RENEWAL FINES. 541 for lives renewable, conveyed it to his eldest son J., for life, with remainder to X, the eldest son of J. In 1813, L. acquired the reversion of the renewable lease, and in 1822 conveyed the reversion to R., the eldest son of his second marriage. In 1854, H., the heir-at-law of R., filed a cause petition against the executrix of X, to recover arrears of the rent against 'X's assets. As a defence to that suit, it was alleged that L. was insane when he executed the conveyance of 1822. In May 1857, H. served a notice on Y, the heir of X, and also of L., calling on him to take out a renewal. To this notice Y returned an answer, declining to take out a renewal till H.'s right was established in the cause petition, but nominating lives to be inserted in the next renewal, if H. should establish his right, and stating his readiness to pay into Court the amount of the renewal fines, to the credit of the then pending petition. In June 1857, the Master made an order establishing H.'s right to the reversion, as against the executrix, which was affirmed on appeal, on the 11th of January 1858. There were some further proceedings in H.'s suit up to November 1858. In December 1858, Y tendered a renewal and fines to H., and filed a petition for renewal in February 1859.-Held, that the tender was too late, and that the right of a renewal was forfeited. Ch. Ap. Long v. Long 252 RENEWAL, COVENANT FOR. See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. RENEWAL FINES. The contributions to renewal fines of the tenant of a College lease, and his sub-tenant, with a toties quoties covenant for renewal, are in proportion to the annual value of their respective interests. In calculating the value, the rent payable by each is to be deducted. If there were buildings on the land A demised certain lands for lives renewable for ever, at £70 a-year. A afterwards agreed to purchase the lessee's interest, then vested in B, in consideration of a perpetual rentcharge of £20 a-year; and, to carry out the contract, B demised the lands for the same lives, renewable for ever, at a rent of £90 a-year, to C, in trust for A. C died; whereupon the interest in the latter lease became vested in B, as C's heir-at-law.-Held, that a suit could be maintained by B for a receiver to recover the arrears of the profit-rent of £20, there being no remedy for it at Law. R. Tobin v. Redmond 445 REPRESENTATION. See DEED, 7. REPRESENTATIVE OF LESSOR. See CONVENTIONAL RENTS, AR REARS OF. RESIDUE. See WILL, 2, 10. RESIDUARY LEGATEE. See BEQUEST. RETURN TO WRIT. See PARTITION SUIT. REVIVAL AND RE-DOCKETING. See JUDGMENT. SEIZURE OF SHARES IN SHIP. See JUDGMENT CREDITOR. SEPARATE ESTATE, See DESCENDIble Freehold. SETTLEMENT. A marriage settlement contained a clause that the provision thereby made and intended for the wife, in the event of her viduity, should be accepted, deemed and taken in full lieu of dower or thirds, to which she might be entitled at Common Law, or otherwise howsoever.-Held, that she was barred of her share of her husband's personal estate, under the Statute of Distributions. R. In re Burgess' Trusts 164 SHERIFF, BILL OF SALE BY. See JUDGMENT CREDITORS. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See CONTRact. THEATRE. WILL, 14. In 1827, a lessor, as to whom it was disputed whether she was only tenant for life, or was entitled in quasi tail for lives renewable for ever, made a lease for her own life, with a covenant that if she should be enabled, either separately or in conjunction with any other person or persons, to grant the said premises for any longer term than was thereby granted, she would, at the request and costs of the lessee, execute all such further act or acts, &c., for the purpose of granting the premises to him, for any term not exceeding three lives, with covenant for perpetual renewal, on payment of a peppercorn fine on the fall of each SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. life, at the rent thereby reserved, &c., and the lessee covenanted for himself, his heirs and assigns, with the lessor to accept such grant. It was decided by the Court of Appeal (7 Ir. Chan. Rep. 388) that the lessor was tenant in quasi tail. Semble. The covenant was a personal covenant, binding on the lessor during her life, and did not descend with the land. No claim was made on foot of the covenant during the lifetime of the lessor, who died in 1854. Judgments had been obtained by the petitioners for the same debt against the lessee and R., who was entitled in remainder to the reversion, and who afterwards became entitled to the lessee's interest. After the lessee's death, a petition was filed by creditors of R., in the Incumbered Estates Court, for sale of the reversion, on the ground that the lessor was only tenant for life, or, if she were tenant in quasi tail, that she had not barred the entail. The petitioners were made parties in that matter, as judgment creditors of R.; and, after it was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, they had, in other proceedings in the Landed Estates Court, admitted the right of the respondents, who were devisees of the lessor, and had gone into possession of the lands.-Held, that the right to a specific performance of the covenant had been abandoned, and was barred by laches and acquiescence. A judgment creditor of a tenant may maintain a suit for a renewal. R. Homan v. Skelton STATUTES QUOTED. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27. 3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, ss. 78, 79, 80. 13 & 14 Vic., c. 29, s. 6. 