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sort of caput mortuum, wherein the mind is unable to derive any rational guide or real criterion either for practical or speculative purposes.
Such is even at the present moment the position of Logical Science, though it is more than half a century since the renovation of Logic was accomplished by one of the most extraordinary thinkers that ever existed. I mean Hegel.
When Hegel's Logic appeared* it was hailed in Germany by the philosophical world with admiration; nay, with enthusiasm. It was felt that it would do away with old Logic, and inaugurate a new era not only for Logic and Philosophy, but for Science in general. For Logic being a universal science, there is no province of knowledge to which its influence does not extend; there is no theory, nor thought, relating either to God, or to Nature, or to ourselves, which does not involve some logical notion or law; and consequently the renovation of Logic must needs carry with it new mental habits and criteria, new methods and principles, in all provinces of science.
That Hegel's Logic, when better known, when a blind attachment to old formulas and a sort of mechanical use of them shall have given way before rational and demonstrative principles, will supersede old Logic, does not leave a shade of doubt in my mind. And the objection raised by some against the Hegelian philosophy, namely, that this philosophy which once held sway has now been falling off; that his disciples are scattered and discouraged, and hardly acknowledge the doctrine of their master; that consequently this doctrine a fait son temps, and that it was a transitory phase of the human mind, a bold but sterile attempt to explain the absolute laws of the Universe,—this objection has, in my opinion, very little, if any, value. To those who assume that the Hegelian philosophy has lost its influence, may be opposed the contrary assumption. It may be said that what it has lost in intensity it has acquired in extent, and that its influence which was formerly confined to Germany is now spread all over Europe and beyond the seas, as is attested by private and public accounts, and by publications relating directly or in
directly to the Hegelian philosophy.* Moreover, were the objection correct as to its influence being on the wane, the inference which some would draw therefrom against its intrinsic worth and its future action and development does not follow at all from the premises. The same has happened to the Hegelian philosophy as to that of Plato and Aristotle, and what must happen to all comprehensive and profound systems, and, we may add, to all great historical events. There is a reaction and there is a stop. There is a reaction brought about by various causes, namely: by the past; by old habits, interests, and tradition; by ignorance, indifference, and the difficulty of embracing the full and real meaning of a theory; and also by impatience and disappointment at not seeing ideas immediately realized. But this is the eclipse and not the evanescence of the planet. Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy was followed, or, as the anti-Hegelian would say, superseded, by the Stoic, the Epicurean, &c. &c.; yet this did not prevent the former from reviving as vigorously-nay, more vigorously, perhaps, than when it first came forth from the brain and mouth of their immortal authors. For, setting aside the Alexandrian school and the Roman philosophy, which are chiefly developments or reproductions of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the influence and doctrines of the latter were never more widely spread, or more indisputably established, than in the middle ages and at the renaissance; and even at the present day, in spite of the disdainful attacks and pompous promises of Bacon and Descartes, Greek philosophy stands as the foundation of all serious philosophical training, and there are few works upon which of late years more attention and labor have been bestowed by distinguished thinkers, commentators, and editors, than upon Plato and Aristotle. Therefore the momentary obscuration of these great luminaries, far from being a symptom of decline, is the test of their power and vigorous youth, as it shows how vital is the spirit that lives in them, which, like the phenix from its ashes, comes out from among the ruins
* Mr. Remusat, in the paper “ Un Voyage dans le Nord de l'Italie," published in the Reveux des deux Mondes (1st October, 1857), says, “Italy has her Hegelianism. It is the necessity of our time--c'est la nécessité du temps.” It would be more correct to say—it is the necessity of the human mind.
that time and generations heap up to obstruct their passage, breathing an ever new and immortal life.
That Hegel belongs to the family of these extraordinary and divine-born thinkers, and that his theories will stand the proof of time, cannot, in my opinion, have the slightest: doubt in an unprejudiced mind that will give the subject sufficient attention. For his marvellous speculative power, the vast and profound grasp of his mind embracing all provinces of science, and the faculty--unequalled by any other thinker, not excepting Plato and Aristotle--of systematizing knowledge, and deducing and connecting ideas, assigns him one of the highest places among philosophical geniuses.
