mit the evidence, which God gives concerning his own nature; or his own works, unless he give them clear and intuitive ideas of the objects revealed, and unless he make them clearly understand them--which would be, at once, the height of impiety, and the last degree of folly.

But now, God has declared to men, in the most authentic form, that he exists in three persons, perfectly distinct, in a perfect unity of essence, nature, or substance; therefore, you ought to believe this mystery, how incomprehensible soever it may be, after the same manner as you believe your own existence, or that of the world, because, although you have no intrinsic or intuitive evidence of either, still you have other extrinsic irresistible proofs of the said truths. The irrefragable arguments, in support of this mystery, will form the matter for a distinct number.

SECTION III.

XV. The assertion, that the mysteries of Religion involve contradiction, is itself a contradiction in the very terms.

Is there not a manifest contradiction, says the Unitarian, in the mystery of the Trinity? How can one, for instance, be three, and three be one?

To this sophism, borrowed from the school of incredulity, we answer thus:

One can be three and three can be one, after the same manner nearly, (without pretending, however, to exact comparison, which is not to be found in created things,) as our soul, considered in its nature as a spiritual substance, is essentially one, and, at the same time, essentially three, when considered as to its powers, memory, understanding, and free will. These three powers subsist in one and the same individual soul, and partake of its nature, and yet, when viewed in their formal capacity, and their peculiar operations, they are distinct from each other; for he, that simply remembers, cannot be truly said to reason or to will, any more than he, that simply wills, can be said either to remember or to reason. Or, to

use a more familiar comparison, our Congressmen are at once, many and one; many, when considered in their individual capacity-one, when considered as a legislative body: as such, they constitute one indivisible government, and possess one common and indivisible power. Thus, you see, sir, that the same thing may, at once, be one and many-one in one respect, and many, in another: and this is exactly the case with regard to the Trinity, in which there is Unity and Trinity-Unity in nature or substance, and Trinity in persons. There is, therefore, no contradiction.

What then, sir, will be absurd, continues the Unitarian, if this mystery be not so?

My answer is: It will be your mode of reasoning; for you suppose a contradiction where it is impossible to discover any, for the very reason, that this mystery is above your comprehension.

How is it impossible, (you will ask,) to discover a contradiction in the Trinity, or any other mystery?

To make my answer as plain as possible, we must distinguish three kinds of propositions: evident propositions, absurd and contradictory propositions, and incomprehensible propositions. A proposition is evident, when the mind clearly perceives, that the two ideas, of which it is composed, agree with each other, and are, to use the very terms of the school, identified. Such are these propositions: God is good: God is just the whole is greater than any of its parts, severally taken. A proposition is absurd and contradictory, when the mind clearly perceives, that the two ideas, of which it is composed, are jarring with one another, and mutually exclude each other. Such are these propositions: God is unjust: the part is greater than, or equal to, the whole. A proposition is incomprehensible, when it is impossible for the mind to discover the accord, or identity, of the two ideas that compose it. Such are these propositions: A being that has never existed, may receive existence. A being that is in existence, may return to nought. Such would likewise certainly be for you and for me, this proposition, if we had always been out of this world

and out of our bodies: A being composed of a soul and a body, is possible.

Now, it is no more in our 'power to give our assent to an absurd and contradictory proposition, than to refuse it to an evident one. As to propositions which are simply incomprehensible, two things are certain: the first is, that we are not obliged to admit such propositions as true, unless we have proofs elsewhere of the truth of them, equivalent to intrinsic evidence, which is wanting. The second is, that we have no right to deny them, absolutely, unless, in want of intrinsic evidence of their falsity, we derive elsewhere certain proofs of their falsehood. The reason of this is obvious for who does not see, that, because we do not perceive how two ideas agree, and are identified with each other, it does not follow, that they are contradictory to each other, or that they destroy each other? And, likewise, because we do not perceive that two ideas oppose and exclude each other, it does not follow, that they are compatible and identified with each other. Now, I maintain, that this proposition: there exists one God in three distinct persons, or any other proposition relating to mysteries of faith, are propositions of the third kind, that is to say, propositions simply incomprehensible, which, of course, you cannot absolutely deny, unless you have proofs elsewhere that they are false; nor can you help admitting them, when, in defect of intrinsic evidence, you have, from some other source, undoubted arguments that they are true. Were you told that "three Gods make but one God," or that "three persons make but one person," these two propositions would be contradictory and absurd, because either of them would join together two ideas, which manifestly exclude each other. Three Gods and one only God: these propositions would be of the same kind as this: "the whole is not greater than its part:" but what you are told by Christians, viz. that "three persons make but one God," is vastly different from the above propositions; and I defy any man in the world to point out a contradiction in this, or in any other like propositions, that express mysteries of faith: for contradiction sup

