exceeds what legally might have been collected, heretofore there has been no decision upon the point by the Supreme Court. The courts of two states have construed the statute as giving the smaller penalty only. Hinterminster v. First Nat. Bank, 62 N. Y. 212; Bobo v. People's Nat. Bank, 92 Tenn. 444. But such decisions place so severe a strain upon the language of the statute that it has been almost uniformly held that the larger penalty may be recovered. Boemer v. Traders Nat. Bank, 90 Texas 443; Crocker v. First Nat. Bank, 4 Dill. (U. S. Circ. Ct.) 358. This view is now conclusively established by the Supreme Court's decision in the principal case.

CONFLICT OF LAWS FOREIGN JUDGMENTS PROBATE OF WILL. A will created trusts of personal property good by the law of Connecticut but too remote by the law of New York. The will was probated in Connecticut as the will of a citizen of that state. Subsequently the testator's widow, to defeat the trusts, sought to establish the will in New York as that of a citizen of New York. Held, that the testator's domicil at the time of his death was in New York, and that the will should be established there. Plant v. Harrison, 36 N. Y. Misc. 649 (N. Y., Sup. Ct., Sp. Term). Every state in which a deceased person leaves personal property has jurisdiction to determine how that property shall pass. STORY, CONFL. LAWS, §§ 513-518. It is, however, general law that personal property may be transferred by a will valid by the law of the testator's domicil, and that jurisdiction to declare the will of a testator belongs to the state in which he was domiciled at the time of his death. Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 336; Succession of Gaines, 45 La. Ann. 1237. That jurisdiction is in rem, and seems analogous to the jurisdiction in divorce cases over the status of the parties. Cf. 15 HARV. L. REV. 66. A judicial proceeding based on an invalid assumption of jurisdiction is not one to which, by the federal constitution, "full faith and credit must be given. Board of Pub. Works v. Columbia Coll., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 521 ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175. Consequently when a will is probated in a state erroneously claiming jurisdiction on the ground of domicil, the decree of probate, so far as it assumes to declare the will, need not afterwards be respected by the courts of other states. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214. Nevertheless a grant of letters of administration on the property within the state is valid, though the title is determined according to the decree of probate in that state, and effect is thereby given to the probate as to that property; for the subject-matter is within the jurisdiction of the court, and where there has been no previous probate of the will in another jurisdiction there can be no constitutional objection. See Overby v. Gordon, supra.

CONFLICT OF LAWS - FOREIGN JUdgment SUBMISSION BY CONTRACT TO FOREIGN JURISDICTION. - By a clause in a contract made in Belgium, the defendant, an English subject not resident in Belgium, agreed that all disputes should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts. A dispute having arisen, the plaintiff brought action in Belgium, and the summons was sent by registered post to the defendant's address in England. By Belgian law such service was sufficient to give jurisdiction. Action was brought in England on the judgment obtained in Belgium. Held, that the defendant is bound by the judgment. Feyericks v. Hubbard, 18 T. L. R. 381 (Eng., K. B.).

According to the rule of the common law, a foreign judgment, though valid by the law of the court where it was obtained, cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, if it was obtained without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155. Under what circumstances a court has jurisdiction by that rule is not clearly defined. It has, however, been decided that jurisdiction will be held to have existed if, at the time of the commencement of the suit in the foreign jurisdiction, the defendant was a subject or resident of the country; if he had come into the court as a plaintiff; or if he voluntarily appeared. Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686; see Schibsby v. Westenholz, supra. Furthermore, in cases where none of these circumstances existed, but where the defendant had purchased stock in a foreign corporation under laws requiring submission to the foreign jurisdiction, a judgment of that jurisdiction has been held valid on the ground that the defendant had impliedly contracted to submit. Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717; Copin v. Adamson, 1 Ex. D. 17. It would seem that, a fortiori, the result should be the same where the contract to submit is express; but only a dictum has been found to that effect. See Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351, 371. A defect in a foreign judgment for want of personal jurisdiction can be set up only as an affirmative defence, and the defendant's contract is a good equitable answer to an attempt to set up that defence.

