words, THE TRUSTS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONSTRUCT A SYSTEM THAT WILL KEEP THE PRICE LEVEL FROM FALLING, because the opposing parties are advocating the only system that will do this and that can be put through Congress and accepted by the people. A further important factor as to the volume of money in the near future is the possibility of war. If the great countries of Europe engage in war, gold hoards will be expended in foreign countries for supplies, and that would make prices rise tremendously; and, furthermore, specie payments would very likely be suspended, paper money issued, and the gold forced abroad. On this point Prof. Lotz, of Germany, has pointed out that if war comes between the great nations of Europe they will "borrow enormous sums of gold coin from their central banks" and will issue paper currency for use within the country. In the past, we have had severe wars with an issue of paper currency, and this has forced the metal money into foreign countries in the purchase of munitions of war. Prof. Jevons has commented upon this fact, pointing out the tremendous changes it has wrought in the price level, and in conclusion he said: "Above all I must insist upon the importance of establishing a rule against the sudden replacement of masses of metal by paper currencies. As several great nations may join in a war, this means an immense sudden supply of bullion and a decreased demand. I can only repeat that these excessive rises and falls of value are not due to silver or gold, but to paper. * * * The real evil comes from paper." We reply that the necessities of war are such that increased issues of paper currency at these times cannot be prevented; but the countries not at war, which must take gold into their circulation or close their mints, can gradually retire their paper currency, and then when the war is over and the countries buy back their gold, the paper currency can be reissued. From the facts in the two preceding sections we arrive at the following conclusion: (c) CONCLUSION. The voters of the United States should declare that their Government shall control the volume of paper currency so as to offset (1) the changes in the volume of credit, (2) the changes in the volume of standard money, and (3) the demand for money. By doing this there will result a stable money market and stable price level. The details of such a system are pointed out at page 49, above. Until it is adopted we shall go on "bumping our heads." Our business men cannot tell the direction of the bank rate two hours in advance, yet they must make contracts for the payment of money years in advance; in other words, with the volume of money very uncertain, and with no way of foretelling its value. business men must make contracts for the payment of money. Thus they are forced into a gambling transaction, and the fluctuating price level, with the resulting disorganization of business, is an evil of such proportions that pages will not fittingly describe it. And this is not all. A price level that will continue stable will result in a prosperity so far in advance of that which we have ever experienced that at present we have no gauge or standard whereby to determine the inestimable blessings that will flow from it. The election of the Reform Ticket will usher in this great blessing: if the Congress elected this year will not grant it, then two years from now the good work accomplished by the reform forces will result in a Congress that will control the volume of paper currency under fixed rules of justice. The effect of such a control is shown on the following page. HISTORY OF GOLD STANDARD AND NECESSITY FOR CONTROLLING VOLUME OF PAPER MONEY. 1873-1900: THE GOLD STANDARD OF PRICES; i. e., the total volume of the 1901 AND FUTURE YEARS: THE MULTIPLE STANDARD; i. e., if the prin- "Monopoly," as the term is used in the following pages, is such an absence of competition between business organizations that price is thereby controlled. The degree of control may vary. Where 60 or 70 per cent of the product in an industry is controlled by an organization, it controls the price. Where the control of a monopoly price is by private individuals, it is a Private Monopoly. Where there is a control of monopoly price by the Government, the title to the property remaining in private individuals, it is a Publicly-Regulated Mo B. Under the McKinley Administration the Prices Charged by National Monopolies are Fixed by Private Individuals, Except in the Postal Service. I. GENERAL STATEMENT. The In the United States all monopolies that are national in extent are Private Monopolies, except the postoffice. Government does not regulate the price charged, nor is there public ownership except in the postal service. The telegraph is a private monopoly, so is the express. The railways are private mo 2. nopolies and so are the monopolies in production and trade, known as trusts. Everyone knows that the prices charged by the trusts are in nowise regulated by the Federal Government, and the following is proof that railway rates (including accommodations) are no longer controlled by the Federal Government. RAILWAY RATES ARE NOW FIXED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. a. History up to 1884. The prices charged by railways in the United States were not controlled by the Government until in the '70s. During the years 1867 to '70 the people in the Western States complained that the railway rates were too high and that there were discriminations between shippers and against many of