most experience. Then you sacrifice the man who may be most fit for the situation, and who might be the choice of a large majority of the people of the Commonwealth, for a mere speculative notion, which, in practice, never has been tried, and consequently must be uncertain in its effects. He had never seen this doctrine, of a single term for an Executive applied any where, but in one place, and there it has not operated in a manner which would recommend it to us. A provision of this kind is contained in the Constitution of the Federal Government of Mexico.The President of the Mexican Republic is elected for five years, and is then ineligible. Now, he need not say a word more than ask the committee to contrast the operations of our own Constitution, or that of the General Government with the Constitution of Mexico, and say which they consider to be best. The point upon which that Government was near being wrecked, if it be not entirely wrecked, would probably have been avoided, if instead of being driven to the necessity in 1827, of electing a new President, when the country was convulsed with disorder and revolution, they could have continued in office the man who was then President. The new election was the crisis, and there had been no peace since. There waa a great difference, to be sure, between this country and that, but there, this theory has been carried out, and we can see how it has operated, and we see by that it is good for nothing. It appeared to him, then, that we should not reduce the limitation, because he found the limitation to nine years to have proved to be good, and if it were likely to be too long, the people can remedy it. But he would not materially shorten the term, because it had worked well, and because he could not see any reason, if the people should prefer an officer for a second term, why they should not be permited to elect him, any more than any other officer. It was an unreasonable curtailment of the power of the people. We had a debate, a day or two since, upon a proposition to prevent the members of this Convention from holding any office created by their act, in the shape of amendments to the Constitution, if any should be made, and almost the whole body seemed to rise up, and say this was anti-republican. Clearly, there was nothing anti-republican in self denial. Every man may retire from office when he pleases, and if it suits his convenience he will do so, and his country will suffer no great loss, because, in the language of the old ballad of Cheoy Chase, they may say, "We trust we have a hundred as good as he". So every man my refuse office. The argument against that proposition was, that the people had a right to our services, and if they should so desire, we ought not to deny them the right of electing us. The vote being taken on this question, after discussion, it was rejected, 92 to 18.— Now, what say these same gentleman to the people, in relation to a Governor? They say, you must not elect him for more than three years, and forever thereafter he will be ineligible, even though three fourths, nay, though the whole of the people should wish to keep him in office. There is danger in these restraints, and he begged leave to call the attention of the Convention to it. As sure as you have unreasonable restraints, that is, restraints upon the majority, which will deprive them of any of the rights they now enjoy, so sure will you have attacks upon the Constitution, and an excitement in the country, and you will have a new Convention called to alter the Constitution, and restore to the people those rights we shall have taken away. It seemed to him, that the Constitution, as it now stands, was a reasonable one, and should be left as it is, in this respect, unless we should adopt the reasoning of a member of Congress, he had mentioned some days since. That member wished to limit the term of office of President to four years, in order that his brother members, whom he considered aspirants, might have a better chance of being elected President. That, however, is a perversion. The office is for the public, not for the individual. There is in the nature of things a limitation to this office. A man is not advanced to be Governor, until he gets on pretty well in life. At the age of twenty-one years a man becomes entitled to vote, and at the same time, is entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives; at twenty-five a Senator. These are the steps by which he comes to be politically known and estimated; his qualifications for office exhibited to the community. It is upon this knowledge of his qualifications, that at last, he is fixed upon for the office of Governor, and therefore, it can seldom, if ever, happen that a very young man will be elected to the office of Governor. It is right that it should be so; for, he supposed, notwithstanding all that had been said about young and old men, if we take a reasonable view of this matter, it will be found, that although the older man may not be so fit to run a race or fight a battle, yet, in other respects, in prudence and wisdom and self command, he may be superior to the young man. Thus, a man is not put forward for ihe office of Governor, until he has manifested extraordinary discretion, or has attained that age which ordinarily brings with it the character of discretion and stability. Then, after that, a few years will make a limitation to his office; feebleness and decay come on apace and make him unfit for the situation, and at length death overtakes him, and terminates his concern with the cares of this world. So that there is very little to be apprehended from too long a continuance in office of the Executive of this Commonwealth. What is the evil as the matter now stands; and, what is there in which the Governor is likely to do harm? Is it the continuance in office of those he has the power to appoint? That subject was now open to us to alter and amend, and