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THE JOURNAL

Volume of the Philosophische Monatshefte and the Circular to its

Contributors; God-Man; On Primary Instruction in Relation to

Education; Lucretius on the Nature of Things; The Blazing Star;

Hypotheses; A Treatise on the Common and Civil Law, &c.; Half-

hour Recreations in Popular Science; Consumption, its Pathology

and Treatment; As Regards Protoplasm; Problema dell’ Assoluto.. 92

um ๆ

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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by WILLIAM T, HARRIS, in the Office of

the Librarian of Congress at Washington,

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY .

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, It is intended as a vehicle for such translations, commentaries, and original articles, as will best promote the interests of Speculative Philosophy in all its departments.

TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION. Two dollars per volume; single number, 50 cents.

Vols, I. and II., bound in one volume in muslin, will be sent post paid by mail for $5.00.

Vol. III., Vol. IV., Vol. V., and Vol. VI., in muslin, $3.00 each.
B:ck volumes (unbound) may be had at $2.00 per volume.
To English subscribers the price is 12s. per volume, 38. per nun

All foreign subscribers should order through Messrs. Trübner & Co., 60 PX ternoster Row, London.

All subscriptions (within the United States) should be addressed to the Editor,

WM, T. HARRIS, Box 2398, St. Louis, Mo.

THE SEVENTH VOLUME OF TAE

JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

WILL CONTAIN, BESIDES OTHER MATTER, THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES, PREPARED

EXPRESSLY FOR THIS JOURNAL:

I. Rosenkranz's Pedagogics (continuation), translated by Anna C. Brackett. II. Criticism of Berkeley's Idealism, by James Hutchinson Stirling, LL.D.,

of Edingburgh. III. The Philosophy of Law (continuation), by the same author. This is a

reprint.) IV. Interpretation of Kant's Critic of Pure Reason (continuation), by Simon

S. Laurie, F.R.S., of Edinburgh. V. An Extended Introduction to Speculative Logic and Ph ophy, by Pro

fessor A. Vera of the University of Naples. VI. Chapters from the Rational Psychology and other Writings of Herbart,

translated by H. Haanel. VII. Extract from Hegel's Æsthetics (continuation), translated by Sue A.

Longwell. VIII. Leibnitz's Abridged Statement of his Theodicy, translated by A. E.

Kroeger. IX. Fichte's Facts of Consciousness (conclusion), translated by A. E. Kroeger. X. On the Music of Mendelssohn, Schuman, Liszt, and others, by Professor

E. Sobolewski. [This distinguished composer was engaged on a series of articles for this Journal at the time of his death in the summer of

1872.] XI. Schopenhauer: Another Extract from the Parerga and Paralipomena.

Translated by Dr. C. Joséfé. XII. Rosenkranz: Continuation of chapters from his work on Hegel as the

National Philosopher of Germany"; these treat of Psychology, Æsthetics, Religion, History of Philosophy, &c. Translated by Professor G.

S. Hall, of Antioch College. XIII. Aristotle's De Anima, translated and accompanied with a Commentary

by Prof. Thomas Davidson,

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Preliminary Remarks. That there is a Logical science is admitted on all hands, and that this science is of paramount importance for purely speculative as well as for practical purposes is a point upon which all men seem to agree. For although in practical life men are mostly guided by opinion, by interest, by passion and caprice, yet there is not one who is not anxious to strengthen and develop his logical powers—-"the faculty of reasoning” as it is generally termed-either to apply it to the peculiar object of his industry, or to outdo the adversaries whom every one has to meet and to contend with in the struggles of life. This it is which, with Mathematics, makes Logic the most popular amongst abstract sciences. For every one feels, as if by instinct, that to act rightly one must think rightly, and consequently that the science which inquires into the rules of thought must be worthy of the attention of all rational beings; and as there is neither science nor art, nor any practical avocation, which is not founded upon thought, and does not require the normal exercise of the logical faculties, the conclusion naturally drawn therefrom is that Logic is a science embracing within its boundaries the whole range of human knowledge and activity.

But if Logic, when considered in its abstract notion, takes so high a standing even in popular opinion, it little answers

Vol. vii.-7

the general expectation when considered in its present shape and as embodied in the various logical treatises; and this accounts for the fact of Mathematics having seen the number of its worshippers increased, and the field of its researches and application becoming more and more enlarged, whilst Logic has fallen into neglect and decay, and if still taught in colleges and schools it is more owing to the tradition of the scholastic curriculum than to the earnest desire of becoming acquainted with it; and this in spite of its intrinsic and acknowledged importance, not only with respect to other sciences in general, but to Mathematics itself, mathematical knowledge supposing the existence and the application of Logical laws. The fact is that this science, the object of which is to strengthen and develop the rational powers of the mind as it is now constituted, seems rather to have been intended to mislead and vitiate them. For its theories consist of nothing but an aggregate of empty formulas, of arbitrary rules, and artificial proceedings, which are neither consistent with themselves nor with the things to which they are applied; and it is only by false teaching and false habits of thought, and by a distortion of facts, that we are brought to think that concrete objects, either physical or metaphysical, are apprehended by our mind through, and according to, laws as they are laid down by Logic. For if the matter be truly investigated it will be seen that they are apprehended and known in spite of and in contradiction to them.

The failures of Logic have long been felt by philosophers, and several attempts have been made, since Ramus, to remodel this science. But I do not hesitate to say that all attempts have failed, and not only failed but are merely an inferior reproduction of the theories they propose to overthrow and replace. For there is nothing in Bacon's Organon or Descartes' philosophy,* as far as the fundamental principles of Logic are concerned, which could not be found in the Aristotelian Organon; and those who have seriously attended to these matters, and whose judgment is not biassed by national prejudices and vanity, will agree, I trust, with me in saying that the Aristotelian Organon surpasses all subse

* Discours sur la Méthode et Règles pour bien conduire ses Pensées.

567/

quent logical theories by the range and accuracy of its inquiries, and by the scientific character with which it is stamped. As to Bacon's Organon, the long cherished delusion that he had discovered a method and logical proceedings unknown. to Aristotle and ancient philosophers has been exploded by modern criticism and a more accurate knowledge of ancient philosophy.

The common failure of all logical theories--of the Aristotelian as well as others, but more especially of the latter than of the former, as will be shown in the course of this inquirythe error which has precluded the authors of these theories from establishing Logic on a sound and firm basis, and which vitiates, as it were, the whole structure, is to be found in the very principle from which they start, in the very notion they form of Logical Science. For they have, one and all, considered Logic as a formal science, as a science whose business it is to analyze and describe the merely subjective forms of thoughts, i.e. forms that possess a value and meaning as far as the mind is concerned, but which have no objective bearing or consubstantial connection whatever with the things the mind apprehends and knows through them.

This is the view philosophers have generally taken of Logic, and starting from this notion they have curtailed it, and stripped it, as it were, of all substance, leaving nothing but a mere form, which, for the very reason that it has been severed from its substance and considered apart from concrete and real objects --either experimental or metaphysical -- is anything but a rational form and organon of truth. Indeed, from Aristotle down to the present time, it would seem that Logicians, instead of enlarging and completing the field of researches marked out by the Greek philosopher, have exerted all their ingenuity in compressing it into a narrower compass by cutting off some of its essential branches and reducing it to its minimum. Hence the arbitrary and superficial distinctions of Metaphysical and Logical Truth, of Reason and Reasoning, of Logic as the science of mere Possibilities and Metaphysics as the science of eternal and absolute Realities - distinctions which, whilst breaking asunder the unity of the mind and knowledge, and with the unity of knowledge the unity also of things, have made of Logic a

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