75 TENANT FOR LIFE. A, tenant for life of lands (with power of charging £1000 thereon for his own use), with remainder (in the events which happened) to his daughter B in tail male, by a deed, for value, conveyed the lands, and all his interest therein, to B, subject (amongst other things) to the charge of £1000, and covenanted for good title, quiet enjoyment and further assurance. B subsequently became the purchaser of a judgment for £3000, entered up against A before the date of the conveyance.-Held, that although the effect of the conveyance was not to merge the charge during the lifetime of A, yet that the petition must be dismissed with costs, on the principle of Equity that a tenant for life, having a charge on the inheritance for his own benefit, cannot deal with it so as to prejudice a judgment creditor on his life estate, and also because, under the covenant for quiet enjoyment, A was bound to indemnify B against the judgment, the amount of which he must pay before he could raise his charge of £1000. L. E. Ct. In re Gardiner 519 TENANTRY ACT. See RENEWAL, 2. THEATRE. The owners of a theatre, by deed bearing date in 1839, made for valuable A testator, being possessed of £4000 stock, bequeathed of it £2000 to an individual. £1000 of the remainder he bequeathed for the use of Protestant schools of St. Peter's parish, and ano ther £1000 for the use of the school attached to the Episcopal chapel in B.-street. The chapel in B.-street had no school attached to it. B.-street was in St. Peter's parish.-Held, that with regard to the second £1000, the will showed a general charitable intention, which might be executed cy pres, in favour of Protestant schools in St. Peter's parish; and it was referred to the Master to settle a scheme accordingly. The costs, down to and including the hearing, ordered to be paid out of the residue; the costs of the reference to be borne by the fund. C. Daly v. Attorney-General VALIDITY OF AFFIDAVIT. See JUDGMENT MORTGAGE, 2, 3. 41 Where a lessee, bound by covenant not to commit waste, has committed acts of waste, for which damages merely nominal would be given, the Court of Chancery will not entertain a suit against him, founded on those acts of waste, where it appears that he does not contemplate committing any further waste, nor assert a right to commit it. No change in this respect has been introduced by the Chancery Amendment Act 1858. A tenant, by replying to a lettter charging him with the commission of waste, and requiring him to make compensation for it, "that he is prepared to defend any action which may be brought against him, and to show that, so far from having committed injury, he has materially improved the premises demised to him," does not assert a right to commit the waste complained of. C. Doran v. Carroll 379 WIDOW. See SETTLEMENT. WIFE'S FORTUNE. See POWER TO JOINTURE, EXECU TION OF. WILL. 1. Bequest of the interest of £500 to A for life, and, as to the principal, after the decease of A, and as "to all other property belonging to me, that I may die seised and possessed of or entitled unto, in trust, for the use, benefit and behoof of" B and her children, "without the control or intermeddling of her husband, and to be paid in such manner as my said trustees shall in their discretion think fit."-Held, that B took a life interest in all the property, with remainder to all her children born in A's lifetime, before and after the death of the testatrix. R. Scott v. Scott 114 3. Where there is an indefinite bequest to the parent, and, if he die without having or leaving children, over, the children do not take by implication. Where there is a bequest to the parent for life, and, if he die without having or leaving children, over, the children are not entitled by implication. Where there is a bequest to the parent for life, and, if he die without having or leaving children, over, and there are matters in the will to raise an inference in favour of the children, the Court is at liberty to take them in connection with the bequest in the event of the parent dying without having or leaving issue, and to hold that the children are entitled by implication. A testator bequeathed to each of his grand-nephews, A and B, an annuity for their respective lives, and, in case of the death of either of them, leaving issue, he directed that the annuity of him so dying should go to such issue, if more than one, share and share alike; the share or shares of such child or children as should die under twenty-one or marriage to go to and be equally divided amongst the survivor and survivors of such issue, during their respective natural lives; and if but one, the whole of the annuity to go to such only child for life; and in case of the death of either A or B without lawful issue living at his death, that the annuity of him so dying should go to the survivor for his life; and in case of the death of both A and B without leaving issue, or, leaving such, and that such issue should die before the age of twenty-one years, then, after the death of the survivor of such issue of A and B, he directed that the said two annuities should sink into his residuary personal estate. A died without issue.-Held, that there was a bequest, by implication, of A's annuity to the children of B. R. Kinsella v. Caffrey 154 4. A testator bequeathed to his two sons all his property, real and personal, to have and to hold the same in the most absolute manner, and he declared it to be his will and intention that his sons should at their discretion, and according to their own judgment, allocate to the other members of his family, being his lawfully begotten children, such portions of the said property and goods, be the same more or less, as to them should seem fit and suitable; and he appointed his said sons his executors.-Held, coupling the will with an admission in the petition by the sons, of the testa |