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pass the best one that can be agreed upon. If the Senators and Representatives who have introduced the various bills would not agree to the Ralston & Siddons bill, we would advocate the uniting upon some bill and passing it, and one which would afford as much relief as possible during this session of Congress.

Very truly, yours,

NOBLE, PINNEY & WILLARD.

STATEMENT OF MR. SAMUEL GOMPERS.

Mr. GOMPERS. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, one of the gentlemen who drafted the bill now before you expressed the opinion, in which I concur, that he should conclude the argument, and I shall therefore try to say what I have to say in as succinct a manner as I possibly can. Last week, when I had the honor of appearing before the committee, I called attention to the fact that the difficulty from which labor suffers in this particular regard is the fact that the injunction when issued has already committed the injury and the wrong for which there is no remedy or redress. Let me say that one of the peculiar features in the issuance of these injunctions is this: When the injunction is issued it is usually made returnable about four, five, or six weeks after the date of its issuance. In other words, the hearing, whether the injunction is to be made permanent or dismissed is set the day for the hearing is set-usually after the termination of the labor dispute, and hence the interest is lost in it and the injury is done. And though the injunction may be vacated or dismissed, the wrong is already committed. Should it be made permanent, and upon appeal to a higher ceurt, the higher court reverse the decision of the judge granting the injunction, the wrong is done, the injury is committed. No remedy! No redress!

One of the honorable members of this committee, during the course of Mr. Darrow's remarks, inquired, substantially, whether it would not be advisable to enact a law to enjoin employers of labor as well as laborers; in other words, as I gathered from the questions, whether a law might not be enacted enjoining employers of labor from doing certain things. That, I would say, might be necessarily answered in the affirmative; but if there would be a wrong committed against an employer of labor by the issuance of an injunction, that in itself would imply the power on the part of the employer to obtain damages from those who should secure the issuance of the injunction, for we would be compelled also to give bonds to indemnify the employer, and the employer, through the power of dollars and cents, might be in a position to show his loss, whereas, as a matter of fact, the workingmen can not demonstrate their loss to the satisfaction of a court and a jury.

There were more damages inflicted on the Government and the commerce and the people of the United States, indirectly, in the Alabama outrages than were compensated for by what was secured under the treaty which gave to the United States $15,000,000 by reason of direct damages; and you will remember that the International Board of Arbitration, which was called upon to discuss this question and make an award, ruled out the indirect damages. Then, again, there are those damages which result from a defeat of the workingmen which can not be calculated in dollars and cents.

Now, it was my pleasure last week to briefly call attention to the language of some of these injunctions. I have with me quite a large number.

First, permit me to call attention to the phraseology of some of these injunctions. We are enjoined "restrained from entering upon the property of the owners of the said Monongah Coal and Coke Company for the purpose of interfering with the employees of said company, either by intimidation or the holding of either public or private assemblages upon said property, or in any wise molesting, interfering with, or intimidating the employees of said Monongah Coal and Coke Company, so as to induce them to abandon their work in said mines." In other words, this eliminates those things which we did not claim that we had the right to do. We have not the right to molest, but we insist that we have the right to interfere, so long as we do not intimidate, coerce, or use force

Mr. ALEXANDER. That injunction does not say that you have not that right, but what it says is that you must not go upon the property of these people to do it.

Mr. GOMPERS. I desire to call attention to the next paragraph of the same injunction, which says:

And the defendants are further restrained from assembling in the paths, approaches, and roads upon said property leading to and from their homes and residences to the mines

The roads leading to and from the mines, the approaches to the mines; the approaches and roads leading to the miners' homes.

Mr. PARKER. Is that all of the phrase? Just read the whole of it. Mr. GOMPERS. I am quoting the paragraph.

And the defendants are further restrained from assembling in the paths, approaches, and roads upon said property leading to and from their homes and residences to the mines, along which the employees of the Monongah Coal and Coke Company are compelled to travel to get to them, or in any way interfering with the employees of said company in passing to and from their work, either by threats, menaces, or intimidation, and the defendants are further restrained from entering the said mines and interfering with the employees in their mining operations within said mines, or assembling upon said property at or near the entrance of said mines.

The literal construction of those phrases is what? All the paths and roads from this Capitol building to the mines of the Monongah Coal Company are the approaches to it.

