being sent farther in on sleds, and in the meantime to employ the animals in moving forward to No. 2 all the line material possible which can be done by wagon during a part of October and November.

DECEMBER 1, 1900.

The condition of the weather prevented the further progress of work on the telegraph line during the greater part of the month. The repairman's cabin under construction at Dutch Flat at the beginning of the month was completed and the men returned to the post.

Poles were cut and the way cleared from station No. 4 (Government stables) to Ernestine Creek, when the men engaged in that work were ordered to return, as the work could not be advantageously carried on, owing to snow and cold weather.

The work of building a temporary stable for the pack animals began on the 7th, the stable being now nearly completed. The packers and pack animals have been engaged during the greater part of the time in getting out logs and timber for the construction and taking line material to station No. 2.

FEBRUARY 8, 1901.

Due to the season, sledding was the principal work done during the month of January. All the line material on hand is now at station No. 2, including 200 iron poles to be used on both sides of the summit to replace such poles (wooden) as have already been or will be broken or carried away by snow slides.

The men of the detachment have mostly been employed in repacking material and supplies in such shape as makes transportation by pack train practicable. Their health has throughout been good.

The Signal Corps property now over the summit comprises 307 7,000 brackets, 127 boxes insulators, and several minor articles. to transport the insulators in bulk as received here.

MARCH 2, 1901. coils of wire, about It was impossible

APRIL 9, 1901.

In order to push forward the material and supplies as fast as possible eight horse sleds were hired for two weeks, at a flat rate of $25, with the option of purchasing them at the expiration of that time, should they be required, at market price less the amount paid for rental. It was hoped in the meantime the sleds asked for would be received, but as they were not, it was thought for the best interest of the service to purchase these sleds in order to get the material as far as possible before the sledding season ends.

All the material reported as being over the summit in my last report, together with 20 of the 25 crates of brackets which were then being brought up from station No. 2, has been moved to Stuart Creek.

On March 25 I availed myself of an opportunity to go over a portion of the ground over which the line will be constructed with a view of deciding as to the advisability of putting the line over Kimball Pass, where poles will have to be hauled some distance, or going around by the South Fork, where timber is more plentiful, but the distance greater, and also to inspect the line over the summit, noting effect of the heavy snow.

MAY 8, 1901.

Nearly all the line material and supplies were brought up to a point 5 miles north of station No. 4, where a cache was made. Owing to the depth of the snow over Kimball Pass and the absence of sufficient crust to be of any value, it would not be practicable to take the material any farther on sleds this summer.

On April 27 I left Fort Liscum with my detachment with two Hospital Corps men, three Signal Corps men, and eight men from Company G, Seventh Infantry, arriving at station No. 4 May 5. The trail was then so soft that it was not possible to use animals beyond station No. 2. It was therefore necessary for the men to sled in their rations and bedding by hand. After starting over the summit (Thompson Pass) there came up a heavy snowstorm, which made it extremely difficult and uncomfortable traveling. We finally reached station No. 3 at 10.30 p. m., having covered a distance of 10 miles in thirteen hours and forty-five minutes. A number of the men became snow-blind, which necessitated stopping one day at station No. 3. JULY 3, 1901.

The sledding in of material and supplies was practically discontinued about May 4. The line material, as stated in my last report, being cached 5 miles north of station No. 4.

In order to cover as much distance as possible while waiting until such time as the pack train could be brought in, and as it would not be advisable to depend on using sleds to move camp, the snow being too soft and deep, a detachment was sent to a point 5 miles north of Stewart Creek (the end of the line).

The work of line construction was somewhat slow, as it became necessary to take advantage of conditions and work whenever it was practicable, at different points along the line, as the snow disappeared. Although poles had been cut for this section, to expedite the work trees were topped and used in places where the snow was very deep and would be late in going off. The following work was done during the month: A small log shelter, roofed with tar paper, was put up at Stewart Creek to be used as a temporary shelter by repairmen in winter. A floor was put in station No. 4, the lumber having been whipsawed by the detachment, and the roof was repaired by being covered with the paper and dirt. A log storehouse was built at station No. 5. Four hundred and fifty-seven trees were trimmed and topped, 290 poles were set, and 171⁄2 miles of wire was put up, bringing the north end of the line to Ernestine Creek. In order to continue the work it became necessary to move camp, and as the pack train had not yet been able to get over Thompson Pass, the camp at station No. 4 was moved, May 30, to Ernestine Creek with sleds over bare ground. On May 9 my pack train was increased by the arrival at Valdez of 29 pack mules and two bell mares.

JULY 22, 1901.