how far it should be done, he would not undertake at present to say. But the Governor is the representative of a majority of the people of Pennsylvania; it might be, by possibility, that he only represented a plurality, but it generally happened that he represented a majority of the people, and those appointments must be of the same character, because those partisans, who are in the majority, are always looking to the Executive for the appointments he may have to confer.Every change you have in the Executive, you have a change of officers, so that the longer the Executive is continued in office, the less change you have. Every time he is removed you have a removal of officers. It is admited, that under our present system, these struggles were frequent enough, and fierce enough, yet here you propose to increase the number of those struggles, which will inevitably increase their fierceness and severity, until they will be perpetual. He did not see, therefore, that we were likely to gain any thing, and believing, as he did, that our institutions under our present Constitution, have been in strict conformance with the principles we ought to maintain, he did not like to see any alterations in the system. The dignity of this office was part and parcel of the dignity of the State, and he did not wish to see it diminished. He liked to see the Governor of Pennsylvania, stand next in rank to the President of the United States. Mr. Brown, of Philadelphia, said he had listened with great attention to the gentleman from the city, (Mr. SERGEANT) and he must say that he was not able wholly to comprehend his arguments, as they appeared to him to be in themselves contradictory. He was, however, at no loss to understand the gentleman's object. The gentleman has reiterated the oft repeated assertion made here by all the conservatives, that the Constitution has worked well, and that every thing has gone on harmoniously since its adoption. This had been reiterated so frequently that if the people were not deaf to the assertion, they must come to the same conclusions with gentlemen. The gentleman had come forward on all occasions with the same argument, so that if it was to be taken as good for any thing we must believe that every portion of the Constitution has worked well. Now it was strange that if all the departments of the Constitution were so perfect as gentlemen had represented them to be, and had given so much satisfaction, that this Convention had been called, even to deliberate on alterations and amendments. It was strange that the people had petitioned the Legislature on the subject of revising the Constitution; and it was strange that a large majority of them should have voted in favor of a change in the instrument, and then, again, elected delegates to come here and make that change, if the Constitution was so perfect and had worked so well. But he apprehended that the gentleman from the city was altogether mistaken; the Constitution had not worked well, and no part of it had worked worse than the Executive department. The frequent elections of the Governor, and the length of the term for which he is eligible, together with the immense patronage which he wields, so far from working well and harmoniously, has produced more confusion and dissatisfaction in this Commonwealth than has been experienced in any, or all, of the other States of the Union. These defects had come fully within the knowledge of the people, and to them, perhaps, more than to any other defect was to be attributed the call of this Convention. The President of the Convention has told us that the Constitution of Pennsylvania had been taken as a model for other States. Now he (Mr. B.) had looked into the Constitutions of all the States that had formed or reformed their Constitutions since our Constitution was established, and he had not found a single one which had taken it for a model ; on the contrary, nearly all the States which elect their Governors for a longer period than one year, make them ineligible at a much shorter period than the Constitution of Pennsylvania does. The gentleman from the city hat told us at one time that the Governor ought to be independent, and then, again, he has told us that he ought to be dependent. He has told us at one time, that the people ought to be allowed to elect the Governor as long as they approve his conduct, and at another time he eulogizes the present Constitution as all perfection; and yet this instrument makes the Governor ineligible after nine years. The gentleman has also told us, that the frequent elections of Governors were attended with excitement, because of the number of officers who were affected by it. In answer to this argument he (Mr. B.) would say that he had no doubt nearly all the officers now appointed by, and dependent upon the will of the Governor, would be taken from him and given to the people, or otherwise provided for; and then he apprehended there would be but little excitement attendant upon the change of a Governor. He must confess that he was at a loss to understand the gentleman's argument in refer a a a ence to the independence of those Governors who had not been re-elected. The gentleman had said that some were independent and some were not. Now does he mean that a Governor is to be kept in office for the purpose of becoming wealthy ? This part of the gentleman's argument he was unable to comprehend. Rotation in office is a democratic principle, and it is one which he (Mr. B.) would ever hold to, and it was one which he apprehended the people of this Commonwealth would ever stand by. The principle of rotation in office and ineligibility at short periods has been growing in favor with the whole people of the United States, since the example was first set them by the “noblest Roman of them all”—the great WASHINGTON—and it was one which would be adopted by the people of the United States generally. He had intended to present his