the presence of the members of both Houses of the Legislature. The person having the highest number of votes shall be Governor. But, if two or more shall be equal and highest in votes, one of them shall be chosen Governor by the joint vote of the members of both Houses. Contested elections shall be determined by a committee, to be selected from both Houses of the Legislature, and formed and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law.”

Mr. Bell, of Chester, moved to amend the report by striking out all after the word “Governor”, in the first line, and inserting as follows:

6 And a Lieutenant Governor shall be chosen on the second Tuesday in October, by the citizens of the Commonwealth, at the places where they shall respectively vote for representatives. The returns of every election for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, shall be sealed up and transmited to the seat of Government, directed to the Speaker of the Senate, who shall open and publish them in the presence of both Houses of the Legislature. The persons respectively having the highest number of votes for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, shall be elected; but, if two or more shall have an equal and the highest number of votes for Governor or Lieutenant Governor, the two Houses of the Legislature shall, by joint ballot, choose one of the said persons, so having an equal and the highest number of votes for Governor or Lieutenant Governor. Contested elections shall be determined by a committee, to be selected from both Houses of the Legislature, and formed and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law”.

Mr. BELL said, he was by no means tenacious of the form of his proposition. He had made, the report, rather to elicit the opinions of gentlemen than from any strong desire to see his own views adopted. In case of the death or resignation of the Governor, as the Constitution now stands, the Speaker of the Senate would succeed, so that an individual, elected by the citizens of a single county, and never thought of even by them as a fit person to be Governor, may take the office of Governoi.The proposition he had now offered was in conformity with the provisions which he had found in some of the other Constitutions.

How far it would meet the views of the committee, he would not pretend to give any opinion.

Mr. MANN suggested the propriety of making it “third" instead of “second” Tuesday, and the mover modified his amendment accordingly

. Mr. MAGEE, of Perry, moved to amend the amendment by striking out the words “third Tuesday in October", and inserting the words " first Tuesday in November”.

The question being put, the motion was decided in the negative.

Mr. CHAMBERS, of Franklin, observed that the amendment which was now brought before the committee was one containing the proposition to establish the office of Lieutenant Governor. He was opposed to the amendment as creating an office which was uncalled for. We have had no experience of any inconvenience arising from the want of this office. Our Constitution, as has respeatedly been said, is one under which the Gove ernment has been satisfactorily administered during half a century, but as yet, we have derived no inconvenience from the want of a Lieutenant Governor. During all that period, although Governors have been elected for extended terms of office, iwo or three in succession, not a single case has

occured in which it has become necessary to supply a vacancy caused by death. If, therefore, this be a contingency of such rare occurrence as not to have happened once in the course of half a century, is it necessary to establish an officer for all time, in order to provide against such a contingency when it shall arise? If it should arise, provision is already made for it. The Speaker of the Senate is empowered by the Constitution to act until a new Governor shall be elected. It has been said that this is casting the Executive station on an officer who has not been elected in reference to it. Why is it said he is not elected in reference to it, when it is known, that under a provision of the Constitution, it may fall upon him? If he is a representative of the people, can we not trust them to elect an individual to act as Governor, when, in the course of events, it may happen to fall upon him? A person qualified to act in the Senate, and to fill the Speaker's chair, must be qualified to act as Governor; and, when the people know that the office may be devolved upon him, he will be elected in view of that contingency. There is no evidence of public opinion demanding suc a change, therefore, he would vote against the proposition as unnecessary and uncalled for.

Mr. FLEMING, of Lycoming, said he did not know that he could add any thing to the reasons which had so often been urged in favor of the election of a Lieutenant Governor. He had no doubt, that the subject is one, which had been thought of by the people. It had occured to him, as it was an appointment which could add nothing to the expenses of the Government, and as it gives the people an opportunity to elect an individual, with a special reference to the possibility of his being called to fill the Executive chair, that there was no impropriety in the proposition. It was true, that the gentlemen who had heretofore filled the office of Speaker of the Senate have been amply qualified to fill that of Governor of the Commonwealth. In many instances, however, he was not competent to form a judgment as to their abilities. But he was disposed to put into that high and respectable office, a man of the people's choice, and not one who had been elected by a mere majority of the Senate to fill the chair of that body -an individual always elected by a political party, and pretty generally under a high degree of excitement. From the character of our Government, from the increase of population, the excitements growing out of politics, and other causes, it may so happen, that we may have a vacancy in the office of Governor, by death, resignation, changes or otherwise. If it may occur, as there is but a probability that it will, where could be the impropriety of allowing the people to elect an officer who would be fitted, from his being chosen in reference to the contingency by the people, to supply the place. He did not see any good and substantial reasons against the election of a Lieutenant Governor. It could not, in any way, detract from the dignity of the Governor. On the contrary, it would add to, and strengthen that department of the Government. He could not doubt that it was the desire of all to place power in the hands of an individual elected by the whole people, in preference to taking one from the Senate. Distinctions have frequently been caused by party feelings, and thus, if an individual elected by a party in the Senate should be placed in the Executive office, the whole machinery of the Government would be made to work to particular party objects. He would vote for the section as introduced by the gentle man from Chester ; but, if in the opinion of the committee, it should be