On June 1st one detachment was employed getting out poles and cutting right of way from their camp 7 miles north of Tonsina; another was camped at Ernestine, from which point the work at line construction was continued as rapidly as the disappearing snow on Kimball Pass would permit. At a point about 3 miles from camp it was found necessary to begin hauling poles for the south side of Kimball Pass. Three miles of poles were hauled from this point northward, employing four of the animals which had been used for sledding for this purpose. The hard digging, as the ground was still frozen, together with the time consumed hauling poles, made the work progress somewhat slowly; however, there was no time lost, as the camp could not be moved before the arrival of the pack train.

On the 14th one-half the pack train arrived, and the camp was then moved 2 miles north of the summit of Kimball Pass. Poles for the north side of Kimball Pass were hauled from this point, a distance of about 2 miles. From this point more satisfactory progress was made. The following work was done during the month: One hundred and eighty-six trees were trimmed and topped, 404 poles were set, and 16 miles of wire was put up, bringing the north end of the line nearly to Tonsina. On the 19th it was discovered that a forest fire was raging in the valley south of Ernestine not far from the location of my cache, and as that section is covered with a thick growth of spruce timber I became anxious for the safety of the cache should the wind shift and direct the course of the fire to the northward. I therefore proceeded to the cache and burned around it and had the brackets, boxes of insulators, etc., moved to a gravel bank and partially covered with dirt for protection. The precaution was taken none too soon, as four days later, although the property was in a clear space and a considerable distance from timber, when the fire reached that locality three men were employed constantly for several hours carrying water, shoveling dirt, and otherwise fighting fire to protect the cache. These fires have swept over large areas along the trail and telegraph line between station No. 3 and Copper Center, and a great deal of trouble will no doubt be caused by fires every season.

AUGUST 16, 1901.

The progress of line construction was somewhat retarded in the beginning of the month of July by fierce forest fires, particularly south of Tonsina. On July 7 the wire was brought up to station No. 5 and an office established. From this point progress was more rapid, and on the 22d the line was completed to Copper Center and on the 31st to the 110-mile post near the Taslina River, where in the meantime the detachment had been removed.

During the month 41 trees were topped and prepared for wire, 197 poles were set, and 32 miles of wire were strung.

This section of the line, with the exception of a few miles, is over a fairly level and considerably open country; in some places, however, considerable trimming and heavy cutting had to be done, and for a few miles the line is through a marshy country, which made it difficult to set pores solidly, but as frost was found within a few inches of the surface it is thought the coming winter season, with the freezing of the earth around the poles, will remedy this defect.

Considerable trouble has occurred through the burned districts along the line by falling trees, which has demonstrated beyond a doubt that it will be necessary to

remove most of the trees within reach of the wire where the fires have occurred. This work will be done at the close of the season, as men could not well be spared for that work at present.

It was not thought advisable to delay work on the line this summer to build a cabin at Copper Center, as it is desired to erect poles as far as possible with a view of putting up the wire during the sledding season, so a cabin was hired for temporary use as an office and storeroom.

I anticipate building cabins at Copper Center, at either the Kulkana or Gacona and at the Chastochena rivers, at the close of the sledding season next year before line work could be carried on advantageously.

APPENDIX No. 5.

REPORT OF MAJ. GEORGE P. SCRIVEN, SIGNAL OFFICER, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION, ON OPERATIONS OF THE SIGNAL CORPS IN CHINA.

SIGNAL OFFICE, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

Tientsin, China, November 7, 1900.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of service of the detachment of the Signal Corps under my command during the China Relief Expedition in its advance from Tientsin to Pekin in August, 1900, together with various notes on the telegraph corps of other armies and recommendations regarding our own organization and equipment, suggested by experience in the field, both in China and the Philippine Islands.

Having been ordered July 12, 1900, to proceed from Iloilo, Philippine Islands, to Manila, "thence to Taku, China, reporting upon arrival to the commanding officer of the United States forces for duty," I left Iloilo by the first steamer sailing for Manila, July 17; arrived there July 19; embarked on the freight ship Wyefield, which reached Taku, China, August 2, and on August 3 reported in person at Tientsin to Major-General Chaffee, who on July 30 had reached that place and had assumed command of the American forces. By him I was designated chief signal officer of the China Relief Expedition, and had the honor to serve on his staff in the field during the march to Pekin.

On August 4, about 3 p. m., the expedition started from Tientsin.

