155 to other punishment than will be inflicted by his own Chap. II. sovereign, was an inquiry foreign to the present purpose. If his crimes be such as to render him amenable to the local jurisdiction, it must be because they forfeit the privileges annexed to his character; and the minister, by violating the conditions under which he was received as the representative of a foreign sovereign, has surrendered the immunities granted on those conditions; or, according to the true meaning of the original consent, has ceased to be entitled to them. $99. from the local jurisdiction of 3. A third case, in which a sovereign is understood to Exemption cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction, was where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions. In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising it the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require. But if, without such express permission, an army should be led through the territories of a foreign prince, might the territorial jurisdiction be rightfully exercised over the individuals composing that army? Without doubt, a military force can never gain immunities of any other description than those which war gives, by entering a foreign territory against the will of its sovereign. But if his consent, instead of being ex foreign troops passing through the territory. Part II. pressed by a particular license, be expressed by a general declaration that foreign troops may pass through a specified tract of country, a distinction between such general permission and a particular license is not perceived. It would seem reasonable, that every immunity which would be conferred by a special license, would be, in like manner, conferred by such general permission. $ 100. Exemption of foreign ships of war, It was obvious that the passage of an army through a foreign territory would probably be, at all times, inconvenient and injurious, and would often be imminently dangerous to the sovereign through whose dominions it passed. Such a passage would break down some of the most decisive distinctions between peace and war, and would reduce a nation to the necessity of resisting by war an act not absolutely hostile in its character, or of exposing itself to the stratagems and frauds of a power whose integrity might be doubted, and who might enter the country under deceitful pretexts. It is for reasons like those that the general license to foreigners to enter the dominions of a friendly power is never understood to extend to a military force; and an army marching into the dominions of another sovereign, without his special permission, may justly be considered as committing an act of hostility; and, even if not opposed by force, acquires no privileges by its irregular and improper conduct. It might, however, well be questioned whether any other than the sovereign of the State is capable of deciding that such military commander is acting without a license. But the rule which is applicable to armies did not appear to be equally applicable to ships of war entering the ports of a friendly power. The injury inseparable from the march of an army through an inhabited country, and the dangers often, indeed generally, attending it, do not ensue from admitting a ship of war, without special license, into a friendly port. A different rule, therefore, with respect to this species of military force, had been generally adopted. If, for reasons of State, the ports of a nation generally, or any particular ports be closed against vessels of war generally, or against the vessels of Chap. II. any particular nation, notice is usually given of such determination. If there be no prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all powers with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports, and to remain in them while allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the place. The treaties between civilized nations, in almost every instance, contain a stipulation to this effect in favour of vessels driven in by stress of weather or other urgent necessity. In such cases the sovereign is bound by compact to authorize foreign vessels to enter his ports, and this is a license which he is not at liberty to retract. If there be no treaty applicable to the case, and the sovereign, from motives deemed adequate by himself, permits his ports to remain open to the public ships of foreign friendly powers, the conclusion seems irresistible that they enter by his assent. And if they enter by his assent necessarily implied, no just reason is perceived for distinguishing their case from that of vessels which enter by express assent. The whole reasoning, upon which such exemption had been implied in the case of a sovereign or his minister, applies with full force to the exemption of ships of war in the case in question. "It is impossible to conceive," said Vattel, "that a prince who sends an ambassador, or any other minister, can have any intention of subjecting him to the authority of a foreign power; and this consideration furnishes an additional argument, which completely establishes the independence of a public minister. If it cannot be reasonably presumed that his sovereign means to subject him to the authority of the prince to whom he is sent, the latter, in receiving the minister, consents to admit him on the footing of independence; and thus there exists between the two princes a tacit convention, which gives a new force to the natural obligation " (z). (z) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 7, § 92. Part II. $101. Distinction between public and private vessels. Equally impossible was it to conceive, that a prince who stipulates a passage for his troops, or an asylum for his ships of war in distress, should mean to subject his army or his navy to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. And if this could not be presumed, the sovereign of the port must be considered as having conceded the privilege to the extent in which it must have been understood to be asked. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, where, without treaty, the ports of a nation are open to the public and private ships of a friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty, without special license, to enter the country for business or amusement, a clear distinction was to be drawn between the rights accorded to private individuals, or private trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed ships which constitute a part of the military force of the nation. When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other; or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects, then, passing into foreign countries, are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption. But the situation of a public armed ship was, in all respects, different. She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation, acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign, is employed by him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives Chap. II. for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign State. Such interference cannot take place without seriously affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such vessel enters a friendly port may reasonably be construed, and it seemed to the Court ought to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality. Upon these principles, by the unanimous consent of nations, a foreigner is amenable to the laws of the place; but certainly, in practice, nations had not yet asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering a port open for their reception. Bynkershoek, a public jurist of great reputation, had indeed maintained that the property of a foreign sovereign was not distinguishable, by any legal exemption, from the property of an ordinary individual; and had quoted several cases in which courts of justice had exercised jurisdiction over cases in which a foreign sovereign was made a party defendant (a). Without indicating any opinion on this question, it might safely be affirmed that there is a manifest distinction between the private property of a person who happens to be a prince and that military force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince and assuming the character of a private individual (b); but he cannot be presumed to do this with respect to any portion of that armed force which upholds his crown and the nation he is intrusted to govern. The only applicable case cited by Bynkershoek was that of the Spanish ships of war, seized in 1668, in (a) Bynkershoek, de Foro Legat. cap. i. 87. (b) The Charkich, L. R. 4 A. & E. |