views to the Convention, somewhat at large, on the subject of appointments generally, but as he knew that the committee was desirous of going through the first reading without much debate, he would not say any thing he had intended to say on the subject until the sixth article came up, only, that he should vote for the shortest term of office possible, and in favor of taking from the Governor the appointment of all officers, other than those connected immediately with the State Executive department. The amendment of Mr. HIESTER was then agreed to—ayes 37, noes 33. Mr. Smyth called for a division of the question so as to take the question on the first branch of the amendment, ending with the word “four”. Mr. FORWARD hoped the question would not be put in this shape as his vote would be much influenced by the manner in which the question of eligibility of the Executive should be decided. Mr. WOODWARD would enquire whether the vote just taken had not deci. ded that the Governor should not be eligible after four years. Mr. Symth had expected the amendment to the amendment would not have been agreed to. He was disposed to lengthen the term somewhat more than the present amendment proposed, therefore, he had called for a division of the question. Mr. DICKEY said the gentleman could obtain his object by voting against the proposition of the gentleman from Lancaster. If that was voted down then he could amend the report of the committee to suit his views. Mr. Smyth then withdrew the call for a division. Mr. MANN hoped the gentleman from Philadelphia would withdraw the motion for a division and let the question be taken fairly on the proposition. It seemed to him to be so connected that he could not vote understandingly on the first part unless he knew how the latter part would be decided. If the part was to be adopted he would vote one way, but if it was to be rejected, he would vote differently. Mr. Smyth said he had withdrawn his motion for a division with the expectation that the proposition of the gentleman from Lancaster would be voted down, and that he would then have an opportunity to amend the report of the committee on the section. Mr. STEVENS could see no difficulty in voting on the question as it stood. We could vote now on the presumption that the clause in relation to ineligibility would be carried, as it had just been carried; but if it was a lost those gentlemen who voted on that presumption could change their vote on second reading. Mr. M'SHERRY thought the question was not well understood in this way. The only way the gentleman from Centre could obtain his object would be by voting against this and proposing an amendment to the report of the committee. Then every gentleman would be able to understand it. Mr. HOPKINSON, of the city, said that as far as he could understand the argument, it was to limit the power of the Governor of this Commonwealth to a single term and to lessen the period of it. The argument against the re-eligibility of the Governor was that he used his power to secure his reelection. That, however, would depend upon what he might have. The whole argument rested on that, for, while he was in office he might use the great power of appointment to get himself re-elected, should he happen to be vested with it. If the Governor was to have what he now had, the appointment of every officer in the Commonwealth, the argument might have some foundation. But, if on the other hand, he was to be deprived of that power, no danger was to be apprehended that he would abuse his office. If his patronage was to remain, he would vote against his holding the office for more than one term. Until he knew what that power was which might be abused, he was not disposed to vote for any alteration in the Constitution in this respect. Mr. STEVENS, of Adams, remarked that he agreed with the argument of the gentleman from the city, that should the Governor be ineligible a second term, he should not be deprived of his patronage. The decision of the committee with respect to the term of office and the re-eligibility of the Governor, would have a material bearing upon the question of patronage. The re-eligibility of the Governor, then, ought to be settled before the committee proceeded further. And, if he was to be re-eligible, there would be reason to divest him of most of his patronage. But, if on the contrary he should be eligible for one term only, his patronage should be shaped according to the tenure of his office. He (Mr. S.) would vote to make him ineligible after the first term-though, perhaps a long one. Mr. Bell, of Chester, concured with the gentleman from Adams, (Mr. STEVENS) in what he had said with respect to the appointing power and the ineligibility of the Governor to office. The different terms of office which had been proposed were some of them too long, while others were too short. He thought that the limitation of four years, proposed by the gentleman from Lancaster, (Mr. REIGART) was too short. If asystem of State policy was commenced by a Governor, four years might not be sufficient to carry it out. If we make the term three years, and the eligibility two terms, the people, if they desired any system of policy commenced by a Governor carried into execution, could re-elect him. He thought that good policy demanded that he should not be restricted to one term, but that the people should have an opportunity of passing upon his conduct. Mr. Banks, of Mifflin, observed that it was somewhat difficult for him to make up his mind what course exactly to adopt in reference to this question. He felt satisfied that whatever conclusion he came to, after mature deliberation, his constituents would acquiesce in. With regard to the question of ineligibility and cutting men off from holding offices, at limited periods, while they may be fully capable of discharging the duties devolving on them, it was a difficult matter to resolve upon. It was well known |