grand total of 1,071,539 messages as the actual number handled during the year by the operators of the military telegraph service.

The actual cash received by the service from its commercial messages during the year amounted to $79,726.63 as against $57,712.13 received during the previous year, an increase of $22,014.50, or an increase of nearly 40 per cent, while the value of official business would amount, reckoned at regular tariff rates, to $113,597.81, and the other line business to $22,664.61. These figures, however, do not show the entire financial benefit that has accrued to the Government by the maintenance of its lines, since had it not been practicable to transact this business over the Government lines, and had it been necessary to send it over the lines of the ocean cable companies the cost of official business alone would have amounted to $269,925.11 on the basis of $1.69 per message, as shown by the accounts of the cable company.

This showing of business transacted and revenue received and the extraordinary increase in the commercial traffic of the lines is most gratifying, not only on account of the increased income, but particularly as substantial evidence of the advancing prosperity of the island and progress in its commercial and business affairs, and continued increasing confidence engendered in the security and efficiency of the Government telegraph service.

CUBAN CABLES AND TIME SERVICE.

Colonel Dunwoody states that no part of the annual subsidy claimed by the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company has been paid. The Chief Signal Officer, without questioning the validity and justness of this concession, agrees with Colonel Dunwoody in recommending that the payment be deferred until the form of government for the island of Cuba be definitely determined.

Through the cooperation of the Interocean Cable Company the Signal Corps has given throughout the island of Cuba time signals from Washington at 12 o'clock each day. In connection with this time service a time ball has been operated at Habana through cooperation with the captain of the port.

DEPARTMENT OF PORTO RICO.

The operations of the Signal Corps in Porto Rico are shown by the final report of Maj. William A. Glassford, signal officer of the department. (Appendix No. 7.)

Maj. Glassford is entitled to great credit for the energy and ability evinced in conducting the telegraph work in the department of Porto Rico, and for the businesslike ability with which he has effected the final transfer of this branch of the service to civil control. To his energy and professional skill were due the entire reconstruction of the Porto Rican telegraph lines, after they were entirely destroyed by the destructive cyclone of August 8, 1899. The system was entirely recast, expensive and useless offices eliminated, and a system of efficient administration initiated, with a promptness of service never before known in Porto Rico. The military telegraph system of Porto Rico had been maintained, operated, repaired, and reconstructed without entailing a dollar of expense to the treasury of Porto Rico. Moneys received from commercial messages from May 1, 1900, to February 1, 1901,

were turned into the United States Treasury, as is required by law in the case of commercial receipts of the military telegraph lines in the United States.

When the civil government was installed under act of April 12, 1900, the telegraph system continued as military lines and so was maintained and operated by the Signal Corps. The Commanding General advocated its transfer to the Insular authorities, and upon the discontinuance of the island of Porto Rico as a separate military department transfer was ordered and gratuity made to the island of 806.6 kilometers of line (504 miles) valued at $36,294.27, the cost of the rebuilding, not considering expense of transportation. This transfer was effected February 1, 1901.

These telegraph lines, such as they were, under Spanish authority, had been operated in conjunction with the mail service; it may be said that all its employees were Spaniards, or those in full sympathy with Spanish methods.

SIGNAL CORPS OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

It is impossible for the Chief Signal Officer of the Army to give an adequate idea of the great amount of work performed by the Signal Corps in the Military Division of the Philippines during the past fiscal year. As in previous years the duties have been the most important and extensive in the history of the Corps. Lieut. Col. James Allen, Signal Corps, remained in charge during the entire year, and the Chief Signal Officer of the Army can not commend in too high terms the ability, energy, and professional skill of this officer. In his work he was ably seconded by the signal officers of departments: Major Scriven and Capts. Edgar Russel, Daniel J. Carr, Carl F. Hartmann, Leonard D. Wildman, E. B. Ives, and Lieuts. Frank E. Lyman, jr., Walter L. Clarke, Henry S. Hathaway, and Basil O. Lenoir. Among the subordinate officers may be particulary mentioned Lieuts. Richard O. Rickard and Charles S. Wallace.

