various other important committees, and with your duties in the House and various other duties, I am afraid you will not have time to think of the briefs that we may submit, and we would likely command your attention, perhaps in a better way, by an oral hearing. Mr. OVERSTREET. I asked you this because of the lack of time, and the gentleman who sought this hearing, I understood, stated that altogether there would be but two people who wanted to be heard and three-quarters of an hour would be ample time. Now, we have given an hour and a half, and I wondered how much longer you really wanted, as we have doubled the time suggested already. Mr. GOMPERS. Then I will withdraw the request. Mr. OVERSTREET. No; I want to know how long you will want, because if it comes to our subcommittee the question of granting a hearing would have something to do with the time. Mr. ALEXANDER. For one, I would like to hear this question discussed to a finish, and hear the gentlemen here. I would like to hear it before the full committee, or at least have an opportunity of coming here. The CHAIRMAN. I will submit to the committee the question whether the committee desires to have this discussion continued or not. The committee agreed to continue the hearing at 10.30 on Monday next. Thereupon the committee adjourned. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. George W. Ray, chairman, presiding. STATEMENT OF MR. HUGH R. FULLER, REPRESENTING THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN, THE ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS, THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN, AND THE ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS. Mr. FULLER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I do not desire to take up very much time, but I desire to explain, in my way, the experience that the railroad employees have had with the injunction question and why we come here and ask for the passage of this bill. Some years ago, during a strike on the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railroad, Federal Judges Ricks and Taft issued injunctions upon employees, requiring them to do certain work against their will. Some time after this Judge Jenkins, of the Federal court of Wisconsin, enjoined employees of the Northern Pacific Railroad from quitting the service in a way that would hinder the operation of the road. This was practically compelling them to work against their will, for it must be understood that no considerable number of men could quit the service together without hindering the operation of the road. The restraining order was, however, modified by a higher court so as to allow the employees to quit if they desired to do so; but it, like the ones of Judges Ricks and Taft, was so radical and sweeping that great protests were made by the railroad employees all over this country, and much adverse criticism was indulged in, and from that time up until the present day there has been a growing sentiment among not only railroad employees, but other classes of labor, that their liberties. are being encroached upon and gradually taken away by our courts. This feeling has not grown up without a good reason, for the Ricks decision seemed to furnish a precedent, and from that time on there has hardly been a strike of any importance in which the judicial hand has not been felt by the workingmen. Mr. KAHN. Can you give us the title of that case, the Ricks decision that you refer to? Mr. FULLER. I can not; I have it at home and can furnish it for the committee, but I did not bring it with me. It was during the engineers and firemen's strike; I think it was in 1893. Mr. PARKER. What court? Mr. FULLER. The United States court for the district of Ohio. Mr. KAHN. Are you familiar with the case? Mr. FULLER. I do not know that I can say I am. The Ricks decision, as I say, seemed to furnish a precedent, and in almost every strike of importance the judicial hand has been felt by the workingmen. This has not been confined to any one class of judges, for we find the judges from the Federal courts down to the county courts issuing injunctions restraining employees from holding meetings or assembling on the public highways, and forbidding them from going to the homes of the employees who have taken their places, to induce them to quit work, and many other things that might be mentioned. When the railroad employees began to protest against this new mode of oppression we were told that it was wrong to indulge in such criticism of our courts. We were told that these injunctions were necessary to protect property and other rights; that the courts of equity were more beneficial to the weak than to the strong, as they would protect the weak from the strong. Indeed, we were told that even where there was no protection by statutory law these courts of equity would protect us from irreparable wrong by injunctions, and the time would come when it would be our turn to reap the benefit of these injunctions. In 1894, only a few months after the railroad strike, during which a large part of our country was covered with injunctions, issued at the instance of railroad corporations, the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, which was then in the hands of receivers appointed by the Federal court, notified its employees that they must either withdraw from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen or leave its service. The men had belonged to this organization for a number of years, and had paid in a considerable amount of money in monthly dues in order to receive financial aid in case of sickness. They also carried insurance policies which entitled them to $1,000 in case they were disabled, or, in case of death, would go to their wives and families. To leave the brotherhood meant to forfeit this protection to themselves and families, and many of them had grown so old in the service or had been so badly crippled that they could not procure protection in any of the old-line insurance companies. To leave their brotherhood also meant to surrender their manhood and their liberties. It meant to strip them of their only means of defense against the avaricious encroachments of a soulless corporation, whose principal object was to make its employees serfs. A serious condition confronted these men. They counseled together. They thought that to take away from them these rights was to take away from them rights which were as dear as any property right could be. They thought the