CONTENTS.

DIALOGUE I.

A sermon at which the friends are present lays down the following propositions: viz. 1. Religion is essentially dogmatic. 2. Salvation is contingent upon the belief of certain dogmas. 3. God has furnished mankind with an infallible guide to essential dogmatic truth. Leonard undertakes to show that these propositions lead necessarily to Rome. Basil denies this. It is agreed that the propositions are held by all Catholics, whether Romanists or rot, and by almost all orthodox Protestants. The exceptional position of Broad Churchmen considered. The logical weakness of the Broad Church position admitted. The propositions in question import that a search after true religion resolves itself into a search after the infallible guide. How this search should be conducted. The absurdity of making our estimate of the doctrines taught by the alleged guide, the test of its pretensions to infallibility. Are there any easily recognizable signs— plain and palpable to all men, whether learned or unlearned-which must necessarily characterize an infallible religious guide? Leonard thinks there are. Two such signs accepted. 1st. The infallible guide must either plainly profess infallibility, or have its authority attested by an obviously infallible witness: 2. The infallible guide must be available as a referee to decide dogmatic questions.-The guides on behalf of which infallibility is claimed may be practically reduced to three: viz. 1. The Bible as viewed by Protestants. 2. The Church as defined by the Anglo-Catholics; and 3. The Church of Rome. Conway undertakes to show how the Bible, as viewed by Protestants, exhibits the accepted signs of infallibility. The argument, which is chiefly derived from the work by the Bishop of Ely on the Thirty-nine Articles, proposes to prove: 1. That the infallibility of the Bible is asserted by our Lord; and 2. That it is affirmed by itself. The argument breaks down upon both points. Basil also shews that the Bible does not satisfy the conditions of the second sign. The discussion adjourned PAGES 1-52

DIALOGUE II.

Basil undertakes to show that the Church, as defined by the Anglo-

Catholics, is the true guide. The Church and its branches defined.

Conway denies that the Church of England comes within Basil's de-

finition of a branch Church. Basil replies; Leonard, though agreeing

with Conway, stops the discussion as irrelevant. Basil, reverting to

the accepted signs of infallibility, tries to show that the Church, as

defined by him, plainly and unmistakably professes infallibility. The

matter left in doubt. As to the second sign, Basil altogether fails to

show that his Church can answer the purpose of an available referee

on dogmatic questions. Leonard shows that the Roman Church ob-

viously exhibits both the accepted signs of infallibility; and being

the only guide that does, it must be the infallible guide required.

Conway urges the argument of Janus against Leonard's conclusion.

Leonard shows that Janus does not touch the point of the discussion.

Max, being appealed to, says that, in his opinion, Leonard's conclusions

follow from the accepted propositions. He, however, declares that he

rejects the first of these propositions: viz. that Religion is essentially

dogmatic. Basil declares that without a God to worship there can

be no religion, and that the propositions that God is, and that God is

good, are dogmas. Max denies this. The difference between Baur

and Dr. Liddon as to whether Christ's teaching is dogmatic, consid-

ered. Max defines the class of doctrines which come within his idea

of dogmas, to be-professedly religious opinions which, ex confesso,

cannot be established without having recourse to an intellectual pro-

cess of proof, or to the dicta of some external authority.-The doc-

trine of the goodness of God does not fall within this definition.

Max's view of dogmas, as contrasted with opinions held intuitively

or by conscience, illustrated. The views of Dr. Liddon and Dr. New-

man contrasted. Conway proposes an adjournment. Before separa-

ting, Max, referring to the original argument as to the necessary

interdependence of dogma and infallible guidance, suggests that the

argument may be so used as to negative the alleged essential connec-

tion between dogma and religion
. PAGES 53-107

DIALOGUE III.

Max is required to explain more fully his views as to the undogmatic
character of religious faith. What is faith? The prevalent confusion
of ideas respecting it; the term being used sometimes to designate a
distinctive tenure, and sometimes being used to designate the tenure

by which all religious opinions are held. By the term 'faith,' Max

proposes to designate the tenure by which those doctrines are held,

which have consciously a subjective basis alone. The doctrines so

held, he calls 'faiths.' The tenure by which we hold other religious

doctrines, all of which, he maintains, will be found to fall within his

definition of dogmas, he calls the dogmatic tenure.' Leonard and

Conway illustrate the advantage of observing this distinction, and the

confusion resulting from disregarding it. In reply to Basil, Max

points out certain simple, practical tests by which faiths and dogmas

may be readily distinguished from each other. The conscious inde-

fectibility of faiths Why the heathen doctrine that God is wicked,

belongs to the class dogmas.' These matters of definition having

been cleared away, Max proceeds to read a memorandum, explanatory

of his opinion, that dogma is no essential part of true religion. At

the commencement of the reading, the question is raised whether man

has a moral sense.' General disposition to accept the doctrine of a

moral sense; but doubt expressed as to the limits of its jurisdiction.

Is Bishop Butler right in supposing that the moral sense tells us

what we ought to do under almost all circumstances? Max thinks

not. He thinks that the terms 'moral' and 'immoral' are not pre-

dicable of simple actions at all-that the moral sense does not pro-

nounce upon the relative worth of actions, but only on the relative

worth of the various principles of human action. These views illus-

trated-The reading of the Memorandum continues. It developes the

following trains of thought: 1. Why it is supposed that, the know-

ledge of God, of His will, and of our duties towards Him' (Dr.