the smaller cities. To such a height did resentment rise that in many of the States a majority of the legislators were pledged to redress the people's grievances. The laws enacted were so effectual in controlling rates and preventing discrimination that the private owners of the roads secured from the United States Supreme Court a decision (quoted below) which took the control of freight rates from the State Legislatures AND PLACED IT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. This transfer of the governmental power over interstate traffic was accomplished in the following manner: Congress had not attempted to regulate the freight rates on interstate com merce. If it had, there would have been no question of its right to do so under the constitutional provision giving it power "to regulate interstate commerce." But before Congress attempted to regu late this commerce, the Supreme Court held that the State had no power under the Constitution to limit the rates in transportation within the State for freight or passengers destined for another State (Wabash, etc., R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. R. 557). Three of the judges refused to thus limit the power of the States, WHILE SIX VOTED TO CHANGE THE RULE WHICH HAD PREVAILED FROM THE TIME THE CON STITUTION HAD BEEN ADOPTED. Thus were the Legislatures of the several States deprived of nearly all their power over the railways within their borders, and to Congress was delegated the control. Subsequent events proved that the railway corporations owned Congress, and there fore the people of the several States were again delivered into the hands of the monopoly barons-PRIVATE MONOPOLY. b. The Interstate Commerce Law, and How Thwarted. It was in 1884 that the Supreme Court took from the States the power to restrain the railway corporations and placed it in Congress. During the fol lowing winter the Regan bill passed the House, but the Senate rejected it and submitted a bill more favorable to the holders of railway franchises. At the next session of Congress the same process was gone through with; and during the succeeding session a similar deadlock occurred, but in the conference between the House and the Senate an agreement was reached and the compromise measure became a law. Subsequent events demonstrated that the law was a benefit to the public and also a benefit to the holders of railway franchises. It was beneficial to the public in shutting off a tremendous amount of discriminations in rates and accommodations, while it was a benefit to the railway corporations in doing away with a large amount of rebates, passes, etc. C. But since the time the Interstate Railway Law was enacted the Supreme Court has been taking from the Interstate Commerce Commission its power, AND DURING 1897 IT WAS DEPRIVED OF PRACTICALLY ALL POWER OVER RAILWAY RATES AND DISCRIMINATIONS. In the words of a member of the Commission, Mr. Prouty, in the North American Review, November, 1898: "Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States within the year have determined that the Commission did not possess powers OF THE MOST VITAL CONSEQUENCE, WHICH IT HAD ASSUMED TO EXERCISE FROM THE FIRST." The Railway Question of Today: Regulation or No Regulation? (1) BILL PROPOSED BY INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. Commissioner Prouty, after stating the foregoing, continues: "From all this it had become evident in the fall of 1897 that in the interest of both the railways and the public this law must be revised. The railways already had before Congress certain important amendments to the Act, WHICH THEY WERE URGING WITH GREAT INSIST ENCE. With a view to presenting the side of the public as well, so that Congress might have before it the claims of all the parties, the Commission in its Eleventh Annual Report endeavored to explain the present condition of this law and to point out the amendments which were necessary to secure to the public the benefits contemplated by the original act." But the Administration refused to restore to the Commerce Commission its power to prevent discriminations in freight rates, and to prevent excessive charges. The next year the Commission again asked that power be restored to it in order to prevent discriminations in freight rates and excessive charges, and again the Administration pigeon-holed its request. In its next annual report, that of Jan uary 15 of this year, the Interstate Commerce Commission again asked for a restoration of power to prevent discriminations and excessive freight rates, and again the Administration pigeon-holed its request and attempted to deceive the people as to the cause of trusts by putting a bill through the House asking that Congress be given power to prevent trusts, by granting to it the power which the States now exercise under the Constitution. Compare the following statement by the Interstate Commerce Commission, for it clearly shows that Congress has power to control the trusts and is refusing to exercise it. WASHINGTON, D. C., January 15, 1900. To the Senate and House of Representatives: The Thirteenth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission is respectfully submitted to the Congress. In its last annual report the Commission stated that attention had been called in previous reports to THE VITAL RESPECTS IN WHICH THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE HAS PROVED DEFECTIVE AND INADEQUATE; THAT THE PRESENT LAW CANNOT BE PROPERLY ENFORCED, AND THAT UNTIL FURTHER LEGISLATION IS PROVIDED THE BEST EFFORTS AT |