MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL MEADE.

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Maryland, and West Virginia to furnish 100,000 militia for the protection of those States. Pennsylvania, the one in greatest danger, was so laggard that she asked New Jersey to come to her help, and that little State gallantly did so.

GENERAL MEADE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Hooker deserved credit for appreciating his own unfitness for the command of the army that was again to fight Lee. He crossed the Potomac June 26th, making a movement which threatened Lee's communications, and resigned the next day. At Frederick, on the 28th, he published an order to the effect that the army had been placed in charge of Major-General George G. Meade.

This was an excellent appointment. Although Meade was born, in 1815, in Cadiz, Spain, he was an American, because his father was the United States. naval agent at the time. Meade was graduated from West Point in 1835, and won distinction in the war with the Seminoles and with Mexico. The appointment was a surprise to him, but it pleased everybody, and he modestly took hold, resolved to do the best he could.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL MEADE.

He adhered to the general plan of Hooker. His army numbered about 100,000, and no braver men lived anywhere. Nearly all of Lee's troops were north of the Potomac, partly in Maryland and partly in Pennsylvania. On the 27th of June the whole army was at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; but Lee was greatly hampered by the absence of Stuart and his cavalry. That dashing officer was very fond of making raids, and, giving a wider meaning to the permission of Lee than that general intended, he was off on another of his bold ventures, with no certainty as to when he would return. It was upon him that Lee was obliged to depend for news of the Union army. Receiving none, he was on the point of advancing against Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, when he paused upon receiving the first reliable news of the Army of the Potomac.

Meade had pushed his advance beyond Middleton, where his left was lying when he took command of the army at Frederick. This action of the Union commander looked as if he intended to cross the mountains and attack the Confederate rear. Ewell's corps was at York and Carlisle, but still there was no knowledge whatever of the whereabouts of Stuart.

Lee now attempted to draw Meade away from the Potomac by concentrating his army to the east of the mountains. Hill and Longstreet advanced to Gettysburg, while Ewell was ordered to do the same. Lee himself lagged in the hope that Stuart would join him, and because of that, Meade, who was

keenly on the alert, arrived in the neighborhood of Gettysburg first. On the last day of June, he was within a few miles of the town, while Lee was somewhat to the north and making for the same place.

Stuart and his cavalry had harassed the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, but, unable to stay its advance, they crossed the Potomac, and, moving to the east of Meade, entered Carlisle shortly after Ewell had left for Gettysburg. Stuart's delay was owing to the fact that he did not know Lee's whereabouts.

THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

The two mighty armies were now within striking distance of each other. It was yet early in the day when a collision took place between a Confederate division and Reynolds' Corps on the western side of the town. Reynolds was one of the best officers in the Union army. He was engaged in directing the movements of his troops when he was struck in the head by a rifle bullet and instantly killed. General Doubleday succeeded him in command, but was unable to drive back the enemy. Howard arrived with the Eleventh Corps early in the afternoon and took charge of the whole force. These were mainly composed of Germans, who were so overwhelmingly stampeded by Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville. They did not appear to have recovered from that panic, for they fled pell-mell through Gettysburg, with the enemy whooping at their heels. Nearly all who did not run were cut down or they surrendered.

Meade had sent Hancock to take chief command, and, aided by Howard, he rallied the shattered corps on the crest of Culp's Hill, behind the town. The keen eye of Hancock was quick to see that it was here the decisive struggle must take place, and he sent an urgent message to Meade, fifteen miles away, to lose not an hour in hurrying his troops forward. Meade followed the counsel. Some of his men arrived that night, some the next morning, while those from the greatest distance did not come in until the following after

noon.

The line as formed by Hancock extended along Cemetery Hill on the west and south of Gettysburg. It was a formidable position, and Lee, after carefully studying it, decided to await the arrival of Longstreet and Ewell with their corps before making his attack. Events proved that the decision was a disastrous mistake on the part of the Confederate commander.

When the sultry first day of July drew to a close, the Federal right held Culp's Hill, the centre Cemetery Hill, the left was along Cemetery Ridge, and the reserve on the right. This line curved in the form of a horseshoe, with the projecting portion facing Gettysburg. Sedgwick, it will be remembered, had not

arrived, but the force was composed of a hundred thousand veterans who had 200 cannon at command.

That night the Confederates were in Gettysburg and a part of the country to the east and west. Ewell formed the left and held the town; Seminary Ridge was occupied by Hill's Corps, and confronted the centre and left of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. When Pickett's division came up on the 3d, it was placed on the right of Hill's position and faced Round Top.

Most of the succeeding day was spent by both armies in preparing for the tremendous death-grapple. At about five o'clock in the afternoon, having become convinced that the left and

left centre of the Union line were the weakest points, Lee directed his efforts against them. They were held by Sickles, who made a blunder by advancing a portion of his force beyond the battle-line and seizing a ridge. It was because of this blunder that the first Confederate attack was made at that point.