Newman's definition of religion) is generated and developed by a

purely spiritual process: 2. Why it is supposed that religion cannot

be dependent upon dogmatic orthodoxy: 3. The conscious subordi-

nation of dogmatic beliefs to 'faiths:' 4. The impossibility of

establishing the principle of Catholicism on dogmas, or on anything

but 'faiths.' The Memorandum being finished, Conway raises the

question whether Max is an infidel. The question answered. The

debate arrested at the door of Canterbury Cathedral . PAGES 108-170

DIALOGUE IV.

A letter against Max's views read. The letter insists that as religion is
intended to govern all our faculties, it must come to man, not only
through his conscience, but through every part of his nature; that
though doctrines which address themselves to the intellect, dogmas
that is to say, are therefore a necessary part of religion, the supposed
interdependence of dogma and infallible guidance is an untenable

hypothesis that there is no reason to suppose that God has given us

an infallible guide to religion more than to anything else, and that

the fair use of our ordinary faculties would lead us to adopt funda-

mentally necessary dogmas. Leonard shows that this letter re-opens

the Broad Church question over again. He developes the inherent

weakness of the writer's position, and is followed by Conway and

Basil on the same side. Max, though admitting the subordination of

all the human powers to religion, shows that in referring the source

of religious perception to a single faculty, he is following, not depar-

ting from, the analogy of mutual phenomena. Basil suggests that

Max stands in need of an infallible guide, just as much as the dog-

matist. Max replies. Basil, though admitting that a belief in God's

goodness may come from conscience, denies that men, without the

guidance of authority, would form correct ideas of God's goodness-

witness, Bérenger's Dieu des bonnes gens.' Leonard points out

that Basil's case is based upon a misapprehension of Max. The

question is raised-how would Basil and Max respectively deal with

the disciples of Bérenger? Basil's proposed method of dealing with

them contrasted with that recommended by Max. Conway objects to

Max, that his religious views are unsocial. Max replies. Conway

challenges Max to show how, on his principles, he can admit any part

of the Bible to be inspired, without admitting the inspiration of many

other books. Max replies that he does admit the inspiration of many

other books. The debate adjourned, on the understanding that when

resumed, Basil shall be left to state the case on behalf of dogma in

his own way
PAGES 171-204

DIALOGUE V.

Basil begins by showing how, the possibility of miracles being admitted,
the connection of dogma and religion necessarily follows. Conway
tries to show that Christ's testimony in favour of the evidential value of
miracles is ambiguous. He also insists that the line taken by ortho-
dox theologians with regard to medieval and modern miracles tends
to discredit their teaching with regard to Gospel miracles. Leonard
gives a succinct abstract of Lecky's argument on miracles. Basil
shows that the criticisms of neither Conway nor Leonard reach the
point where his argument on miracles touches Max. Max admits
this, and enters upon an elaborate argument to show that miracles
can prove nothing but superhuman power-and that instead of de-
monstrating the divine origin of doctrine, they cannot themselves be
accepted by us as divine, until after we have decided whether the doc-
trine associated with them, is divine or not. Bishop Atterbury's

6

counter argument considered and refuted. The answer given to Max's

view by Dean Mansel, in Aids to Faith,' considered and refuted.

Basil, following the Bishop of Ely, insists upon the fanatical ten-

dencies of conscience, when unchecked by authority. Leonard shows

that every case mentioned by Basil in support of his view, is an in-

stance of dogmatic fanaticism. Max shows that whilst fanatical ex-

cesses have never accompanied the profession of what he has defined

as 'faiths,' the history of dogma is throughout a history of the most

revolting fanatical excess. Basil and Conway maintain that the good

avowedly resulting from Christianity, must be attributed to Christi-

anity as a whole—that is to say, to a religion compounded of dogmas

as well as faiths. Leonard and Max deny the soundness of this view,

or its logical bearing upon the question at issue. Conway, referring

to Dr. Newman's 'Grammar of Assent,' maintains that the thought

or image of Christ' underlies all that Christianity has done, and that

this thought or image has always had a dogmatic foundation.

Leonard denies this, and supports his denial. Basil then refers to the

testimony of Christian missionaries as proving that the dogma of the

Atonement is more influential in converting sinners, than any of the

doctrines which Max calls faiths. Leonard points out a glaring

fallacy in the missionary reasonings on this subject. Max contrasts

the practice of modern missionaries with that of Christ; and, bringing

together a mass of evidence from Africa, China, India, and Europe,

shows that, not only does the doctrine of the Atonement repel more

persons than it attracts, but that in dealing with large masses of

human beings, faiths are more influential than dogmas. Diverse

views of Christ's nature. Basil insists upon the impossibility of keeping

alive religion without a ritual, or a ritual without dogma. Max admits

the immense importance of congregational worship; but thinks that

it would flourish better without dogmas than with them. Emerson's

opinion on the point. Leonard sums up the result of the discussion.

The friends part

PAGES 205-281

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