TO THE REPUBLICS OF THE WORLD, such action being, as I shall herein point out, without foundation in justice."

The press dispatch goes on to give the substance of the argument presented by the representatives of the Philippine Republic. Among other things he declared that the purpose of the revolution against Spain was independence; that the United States so understood

I.

D.

and encouraged it, and that she should have recognized its independence before the signing of the protocol with Spain. Spain had been ousted from the Philippines, and therefore could not deliver the Philippines to the United States. "THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," he continued, REPRESENTS 10,000,000 SOULS, WHILE THE AMERICANS CONTROL ONLY ABOUT 300,000."

a STATEMENT.

To ratify the treaty with Spain required a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and many of the opponents of the colonial policy declared that they would vote for the treaty to prevent a reopening of negotiations with Spain and a possible complication, and that afterward they would vote for the United States to promise independence to the people of the Philippines.

But enough Senators were insisting on direct cession of sovereignty to the people of the Philippines to defeat the treaty; it required but a one-third vote to do this. While the Administration was thus facing defeat-a defeat which was reasonably sure UNLESS THE FLAG SHOULD BE FIRED UPON IN THE PHILIPPINES, the news came from the Philippines that THE FLAG WAS BEING FIRED UPON, AND DURING THE DAY SOME 250 AMERICAN SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED AND KILLED. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY THE TREATY WAS RATIFIED.

more and more troops to the Philippines and purchase boats for military operations on the Philippine rivers, but at Manila Otis erected distilling plants so that should their water supply be cut off they could stand a siege. As to the firing of the first shot, it was doubtless unpremeditated by the Administration's officers. It is thus described in General Otis's report:

"An insurgent, approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment], refused to halt or answer, when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece [killing the Filipino], when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed. During the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between opposing lines for a distance of about two miles. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE CHIEF INSURGENTS WISHED TO OPEN HOSTILITIES AT THIS TIME."

But after daybreak GENERAL OTIS SENT HIS TROOPS TO ATTACK THE FILIPINO LINES, AND FORCED THE FIGHTING UNTIL 5 O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING, killing and wounding something like 3,000 Filipinos, while 250 of bis fellow - citizens were killed and wounded.* BUT THE SENATE DID NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS MCKINLEY'S AGENT WHO WAS FORCING THE FIGHT, FOR THE CABLEGRAMS WERE CENSORED.

Otis wired Dewey: "Insurgent dead between 500 and 1,000." And in a later report he names their loss at 3,000. As to the American loss, he says it was about 250 killed and wounded.

ITS MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THE FILIPINOS WERE ATTACKING OUR TROOPS.* This deception resulted in the two-thirds vote for the acceptance by the United States of sovereignty over the Philippines. Ten days later a majority of the Senate, in a vote upon the Bacon resolution, refused to promise independence to the people of the Philippines, THEREBY EVIDENCING A FIRM DETERC FURTHER PROOF OF (1) Censorship of Cablegrams at Manila. The censorship at Manila was in full operation when the first battle with the Filipinos took place, February 4. Evidence of this is a Washington special to the Chicago Times-Herald, January 27, 1899. In speaking about "a story published this morning concerning Agoncillo." it says: "About all the truth there was in it was that General Greeley, Chief Signal Officer of the War Department, had sent a cable message to Colonel Thompson, the censor at Manila, urging THAT A MORE COMPLETE CENSORSHIP BE MAINTAINED." This was eight days before the battle of Manila took place, and the people of the United States were told by the censor at Manila that the Filipinos were firing upon the troops and the flag, thus concealing the fact that the fight was forced by General Otis against the protests of the Filipino General.

Further evidence concerning the censorship is the following protest of the Manila correspondents, presented to General Otis July 9, 1899, and cabled from Hong Kong to the United States July 17:

Round Robin of Manila Correspondents.

