For this reason there are but few proper names belonging to

a language.

156. And the reason why general words make the greatest part of every language, may be easily accounted for by the following illustrations.

Illus. 1. Every individual that falls within our view has various attributes; and it is by these that it becomes useful or hurtful to us. We know not the essence of any individual object. All the knowledge we can gain of it is the knowledge of its attributes, its quantity, its various relations to other things, its place, its situation, its motions. It is by such attributes of things only that we communicate our knowledge of them to others. By their attributes, our hopes and fears from them are regulated; and it is only by attention to their attributes that we can make them subservient to our ends; and therefore we give names to such attributes.

2. Now, all attributes must, from their nature, be expressed by general words, and are so expressed in all languages. Anciently, attributes were, in general, expressed by two names which express their nature. They were called universals, because they might belong equally to many individuals, and are not confined to one. They were also called predicables, because whatever is predicated, that is, affirmed or denied of one subject, may be affirmed or denied of more than one, and is, therefore, an universal, and expressed by a general word. A predicable, therefore, signifies the same thing as an attribute, with this difference only, that the first word is Latin, the last English. The attributes which we find either in the works of nature, or of human ingenuity, are common to many individuals. We either find them to be so, or presume them to be so, and give them the same name in every subject to which they belong.

3. There are not only attributes belonging to individual subjects, but there are likewise attributes of attributes, which may be called secondary attributes. Most attributes are capable of different degrees and different modifications, which must be expressed by general words.

Example. Thus, it is an attribute of many bodies to be moved, but motion may be in an endless variety of directions. It may be quick, or slow, rectilineal, or curvilineal; it may be equable, accelerated, or retarded.

Corol. As all attributes, therefore, whether primary or secondary, are expressed by general words, it follows, that in every proposition which we express in language, what is affirmed or denied of the subject of the proposition, must be expressed by general words. And that the subject of the proposition may often be a general word, will appear from the next illustration.

Illus. 4. The same faculties by which we distinguish the different attributes belonging to the same subject, and give names to them, enable us likewise to observe, that many subjects agree in certain attributes, while they differ in others. By this means we are enabled to reduce individuals which are infinite, to a limited number of classes, which are all kinds or sorts, and, in the scholastic dialect, these are called general species,

157. Observing many individuals to agree in certain attributes, we refer them all to one class, and give a name to the class. This name comprehends in its signification, not one attribute only, but all the attributes which distinguish that class, and by affirming this name of any individual, we affirm it to have all the attributes which characterize the class.

Illus. Thus men, dogs, horses, elephants, are so many different classes of animals. In like manner we marshal other substances, vegetable and inanimate, into classes; as oaks, elms, firs; earths, minerals. We form also into classes, qualities, relations, actions, affections, and passions, and all other things.

158. When a class is very large, it is divided into subordinate classes; the higher class being called a genus or kind; the lower a species, or sort of the higher. Sometimes a species is still subdivided into subordinate species; and this subdivision is carried on as far as is found convenient for the purpose of language, or for the improvement of knowledge.

Illus. In this distribution of things into genera and species, it is evident that the name of the species comprehends more attributes than the name of the genus. The species comprehends all that is in the genus, and those attributes likewise which distinguish that species from others belonging to the same genus; and the more such divisions we make, the names of the lower become still the more comprehensive in their signification, but the less extensive in their application to individuals.

Corol. Hence it is an axiom in logic, that the more extensive any general term is, it is the less comprehensive; and on the contrary, the more comprehensive, the less extensive.

Example. In the following series of subordinate general terms, animal, man, Frenchman, Parisian, every subsequent term comprehends in its signification, all that is in the preceding, and something more; and every antecedent term extends to more individuals than the subsequent.

159. Every genus, and every species of things, may be either the subject or the predicate of a proposition, nay, of innumerable propositions; for every attribute common to the genus or species, may be affirmed of it; and the genus may be affirmed of every species, and both genus and species of every individual to which it extends.

Illus. 1. Thus, of man, it may be affirmed, that he is an animal made up of body and mind; that he is of few days and full of trouble; that he is capable of various improvements in arts, in knowledge, and in virtue. In a word, every thing common to the species may be af firmed of man; and of all such propositions, which are innumerable, man is the subject.

2. Again, of every nation and tribe, and of every individual of the human race that is, that was, or that shall be, it may be affirmed that they are men. In all such propositions, which are innumerable, man is the predicate of the proposition.

Obs. We have observed above an extension and comprehension of general terms; and that in any subdivision of things, the name of the ⚫ lowest species is most comprehensive, and that of the highest genus most extensive; we shall now see that, by means of such general terms, there is also an extension and comprehension of propositions, which is one of the noblest powers of language, and fits it for expressing, with great ease and expedition, the highest attainments in knowledge of which the human understanding is capable.

160. When the predicate is a genus or a species, the proposition is more or less comprehensive, according as the predicate is so.

