exist in the present moment; and this information, if it were not preserved by Memory, would vanish instantly, and leave us as ignorant as if it had never been. (See Art. 124. Illus. and Corol.)

2. Memory must have an object. Every man who remembers, must remember something, and that which he remembers, is called the object of his remembrance. In this, Memory is allied to Perception, but differs from Sensation, which has no object but the feeling itself. (See Art. 125. and its Illus.)

3. We can distinguish the thing remembered from the remembrance of it. We may remember any thing which we have seen, or heard, or known, or done, or suffered; but the remembrance of it is a particular act of the mind which now exists, and of which we are conscious. (See Illus. Art. 99.)

Corol. The object of Memory being something that is past, and the object of Perception and of Consciousness something which is present; what now is, cannot be an object of Memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of Perception or of Consciousness.

243. Memory is always accompanied with the BELief of that which we remember, as Perception is accompanied with the belief of that which we perceive, and Consciousness with the belief of that whereof we are conscious. (See Art. 100. Illus.)

Illus. This belief, which we have from distinct Memory, we account real knowledge, no less certain than if it was grounded on demonstration; no man in his wits calls it in question, nor will he hear any argument against it. But it cannot be resolved into the evidence of sense, or of any process of Memory, but must be stated as a peculiar kind of evidence, which we are so constituted as to admit of itself immediately, and incontestably. The testimony of witnesses, in causes of life and death, depends upon it, and all the knowledge mankind have of past events is built upon this foundation. (See Illus. 2. Art. 116.)

Obs. There are cases in which our Memory is less distinct and determinate, and where we must frequently allow that it may have failed us; but this does not in the least weaken its credit where it is perfectly distinct.

244. To the exercise of Memory, we appear to be entirely indebted for the notion of time or duration; for a being, destitute of that faculty, could never have possessed that notion; and without Memory, he would have no idea of such a thing as motion, for motion is a successive change of place, and presupposes the notion of succession, or duration.

Illus. 1. Memory implies a conception and belief of past DURATION; for it is impossible that we should remember any thing distinctly, without believing some interval of duration, more or less, to have passed between the time it happened, and the present moment; and, if we had no Memory, we could acquire no notion of duration.

2. Things remembered must be things formerly perceived or known. I remember the comet of 1811. I must, therefore, have perceived it

at the time it appeared, otherwise I could not remember it. (See Illus. 2. Art. 59.) Our first acquaintance with any object of thought cannot therefore be by remembrance; for Memory can only produce a continuance or renewal of a former acquaintance with the thing remembered.

3. The notion of limited duration which we distinctly remember, leads us, by a kind of necessity, to the admission of a duration which has no limits-which neither began nor will have an end. In like manner, the notions of limited extension and magnitude, which we acquire by the senses, leads to the belief of an unlimited extension, or of space which has no bounds.

4. Thus are acquired the notions of infinite space, and of infinite time or eternity. It cannot, however, be pretended, that our finite capacities are capable of forming adequate conceptions of that which is infinite and unbounded; it can only be said, that there is less difficulty in conceiving infinite space, than in conceiving the final boundaries of space, or the beginning or end of time.

245. The remembrance of a past event is necessarily accompanied with the conviction of our own EXISTENCE at the time the event happened.

Illus. I cannot call to my remembrance the death of the amiable and lamented Princess Charlotte, that happened a year ago, without a conviction as strong as memory can give, that I, the identical person who now remember that mournful event, did then exist. (See Illus. to Art. 52.)

Obs. These are principles obvious and certain, of which the reader must judge by what he feels; and they admit no other proof but an appeal to his own reflection.

II. Of Memory as an original Faculty.

246. Of our ORIGINAL FACULTIES, of which Memory is one, we can give no account, but that they were given us by the Author of our being. (See Art. 130.)

Illus. 1. The knowledge we have by Memory of things past, seems as unaccountable as an immediate knowledge would be of things to come. I find in my mind a distinct conception and a firm belief of a series of past events, as the battle of Trafalgar, the battle of Vittoria; but I know not how this is produced. I call it Memory, but this is only giving a name to it; it is not an account of its cause. I remember the building of Waterloo Bridge; I have seen hundreds of men employed on it, and thousands of blocks of granite used in its construction, and I most firmly believe these facts; but I am unable to give any reason of this belief. I conclude, therefore, that it is the inspiration of my Maker that gives me this understanding.

2. When I believe that I washed my hands and face this morning, there appears no necessity in the truth of this proposition: it might be, or it might not be. You may distinctly conceive it without believing it. But how do I come to believe it?-I remember it distinct

ly; and this is all I can say about it. But this remembrance is an act of my mind. Could this act of my mind have existence if the event had not happened? If you can show that it could not have existence, you will then have fairly accounted for that belief which we have of what we remember; but on the other hand, if you cannot show this, allow me still to think that this belief is unaccountable, and that we can say no more but that it is the result of our constitution.

Corol. We are so constituted as to have an intuitive knowledge of many things past (Art. 47.); but we have no intuitive knowledge of the future. The past was, but now is not; we only remember things past. The future will be, but is not; we can have no remembrance of the future, because we have no knowledge of it. We might perhaps have been so constituted as to have an intuitive knowledge of the future; but not of the past: nor would this constitution have been more unaccountable than the present, though, for any thing we know to the contrary, it might be much more inconvenient. Had this been the constitution of the human kind, they who doubt the prescience of the Deity, or his knowledge of things future, would be plunged into an opposite disbelief of admitting his knowledge of things that are past. How limited, then, are proud man's most comprehensive conceptions!