H

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFLICT OF LAWS - TORT ACTION FOR ACT DONE IN ANOTHER STATE. — The plaintiff, an Indiana citizen, was a servant of the defendant railway company, whose road ran through Indiana and Illinois. He was injured in Illinois through the negligence of a fellow-servant, for which, on the record, the company would not be liable in Illinois. He sued in Indiana under an Employer's Liability Act, relying on § 4, which provides that in a suit under the act for injuries occurring in another state, it shall not be competent for a railroad company to plead or prove the decisions or statutes of that other state. Held, that § 4 is unconstitutional as taking away a vested right of defence and therefore involving a deprivation of property without due process of law. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Read, 62 N. E. Rep. 488 (Ind., Sup. Ct.).

As the statute in question was passed before any right of defence vested, the reason given for the court's decision is unsatisfactory; but the case may be supported on another ground. The American rule that the right to bring an action of tort depends on the lex loci delicti, has often been applied to cases of negligence by fellow-servants. Ala. G. S. Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whitlow's Adm'r, 43 S. W. Rep. 711 (Ky.). The attempt to abrogate this rule by legislation raises a question under the Fourteenth Amendment, under which the courts are inclined to group cases of objectionable extraterritorial legislation by a state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733. To attach liability to acts done in another state and entirely lawful there, would seem to be an excess of legislative jurisdiction, and therefore to fall short of the requirement of due process of law. The English rule, it is true, appears to be that if the act is not innocent or justifiable where committed, although not a tort there, the English law will govern tort liability in England. Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231. But this doctrine, whether or not it would lead to an opposite result in the principal case, is difficult to support, and the American rule seems to have a basis of necessity in the sound principle that laws can have no extraterritorial effect. CONTRACTS PUBLIC POLICY - RELEASE of MASTER FROM LIABILITY TO SERVANT'S NEXt of Kin for Negligence. -The next of kin of a railroad employee released to the company all right to damages which might accrue to him by the death of the employee through the company's negligence. Held, that the contract of release is void as against public policy. Tarbell v. Rutland R. R. Co., 51 Atl. Rep. 6 (Vt.).

Where the contract is between the employee and the company, it has generally been held void in this country. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Spangles, 44 Oh. St. 471. The courts have gone on the ground that the employee, being at a disadvantage in contracting, should be protected, and that such contracts would tend to increase negligence on the part of the company. See note, 58 Am. Rep. 836. In two jurisdictions, however, these contracts have been enforced, in the absence of criminal or gross negli gence, in order to allow the greatest possible freedom of contract in the disposal of services. Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357; Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465. Where the release is given by the next of kin of the employee the same arguments for holding it void seem applicable. Consequently, though the case is new, it will probably be generally followed.

COPYRIGHTS ARTICLE IN ENCYCLOPÆDIA WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE COPY. RIGHT.- - The defendants employed the plaintiff to act as editor of an encyclopædia, and also to contribute articles. The copyrights to these articles were registered in the plaintiff's name. The defendants afterwards published the articles in separate form. Held, that the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction and damages. Aflalo v. Lawrence & Bullen, [1902] 1 Ch. 264.

In both England and America, where one employs another to do literary work, the author is entitled to the copyright, unless the employment is on the terms, either express or implied, that the copyright shall belong to the employer. See Hereford v. Griffin, 16 Sim. 190; Heine v. Appleton, 4 Blatch. (U. S. Circ. Ct.) 125. In some cases the agreement may be inferred merely from the nature of the work and the kind of employment. Lamb v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 218. It would seem that, in the absence of circumstances negativing such an agreement, it might be implied in the ordinary case of a magazine article, and perhaps an article in an encyclopædia, at least where the article is written by some one regularly employed to write for such periodical or encyclopædia; but there is apparently no American authority directly in point, and very little in England. See Sweet v. Benning, 16 C. B. 458. Each case, however, must stand on its own circumstances, and no hard and fast line can be drawn. If the principal case is sound the author can republish in separate form unless, in

deed, as has been suggested by one text-writer, there is some principle by which he could be restrained for a reasonable time from nullifying his license to the publishers. See DRONE, Cop., 259, 260.