Mr. PARKER. This provision is against the assembling, and this committee will put its own interpretation upon that.

Mr. ALEXANDER. It is broad enough to cover all places, wherever they might happen to be.

Mr. KERR. You can start out here, and it is broad enough to cover any assemblage anywhere.

Mr. GOMPERS. And from the homes of the defendants, wherever any of those miners live, no matter where it may be.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are mistaken. I thought it said they were restrained from assembling in the paths and roads upon said property and leading to and from said property.

Mr. GOMPERS. Shall I read it again?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; do so.

(Mr. Gompers here read again the above last-quoted paragraph of the injunction.)

Mr. GOMPERS. On an injunction issued by Judge Melville W. Fuller I had the distinguished honor to be enjoined, with a very large number of "confederates, associates, and coconspirators, whose names are unknown," from trespassing in West Virginia during the miners'

strike of 1897. Let me quote a few more phrases employed by some of the justices in the issuance of these injunctions.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you there, was that injunction which you read made the subject of judicial inquiry anywhere as to whether it was binding and valid?

Mr. GOMPERS. No, sir; the miners' strike was won in spite of the court's injunctions, and the employers and employees had agreed upon wages and hours and terms and other conditions of labor, and solely by default the injunction was made permanent.

Mr. ALEXANDER. What court did you say it was that made that injunction?

Mr. GOMPERS. The injunction to which I just referred?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Yes.

Mr. GOMPERS. The circuit court of the United States for the district of West Virginia.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Who was the judge?

Mr. GOMPERS. Judge Jackson.

In one of the injunctions, which was issued in the northern district of Ohio in the case of The American Steel and Wire Company v. The Wire Drawers and Die Makers' Union No. 1, of Cleveland, Ohio, Walter Gillett, et al., Judge Hammond enjoined the men from

compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence, and so forth, and from ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or abetting, in any manner whatever, any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid.

Mark you, not even were the members of this organization permitted to persuade the employees of that concern, the American Steel and Wire Company. They were not even permitted to persuade, and were enjoined from so persuading, any of the employees from leaving the employment of that company for the purpose of preventing a reduction in wages. And the defendants were further enjoined from in any manner interfering with the American Steel and Wire Company in carrying on its business in its usual and ordinary way, and from in any manner interfering with or molesting any person or sons who might be employed in said employment, or seeking employment, by that company.

And defendants and each and all of them are enjoined and restrained from going, either singly or collectively, to the homes of complainant's employees, or any of them, for the purpose of intimidating or coercing any or all of them to leave the employment of the complainant, or from entering complainant's employment, and, as well, from intimidating or threatening in any manner the wives and families of employees at their said homes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that case?

Mr. GOMPERS. The case of The American Steel and Wire Company, complainants, v. The Wire Drawers and Die Makers' Union, of Cleveland, Ohio, Walter Gillett, et al.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that injunction made the subject of judicial decision as to its validity in all of those broad and sweeping provisions? Mr. GOMPERS. I am not prepared to say that it was; but it was made permanent, and has never been upset.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it made permanent in that form?

Mr. GOMPERS. In that form; yes, sir.

Mr. OVERSTREET. What effect did it have?

Mr. GOMPERS. It destroyed the union and destroyed the strike and

the wire drawers and die makers of Cleveland and-yes, and throughout several other parts of the country-are almost the abject slaves of this wire and steel trust to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe they will issue an injunction preventing you from coming here and trying to "persuade" us.

Mr. GOMPERS. Perhaps they may. And I had the honor of saying to this committee and I want to say to you, gentlemen, that I said it in no vein of bravado, nor in any boastful spirit-that by everything I hold dear or prize, I would rather lose my life than to obey an injunction of such a character, no matter by which court issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any knowledge of any case where a man was ever punished in any way by a court for disobeying that clause of an injunction forbidding him to go to the home of a workman, to meet a workman, and by persuasion, merely, induce him to leave his employment?