Illus. Thus, when I say, that this seal is gold, by this single proposition I affirm of it all the properties which that metal is known to have. When I say of any man, that he is a mathematician, this appellation comprehends all the attributes that belong to him as an animal, as a man, and as one who has studied mathematics. When I say, that the orbit of the planet Mercury is an ellipse, I thereby affirm of that orbit all the properties which Apollonius or other geometricians have discovered, or which may be discovered, of that species of figure.

161. Again, when the subject of a proposition is a genus or a species, the proposition is more or less extensive, according as the subject is.

Illus. Thus, when I am taught, that the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right angles, this proposition extends to every species of plane triangle, and to every individual plane triangle which has existed, which does exist, or which can exist.

Obs. Such extensive and comprehensive propositions condense human knowledge, and adapt it to the capacity of our minds with great addition to its beauty, and without any diminution to its distinctness and perspicuity.

II. Of General Conceptions.

162. Words could have no general signification, unless there had been conceptions in the minds of those who used them, of things that are general; and it is to such that we give the names of general conceptions. These conceptions take this denomination, not from the act of the mind in conceiving, which is an individual act, but from the object or thing conceived, which is general.

163. General conceptions are expressed by general terms, that is, by such general words as may be the subject or the predicate of a proposition; and these terms are ei

ther attributes of things, or they signify genera or species of things.

164. We have a more distinct conception of the attributes of all the individuals with which we are acquainted, than of the subject to which those attributes belong.

Illus. 1. The conception that we form of any individual body we have access to know, is, that it has length, breadth, and thickness; such a figure, and such a color; that it is hard, or soft, or fluid; that it has such qualities, and is fit for such purposes. If it is a vegetable, we may know where it grows, what is the form of its leaves, and flower and seed; if an animal, what are its natural instincts, its manner of life, and of rearing its young. Of these attributes belonging to this individual, and numberless others, we may surely have a distinct conception; and we shall find words in language by which we can clearly and distinctly express them.

2. If we consider, in like manner, the conception that we form of any individual person of our acquaintance, we shall find it to be made up of various attributes, which we ascribe to him; such as, that he is the son of such a man, the brother of such another, that he has such an employment or office, such a fortune, that he is tall or short, well or ill made, comely or ill favored, young or old, married or unmarried; to this we may add his temper, his character, his abilities, and perhaps some anecdotes of his history. Such is the conception we form of individual persons of our acquaintance; by such attributes we describe them to those who know them not; and by such attributes historians give us a conception of the personages of former times; nor is it possible to describe them in any other

way.

Corol. All the distinct knowledge we have or can have of any individual, is the knowledge of its attributes, for we know not the essence of any individual; and indeed this seems to be beyond the reach of

the human faculties.

165. Now, every attribute is what the ancients called an universal. It is, or may be, common to various individuals; and, on this account, attributes are expressed by general words.

Obs. 1. It appears, likewise, from every man's experience, that he may have as clear and distinct a conception of such attributes as we have named, and of innumerable others, as he can have of any individual to which they belong.

2. Indeed, all that we distinctly conceive about individuals is about their attributes. It is true we conceive a subject to which they belong; but of this subject, whether it be body or mind, when its attributes are set aside, we have but an obscure and relative conception.

166. The other class of general terms are those that signify the genera and species, into which we divide and

subdivide things. And if we be able to form distinct conceptions of attributes, it cannot surely be denied that we have distinct conceptions of genera and species; because they are only collections of attributes, which we conceive to exist in a subject, and to which we give a general name. If the attributes comprehended under that general name be distinctly conceived, the thing meant by the name must be distinctly conceived; and the name may be justly attributed to every individual that has those attributes.

Illus. Thus, we can conceive distinctly what it is to have wings, to be covered with feathers, to lay eggs. Suppose, then, we give the name of bird to every animal that has these three attributes. And if this be admitted to be the definition of a bird, there is nothing that we can conceive more distinctly; for undoubtedly our conception of the animal is as distinct as our notion of the attributes which are common to the species. If we had never seen a bird, and can but be made to understand the definition, we can easily apply it, without danger of mistake, to every individual of the species.

167. When things are divided and subdivided by men of science, and names given to the genera and species, those names are defined.

Illus. Thus, the genera and species of plants, and of other natural bodies, are accurately defined by writers in the various branches of natural history; so that, to all future generations, the definition will convey a distinct notion of the genus or species defined.

168. When we meet with words signifying genera and species of things, which have a meaning somewhat vague and indistinct, so that they who speak the same language do not always use them in the same sense, we may rest assured that there is no definition of them which has authority.

Illus. Thus, a man may know, that when he applies the name of beast to a lion or a tiger; and the name of bird to an eagle or a turkey, he speaks properly; but whether a bat be a bird or a beast, he may be uncertain. If of a beast and of a bird there was any accurate definition, of sufficient authority, he could be at no loss. And, strange as it may seem, legislators have seldom or never thought fit to give the definition of a man.

Corol. A genus or species, being a collection of attributes, conceived to exist in one subject, a definition is therefore the only way to prevent any addition or diminution of its ingredients in the conception of different persons; and when there is no definition that can be appealed to as a standard, the name will hardly retain precision in its signification.

169. To conceive the meaning of a general word, and to conceive that which it signifies, is the same thing. We conceive