Longstreet and Ewell opened with a sharp cannonade, under cover of which Hood's division impetuously assaulted Sickles' left. He drove his right wing between Sickles left and Little Round Top, and was steadily succeeding in his purpose, when one of those apparently trifling things, for which no one can account, interfered and brought about momentous results.

Little Round Top was the key

to the position, and yet it had no real defenders. could have seized it without the slightest difficulty. he began working his way toward it, and only some could prevent it speedily falling into his possession.

Had Hood known this, he Perceiving its importance, extraordinary interference

But General Gouverneur Warren, chief engineer, and his officers had climbed Little Round Top and were using it as a signal station. Soon the shots began flying so fast about them that they made hurried preparations to leave. Warren, however, saw the importance of holding the hill, and told his

associates to make a pretense of doing so, while he looked around for a force to bring to the spot.

Fortunately, a large body of reinforcements were hurrying past to Sickles, who had sent an urgent call for them. Without hesitation, General Warren detached a brigade for the defense of Little Round Top. They ran up the slope, dragging a battery with them. Hardly had they done so, when Hood made a fierce charge. The fighting was of the most furious nature, and it looked for a time as if the yelling Texans would carry the hill, but they were forced back, and, pressing their way up the ravine at the foot, turned the left Union flank, but were forced again to retire by a bayonet charge.

Sickles called for reinforcements when attacked by Longstreet, but with their aid he could not hold his position. He was rushed back by the terrific fighter, and Longstreet gained and held the key-point of the line against the repeated assaults of the Union troops. Not only that, but he was resistlessly advancing, when more reinforcements arrived and attacked him just as he reached a wheatfield and grove of woods on the western side of Plum Run. The Confederates were beginning to give way, when Hood, having carried Sickles' extreme left, arrived. A vehement charge carried Hood through two divisions that were doubled back on their main line on Cemetery Ridge; Sickles' left having been crushed, his centre and right were assailed, and the latter was driven back. In the fighting Sickles lost a leg as well as his entire advanced position.

The close of the 2d of July brought brilliant, but only partial, success to the Confederates. After reaching Cemetery Ridge, Longstreet's men were repulsed by Hancock. The Confederate commander fell back to the western side of the wheatfield, where he remained until morning. Ewell, impetuously attacking the Union right centre at Cemetery and Culp's Hill, kept back Federal reinforcements from reaching the left, which Longstreet was pounding, drove out the Federal artillery and infantry, and held the works. This was a most important success, and, if Ewell could maintain his position throughout the morrow, General Lee would have a chance of taking Meade's line in reverse. The conclusion of the second day, therefore, left matters in dubious shape for both sides. While the Confederates had made gains, they were not decisive. Still they were such as to cause grave concern on the part of Meade and his brother officers, who held a long, anxious consultation, and discussed the question whether it was not wise to fall back and assume a new and stronger position. The decision was to remain where they were.

THE THIRD DAY.

Naturally Lee strengthened his force near where Ewell had secured a lodgment within the breastworks of Culp's Hill, with the purpose of making

his main attack there; but Meade could not fail to see the utmost importance of driving out the enemy from his position. He shelled it at daylight on the 3d, and sent a strong body of infantry against the intruders. The Confederates made a desperate resistance, but in the end were expelled, and the Union line re-established.

It will be seen that this miscalculation of Lee compelled him to change his plans. Sitting on his horse, riding back and forth, often halting and scanning the battlefield through his glasses, and continually consulting his officers, he finally decided to direct his supreme effort against the Union centre. Success there meant the defeat and rout of the Union army, for, if the two wings could be wedged apart, they would be overwhelmed and destroyed by the charging Confederates.

But the impressive fact was as well known to the Federals as to their enemies, and nothing was neglected that could add to the strength of their position. All night long troops kept arriving, and in the moonlight were assigned to their positions for the morrow. It took Lee several hours to complete his preparations for the assault upon the Union centre. At noon he had 145 cannon posted on Seminary Ridge, opposite Meade's centre, while Meade had 80 pieces of artillery lined along the crest of Cemetery Hill.

PICKETT'S CHARGE.

At noon the Confederates opened with all their cannon, their object being to silence the batteries in front, to clear the way for the charge against the Union centre. The eighty Federal pieces replied, and for two hours the earth rocked under the most prodigious cannonade ever heard on this side of the Atlantic. Then the Union fire gradually ceased, and, as the vast volume of smoke slowly lifted, a column of 5,000 gray-coated men were seen to issue from the Confederate lines more than a mile away and advance at a steady stride toward the Union intrenchments. Their bayonets shone in the afternoon sun, and their fluttering battle-flags, the splendid precision of their step, and their superb soldierly appearance made so thrilling a picture that an involuntary murmur of admiration ran along the Union lines, even though these same men were advancing to kill and wound them.

They formed the division of General George E. Pickett, and no more magnificent charge was ever made. They advanced in a double line, their own artillery ceasing firing as they gradually passed within range with beautiful regular step, which seemed to hasten, as if even with their perfect discipline they could not restrain, their eagerness to join in the death-grapple.

The Union artillery remained silent until half the space was crossed, when it burst forth, and the Confederates went down by the score. The gaps