The labors of the volunteer officers, characterized by fidelity, aptitude, and skill, have ably seconded the efforts of the officers of the regular corps. Among the volunteers Lieutenants Niels P. Yurgensen, Magnus Nordquist, Burt E. Grabo, and Rush P. Wheat deserve especial mention for strenuous and well-directed labors in various lines in the field. Indeed, there is no officer in the Signal Corps, volunteer or regular, who has not acquitted himself with credit in the Philippines. The well-directed and unremitting efforts of Colonel Allen have perfected in the Philippines a system of military telephones and telegraph and cable lines unequaled in the history of warfare as to their importance, efficiency, and extent. The military telegraph system now covers all of the important islands of the Philippine group except Paragua. It extends through more than 1,000 miles from north to south, from Seno de Bangui, Luzon, to Jolo, and without it it is safe to say that no single island, let alone any one department of the Archipelago, could be sufficiently controlled by the present military force. The almost absolute lack of intercommunication between the various islands of the Archipelago is rarely known and still more rarely realized. It is safe to say that more than half of the military garrisons of the entire Archipelago are so remote from department headquarters that under average conditions most urgent and important communications can not be received by mail in less than two months' time.

In Luzon mail conditions have somewhat improved, so that an answer can be obtained from near posts within the month; but there are a considerable number of stations in the Philippines from which nothing is received by mail for long periods, ranging from two to four months. It is thus a matter of fact and not of opinion that an adequate telegraph service is an indispensable adjunct of successful military operations in the Philippines, and apart from its absolute necessity as a means of conveying orders and directing operations it is extremely important from an economical standpoint.

It should be understood that no one of these lines has been built except when judged a military necessity by either the commanding general of the department or of the division. Indeed the number of officers and men of the Signal Corps has been so small compared with the volume of work to be done that only work of current necessity and urgency has been pursued.

In an official report General MacArthur says:

I respectfully inclose an extract from a former report, as the quickest way of expressing my views of the importance of the Signal Service. I desire to add that all subsequent experience has confirmed convictions expressed therein, and to renew the recommendation then submitted for the enlargement and perfection of the Signal Corps of the regular establishment. The splendid service of this corps makes it a matter of regret that in operations in these islands we have not had as much force from that body as is necessary. As it is, their wire service is simply indispensable. It is not too much to say that in the absence of this efficient service it would be impossible to hold this archipelago with less than 150,000 men, which is now well and efficiently performed by 60,000. We need wires, instruments, and operators everywhere, the more the better; it simplifies everything, makes unity of action possible, insures concentration of troops on threatened points and altogether is of such importance that it is impossible to say too much in behalf of its indefinite extension to the limit of possible usefulness.

If the principle of expanding this corps is admitted, the proper limit for the organization must be determined by investigation in the War Department. So far as the commissioned personnel is concerned, it would seem that it ought to be doubled at once, perhaps trebled. This, however, is a matter for careful consideration in the light of the whole situation.

The purpose of the present writing is to impress the Department with the view that successful operations in these islands, absolutely depend upon this service, in consequence of which, provision therefor should be made upon a scale commensurate with the importance of the interests involved.

In compliance with the instructions of the commanding general of the division and department commanders the telegraph lines have been extended until they aggregated on July 1, 1901, 4,851 miles, an increase during the fiscal year of 2,054 miles.

This does not, however, indicate the reconstruction work of the corps in line building, as it was necessary to replace 391 miles of wire destroyed by insurgents.

Important as are the land lines of military operations of the various islands, it would be impossible for the commanding general of the division to coordinate the energies of the various commanders if a comprehensive cable system were lacking. At the beginning of the fiscal year there was only one military cable south of Luzon, about 50 miles in length, connecting Cebu and Leyte. This condition of affairs caused Major-General MacArthur, commanding general of the Philippines, to represent to the Secretary of War the military and economical advisability of putting Manila in direct communication with the principal points of the island. The necessity therefor having been strongly reenforced by the interruption to the Eastern Extension Cable

WAR 1901-VOL 1, PT II—59

between Manila and Iloilo, by which Manila was cut off from all telegraphic communication with the southern islands for twenty-eight days. The Secretary of War approved the recommendation of the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, and operations speedily began.

It must be understood that every mile of this cable had to be manufactured to order in the United States, on carefully drawn specifications by the experts of the Signal Corps, and was duly inspected and then transported more than halfway round the world either by cable ship or commercial steamer to Manila and other points in the Archipelago, from 300 to 600 miles distant from division headquarters. Such energetic and well-directed efforts were made as have produced results which appear surprising in their entirety.

The military cable system of the Philippines now covers 749 miles. It connects Manila directly over our own lines with the islands of Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Mindanao, Jolo, and Siasi with division headquarters. The island of Panay is reached over either the Eastern Extension Company via Signal Corps lines from Bacalod or direct from Manila to Iloilo, the policy being followed of respecting to the fullest extent the provisions of the concession of the Visayan grant to this company, if not strictly conforming to the retained concession, and is in its rearrangement an equity right against the Philippine government.

