolition of competition among business firms and the introduction of a system whereby the prices of products and labor are arbitrarily fixed by boards of directors, THE RESULT IS A GROWING SURPLUS OF PRODUCTS OWING TO THE FACT THAT THE INCOMES OF THOSE WHO WORK AMOUNT TO A LESS NUMBER OF DOLLARS

THAN IS REQUIRED ΤΟ PURCHASE THE PRODUCTS OF THEIR LABOR. The consequence is an increase in the number of unemployed, loss of profits on the part of the employers not in the monopolies, and reduction in wages, and with each lessening of the income of the workers there is a reduction in the demand for products, and this calls for a further discharge of hands. The growing industrial depression will increase in proportion to the length of time that the law of supply and demand as the regulator of particular prices is suspended, or until human laws equitably regulate the prices-boards of directors of private corporations acting separately and representing the interests of about one per centum of the people can not adjust the prices so as to dispel the depression.

Such are the economic laws as I see them. It is to help get rid of the surplus of products that the demand is made for an opening into new foreign markets. But these markets can not take a tithe of the surplus, and besides the growing surplus from Germany, England and France will meet us and result in a knockdown of prices in foreign trade, with a reaction on the home prices and attempts to force down wages. The way out is to either restore the law of supply and demand as the regulator of particular prices, or to fix the prices by a National Board. If the National Board is used it must represent the whole people and not one, per centum of them, and therefore it must be appointed by Congress, and act in conformity to the rules prescribed by Congress. G. H. S.

STOCK MARKET.

Neither buying nor selling; the public keep away from the market, and consequently the trades have it all to themselves. News, good or bad, is without effect. The declaration of the dividends on Missouri Pacific and Baltimore & Ohio, and better income statements from other railroads, induced some buying of the railroad list at the close of the week.-Record and Guide, August 4, 1900.

In Wall Street there are few new developments and no increase of business to cheer brokers. We hear exaggerated reports of foreign loans and of the demand for American coal abroad. Seemingly reporters and writers on Wall Street topics will not be content with a natural, though somewhat slow, ad

vance, either in the way of loaning money or selling commodities abroad, but must treat both subjects sensationally.

The fear of dear money has passed away under an inability of bankers to employ much of the funds in their hands, EVEN AT THE LOW RATES NOW PREVAILING.-Record and Guide, September 1, 1900.

WOOLEN AND COTTON TRADE.

The history of the past week's operations is very much the same as for the past several weeks, and it appears to be the general opinion that the developments of the next six or seven weeks will not work any great change in the character of the market. There are some agents who profess to see signs of an improving trend. They say that they find the buyer somewhat more reasonable and more liberally inclined than heretofore. Other agents say they fail to experience any such change for the better; that business is extremely dull and unsatisfactory and that to their minds there is very little in the present situation to justify much hope for the immediate future.

Trade is still slow on ingrains. Manufacturers making cotton ingrains are finishing up old orders, which are very limited, only requiring a portion of their looms to complete them, and they hesitate under present conditions to place large orders for 2-14s chain yarn. -American Wool and Cotton Reporter, September 20, 1900.

SHOES AND LEATHER.

No wonder business has been dull and depressed. A half million cases of shoes taken out of the trading of a half year is a great loss. Counting twentyfour pairs to a case, THERE WERE TWELVE MILLION FEWER PAIRS OF SHOES SHIPPED FROM BOSTON THAN IN THE SAME SIX MONTHS OF 1899. Counting thirty-six pairs to a case, the loss was eighteen million pairs. Perhaps fifteen million would be a fair average calculation, although this is too low rather than too high.

There seems to be a well defined opinion that prices of leather of all kinds have reached the lowest point. People have entertained such a belief before, but have been compelled to modify it.

Under normal. conditions most shoe manufacturers would consider this an opportune time to lay in a stock, but the times have been out of joint so long and the business has been so unsettled and unsatisfactory that they have become intensely cautious and conserva

tive, AND CANNOT YET BE INDUCED TO PURCHASE ANY MORE THAN THEY NEED FOR

IMMEDIATE USE, even though fully convinced that bargains are within their grasp. Shoe and Leather Reporter, September 20, 1900.

IRON TRADE.

Every one is familiar with the tremendous falling off in the demand for iron and steel. The fall in prices has been almost as phenomenal as was the rise. Mills are idle in many places and a wage reduction has just been agreed upon by the Amalgamated Association of from 5 to 10 per cent. The larger concerns are wiping out the smaller ones. The Iron Age of September 13 contains a long homily on the present period of depression, and says:

A "boom" bears about the same relation to ordinary business that a banquet of many courses and unlimited wine, liquors, black coffee and strong cigars bears to the average daily dinner of a well ordered private family.

It then goes on to describe the causes in detail and concludes:

BUSINESS IN GENERAL.

In all of these reasons together we find an explanation of THE ALMOST IN

COMPREHENSIBLE PHENOMENON OF A SUDDEN FALLING OFF IN CONSUMPTION, WHICH WITHIN A FEW WEEKS, OR SOMETIMES A FEW DAYS, CAN PRODUCE AN ABRUPT TRANSITION FROM EXTREME INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY TO EXTREME INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION.

The following is from Dun's Weekly Report, August 18, 1900:

After a great wave of advancing prices optimism as to business is generally dangerous. BUT THE TOP WAS REACHED THE MIDDLE OF MARCH, SINCE WHICH TIME REACTION HAS COME IN EVERY GREAT INDUSTRY, so that consumers are asking whether in some directions the decline may not have been unreasonably large, as was the advance, and whether buying on the present basis of prices is not fairly

sure.

The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, August 25, 1900, says:

Business affairs have remained quiet and almost precisely as they were a week ago. Indeed, each succeeding seven days cycle has for some time pretty much repeated its predecessor. except in one particular, which is that

they are 23 per cent greater and of 1897 14 per cent greater.

During the second quarter of this year, i. e., April, May and June, the liabilities were nearly three times as great as for the same period of last year ($41,724,879, as against $14,910,902). They were 17 per cent greater than for 1898, 4 per cent less than for 1897, 3 per cent more than for 1896, and 10 per cont more than for 1895.

During the first quarter of this year the liabilities were 18 per cent greater than for the like period of the preceding year and slightly greater than for the same period in 1898.

The tide turned towards depression during the early months of this year, for the liabilities of the business failures in the preceding quarter were very low, namely, 40 per cent less than for the like period in 1898.