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thought improper to introduce it into the Constitution, he would willingly assent to their decision.

Mr. MEREDITH, of Philadelphia, stated that he was a member of the committee to whom had been refered this article, and in which this amendment had been proposed and rejected. He would say a few words, in order to place before the committee the reasons which induced him to oppose it. As had been justly said by the gentleman from Franklin (Mr. CHAMBERS) there had never been any inconvenience felt from a want of a Lieutenant Governor; and unless strong and powerful reasons could be given to shew why there should hereafter be inconvenience, it would be a sufficient ground for rejecting the amendment. The more he reflected on the subject, the more satisfied was he that they who framed the Constitution of 1776, took the true ground which reason and sound policy dictated. The reasons assigned by the gentleman from Chester, (Mr. BELL) and the gentleman from Lycoming, (Mr. FLEMING) in support of this amendment, were two fold; first, the necessity for such an officer to fill a possible vacancy; and secondly, the impropriety of taking the Speaker of the Senate. The Speaker of the Senate would, under the existing provision, hold the power until the election of a new Governor. The Constitution says that he shall only hold it until the next general election; and not, the Governor should happen to die in the February after his election, for three years--but only until the next election. This is the same principle as that which related to Sheriffs. If a Sheriff die, his place is only filled until the next general election. The time, therefore, during which the Speaker may continue in office is not the objection. It is said that the Speaker is an improper person to fill the office, because the people have not elected him. The people elect the Senate: the people, in their different districts, elect the Senators, one of whom must be Speaker of the body, and he may be called on to exercise the functions of the Executive. How is this objection proposed to be obviated ? By the election of a Lieutenant Governor, to be without salary, but to receive double pay when he sits in the Senate, to decide by his casting vote, where there is no opportunity to explain his vote, or defend himself against imputation. You place him there with a barren sceptre, without pay, and he may be called to fill the Executive chair. On the other hand, you take the Speaker of the Senate, elected by the people as a Senator, and by the Senate as their Speaker, a sufficient pledge of his fitness to discharge the functions of the Executive. From a Lieutenant Governor what have you to expect? It may be that an officer may take the situation with a view to make it the path to the Executive chair. Experience has given us lessons on this point; and it was a dangerous course which he would not sanction. How can we expect a man of intellectual vigor to take office, where he inust occupy a chair, liable to be broken down by the assaults of political enemies, without an opportunity being given to him to defend himself. He may become dangerous to the party who elected him, by exerting his influence in some way, equally illegitimate and unexpected. Suppose you elect a nullity, a man of weak talents, he would detract from the character of the Senate over which he was elected to preside, and when called to discharge the duties of the Executive, would cast a discredit on the reputation of the State. For these reasons, he should vote against the amendment. He considered it unnecessary; that hitherto we have suffered no inconvenience from

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the want of such an officer, and that if we are to suffer inconvenience in future, this would be a bad way to remedy it.

Mr. Bell rose to make a few remarks in reply. He had not heard any objection to the principle contained in his aiendment. All which had been said, in opposition to it, was on the ground of expediency. Gentlemen did not agree as to the term for which the Speaker might continue to hold office. The provision of the Constitution was not very clear on this point, and had given rise to much diversity of opinion. A reference to the section would shew that the language allowed room for strong doubt, and he had heard able men disagree concerning it. A Governor may die immediately after his inauguration, and the person who succeeds may

exercise the power for three years at least. What is that democratic principle which lies at the bottom of our institutions ? That the people shall select their own agents for the discharge of particular offices, and that the individual who fills that office shall be the particular individual so elected. He had heard much since he came here on the subject of gerrymandering. The session of the Legislature before the last, a district had by that process, been fraudulently formed for the purpose of cheating the people. The district which comprehended his constituents was so arranged as to give a misrepresentation of the sentiments of the people. May it not happen again, as it has already happened. May not a Speaker of the Senate be thus raised to the Executive chair, who may differ in his political views from the majority of the people? Might not an individual of this character, by chance, or by accident succeed to the Executive chair? Would not this be a direct contradiction to the sentiments and principles which we hold most sacred? We have been told that, in the period of fifty years, we have experienced no inconvenience from the want of a Lieutenant Go