The undersigned, being all staff cor

*Further Proof of Deception. The following are the words of McKinley's campaign text book for the information of his speakers and writers:

"The attack of the Filipino forces UPON OUR TROOPS in the Philippines began February 4, 1899." (Page 90.)

"Just before the time set by the Senate of the United States for a vote upon the treaty, an attack, evidently prepared in advance, was made all along

MINATION ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO HOLD THEM AS SUBJECTS.

Before taking up the vote on this proposition it will be well to give further proof that the infamous action of General Otis in continuing the fight, and in lying about it over the cable, was in order to secure sovereignty over the people of the Philippines and the resources of their lands. FRAUDULENT PRACTICES.

respondents of American newspapers stationed at Manila, unite in the following statement:

We believe that owing to official dispatches from Manila made public in Washington, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED` STATES HAVE NOT RECEIVED A CORRECT IMPRESSION

OF

THE SITUATION IN

THE

PHILIPPINES, but that these dispatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field.

We believe the dispatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Philippines in respect to dissension and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand character of their army.

We believe the dispatches err in the declaration that "The situation is well in hand," and in the assumption that the insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased force.

We think the tenacity of the Filipino purpose has been underestimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers are willing to enlist in further service.

The censorship HAS COMPELLED US TO

PARTICIPATE IN THIS MISREPRESENTATION

by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of facts on the plea, as Gen. Otis stated, that "they would alarm the people at home," or "have the people of the United States by the ears."

Specifications: Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports of field operations in the event of failthe American lines which resulted in a terribly destructive and sanguinary REPULSE OF THE INSURGENTS." (President's Message, December, 1899, page 40.)

"Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are engaged was UNAVOIDABLE BY US. WE WERE ATTACKED by a bold, adventurous and enthusiastic army." (Philippine Commission's "Preliminary" Report.)

The following is the letter to the general manager of the Associated Press from the correspondent in the Philippines called forth by a request for an explanation of his reason for signing the protest of the correspondents against the censorship. It was written for the information of the general manager of the Associated Press:

Manila, P. I., July 30, 1899.-Melville E. Stone, Esq., General Manager the Associated Press, Chicago, U. S. A.-My Dear Mr. Stone: Your request for a detailed record of all circumstances leading to the statement cabled to the newspapers by all the correspondents in Manila is just received. In the beginning it should be explained that the correspondents had the question of taking some united action to secure the right to send the facts about the war, or, failing in that, to explain to our papers and the public why we were not telling the facts, two months before the cablegram was released.

The censorship enforced during the war AND BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF IT was, according to newspaper men who had worked in Japan, Turkey, Greece, Egypt and Russia in war times, and in Cuba under the Weyler regime and during our war, so MUCH MORE

STRINGENT THAN ANY HITHERTO ATTEMPTED THAT WE WERE ASTONISHED THAT THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD COUNTENANCE IT, and were confident that public opinion would be overwhelmingly against it if its methods and purposes became known.

For a long time we submitted to the censorship because of appeals to our

patriotism and a feeling that we might be accused of a lack thereof if we made any trouble for the American authorities here.

But when Gen. Otis came down in the frank admission that it was not intended so much to prevent the newspapers from giving information and assistance to the enemy (the legitimate function, and, according to our view the only legitimate one of a censorship), BUT TO KEEP THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONS HERE FROM THE PUBLIC AT HOME, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, "MY IN

STRUCTIONS ARE TO LET NOTHING GO THAT CAN HURT THE ADMINISTRATION," we concluded that protest was justifiable.

Otis had gained the idea from the long submission by the newspaper men to his dictation that it was a part of the duty of the Governor General to direct the newspaper correspondents as he did his officers. Much of the censorship was conducted by him personally, the censor sending a correspondent to the General with any dispatch about which he had doubts. The process of passing a message was identical with the correction of a composition by a schoolmaster, Otis or the censor striking out what displeased him and inserting what he thought should be said, or, what came to the same thing, telling the correspondent he must say certain things if his story was to go.

