a national council elected directly by the people, and a council of States Chap. II. composed of two deputies from each Canton. The Federal Council was composed of seven persons chosen from all the citizens eligible for the National Council, but no two members of it were to come from the same Canton. They retained their office for three years, and from among them a President was annually to be chosen, but they were precluded from sitting in either House of the Federal Legislature. This body constituted the executive authority of the Confederation (c). In 1874 the Swiss Constitution was again revised, and some serious changes were made. The power of the Federal Government was greatly strengthened, and the maintenance and control of the army was conferred upon it (d). Switzerland has now ceased to be a system of confederated States (Staatenbund), and has become a compositive State (Bundesstaat) (e).

(c) See Calvo, liv. ii. § 55.

(d) Annual Reg. 1874, p. 288. Calvo, loc. cit.

(e) Statesman's Year-Book, Art. Switzerland.

PART SECOND.

ABSOLUTE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF STATES.

CHAPTER I.

RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION AND INDEPENDENCE.

THE rights which sovereign States enjoy with regard to one another may be divided into rights of two sorts: primitive, or absolute rights; conditional, or hypothetical rights (a).

Every State has certain sovereign rights, to which it is entitled as an independent moral being; in other words, because it is a State. These rights are called the absolute international rights of States, because they are not limited to particular circumstances.

The rights to which sovereign States are entitled, under particular circumstances, in their relations with others, may be termed their conditional international rights; and they cease with the circumstances which gave rise to them. They are consequences of a quality of a sovereign State, but consequences which are not permanent, and which are only produced under particular circumstances. Thus war, for example, confers on belligerent or neutral States certain rights, which cease with the existence of the war.

Of the absolute international rights of States, one of the most essential and important, and that which lies at

(a) Klüber, Droit des Gens moderne de l'Europe, § 36.

the foundation of all the rest, is the right of self-preser- Chap. I. vation. It is not only a right with respect to other States, but a duty with respect to its own members, and the most solemn and important which the State owes to them. This right necessarily involves all other incidental rights, which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end.

§ 62.

defence

the equal

to rights of

or by treaty.

Among these is the right of self-defence. This again Right of selfinvolves the right to require the military service of all modified by its people, to levy troops and maintain a naval force, build fortifications, and to impose and collect taxes for other States, all these purposes. It is evident that the exercise of these absolute sovereign rights can be controlled only by the equal correspondent rights of other States, or by special compacts freely entered into with others, to modify the exercise of these rights.

In the exercise of these means of defence, no independent State can be restricted by any foreign power. But another nation may, by virtue of its own right of self-preservation, if it sees in these preparations an occasion for alarm, or if it anticipates any possible danger of aggression, demand explanations; and good faith, as well as sound policy, requires that these inquiries, when they are reasonable and made with good intentions, should be satisfactorily answered (b).

Thus, the absolute right to erect fortifications within the territory of the State has sometimes been modified by treaties, where the erection of such fortifications has been deemed to threaten the safety of other communities, or where such a concession has been extorted in the pride of victory, by a power strong enough to dictate the conditions of peace to its enemy. Thus, by the Treaty of Utrecht, between Great Britain and France, confirmed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, and of Paris, in 1763, the French Government engaged to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk. This stipulation, so humiliating to France, was effaced in the treaty of peace concluded

(b) Heffter, § 40.

Part II. between the two countries, in 1783, after the war of the American Revolution. By the treaty signed at Paris, in 1815, between the Allied Powers and France, it was stipulated that the fortifications of Huningen, within the French territory, which had been constantly a subject of uneasiness to the city of Basle, in the Helvetic Confederation, should be demolished, and should never be renewed or replaced by other fortifications, at a distance of not less than three leagues from the city of Basle (c).

§ 62a. Belgian fortresses.

The Aland
Islands.

$ 63. Right of intervention or interference.

After the separation of Belgium and Holland in 1830, the Powers agreed that as the neutrality of Belgium had been guaranteed, she ought to change the system of military defence which had been adopted for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the Belgian fortresses of Menin, Ath, Mons, Philippeville and Marienberg were accordingly selected for demolition (d). In 1856 Russia agreed that the Aland Islands in the Baltic should not be fortified, and that no military or naval establishment should be maintained there (e). Russia and Turkey also agreed at the Peace of Paris, 1856, not to maintain any military-maritime arsenals on the coast of the Black Sea, but this clause of the treaty was abrogated in 1871 (ƒ).

The right of every independent State to increase its national dominions, wealth, population, and power, by all innocent and lawful means; such as the pacific acquisition of new territory, the discovery and settlement of new countries, the extension of its navigation and fisheries, the improvement of its revenues, arts, agriculture, and commerce, the increase of its military and naval force; is an incontrovertible right of sovereignty, generally recognised by the usage and opinion of nations. It can be limited in its exercise only by the equal correspondent rights of other States, growing out of the same primeval right of self-preservation. Where the exercise of this right, by any of these means, directly affects the security of others,-as where it immediately interferes with the actual exercise of the sovereign rights of other States, there is no difficulty in assigning its

(c) Martens, Recueil des Traités, tom. ii. p. 469.

(d) Protocol of 17th April, 1831. See Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii. pp. 856

and 882.

(e) Ibid. vol. ii. p. 1272.

(f) Art. xiii. See Hertslet, vol. ii. p. 1256; vol. iii. p. 1920.

precise limits. But where it merely involves a supposed Chap. I. contingent danger to the safety of others, arising out of the undue aggrandisement of a particular State, or the disturbance of what has been called the balance of power, questions of the greatest difficulty arise, which belong rather to the science of politics than of public law.

The occasions on which the right of forcible interference has been exercised in order to prevent the undue aggrandisement of a particular State, by such innocent and lawful means as those above mentioned, are comparatively few, and cannot be justified in any case, except in that where an excessive augmentation of its military and naval forces may give just ground of alarm to its neighbours. The internal development of the resources of a country, or its acquisition of colonies and dependencies at a distance from Europe, has never been considered a just motive for such interference. It seems to be felt with respect to the latter, that distant colonies and dependencies generally weaken, and always render more vulnerable the metropolitan State. And with respect to the former, although the wealth and population of a country is the most effectual means by which its power can be augmented, such an augmentation is too gradual to excite alarm. To which it must be added that the injustice and mischief of admitting that nations have a right to use force for the express purpose of retarding the civilization and diminishing the prosperity of their inoffensive neighbours, are too revolting to allow such a right to be inserted in the international code. Interferences, therefore, to preserve the balance of power, have been generally confined to prevent a sovereign, already powerful, from incorporating conquered provinces into his territory, or increasing his dominions by marriage or inheritance, or exercising a dictatorial influence over the councils and conduct of other independent States (g).

§ 63a.

Sir W. Harcourt says of intervention: "It is a high and summary Legal aspect

(g) Senior, Edinb. Rev. No. 156, art. 1, p. 329.

of intervention.