Novem'r Term. Case. 1878. knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in the issue of a case, there collateral parts, that is, other acts and declarations of a similar character tending to estabTrogd'n's lish such intent or knowledge, are proper evidence. In many cases of fraud it would be otherwise impossible satisfactorily to establish the true nature and character of the act." The remarks of Bigelow, J., in Cook v. Moore, 11 Cush. R. 213, 216, are to the same effect. Now, upon a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretenses the indictment must aver the fraudulent intent, and the Commonwealth must prove it. It is the very gist of the offence. Annable's case, 24 Gratt. 563, 570. It is not sufficient that the accused knowingly states what is false. It must be shown his intent was to defraud. Such intent is not a presumption of law, but a matter of fact for the jury. Being a secret operation of the mind it can only be ascertained by the acts and representations of the party. A single act or representation in many cases would not be decisive, especially where the accused has sustained a previous good character. But when it is shown that he made similar representations about the same time to other persons, and by means of such representations obtained goods, all of which were false, the presumption is greatly strengthened that he intended to defraud. One of the counsel for the accused, in a very able argument upon this branch of the case, insisted that when the accused obtains goods by falsely representing himself a man of property, the jury must infer the guilty intent; and therefore evidence of collateral facts is unnecessary and irrelevant, and can only mislead the jury. It may be conceded that when goods are obtained by false representations of the kind mentioned-and this is the whole case--the jury may justly infer the fraudulent intent. But it frequently happens, in a large majority of cases, there are numerous facts and circumstances, some Term. Case. times of a minute and varied character, throwing light 1878. But let us see what are the authorities on the question. 1878. In civil cases the decisions are abundant which hold that Novem❜r on the question of intent to defraud by false pretenses Term. other acts or representations of a like character done at Trogd'n's or about the same time with that in issue are admissible Case. with a view to the quo animo. The case of McKinney v. Dingley, 4 Greenl. R. 172, is an example. There the suit was to avoid a sale on the ground of the false and fraudulent conduct of the purchaser in representing himself to be a man of good property and credit when he was not; and it was held proper for the vendor to give evidence of similar false pretexts successfully used to other persons in the same town about the same time to show a general scheme to amass property by fraud. In Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 New York R. 139, for the purpose of proving the fraud the vendor relied in part upon the fact that the defendant had purchased of several per.sons large bills of goods, the plaintiff, among the rest, just on the eve of suspension. See also Whittier v. Varney, 10 New Hamp. 291, 477; Menfey v. Brace, 23 Barb. R. 561; Allison v. Matthew, 3 John. R. 234; Olmsted v. Hotailing, 1 Hill 317; 1 Phillip's Ev. 653, 773. These decisions are directly in point, and are entitled to great weight if the rules in criminal are the same as in civil That they are so in general, so far as the means of ascertaining truth are concerned, is established by a great weight of authority. 1 Bishop's Crim. Procedure, § 502; 1 Greenl. §65; Roscoe Crim. Ev. p. 1, and the cases cited by these authors; Grayson's case, 6 Gratt. 712. cases. As, however, it may be said that the rule confining the evidence to the point in issue should be more rigidly applied in criminal than in civil cases, let us examine some of the decisions based upon criminal prosecutions. The case of The Commonwealth v. Eastman, 1 Cush. R. 189, was an indictment for obtaining goods or money under false pretenses. It was ably argued Novem'r and carefully considered. The court in commenting 1878. upon one branch of the case, say: Evidence of other purchases of goods than those charged in the indictment made by the defendants from other persons dur- Trogd'n's ing the month of March, 1844, under similar circum- Case. stances with the transaction charged in the indictment, was admitted for the purpose of showing the nature of the business of the defendants and the extent of the purchases made by them, and also as bearing upon the bona fide character of the dealings of the defendants with the particular individuals alleged to be defrauded. "This species of evidence would not be admissible for the purpose of showing that the defendant had also committed other like offences, but simply as an indication of the intention in making the purchases set out in the indictment. It is analogous to the proof of the scienter in indictments for passing counterfeit money, by showing that the defendant passed other counterfeit money to other persons about the same time. Such evidence is always open to the objection that it requires the defendant to explain other transactions than those charged in the indictment; but when offered for the limited purpose above stated, that of showing a criminal intent in the doing of the act charged, it has always been admissible." This decision was followed by the case of Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray's R. 173-an indictment for embezzlement-and upon the trial evidence was admitted of other acts of embezzlement of different amounts and at different times, for the purpose of showing the fraudulent intent. The next case is that of Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen's R. 548, for obtaining goods by false pretenses. In both cases the decision in Eastman's case was cited, commented upon and approved. And in all the cases the principle gov Novem'r 1878. erning in prosecutions for having counterfeit money is applied to prosecutions for obtaining money by false pretenses. Trogd'n's The counsel for the accused in this case have cited the Case. case of State v. Lapage, 57 New Hamp. R. 245; and have read extracts from the opinion of Chief Justice Cushing. The learned judge discusses with great force and learning the rules governing the admission of collateral facts to show the intent of the accused. And although it is obvious he is not favorably inclined to the admission of such evidence, still he concedes there are cases in which it is admissible. After enumerating these cases, le proceeds as follows: "In cases of indictment for obtaining goods under false pretenses it very often happens that the respondent has been in some kind of business of which buying and selling goods on credit makes a part, and in such case the difficulty is to draw the line between the points where legitimate business ceases and fraud begins. In such cases a single purchase of goods on credit might happen in the ordinary course of business; but if a party should make several purchases of goods at a time when he was in failing circumstances, that fact would have some tendency to show that he knew he was in failing circumstances, and that he did not intend to pay for them. Of course the effect of such testimony would depend upon the number and amount of such purchases, the after disposition of the goods purchased, and all the other circumstances." See also State v. Johnson, 33 New Hamp. R. 441; Horey v. Grant, 52 New Hamp. 569; Defrese v. State, 3 Heisk. R. 53; 42 Ala. R. 532. The case of Wood v. United States, 16 Peter's R. 342, is perhaps a more satisfactory authority than any cited. There, upon an information against the defendant for failing to invoice certain goods imported by him, with design to evade the duties and to defraud the government, |