In this way the entire American press was made THE PERSONAL ORGAN OF OTIS. [And the deceit admitted by Otis in changing the President's proclamation demonstrates what must have been the manner in which he reported the cause of the battle of Manila, whereby the treaty was ratified.]

About the middle of June I wrote a conservative review to the effect that every one here was convinced that it would be impossible to end the war during the rainy season and for some time thereafter unless heavy reinforcements were sent.

The censor's comment (I made note of it) was: "Of course, we all know that WE ARE IN A TERRIBLE MESS OUT HERE, BUT WE DON'T WANT THE PEOPLE TO GET EXCITED ABOUT IT. If you fellows will only keep quiet now we will pull through in time without any fuss at home."

He took the story to Gen. Otis, who said: "Tell Collins that if he will hold that for a week or ten days he will thank me for not letting him send it,"

and when I went to see him repeated the same old story about the insurrection going to pieces, and hinted so portentously about having wonderful things up his sleeve that I almost believed him in the face of past experiences of the same sort. The other men had practically the same experience, each one trying to get through a story of how matters stood at the beginning of the rainy season, then on.

Three hours of exceedingly plain talk followed. The General did not contradict our statements that THE PURPOSE OF THE CENSORSHIP WAS TO KEEP THE FACTS

FROM THE PUBLIC, but said that what we wanted was to have the people stirred up and make sensations for the papers. We told him that there had never been any subject furnishing more good material for sensations than this war, and that he should be exceedingly grateful to the papers for handling it so temperately.

EXAGGERATED.

In that connection we reminded him that the stories of looting in soldiers' letters home HAD BEEN LITTLE, IF ANY, Davis and Bass told him they had personally seen our soldiers bayoneting the wounded, and I reminded him that the cutting off of the ears of two American soldiers at Dasmarinas had been merely retaliation for similar mutilations of dead Filipinos by the Americans. (No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the looting and blackmailing by our soldiers than Otis has told, although he charges it all to the volunteers.)

We told him that we had refrained from sending these things and others of similar nature because we did not wish to make sensations. We told him that the censorship was purely for the purpose of giving the impression at home that everything was lovely here, otherwise he would suppress the local papers which print all sorts of clippings from the American papers denouncing the Administration, and which keep the enemy posted on the position of every company in our army, and even give advance notice of intended movements.

Dealing with the specifications, we said that the hospital officers refused to give us any information as to the number of sick, on the ground that he had instructed them to withhold such facts from the papers; also that he had reported to Washington a percentage of 71⁄2 sick when the surgeons agreed that from 20 to 30 per cent of the command was sick; that not more than 10 per cent of some regiments were fit for

duty, and that the hospital force was entirely inadequate, as well as the hospital room, so that they were compelled to discharge hundreds of men who were really sick to make room for more urgent cases.

In the matter of prejudice against the navy, it was stated on the part of the correspondents that all were compelled to change their accounts of the taking of Iloilo, to make it appear that the army had done the work with immaterial assistance from the warships, and that only a few houses were burned. The unquestioned facts told in the original stories were that THE SOLDIERS DID NOT LAND UNTIL THREE HOURS AFTER THE MARINES HAD RAISED THE FLAG AND CHASED THE INSURGENTS OUT.

Recently I filed what I thought a most inoffensive statement that the business men who had appeared before the commission had advocated the retention of the existing silver system of currency. The censor said: "I ought not to let that go. That would be a lift for Bryan. MY INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO SHUT OFF EVERYTHING, THAT COULD HURT MCKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION. That is free silver." I explained that the silver system here was not 16 to 1, and with seeming reluctance he O. K.'d the item.

There has been, according to Otis himself, and the personal knowledge of every one here, a perfect orgy of looting and wanton destruction of property and most outrageous blackmailing of the natives and Chinamen in Manila and various incidents like the shooting down of several Filipinos for attempting to run from arrest at a cock fight, not to mention court-martials of officers for cowardice and the dismissal of General for getting hopelessly drunk on the eve of two important battles-all of which the correspondents have left untouched by common consent.