Mr. GOMPERS. I can not recollect any particular incident of that character; but I do know that when men belonging to a union have been out on strike to secure a reduction of hours, or an increase of wages, or to secure a redress for a wrong, they have been restrained from going to the homes of their friends, whom they may have heard desired to return to work, and when they desired to go and see these friends and persuade them not to do this the injunctions of the court have prevented them from so doing, and nothing else. The ordinary man wants to be a law-abiding citizen, and he looks upon an edict of the court as a command to him, and it should be so. He has no desire to violate the edict of the court; and what we want to do is, realizing that the courts have invaded certain of our rights, we want a statute law that shall exactly describe what the judge may do under certain circumstances, and these are the circumstances that I have tried to narrate and bring to your attention.

The rights I speak of are the right of the workingman to quit his employment, his right to assert himself with his fellow-workingmen, and thereby through all possible lawful methods endeavor to secure the improvement of his condition and the condition of his fellowworkers. We insist not only that there shall be a trial by jury for any offense that any citizen shall commit, but that in cases of labor disputes the injunction shall not lie shall not issue-charging a crime or the possibility of a crime, and enjoining a man from committing a crime, when no crime has been committed or contemplated, and by this specious means defeating the very object for which he has organized. The CHAIRMAN. Will you contend at all that it would be policy, or safe, to limit the right of a court to summarily try and fine or imprison a man who, in the very presence of the court when it was in session, should be guilty of a gross contempt against the dignity and peace of the court, even though in doing it he committed a crime? As I illustrated the other day, suppose I should enter a court in session, and having some grievance against the judge, or not-no matter what my purpose wasI should go in with my pockets filled with brickbats, and stand up in the bar and throw brickbats at the head of the court, and hit the judge. Now, that would be not only an assault and battery, a criminal offense, but it would constitute a gross contempt of the court. Now, would you advocate that in a case like that it would be the duty of the court to have me indicted for assault and battery, and leave the matter there? Mr. GOMPERS. No, sir; the Constitution of the United States pro

vides that no man shall be tried twice, or have his life and liberty placed in jeopardy twice, for the same offense. Now, I am not quoting constitutional law, because I know anything about it, but because I think I do

The CHAIRMAN. That is a settled principle of the law; but suppose the same act constitutes a crime against the peace and dignity of the State and also a contempt of court?

Mr. GOMPERS. I should assume that it would be within the province of the judge to hold the transgressor as guilty of contempt of court; or he may lodge complaint against the offender before a grand jury and have him indicted for assault and battery. He may have his choice, and either would be admissible, but not both.

The CHAIRMAN. Should not the judge have both those remedies and also a third one? For instance, this man is in contempt of court. Now, the judge should protect the dignity of the court from all contempts. Then, if you assume an assault and battery was committed on the person, the judge should have the offender indicted. Suppose the judge was laid up by that assault for several weeks, and suffered pain and other injuries and inconveniences, he might also have a civil remedy to recover damages which he had sustained.

Mr. GOMPERS. Very true; but I should say that I quite agree with the chairman in that; but I would submit that this question is not raised by this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true; but you were speaking generally of these injunctions and contempts, and so forth, and I wanted to see what your idea was on that subject.

Mr. OVERSTREET. Does not your bill provide in terms for an abolition of the power of injunction?

Mr. GOMPERS. No, sir; if it did I should not appear here to advocate its passage, because I believe the writ of injunction a very impor tant right. What we complain of is the abuse of that writ. I should add that the issuance of the injunction in labor disputes would be abolished under the provisions of this bill.

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Mr. OVERSTREET. I quote from lines 6 and 7 of the bill: nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto." I called Mr. Darrow's attention to that the other day, and he was inclined to think that that language would abolish the writ, and it ought to be amended.

Mr. GOMPERS. We are not wedded to the phraseology of this bill or any bill. After Mr. Darrow had completed his argument he thought that some change might be required, and in speaking of this matter with our attorney, Mr. Ralston, he, I think, agreed with us; but I should prefer that he should deal with that branch of the question-the legal phase of it. I am sure that he is better qualified than I am on that.

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I want to just take a few moments of time now to call attention to a few other phrases in certain injunctions. The defendants were restrained from "congregating at or near the premises of the said American mill." They were restrained from "inducing or coercing, by threats or persuasion, the employees to leave the said employment. Mark you, "induce." They were restrained from interfering with any such persons as might be employed. They were further enjoined from either singly or collectively going to the homes of any of complainant's employees. They were restrained from congregating near

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