CORPORATIONS DISSOLUTION Of Corporation SUCCESSION OF STOCKHOLDers to Corporate PROPERTY. Upon the dissolution of a Louisiana corporation owning land in Texas, certain stockholders brought in the latter state an action of trespass to try title to the land there situated. Held, that the action is maintainable, since on the dissolution of the corporation the property passed to the stockholders as tenants in common. Baldwin v. Johnson, 65 S. W. Rep. 171 (Tex., Sup. Ct.). See NOTES, p. 743.

CRIMINAL LAW- - Procedure — Demurrer TO EVIDENCE. - Held, that a demurrer to evidence is not a proper method of procedure in a criminal prosecution. State v. Alderton, 40 S. E. Rep. 350 (W. Va.). See NOTES, p. 738.

EQUITY-CONFLICTING EQUITIES — STATUTORY LIEN POSTPONED TO CLAIM OF HOLDER OF SECURED NOTE. The maker of a note assigned to the payee as security a claim for payment under a building contract. The payee assigned the claim to X to hold for him and indorsed the note to a holder in due course. The payee of the note knew, but the indorsee did not, that the contractor's claim was subject to a statutory lien for the benefit of material-men. Held, that the proceeds of the contractor's claim should be used to pay the indorsee of the note in preference to the material-men. Perry v. Parrott, 67 Pac. Rep. 144 (Cal., Sup. Ct.). See NOTES, P. 742.

EQUITY-EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-PART TAKEN BY EMI NENT DOMAIN - RECOVERY OF PURCHASE MONEY.-The defendant contracted to convey land to the plaintiff. After part of the price had been paid, but before the delivery of the deed, a fourth of the land was taken by right of eminent domain. Held, that the plaintiff is entitled to rescind the contract and recover the purchase money which he had paid. Kares v. Covell, 62 N. E. Rep. 244 (Mass.). See NOTES, P. 733.

EQUITY INJUNCTION COVENANT IN Lease not TO ASSIGN. — The defendant was the assignee of a lease for a long term of years with a covenant against assignment without the lessor's consent. The lease, which was very advantageous for the lessor, had still many years to run. Held, that equity will enjoin a threatened breach of the covenant. McEachern v. Colton, [1902] A. C. 104 (P. C.).

It is often said that courts look with disfavor upon covenants in leases. TAYLOR, LANDLORD & TENANT, § 685. Whether this attitude be correct or not as regards actions at law, equity, being free to deal with each case with reference to its peculiar circumstances, should apply the same general equitable principles to covenants in leases as to other contracts. So, when a covenantee has adequate legal remedy, or will suffer no damage, or the agreement is of a kind not ordinarily enforceable in equity, relief is denied. Johnstone v. Hall, 2 K. & J. 414; Hill v. Barclay, 16 Ves. 402. Injunctions, however, have been freely given in cases of covenants limiting the manner in which leased premises may be used; and this even where a right of reentry was reserved but would afford inadequate relief. Fleming v. Snook, 5 Beav. 252; Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313. Covenants against assignment are commonly accom panied by conditions for reentry, which generally furnish adequate protection. This may explain why but two cases have been found, one denying, and one granting, the injunction. Dyke v. Taylor, 3 De G., F. & J. 467; Cubitt v. Heyward, 1 Seton 465. In the very similar case of a covenant not to sub-let, an American court granted an injunction. Brolaskey v. Hood, 6 Phila. (Pa.) 193. Altogether, the principal decision seems a satisfactory one, and will probably be followed.

EQUITY - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION AS A BAR. The defendant, in consideration of one dollar to him paid, agreed to lease land to the plaintiff for mining for oil and gas. The lease subsequently proved to be worth over two thousand dollars. Held, that mere inadequacy of consideration is a sufficient ground for refusing specific performance. Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., 112 Fed. Rep. 373 (Circ. Ct., Ind.). See NOTES, p. 741.