Also there are the usual number of army scandals and intrigues, which we have not aired, foremost among them the fact (it is universally considered a fact in the army) that Otis is deeply prejudiced against and jealous of Lawton, and has done everything in his power to keep Lawton in the background and prevent him from making a reputation.

Further Statement as to Censorship.

The following is a private letter from John T. McCutcheon to the editor of the Chicago Record, explaining his reasons for signing the protest of the correspondents, as published in the Chicago Record, September 30, 1899:

In view of the fact that our protest against the censorship in Manila has attracted considerable attention I thought it might be well to give you a brief story regarding the matter.

Here are a few instances of Otis's censorship:

Collins of the Associated Press submitted a telegram which stated that the business men of Manila believed the silver basis best for the islands: Thompson read it and exclaimed: 'Why, that's a direct boost for Bryan. My instructions are to let nothing go that will hurt the McKinley administration."

One day, when asked just what matter could go, Thompson said: "Nothing in reference to future moves of the military, nothing calculated to aid or comfort the enemy and nothing that will hurt the administration."

On another occasion a telegram was submitted referring to the court-martial of an army officer. Thompson said: "No, that can't go. Nothing can go out of here that will reflect on the army."

During the row between Otis and the Peace Commissioners all news referring to the latter was struck out. "The Peace Commission has no standing here," said Otis.

Matter has frequently been cut out of our dispatches on the ground, to quote literally, "that would have the people of the United States by the ears." This has been a favorite expression of Otis' when he has cut out matter that might alarm people at home.

Nothing was ever allowe to go which might indicate that the volunteers wanted to go home and were disgusted at fighting the Filipinos. There were numberless instances proving this sentiment, but we were not allowed to use any of them. One regiment nearly had a mutiny in one of its companies. It was a regular regiment, but the men who had enlisted for the Spanish war said that they would lay down their arms the day their time was up if not sooner discharged.

From censorship at Manila let us turn to the War Department at Washington. (2) Censorship at War Department.

The following is proof that the War Department at Washington has likewise deceived the people. For example, after the war was in full blast and the term of service of the volunteers had expired, the War Department gave out the following statement: "A cablegram from

General Otis states that the volunteers are willing to remain." But Congressman Lantz, as a member of the Military Committee of the House, demanded to see the original, and it read: "Volunteers willing to remain in Manila until the transports arrive." (Cablegram of April 19, 1899.)

(3) Censorship at State Department.

And the State Department has suppressed the truth. During the summer of 1899 the President entered into an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, and slavery and polygamy were dealt with. The public desired to know just what had been agreed to and the Associated Press endeavored to secure a copy of the agreement. In response to the application, its representative was handed a copy in Arabic-Sulu Arabic at that;

AND THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYBODY IN THE UNITED STATES WHO WAS ABLE TO TRANSLATE IT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD A COPY IN ENGLISH, for the last paragraph of the treaty says: "Signed in triplicate, in English and Sulu, at Jolo this 20th day of August, 1899."

From this it appears that the State Department does not hesitate to withhold information or mislead and deceive the public.

Senator Pettigrew set forth these facts on the floor of the Senate, and continued:

"I wonder if our State Department has two branches, as the English State Department has one that is secret, where secret matter is concealed forever from the public and never published in the Blue Book, and one which is given to the people in order to justify 'English robbery, English plunder and English annexation, in which is filed the information that goes in the Blue Book to silence the conscience of the English people. Have we adopted the same policy of concealment, the same policy of refusal to let the public know what exists?

"I say this agreement, when the Associated Press tried to get a copy of it before the Senate convened, was furnished in Arabic, and an Arabic used in the Sulu Islands. Therefore it was not possible to have it translated in the United States, and we only got this copy