INDEX. ACTIONS. An attachment at law is levied on ADVANCEMENTS. 651 competent evidence to show what was 3. The only issue in the cause being ALIMONY. legal obligation of the husband, inci- 1. If a gift unexplained, in the life-law no alimony was allowable on a Watkins & als. v. Young & 84 2. Whether a gift by a father in his decree a vinculo matrimonii. And if 3. The circumstances must be very would at the same time warrant a de- 4. The wife having left her husband tate. 5. In a suit by a wife against her Frincis v. Francis, APPELLATE COURT. 4. A decree of the court below, Beckwith & wife v. Avery's 533 5. In an insurance case where the 1. S brings debt against W, the ma- Slaughters v. Farland's ex'x, 134 6. In an attachment at law to sub- 784 8. If the only objection to the evidence was its irrelevancy, and it could not possibly have prejudiced the prisoner, then the judgment ought not to be reversed for the error in not excluding it; for to authorize the reversal of a judgment for admitting irrelevant evidence, not only must the evidence be irrelevant, but it must be of such a nature as that its admission may have prejudiced the prisoner. If he may have been so prejudiced, even though it be doubtful whether in fact he was so or not, that is sufficient ground for reversing the judgment. See Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trear, 29 Gratt. 255. Payne's case, 855 ARBITRATION AND AWARD. The County of Norfolk and the City of Portsmouth in March, 1877, enter into an agreement by which they submit all matters in dispute between them to the arbitration of R. II. Baker, of the city of Norfolk, and John R. Kilby, of Nansemond county, men of high standing as men and lawyers. The agreement states the subjects of dispute under fourteen heads, and they include suits both at law and in equity, questions of law and fact, questions in relation to land, docks, ferries, and money; and the, parties waive the plea of the statute of limitations, and all other technical pleas which would interfere in any manner with the award of the arbitrators, except upon the very right and justice of the case as to all matters in controversy; the award to be entered of record in the circuit court of the county of Norfolk and the court of hustings for the city of Portsmouth. In June, 1877, the arbitrators made their award, passing upon each of the subjects submitted to them. Upon a summons to the City of Portsmouth to show cause against entering the award as the judgment of the circuit court of Norfolk county, the City of Portsmouth filed numerous exceptions to the award, which were overruled by the court. Upon appealHELD: 1. It is manifest from all the papers in the case that the arbitrators intended to settle all matters of law and fact upon the very right and justice of the case. City of Portsmouth v. Nor- 727 2. But conceding that they intended to decide according to law, and that they have not done so in every instance, it does not follow that the award is invalid. The court does not set aside an award merely because it may differ with an arbitrator as to the law of the case. Idem, 727 3. Where the merits in law and in fact are referred to an arbitrator of competent knowledge, and there is not any question reserved by him, the court will not open the award unless something can be alleged amounting to a perverse misconstruction of the law, or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. 2. L&S carried on two stores in Norfolk on premises of which they held leases. On the 8th of May, 1866, they conveyed to F all their goods in these stores, all debts due them, and the leasehold premises, in trust to pay certain specified debts, with authority to take possession, sell the goods and collect the debts. On the 15th day of May, W sued L & S in assumpsit for $913.30, and on the same day sued out an attachment against their effects, and this attachment was levied on all the goods and debts at the two stores, which were taken possession of by the sergeant of the city. On the same 15th of May, but two or three hours after the attachment of W was levied, the National Exchange Bank of Norfolk sued out an attachment against the property of L & S, claiming a debt of $11,665, and this attachment was levied by the same officer upon the goods, &c., in his hands under the other attachment, and also upon the leaseholds of the two houses. In this case F interpleaded, and there was a verdiet and judgment in his favor; and afterwards the suit of W was dismissed. F then sued the Bank in an action of trespass on the case for the damages he had sustained by the levy of the attachment-HELD: ute case may be brought wherever the action of trespass ri et armis could be brought, the action on the case was properly brought to recover the damages sustained as to all the property attached. Fechheimer v. National Exch. Bank of Norfolk, 651 2. F has a right to