wrong inflicted by depriving them and their families of protection in case of injury and death was an irreparable wrong. They thought that the Federal court, whose agents these receivers were, would never allow such a wrong to be perpetrated upon them. They thought the time had now come when they could appeal to the courts for redress, and they concluded they would try the injunction and see whether it would do all that was promised for it. They appealed to the circuit court of the United States of the district of Pennsylvania for an injunction restraining the receivers from carrying out their intended action. The case, coming up in such a short time after the railroad strike, created considerable interest, and Hon. Richard Olney, then Attorney-General of the United States, was so much impressed with the gravity of the situation that he wrote a letter to that court, giving many reasons why these employees should be protected. I have a copy of that letter of Mr. Olney, Mr. Chairman, and if you desire it I would like to leave it here. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly; it will be handed to the reporter to be incorporated with your remarks, and it will be regarded as read and inserted at this point. Circuit court of the United States, district of Pennsylvania. In equity. THOMAS C. PLATT V. PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL. Suggestions respecting questions raised by petitions of Hicks, Riley, and other members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The pendency of this petition having been incidentally brought to my attention, the issues raised impressed me as of great gravity and importance, not only as between the parties immediately concerned, but as regards the country at large. In that view-in which I could not doubt the court would share-it seemed to me that the court would not object to a brief discussion of the case from a public point of view merely and uninfluenced by the wishes and interests of the particular litigants before it. Upon this suggestion being made to the court it was most cordially assented to. The considerations following, therefore, are submitted by me as amicus curiæ merely and by express leave of the court. I.-THE FACTS. The material facts may be briefly stated. The petitioners are members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Some of them have been members for seven or eight years have each year paid annual dues and assessments which now amount to considerable sums of money-and by continuing their membership will, in case of death or permanent disability, become entitled by themselves or their representatives to large pecuniary payments from the funds of the brotherhood. On the other hand, by ceasing to be members, they lose all benefit from assessments and dues already paid and forfeit all claims upon the brotherhood treasury. The constitution and rules of the brotherhood and of the subordinate lodges are before the court as part of the petition. No controversy or antagonism has ever arisen or existed between the Reading Railroad and the brotherhood or any of its lodges, or between the Reading Railroad and any members of the brotherhood as such members. If, as is claimed, the Reading Railroad has for some years adopted the rule that it would not have in its service any member of a labor organization, it is a rule which has not been uniformly nor invariably acted upon, since there has been a Philadelphia lodge of the brotherhood on the Reading line for nearly eight years, and its existence can not have been unknown to the Reading officials. What has now happened and what has led to the present petition is this: The Reading receivers have notified the members of the brotherhood on its line that unless they cease to be such members they will be discharged from their present employment on or before October 8. The receivers make no complaint of the manner in which the brotherhood employees discharge their respective duties. The notice has been given simply because of said employees' membership of the brotherhood, as is conclusively shown by the following telegram received by Grand Master Wilkinson in reply to his remonstrance against the course proposed to be taken: "The policy of the company is well known to be that it will not consent that persons in its service shall owe allegiance to other organization which may make claims upon them which are incompatible with their duties to their employers. This position was taken advisedly, and we have no intention of departing from it. Joseph S. Harris, Prest. and Receiver." (Signed) Thus, if the receivers are right and their rule is to prevail, membership of the brotherhood by and of itself incapacitates for service on the Reading Railroad. It is respectfully submitted that the receivers are wrong, and that the action proposed by them ought not to be sanctioned by the court. II. QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT. It will help to make plain the precise question before the court to note the opening words of the telegram just quoted. "The policy of the company is well known to be, etc.' Mr. Harris, who signs the telegram both as president and receiver, evidently forgets that the company is no longer in control; that it can have no present policy on the subject, and that what its past policy was is of slight consequence. The Reading Railroad being now in the hands of receivers, the receivers and all the employees of the company are officers of the court. The court, therefore, and not the company, is the employer of all the persons engaged in the operation of the road. The present policy of the court, and not the past policy of the company, is the material thing to be considered. And hence the precise question is, Will the court now lay down the rule that the members of the Brotherhood of Trainmen, because they are such members, be discharged from the service of the road? III.-STRIKES ARE NOT NECESSARILY UNLAWFUL. The court, it is submitted, ought not and can not lay down any such rule on the ground that either the purposes and objects of the brotherhood, or the means by which they are to be obtained, are shown to be illegal. 