Among the military effects of this cable system may be pointed out the fact that it raised the department commander of Jolo from his practical condition of post commander and departmental adviser to that of a true department commander. Prior to the establishment of these cables there was scarcely a post in Mindanao that could answer any communication from department headquarters at Zamboanga in less than two months' time, there being practically no postal service whatever, the garrisons depending on the casual visits of transports, paymasters' boats, etc. As an illustration of the difference of conditions that existed prior to laying cables, and since, may be mentioned two facts: First, that the first disaster of American arms in the Philippine Archipelago, near Cagayan, was unknown in Manila until three weeks after it occurred. Second, at this same station the terms on which the surrender of an insurgent leader was completed were sent direct to the department commander, General Kobbe, from the cable ship before the shore station was established, and he was enabled to modify unsuitable terms which were about to be agreed to by the local commander. It may be added that General Kobbe stated to the Chief Signal Officer that military operations in eastern Luzon would have been practically impossible without cable lines, whereby orders were transmitted and cooperation insured.

Similar benefits have accrued within the past few months to the commanding general, Department of the Visayas, Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes, who found his operations against the insurgents very materially circumscribed, owing to his inability to telegraph and reach any troops in his command except those under his immediate orders in Samar. General Hughes is now in direct communication with every important island in the Department of the Visayas.

It is gratifying to report that the work of cable laying has been conducted with efficiency and success. The greatest danger to the

cable arises from careless navigation. There were five instances in which the cables have been broken by ships' anchors, while the injuries to several others are probably due to the same cause.

CABLE SHIP BURNSIDE.

The U. S. Army transport Burnside was taken from the transport service between New York and Cuba and Porto Rico in July, 1900. She was overhauled and refitted for cable laying at the Morse Iron Works, Brooklyn. The cable and apparatus on board of her were purchased and inspected under the immediate supervision of Captain Reber and Captain Squier, Signal Corps. It was only by strenuous exertions and technical ability of high order that these officers were enabled to prepare the Burnside for its departure for Manila at so early a date as September 26, when she sailed.

Captain Squier was placed in charge of cable and technical operations on board. During the long voyage to Manila he attended assiduously to the constant care and frequent tests necessary to insure the arrival of the cable at Manila in good condition.

The Burnside arrived at Manila December 6, 1900, and from then until December 23, by unremitting labor, the machinery was installed on board. She sailed on December 23 for the southern part of the Archipelago with Lieut. Col. James Allen, Signal Corps, chief signal officer, Division of the Philippines, on board, in charge of cable operations. Assisting him were Capts. Edgar Russel and George O. Squier, First Lieut. F. M. Jones, Second Lieuts. H. S. Hathaway and Earle W. Binkley, signal officers, U. S. Volunteers. Nineteen Signal Corps noncommissioned officers and men assisted in various technical matters on board, 11 of these being operators destined for the cable stations. A crew of 36 native laborers were employed. The division of special duties was as follows: Captain Russel, commanding detachment and superintendence of the installation of necessary offices and land lines; Captain Squier, in charge of testing and electrical researches generally; Lieutenant Jones, property and disbursing officer; Lieutenant Hathaway, office installation; Lieutenant Binkley, land-line construction.

Beginning at Dumaguete, Negros Island, the Burnside took soundings to Misamis, Mindanao, laying cable between these two places, a distance of about 100 knots. Captain Squier, overcoming many difficulties, laid a piece of cable from Misamis south into Panguil Bay, to connect with a land line across the isthmus of Mindanao. Soundings were taken and cables laid between Misamis, Iligan, and Cagayan on the northern coast of Mindanao, distance of about 30 and 50 knots, respectively. The Burnside then proceeded to repair the cable between Cebu and Ormoc, island of Leyte, which had been broken by a ship's anchor. The ship then returned to Misamis, making a repair in the short cable there and also one near Iligan, where a break had occurred, probably due to earthquake action. The Burnside then went to Zamboanga and laid a cable between that point and Tucuran, a distance of about 136 knots, this last-named place being on the southern coast of the isthmus of Mindanao. Meantime, under General Kobbe's direction, a land line had been constructed to connect with the northern side of the isthmus, where Captain Squier's party had landed their Panguil Bay cable end. This gave Zamboanga cable communication