The personnel of the signal detachment in China at this time consisted of 4 officers, viz: Maj. George P. Scriven, First Lieut. H. W. Stamford, who had been relieved as chief signal officer upon my arrival and placed in charge of the construction of the field line, Second Lieut. Peter Bartsch, and Second Lieut. C. O. Hastings, and in addition 19 enlisted men, of whom 10 had come with Lieutenant Stamford and the Ninth Infantry from Manila, 2 from Iloilo, and 7 with Lieutenants Bartsch and Hastings from San Francisco on the transport Grant, which arrived off Taku July 29. These 19 men, thrown together without coordination, many of them recruits, new to their officers, duties, and associates, and of whom only 8 were telegraph operators, even of low grade, composed the force that must not only convey from the field news of events in China, but must transmit instructions to the Army and influence military events as well as diplomatic action between the United States and other powers. Mail service was practically nonexistent. That they succeeded in accomplishing this reflects credit upon them and upon the Signal Corps, but the inadequacy of the force and the difficulty with which it was brought together shows the need of a great increase in the enlisted strength of the Signal Corps and of organized telegraph and signal companies sufficiently strong to meet emergency demands in the various parts of the world to which United States troops are now called upon for service.

Material for the construction and operation of 100 miles of telegraph line, omitting poles, had been brought by Lieutenant Stamford from Manila, but so bad was the packing and so rough the usage received under the difficult conditions of loading and unloading at Manila and Taku that much of the material was found useless. Four acetylene lamps, all that were carried, were broken, many battery jars were destroyed, and the more delicate instruments injured; all telephones required repair, as did the field buzzers. Much of this material came in the original packages from the United States, a fact that indicates the need of extraordinary care in packing articles for distant service and, as I think, the additional need of simplification of material and the selection of only strong and serviceable articles.

With the detachment of men from the transport Grant came a hundred miles of

line, but no battery material and instruments, an omission that threatened serious difficulty.

On the steamer Wyefield additional supplies were brought, but neither from that ship nor from the Grant could material be brought to Tientsin in time for the advance. Days, or more often weeks, were required to transport articles from the ships off Taku to Tongku, thence by river or rail to Tientsin. In illustration, I may say that even my personal baggage, left hastily at Tongku, did not overtake me until after I had been some weeks in Pekin.

The most serious difficulty, however, now to be encountered was lack of transport. Upon reporting to the commanding general I had requested 5 saddle horses and 1 wagon for use of the field telegraph. The horses were given, but wagons were so few that not one could be spared from the service of ammunition, rations, and hospital stores. The only train available at the start from Tientsin was that brought by Ninth Infantry. As a consequence it was not until the field telegraph had reached the vicinity of Hoshiwu that an army wagon reported for service." I desire here to call attention most emphatically to the necessity for transport wagons attached to the Signal Corps accompanying any expedition. These wagons should be entirely separate from the general transport of the Army, fitted to meet the requirements of the Signal Service-some with flags, heliographs, lanterns, rockets, and the devices for visual signaling; others with telegraph material, batteries, lances when necessary, and supplies for the construction of a reasonable amount of line. These wagons should be packed and ready for the field, put under the control of the chief signal officer of the expedition, and separated entirely from the general transport, to which, as is the case with the ordnance, only extensive and bulky supplies should be turned over for shipment. It is evident that the first necessity of any army advancing into a hostile country is ammunition, rations, then hospital supplies; afterwards telegraph material. Therefore, the Signal Corps, if unprovided with its own train, can not expect to be immediately supplied by the army if transportation is limited, as almost invariably happens in the United States service, and will be unable to keep up with the march. The construction and arrangement of wagons or carts and pack chests suitable for field telegraph and for visual signal trains of the present day is a matter requiring immediate attention, and should be placed under the care of an experienced officer of the corps, by whom a suitable system should be devised.

Owing to the conditions outlined, Lieutenant Stamford had, before my arrival, agreed to cooperate with the English engineers in the construction of a field line to follow the advance of the allied army. This action was approved by the commanding general and by myself; and, as events proved, though attended by drawbacks, was practically the only way in which the line could have been carried on. The English were supplied with light bamboo lances, whereas our own, though brought ashore from the Grant, could not be brought up from Tongku in time to be used; and in addition the English had a large force of coolies and Indians and a junk, but were not supplied with certain other necessary material of which we had a supply, The only wheeled transportation possessed by the entire party, however, consisted of Chinese carts, capable of carrying about 200 pounds each, and a number of small pack mules. The bulk of the material was placed aboard the English junk on the Peiho.

Upon the departure of the allied forces from Tientsin, August 4, Maj. George P. Scriven, Second Lieut. C. O. Hastings, and 2 enlisted men, provided with flags, accompanied the staff of Major-General Chaffee; 1 operator was stationed at Tongku, Second Lieut. Peter Bartsch and 3 men were stationed at Tientsin, and with the construction party under Lieutenant Stamford were present 7 signal men, besides Lieutenant Loch, of the Royal engineers, 2 British linemen, 4 native sappers, and an average of 30 or 40 Chinese coolies, who, of course, were only retained by force, though paid later for their services.