poses a clear and adequate notion of the two ideas, that are joined together in a proposition; and, of course, a clear and adequate notion of the opposition or incompatibility that exists between them. Now, can the Unitarian, can any man, boast of possessing a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of what relates to mysteries? Do you, for instance, sufficiently know the intrinsic nature of the divine essence, so as to be able to pronounce with certainty, that it cannot comport with three persons? Or, have you an idea sufficiently clear of person, as far as it relates to the Divine Being, to affirm without fear of mistake, that three persons are repugnant to the same divine Being? Let, the same be applied to all other mysteries: you assert, for instance, that original sin, and two natures in one and the same person of Jesus Christ involve contradiction. And whence do you know this? Did you ever penetrate the adorable essence of the divine nature? Do you clearly know, how far the rights of the infinite justice of God, and of his sovereign dominion, extend, in regard to man, his creature? Have you a clear idea of original sin, as far as it is propagated in the descendants of Adam, and as far as it affects them? Are you sufficiently acquainted with the divine nature, and the properties of a divine person, with their intrinsic relations and bearing, to decide with full assurance, that the two natures cannot be united in one and the same Christ? No, sir, you have not; you cannot have, in what relates to divine mysteries, a clear, distinct, and adequate idea, for the very reason, that they are above the sphere of reason. It is, of course, utterly out of your power to discover any contradiction in them.

Thus, mysteries are incomprehensible; to deny them on no other ground, but because they are incomprehensible, would be to suppose, that God cannot reveal to man what exceeds the sphere of his understanding, which is downright impiety but when it is demonstrated, by indubitable evidence, that God has revealed them, it is both folly and irreligion to reject them. Such are the principles of Christiansprinciples sanctioned by reason. We Christians follow the

:

example of a man born blind, whom we all resemble so much, especially in things that relate to God. This blind man sees neither the skies, nor the majestic luminary which the Lord has placed therein all, therefore, that he can say of himself, is, that he sees neither the sky nor the sun: he would be rash, were he to say any thing more, and were he to pronounce, absolutely, that there is neither sky nor sun; but when those around unite in telling him that there is a sky and a sun; that they see both, and are ravished with the spectacle presented to their view, he believes them on their word, though he has no idea of what they tell him, and he would act like a fool, were he not to believe them. Yes, were the blind man obstinately to maintain, that there is neither sky nor sun, because he does not see them himself; nor colours, because he cannot form an idea of them; you would consider him as blind in his mind as in his body. And is not this exactly the procedure of Unitarians? "Mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur.”

SECTION IV.

XVI. What is above reason is not always against reason. After all, is it not a maxim generally admitted amongst philosophers, that, "what is above reason, is against reason?

To this anti-christian principle, I answer: If, what is above reason, is always against reason, then the existence of this universe, our own existence, and, finally, the very existence of God, are against reason; for they are certainly above reason, as has been demonstrated.

This maxim is borrowed, not from wise men, but from frantic sophisters, who, finding nothing wherewith to attack religion with success in those ancient principles, which were admitted at all times, and by all nations, and which are the common light of rational beings, and the very foundations of reason, formed the scheme of contriving arbitrary principles: from these principles they draw such inferences as they wish to draw; as it is for the very purpose of drawing No. I.

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