EQUITY-TRAde Libel- RESTRAINING PUBLICATION BY INJUNCTION. The defendant, editor of a magazine, published fictitious letters containing false statements derogatory to the plaintiff's goods. Held, that a bill for an injunction, stating the above facts, is not demurrable. Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 68 N. Y. App. Div. 88. See NOTES, p. 734.

INSURANCE

-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES — INSANITY AS EXCUSE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH AMENDMENT TO BY-LAWS. - The by-laws of a mutual benefit society provided that the benefits payable on the decease of a member should go to his mother under certain circumstances. An amendment to the by-laws struck out this provision and required the member to designate the person to take under the same circumstances, forfeiture being the penalty of non-compliance. A member who had become insane before the amendment was passed, failed to designate any one. Upon his death his mother, who would have taken under the former by-law, brought suit. Held, that the amendment and the non-compliance of the insane member afford no ground of defence. Grossmayer v. District No. 1, etc., 22 N. Y. L. J. 2229 (N. Y., App. Div.).

The contract of insurance in mutual societies includes in its terms the charter and by-laws of the organization. See Mitchell v. Lycoming, etc., Co., 51 Pa. St. 402. It is also generally held to include subsequent amendments to the by-laws, if reasonable. Supreme Commandery, etc., v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436; Allnutt v. Subsidiary High Court, etc., 62 Mich. 110. But it is argued that where, as in the principal case, an amendment is confessedly reasonable, it must apply to all members alike. This seems not to be a sound contention. Although compliance with reasonable amendments is in general obligatory upon all members, non-compliance should not be ground for forfeiture until opportunity has been given for compliance. Accordingly, forfeiture was not allowed where no notice of an amendment was received, nor where the acts required were, as to a particular member, impossible. Thibert v. Supreme Lodge, etc., 78 Minn. 448; Wist v. Grand Lodge, etc., 22 Or. 271. On the other hand, it would seem that where an amendment requires acts that could be done equally well by a guardian, non-compliance after notice to the guardian should not be excused. This is perhaps the proper ground on which to rest a decision holding insanity no excuse for non-payment of premiums, as in Wheeler v. Connecticut, etc., Co., 82 N. Y. 543. In the principal case, as the act in question required an exercise of personal choice, a guardian could not well be substituted, and the court's solution seems the correct one. See also Hoeffner v. Grand Lodge, etc., 41 Mo. App. 359; Supreme Lodge, etc., v. Zuhlke, 129 Ill. 298.

INSURANCE -PERSONS FALSE WARRANTIES BY AN INFANT.-Held, that a breach of a warranty in an insurance policy does not avoid the policy when the insured is an infant. O'Rourke v. John Hancock, etc., Ins. Co., 50 Atl. Rep. 834 (R. I.). See NOTES, p. 739.

MORTGAGE MERGER Extinction of Mortgage DebT. — The plaintiff, having acquired an estate subject to a mortgage, bought in the note and the mortgage securing it. He then sued upon the note. Held, that the equity of redemption merged with the legal estate and that the debt was extinguished by the merger. Hester v. Frary, 17 Chic. L. J. 45 (Ill., App. Ct.). See NOTES, p. 740.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - NEGLIGENCE IN ENFORCING ORDINANCE-COMMON LAW LIABILITY. - A city, after passing an ordinance prohibiting fast bicycle riding on the streets, negligently failed to enforce it. The plaintiff was injured by one violating the ordinance. Held, that the city is liable for the injury sustained. Mayor, etc., v. Klotz, 49 Atl. Rep. 836 (Md.). See NOTES, p. 736.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TAXES ESTOPPEL.

The plaintiff sued to enjoin

the collection of taxes upon his property. The taxes had not been paid, but before the plaintiff purchased the property he consulted the tax records of the city and found an entry of "paid " as to the taxes in question. Held, that the city is not estopped to show that the taxes were not paid. Philadelphia Mortgage, etc., Co. v. Omaha, 88 N. W. Rep. 523 (Neb.). See NOTES, p. 737.

PERSONS - INFANTS' CONVEYANCES TIME OF DISAFFIRMANCE. - Held, that when an infant has made a conveyance of her realty, the right of disaffirmance which

arises on her coming of age may be exercised at any time within the period of the Statute of Limitations thereafter. Shipp v. McKee, 31 So. Rep. 197 (Miss.).