And why have we felt no inconvenience ? Because it has so happened that we have had no death, or resignation of a Governor. Would gentlemen certify that this will always be the case? If we can be assured that, in all time, the Governor shall have a lease of his life to the close of his Executive term, there will be an end to all difficulty ; but so long as it is possible that he may die, or be removed from office, there is a necessity for an amendment. But, it was said, all the Senate is elected by the people, and Senators are chosen for their virtue and talents. In some instances this was true; in others, not. But they were not elected by the whole people of the State, as a Lieutenant Governor would be. A Senator is but a selection of a particular portion of the people, and the election of a Speaker of the Senate is still further removed from them. He is not elected to the Chair by the people, nor even by a particular portion of the people; but, for his political views, he is elected by that body as its Speaker; and the ground on which he is elected is to preside over that body. It is said if a Lieutenant Governor be elected, he will have nothing to do, he will be without influence, and without power, and that he cannot interfere in debate. It is so, and if these objections are of any weight, they are equally applicable to the Vice President of the United States. Would any one agree to introduce the rule that the Vice President should take part in the debate ? Has he the privilege of debate? The right to reply on the floor? No. Has any inconvenience arisen from his creation? There is a recent instance of a distinguished man, who presided over the Senate of the United States, who, day after day, was compelled to sit there, and

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listen to assaults made upon him by his political adversaries. Did he suffer in consequence ? The only effect was to disgrace that body. There was 110 objection made to the principle of his amendment, and he would ask the democratic members if there was any good reason why the Speaker of the Senate should be selected to exercise the functions of the Executive, in preference to an officer elected by the whole people, with a view to the contingency of the death or resignation of the Governor. If so, he would abandon the argument, and not insist on his amendment.

Mr. STERIGERE said the amendment under consideration, proposing to create the office of Lieutenant Governor, is similar to one placed on the files of the Convention at the beginning of the session, as one which, I thought, ought to be adopted. I do not think this has been proposed at the proper place: about that, however, there may be a difference of opinion; but as the question is raised, we may as well consider it now as at any other time. I shall briefly state some of the reasons why I shall vote in favor of the proposition. We must consider this officer in two points of view—as the presiding officer of the Senate, and as the Executive of e State. The Senate is the highest legislative body in the State—its members ld their offices for long terms. In many cases they will be equally diled--and the casting vote, in either rejecting or passing a law, in which e whole State may be interested, should be given only by an officer choen by the whole people of the State. A person so elected would be govrned by the interests of the whole State—not by that of a county or disrict. The presiding officer of such a body should be chosen by the State at large. This mode of election is quite as suitable as the one now n force.

It is said this officer would have to preside over the Senate without any right to debate, or give his reasons for his conduct. He is to have no vote, unless the Senate is equally divided. Then, as in the Senate of the Unied States, he could give his reasons; he would have no occasion to do so it any other time.

It is provided in the present Constitution, and sanctioned and settled by the people, that the Executive officer of the State should be chosen by the citizens at large. For the same reason, the individual who may, by any possibility, be called to exercise the Executive department, should also be chosen by the people at large. The question is, how should our Execuive be chosen? The present mode is not much better than casting lots for a Governor, in case a vacancy occurs.

The President of the Senate is never, or seldom, chosen by the members with regard to his qualifications ind fitness to be Governor, but merely in reference to his qualifications as heir presiding officer. But suppose they were to select him with a view ) fill both situations; he would come into the Executive chair with the oice of a very small portion of the people; and is it to be contended that une county or district shall select a Governor for the Commonwealth? It is a correct principle that an officer who is to exercise an authority only in his county or district, and to act only for the people of that county or district, as a representative, or senator, or the like, should be chosen by the people of such county or district only; they are the only persons to whom he is responsible. But an officer who is to exercise power and authority extending throughout the State, should also be chosen by the whole State

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