1. The general purposes and objects of the brotherhood are stated in the preamble to the constitution, as follows: "To unite the railroad trainmen; to promote their general welfare and advance their interests, social, moral, and intellectual; to protect their families by the exercise of a systematic benevolence very needful in a calling so hazardous as ours, this fraternity has been organized. "Persuaded that it is for the interests both of our members and their employers that a good understanding should at all times exist between the two, it will be the constant endeavor of this organization to establish mutual confidence and create and maintain harmonious relations. "Such are the aims and purposes of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen." Certainly these objects must be regarded as laudable in the highest degree and as deserving the approbation and support of every good citizen. They are indeed practically the same as those for which working people are expressly authorized to incorporate themselves by act of Congress, the statutory description of such objects being "For the purpose of aiding its members to become more skillful and efficient workers, the promotion of their general intelligence, the elevation of their character, the regulation of their wages and their hours and conditions of labor, the protection of their individual rights in the prosecution of their trade or trades, the raising of funds for the benefit of sick, disabled, or unemployed members, or the families of deceased members, or for such other object or objects for which working people may lawfully combine, having in view their mutual protection or benefit." 2. If the means to these praiseworthy ends be now examined, there is nothing in them to which the most captious critic can object except the provisions made for strikes. It is well to note that even these provisions are of an eminently conservative character; that great care is taken to guard against the abuse of a weapon which is a two edged sword and generally proves as damaging to those who use it as to those against whom it is used. Thus, by the brotherhood constitution and rules, a strike does not take effect till approved first by the local grievance committee, second by the general grievance committee, third by a board of adjustment, and fourth by a grand master, with the consent of two-thirds of the members involved; while striking or inciting to strike except in accordance with the above rules is punished by expulsion from the brotherhood. 3. Nevertheless, among the means of accomplishing the ends of the brotherhood is the bringing about of a "strike." As to what a "strike" is is not defined by the brotherhood constitution and rules; its precise nature must be determined by the court. And, as the brotherhood is entitled to the ordinary presumption of lawfulness for its methods as well as its objects until the contrary is shown, the court will hold the thing termed "strike" in the brotherhood constitution and rules to be something lawful unless there can not be such a thing as a lawful "strike." 4. But whatever may be the customary or probable incidents or accompaniments of a strike, it can not be ruled that there is no such a thing as a legal strike-that every strike must be unlawful. The necessary elements of a strike are only three—(1) the quitting of work (2) by concert between two or more (3) simultaneously-and in and of themselves involve no taint of illegality. A strike becomes illegal when to these necessary features are added others, such as malicious intent, followed by actual injury, intimidation, violence, the creation of a public nuisance, or a breach of the peace of any sort. 5. But it is unnecessary to elaborate the proposition that a strike is not necessarily unlawful, since it is emphatically sustained by the recent decision of the circuit court of appeals in Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, just decided in Chicago. And it is hardly necessary to point out that the attending circumstances, which only too often make strikes unlawful, are none of them provided for by the brotherhood constitution and rules and can not therefore be assumed to be necessary incidents of any strike occurring pursuant to them. IV.-RIGHT OF LABOR TO ORGANIZE. If the rule that a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen shall not work on the Reading Road can not be justified because of anything inherently unlawful in the constitution and rules of the Brotherhood, the only remaining ground on which it can be defended is that of business expediency. Discretion of the court.—That question is presented because in operating the Reading Railroad so as to secure the best results for the public and all private parties interested, the court is unhampered by any express statutory provisions and has all the liberty of choice belonging to employers generally. It is conceivable, therefore, though the spectacle would be a curious one, that a court of the United States may, on business grounds, refuse employment to persons for no other reason than their membership of an association whose purposes the laws of the United States expressly sanction. It is conceivable also that a court of the United States, also on business grounds, may attach to employment by its receivers a condition which employers of labor generally in very many States of the Union are prohibited from imposing under penalty of fine and imprisonment. But it is safe to say that the considerations of business policy impelling the court to the course suggested should be of the clearest and most cogent character, and that the question presented is one which the court will recognize as of the greatest interest and importance. Scope of the question.-It involves the right of labor to organize for the settlement of differences between it and capital, whose right to organize is apparently not denied. How the ordinary employer of labor may answer such a question, whether mistakenly or otherwise, is of comparatively little consequence. Effect of a wrongful decision.-But when the court is the employer any mistaken decision may work infinite mischief, both because until corrected it lays down a rule of action for other like cases and because so far as the mistake is recognized it impairs the confidence of either the employer or the employed, or both in the impartiality or capacity of the judiciary. Business expediency.-In considering the question of the business expediency of the employment of Brotherhood men, such objection as there is to it must arise from the fact that under its constitution and rules the employees may engage in a strike, with all the natural and possible incidents and consequences. It can hardly be denied that otherwise the Brotherhood organization is not only not objectionable, but is |