Express assent, or any deliberate act or forbearance by which the infant, after reaching full age, takes or retains a benefit from the transaction or knowingly suffers the other party to make expenditures on the land, is generally held to be an affirmance of the conveyance. Irving v. Irving, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 617; McCormic v. Leggett, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 425. Where, however, there is no such conduct, but only a failure to exercise the privilege of avoidance, the weight of authority seems to incline toward the rule in the principal case. Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300. It is submitted, however, that the aim of the law to protect the infant against his own imprudence is sufficiently attained by giving him a reasonable time to disaffirm after coming of age. A reasonable time may be longer in the case of conveyances than in that of contracts, but it would seem unnecessary to extend it to the full statutory period. Such an extension must result in great insecurity of title and frequent hardship to the other party, while affording a quite unnecessary amount of protection to the grantor. This view is supported by a strong line of authorities. Goodnow v. Empire L. Co., 31 Minn. 463; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195. The legislative tendency is in the same direction. See STIMSON, AM. STAT. LAW, § 6602.

PROPERTY-COVENANT NOT TO ASSIGN A LEASE WITHOUT CONSENT OF LESSOR REASSIGNMENT TO ORIGINAL LESSEE. - A lessee covenanted not to assign without the lessor's consent. The latter afterward consented to an assignment. Held, that a reassignment to the original lessee without consent is a suable breach of the covenant. McEacharn v. Colton, [1902] A. C. 104 (P. C.).

Where a lease contains a condition against assignment without consent, an alienation with consent determines the condition, so that no future alienation gives the lessor a right of entry. Dumpor's Case, 4 Co. 119 b. But a covenant to the same effect runs with the land, and the lessor can sue an assignee for breach of it. Williams v. Earle, L. R. 3 Q. B. 739; see Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486, 487. Consequently the assignee would seem to be liable even for a reassignment to the original lessee without consent of the lessor. In the only case found on the point, however, the court considered that the lessor by making the lease consented to have the lessee as a tenant for the full term, and that such a covenant by its true construction did not require a new and special consent for a reassignment to the original lessee. McCormick v. Stowell, 138 Mass. 431. But properly construed, consent in such a case would seem to mean an act rather than a mere state of willingness, and can hardly be implied from a transaction happening before the idea of a reassignment would naturally occur to either party.

PROPERTY - DEEDS - RECORDING AS AMOUNTING TO DELIVERY.-Held, that the recording of a deed amounts prima facie to a delivery. Lay v. Lay, 66 S. W. Rep. 371 (Ky.).

This appears to be the first decision in Kentucky on the point in question. According to what seems the better view the act of delivery may be completed without the assent or knowledge of the grantee, the sole test of delivery being the grantor's intent to divest himself completely of title. See Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Oh. St. 377; 14 HARV. L. REV. 456. Registry offices are intended for recording real transactions, so it might be regarded as sanctioning an abuse of the system to allow a man who has recorded a document, by which he purports to grant land, to say that he did not intend to give the instrument effect. Recording by the grantor, therefore, should be at least prima facie evidence of delivery, and might well be regarded as conclusive. In one state, however, there seems to be no rule making the mere act of recording even prima facie evidence. Egan v. Horrigan, 51 Atl. Rep. 247 (Me.). But the principal case is supported by the weight of modern authority. Lawrence v. Farley, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 293.

PROPERTY GIFT CAUSA MORTIS-CONstructive Delivery. A depositor, in expectation of death, delivered to her niece the key of a trunk containing a savings bank book, intending thereby to give the deposit to the niece. The trunk also contained other property, including several pass-books. The niece thus obtained possession of the book, though this was never known to the depositor. Held, that the delivery is not sufficient to establish a gift causa mortis. Dunn v. Houghton, 51 Atl. Rep. 71 (N. J., Ch.).

Delivery of a key is usually held sufficient to complete a gift of the entire property to which it gives access. Marsh v. Fuller, 18 N. H. 360. The majority of cases