The telegraph from Tientsin to Tongku was in operation, and, thanks to the energy, ability, and almost incessant work of Second Lieut. Peter Bartsch and the men under his control, it continued to perform valuable service for several months, though a hastily-constructed field line, built by Lieutenant Stamford under great difficulties. The country north of Tientsin is flat, often flooded on the right bank of the Peiho, and almost without trees. There is little difficulty in running the telegraph over it, for the roads are fair in summer. The same character of country extends from Tientsin to Pekin, but north of Yangtsun is less frequently flooded, contains more groves, and is cultivated to the highest degree.

On August 3, the day before the advance from Tientsin, the field line had been carried by Lieutenant Štamford to the outposts north of the city, and on the evening of August 4 an office was established near General Chaffee's headquarters at Shilko,

where our army camped the first night of the advance. On the morning of the 5th occurred the fight at Pietsang, after which the American forces, who had made a considerable detour to the west, went into camp about a mile and a half from the pontoon bridge across the Peiho at the village proper, and on the evening of that day the construction party reached the bridge with the field line, and communication was established with Tientsin. About 9 miles of wire were laid. Next day the army crossed the Peiho, marched eastward to the railroad embankment, thence north, and engaged the enemy at Yangtsun. The fight continued until about half past 2 of the afternoon, when, all resistance having ceased, the allied armies went into camp in and about the village, and before nightfall the construction party had carried the line to General Chaffee's headquarters, and military messages, as well as those of the press and of individuals, were sent to the fleet off Taku, to be transmitted thence to Chefoo, at that time the terminus of the telegraph system of the world. On that day about 16 miles of field telegraph were constructed. No other nation had a telegraph line to the troops. Next day, August 7, the dead were buried and the army remained in camp. The following day the wire in rear was cut and two sections, of 50 yards and 400 yards, removed, but whether this was done by friend or enemy was never determined.

On August 8 the army continued its advance north, crossing to the right bank of the Peiho by the pontoon bridge above Yangtsun. The field telegraph traversed the river by the railway bridge and thence followed the main road north for a time but diverged to a seemingly more direct route through the fields to the westward that day. Riding back over the field line, I realized that this was a mistake, due to unavoidable ignorance of the country. It later caused trouble, for the line passed through many Chinese villages where people were hostile, and not only cut the wire but offered resistance to the construction party, as mentioned in the report of Lieutenant Stamford. However, on that night at the camp at Tsaitsun, the wire was up, but the current, owing to interruptions at the rear, would not pass. About 8 miles of wire was run on that day. At this camp, before the arrival of the telegraph, messages in cipher were received by courier from our minister, Mr. Conger, at Pekin, from the English and from a private individual, and Lieutenant Hastings was sent back to transmit them to Tientsin. This hazardous duty he accomplished well. On August 9 the march was resumed. The heat was intolerable, but the command pushed on within about 2 miles of Ho Shi Wu.

I had been ordered to the Russian headquarters in the late afternoon, and afterwards sent to find the English general to arrange certain disposition regarding a permanent garrison, and upon my return about midnight found that Lieutenant Stamford had brought the field line into camp. It was cut during the night, but next morning worked through to Tientsin, about 48 miles away. About 17 miles of wire was run on August 9. On August 10 the allied armies moved on. The heat had grown unbearable, and men of the command were thrown into convulsions and even went mad. Two men of the Signal detachment were overcome by the heat, and 2 of the Coolie laborers dropped dead by the way. That night we reached the village of Tsi En Ping, with the advance guard of the allies at Matao. For the first time the telegraph party failed to reach headquarters, though close behind and having laid 17 miles of wire. Next day a halt was made at Matao, and the telegraph reached the town about twenty minutes after the advancing army left it, and from that time on fell behind the army, though reaching Pekin about thirty hours after the occupation of the Tartar city. This delay was due largely to a detention at TungChow, caused by the nonarrival of the junk, loaded with material.

The telegraph service of no other nation was in sight during this march, and none reached Pekin within perhaps a week after the fall of the city. Only the Japanese and Russians attempted to follow the troops with the field line. On August 11 the army pushed on, camping that night on the walls of Dshangdshiawan, and next day, August 12, occupied Tungchow. Next day the march was resumed, the column to which I was attached meeting with heavy storm and not arriving until about midnight at the camp, about midway between Tungchow and Pekin.

On August 14 Pekin was occupied and the legations were relieved, and on August 15 the Chinese were driven back by the Americans from their positions along the highway through the Chin-men into the Imperial City, whose last gate was at the mercy of the American troops. Here the fighting stopped. On the morning of August 14 Lieutenant Hastings was sent back by me with dispatches from the commanding general. He found the field office at Tungchow, about 15 miles away, where the field line had arrived. The dispatches were telegraphed to Tong Ku, sent thence to the fleet off Taku, where a dispatch boat was in readiness to convey them to the cable station at Chefoo, and it is believed that the Americans thus conveyed to the world the first news of the fall of Pekin and the rescue of the legations. WAR 1901-VOL 1, PT II- -61