recover from the Bank all the damages he has sustained by the levy of the attachment of the Bank upon the two storehouses held under lease and the withholding the possession from him. Idem, 651 3. If the attaching creditors had been joint trespassers in seizing and detaining the attached effects, then they would have been jointly and severally liable for the whole amount of the damage resulting from such joint trespass. But their acts in so seizing and detaining said effects having been several, they are severally liable for the damage resulting from their several act. 5. If the plaintiff seeks to introduce a copy of the record in the attachment suit, to show its existence and how the case had been disposed of, it can only be done by introducing it for all the purposes for which it may be available to either party. Idem, 651 3. In an attachment at law by W's administrator against J, the executors of C are summoned as garnishees, and the plaintiff in the attachment seeks to subject a legacy left by C to J to the payment of his debt. A common law court has not jurisdiction to compel the executors to pay the legacy. Whitehead's adm`r v. Coleman's ex'ors, BAILMENTS. 784 1. Though at common law action on the case was the proper remedy so far as the goods, &c., embraced in the first attachment were involved, and trespass vi et armis was the remedy as to the leaseholds 1. If a person to whom a sum of which were not levied on by the money has been entrusted for safefirst, yet as under the Virginia stat-keeping is robbed of it, he is not lia 901 ble to the person who entrusted him | horses, and to pay a tax on said liwith it for the money. Danville Bank v. Waddill's adm'r, BANKS. 1. See National Banks, No. 1, 2. and Wroten's ass'nee, v. Armat &als., 2. See Negotiable Instruments, No. 3, 4, and Crews & als. v. Farmers Bank of Va., for, &c.. CITY OF RICHMOND. 469 228 348 1. The city council of Richmond has authority under its charter and the constitution of Virginta to require the owner of a lot upon a street which has been graded, paved and guttered by the city, to pave the sidewalk in front of his lot, and when it is at the corner of a street to pave the sidewalk on the side of the lot. And if the owner does not have the work done within the time prescribed by the ordinance, the city may have it done and collect the money from him. Sands, receiver, v. City of Richmond, 571 2. If the charter of the city requires that an ordinance providing for the opening, grading, &c., of streets shall be passed by a vote of threefourths of each branch of the council, if the present ordinance was not so passed, yet if it is an amendment of a prior ordinance giving substantially the same powers to the council, the act of the council will be sustained. Idem, 571 3. F, who lives outside of the city limits, rents a stall in the markethouse of the city of Richmond, where he carries on his business as a butcher. He prepares his meat for market at his house, and owns two carts and horses, which he uses to bring his meats from his house to his stall, and take out such of it as is not sold, and he pays a tax on these horses and carts as property in the countyHELD: Under the charter of the city, the city council may require F to take out a licence for so using his carts and cense. Frommer v. City of Rich mond, 646 4. What is not a dedication of a public way over which the city authorities have control, and can authorize a railroad company to lay its track along it. See Dedication of Way, No. 1, and Talbott v. Richmond & Dan ville R. R. Co., 685 5. Ch. 44, §13 of an ordinance of the city of Richmond provides that every hotel keeper, and keeper of a restaurant, lager beer saloon, or other place where ardent spirits, beer, cider or other drinks are sold or given away, shall close the bar where such drinks are sold or given away every Sunday during the whole day, any person violating any provision of * and this section shall be fined not less than * * ten nor more than $500. The act of March 6, 1874, ch. 83, p. 76, enacts sold in any bar-room, restaurant, sa"that no intoxicating drinks shall be loon, store or other place within the limits of this commonwealth from 12 o'clock on each and every Saturday night of the week, until sunrise of the succeeding Monday morning." And the penalty for a violation of this act is than $500, and at the discretion of the a fine of not less than ten nor more court a forfeiture of his license: " vided that this law shall not apply to proany city having police regulations on this subject, and an ordinance inflictinflicted by this statute"-HELD: ing a penalty equal to the penalty That the ordinance is not the same as the statute, either in the specification of the offence or in the penalty, so as statute; and therefore a prosecution to bring it within the proviso of the for a violation of the act may be sustained. Thon's case, 887 |