§ 1. Definition of Logic. Nothing, perhaps, shows better the unsatisfactory state and the inadequacy of Logical Science than the various and conflicting opinions as to its object and the exact limits of its province. For to some it is a system of rules, a method for forming clear ideas, and for guiding Reason;* to others it is the Science of Argumentation and Reasoning, which faculty they carefully distinguish from Reason.t Kant considers Logic as a formal science, the science of the necessary forms or laws of thought, and, according to his own expression, of the general use of the Understanding, independent of all particular object or subject-matter, supplied either by Reason or by Experience. There are those who exclude from Logic ail questions relating to Ideas, their origin and their objective meaning; there are others, on the contrary, who not only attribute them to Logic, but who go so far as to include in it the Problem of Certainty, besides other miscellaneous matters, as the problem of probability, of miracles, &c.8
This divergence of opinion, and this uncertainty as to the precise object and limits of its province, which would be a source of error in any other science, by misleading judgment, and by producing false consequences and applications, is
* Descartes and Watts. + This is the view more commonly taken of Logic.
Kant's Logic, published by Jaesche. & The Logic of Port Royal, for instance.
much more so in a science which is held out as the organon of inquiry, as the method by which truth is to be discovered and tested. For the confusion and error that creep into this the universal science will, for this very reason, invade all the other branches of knowledge.
The difficulty of forming a correct notion of Logic, of its limits and real bearing, arises from various causes, but chiefly from the absence of a systematic knowledge, and of a close inquiry into the nature of Form, and of Logic itself. In fact, where there is no system, i.e. where there is not a whole, and where the parts and the whole are not rationally adjusted and connected together, there is only a desultory and fragmentary knowledge; and a particular science which is not systematically arranged, and is not the part of a whole, must necessarily mistake its object, its limits, and the relation in which it stands to other sciences. And so it is with Logic. For this science is handled irrespectively of the relation in which it stands to other sciences, or, when started, the question is answered in a vague and superficial manner, as, for instance, that Logic being the Science of Reasoning, and, as reasoning is needed in all sciences, Logic must necessarily bear upon all sciences; but, what is the nature of this relation, how far and in which way Logic is connected with other sciences, which is the limit that separates and which is the nexus that unites them,--this, the most important point, Logicians do not state; or if, to give a more accurate definition of Logic, they add that it is the Science of the Form and Method by which we dispose our thoughts in order to attain Truth, here too we are left in ignorance as to the nature of this Form and Method, and of this relation to the objects of Thought; whether, for instance, there is between the object -finite or infinite, physical or metaphysical--and the Form a community of essence, or whether the Form is a mere subjective organon, a contrivance for the better arrangement of our conception; whether the Form is eternal or temporal, and, if temporal, how eternal objects can be known through it; thus overlooking or leaving unanswered the questions that are most important, and without which no correct notion of Logic can be formed.
Let us, then, in order to arrive at the right conception of Logic, inquire into the nature of this science, by pointing out, in the first place, the principles upon which old Logic is founded, and the inadvertence and misconception which have brought forth these principles. Logic must be established.
§ 2. Outlines of Formal Logic.
That Logic is a universal science is a point on which all philosophers agree. In fact, whether Logic be the Science of Forms, or the Science of Reasoning, the unity of the mind as well as the unity of science requires that there should be a universal science, extending to all departments of thought and knowledge. But if, on the one hand, it is a universal science, it must, on the other, have its own peculiar object, its own peculiar field of researches; it must, in other words, be a particular Science. For were it a universal Science only. it would be the only Science, and all other sciences would be but different parts and divisions of Logic. The question, therefore, is how Logic can be both a universal and a particular science, to what extent and in what sense it embraces all other sciences, so as the latter may be considered as various branches of Logic, and in what sense it constitutes a science sui generis, having a distinct and limited object.
Now, when we analyze thought, we find two elements in all thoughts, namely, the Thing itself -- either merely thought, or signified externally by words -- and the manner in which the various things are disposed and connected in and by thought; there are, in other words, what has been called the Matter or Contents, and the Form of Thought. For instance, if in the proposition “Man is mortal” we do not considerin any way what relates either to man or to mortal--whether there is a man or what it is, whether there is a mortal thing and in what mortality consists, &c.--but only the way in which these two and all similar terms are or may be connected, we will have the general Form of this proposition. Again, by the same analytical process we will discover in an argument the same elements, i.e. the Terms and the Form, through which this. relation is apprehended by the mind; and if we apply this. process to the various forms through which we apprehend truth, we would obtain the fundamental principles upon which old Logic stands; so that we would have, on the one