III. Analysis of the Faculty of Memory.

247. The faculty of Memory implies two things: first, a CAPACITY of retaining knowledge; and, secondly, a POWER of recalling that knowledge to our thoughts when we have occasion to make use of it.

Obs. The word Memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when of a ready Memory, in the latter.

248. The various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are, from time to time, recalled to our thoughts in two ways: sometimes they recur to us spontaneously, or at least without any interference on our part; in other cases, they are recalled in consequence of an effort of will.

Note. It would probably be as philosophical to say, Memory is either casual or intentional-CASUAL, when subjects or thoughts, by any connection of their own, recur to the mind-INTENTIONAL, when the mind, from design, recalls any subject or thought.

Illus. For the former operation of the mind, we have the appropriate name Reminiscence, or Remembrance: in our language, the latter, too, is often called by the name of memory, but is more properly distinguished by the word recollection. (Art. 254.)

249. The OPERATIONS of Memory relate either to things and their relations, or to events.

Illus. In the former case, thoughts which have been formerly in the mind, may recur to us; but whether, at that time, we have the idea of the past suggested or not, there is, doubtless, a certain modification of time, because what we remember is past. In the latter case, it is more evident, that if we recall to mind former objects of its thoughts, we refer the event to a particular time; so that of every such act of Memory, the idea of the past is a necessary concomitant. (See Illus. 1. Art. 245.)

250. The evidence, or belief, of past existence, which always accompanies Memory, (Art. 243.) forms one important distinction between that faculty and Association.

Illus. 1. The suggestions which are made by the faculty of Association alone, impress us with no belief of their reality. In fact, the very materials upon which they are employed, if not supplied by the immediate perception of the moment, must be furnished by the memory, or that faculty which enables us to treasure up past knowledge.

Corol. Thus the power of Association, in its most useful exercise, presupposes the power of Memory; and when, during the spontaneous flow of the current of thought, we recognize a combination of which we had formerly been conscious, and distinguish it from one newly formed, this necessarily implies an exercise of a faculty which can distinguish former knowledge from new; which is not an attribute of the faculty of Association, but of the MEMORY alone.

Illus. 2. In the case of some old men, who retain pretty exactly the information which they receive, but are sometimes unable to recollect in what manner the particulars which they find connected together in their thoughts at first came into the mind, whether they occurred to them in a dream, or were communicated to them in conversation, we have an example of the power of Association operating without any aid from Memory. (See Art. 254. Illus. 2. and Example.) But in most cases, the suggestions of Memory are made by means of the combinations previously established among our thoughts.

3. This, however, is but one part of the province of Memory; for, as was observed above, (Art. 247.) this faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The first of these is entirely independent of the faculty of Combination; but this faculty is the principal, though not the sole instrument, by which the latter purpose is accomplished.

4. The advantages of this law are thus stated by Mr. Stewart. On the other hand, says he, it is evident that without the associating principle, the power of retaining our thoughts, and of recognizing them when they occur to us, would have been of little use; for the most important articles of our knowledge might have remained latent in the mind, even when those occasions presented themselves to which they are immediately applicable.

Corol. In consequence of this law of our nature, not only are all our various ideas made to pass from time to time in review before us, and to offer themselves to our choice as subjects of meditation, but, when an occasion occurs which calls for the aid of our past experience, the occasion itself recalls to us all the information upon the subject which that experience hath accumulated.

IV. Varieties of Memory in different Individuals.

251. Of all our faculties, Memory is that which nature has bestowed in the most unequal degrees on different individuals; but the original disparities are by no means so immense as they seem to be at first view; and much of this diversity is to be ascribed to different habits of Attention, and to a difference of selection among the various objects and events presented to our curiosity.

Illus. As the great purpose to which this faculty is subservient, is, to enable us to collect and retain, for the future regulation of our conduct, the results of our past experience, it is evident that the degree of perfection which it attains in the case of different persons, must vary; first, with the facility of making the original acquisition; secondly, with the permanence of the acquisition; and, thirdly, with the quickness or readiness with which the individual is able, on particular occasions, to apply it to use.

Corol. The qualities, therefore, of a good Memory, are, in the first place, to be susceptible; secondly, to be retentive; and, thirdly, to be ready.

252. Susceptibility and readiness are both connected with a facility of associating ideas, according to their more obvious relations; retentiveness or tenaciousness of Memory, depends principally on what is seldom united with this facility-a disposition to system and philosophical arrange

ment.

Illus. 1. The more obvious relations which befriend susceptibility and readiness, are those of resemblance and of analogy, and the casual relations arising from the contiguity of time and place; the philosophical arrangement upon which retentiveness and tenaciousness of Memory depend, has for its basis the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclusion.

Obs. This difference in the modes of Association in different men, is the foundation of some very striking diversities between them in respect of intellectual character. But we have anticipated the further illustration of this position in Chapters IV., VI., and VII., to which we must therefore refer the reader.

Illus. 2. Again, our ideas are frequently associated in consequence of the associations which take place among their arbitrary signs. All the signs by which our thoughts are expressed, are addressed either to the eye or to the ear; and the impressions made on these organs at the time when we first receive an idea, contribute to give us a firmer hold of it. Visible objects are remembered more easily than those of any of our other senses (see Art. 142. Illus.); and hence it is, that the bulk