MINISTERIAL MISSTATEMENTS ON THE

AFGHAN QUESTION.

IT

T appears to me that in the circumstances of our quarrel with the late Ameer of Afghanistan, the Government is responsible for misstatements of fact which, both in number and in character, are unprecedented in the political history of this country. They all stand in close connection with the necessity of making out a case on points of great importance respecting which the real facts would have had an adverse bearing. When taken together, they constitute a closely connected series, inverting and perverting the actual transactions of which they treat, sometimes by the omission and suppression of important facts, sometimes by the suggestion of circumstances which are not facts at all, and not seldom by assertions for which there is absolutely no foundation.

I propose in this paper to give some proofs of an accusation which ought not to be made at all, unless accompanied with an appeal to evidence.

And first, let me direct attention to the nature of two of the narratives for which the Government is responsible. One is a narrative given by the Viceroy of India in Council, dated Simla, May 10th, 1877.* The other is a narrative given by the Secretary of State for India, dated London, November 18th, 1878.+ The first of these I shall refer to in this Paper as the "Simla Narrative"-the second as the "London Narrative." Both of these are narratives given under conditions which demand, beyond all other political documents, the most scrupulous accuracy in the statement of facts. The Government of India is a continuous body. It does not lose its identity with a change of Viceroys. When, therefore, it speaks of past transactions, and professes to give an account of them, it professes always to speak of those transactions as its own. Thus one Viceroy may be called upon

to give a narrative of what previous Viceroys have done; but, if he does so, he speaks in their name. "We did so and so," is the language in which he speaks of the doings of his predecessors as well as the form in which he speaks of his own doings. To take advantage of this position, so as to colour such a narrative in any way, and to put an erroneous gloss on the conduct of preceding Viceroys, is a high political offence. If under the guidance and advice of a new Viceroy this one continuous "Government of India" changes its policy, the new Viceroy and his Council are bound to explain and defend that change as a change in its own conduct, and they offend against the first principles of political duty if in doing so they do not state with perfect fairness the conduct of their predecessors in office.

The same observation applies to any narrative emanating from the Secretary of State for India in Council. That also is a continuous body, and each new Secretary of State is under the same moral obligation, if he is obliged to narrate at all what his predecessors have done, to narrate it with scrupulous fidelity to the facts, and even to the views of the Department over which he presides for the time being.

From this explanation it will be seen that any misstatements or concealments, whether of fact, or of argument, or of motive, in narratives of the past given forth by a Viceroy in Council, or by a Secretary of State for India, must be judged with a severity of condemnation not equally applicable to similar aberrations in a mere party speech, whether in Parliament, or at a public meeting. In this last case we look and make allowance for the effects of partisanship. But when men are placed in the position of speaking for others as well as for themselves, and especially when they are placed in the position of speaking for the moment in the name of political opponents, we have a right to demand the most absolute fidelity to facts, and a very scrupulous fairness even in respect to argument.

Bearing all this in mind, I proceed to examine the two Narratives in respect to our relations with Afghanistan, both of which were issued under the conditions now described.

The clearest way of explaining the various misstatements of the Government will be to point out the connection of each of them with the case which it was desirable for them to establish, or with the charges which it was desirable to meet.

It is well known that the quarrel with the late Ameer began with an attempt on the part of the Government to induce or to compel him to receive British European officers, as permanent Residents, into his kingdom.

Now, the first charge against the Government to which this attempt was liable is, not merely that it was a complete departure from the settled policy of previous Governments; but also that it was conducted in a manner which constituted a breach of previous Treaties and engagements. With a view of obviating these charges it would, of course, be very useful to put such a gloss on those previous Treaties, and on the

language of previous Viceroys respecting them, as might be sufficient to represent the new policy as not really new at all, but a mere revival of a policy which had been contemplated by them.

Accordingly this is done in the third paragraph of the Viceroy's Narrative with considerable skill. That paragraph professes to give an account of the only two Treaties which existed between the British Government and the Rulers of Afghanistan, namely, the Treaties of 1855 and 1857. The great object of the paragraph is to present the facts connected with this last Treaty as a precedent for what the Viceroy had been attempting in 1876. The real facts are very simple. Persia had seized and had occupied Herat. There was There was a fear that other portions of Afghanistan might be attacked by Persia. Lord Canning's Government determined to help the Ameer against any such aggression from Persia. For this purpose the Ameer was supplied with a subsidy, and Dost Mahomed agreed that he would receive some British officers charged with the duty of seeing that this subsidy was applied to the purpose for which it was given. These officers were to be deputed "either to Cabul, or Kandahar, or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army might be assembled to act against the Persians." But it was specially provided by a separate (the seventh) Article of the Treaty, that the moment the subsidy ceased the whole of those officers should "be withdrawn from the Ameer's country;" whilst the same Article also contained the significant provision that the British Government might continue to be represented at Cabul by a Native Agent or Vakil-the point of this distinction being emphasized by the additional words, "not a European officer."*

It did obviously require some handling at once bold and dexterous to convert this Treaty, with its pointed prohibition of permanent European Residents in Afghanistan, into a precedent and a sanction for the establishment of such Residents. But the Viceroy in Council was equal to the occasion. In the first place, the Treaty of 1857, all the Articles of which, except the seventh, were purely temporary, is represented in the Simla Narrative "as a much more complete engagement" than the previous and permanent Treaty of 1855.† Next, this temporary arrangement for British officers superintending the expenditure of a British sum of money is represented as an "engagement stipulating for British Agencies in Cabul, Candahar, and Balkh." It is needless to point out the effect of using the word "Agencies," as descriptive of the position of those officers. It serves to confound the narrow and specific duty confided to them by the Treaty of 1857 with the wholly different duties and position of the political Agencies which the Viceroy had been trying to force on the Ameer in 1876.

Having thus identified under one common name two totally different things, the Viceroy goes on to appropriate to this one part of the Treaty certain words of Lord Canning which in reality were applied to the + Ibid., para. 3, p. 160.

*

Afghan Papers, 1878, p. 2.

arrangement as a whole. In a Minute written by that Viceroy after the conclusion of the Treaty, Lord Canning sums up the provisions as a whole. He lays special stress on the very limited duty assigned to the officers, viz., the duty of seeing that the subsidy is used for "its proper purposes." He mentions also, especially, the stipulated withdrawal of the officers whenever the subsidy should cease, the substitution of Agencies limited to natives, and the understanding that for the present Cabul was not to be visited at all, by the British officers; and then, after enumerating other parts of the arrangement, he says, "These provisions are, I think, sound in policy, liberal, and simple. I believe them to be wise in reference to present circumstances, and calculated to encourage in the Afghan people a right understanding of our policy, and confidence in us. They tend to redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1856, in which we appeared to take more than we gave. They show that whilst we desire to assist and secure the Afghans against aggressions from the West, we are not seeking a pretext for sending a single British bayonet across the eastern frontier, and that in return for our assistance we do not even ask for a voice in their councils, or for the smallest right of interference in their internal affairs." Further on he adds, "It is my earnest hope that whatever dimensions the war in which the Government of India is engaged may assume, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan may remain upon a footing similar to that on which they are now placed."

It will be seen that these words, as used by Lord Canning, are applied to the arrangement then lately effected as a whole-an arrangement the essence of which was, (as regards the matter in question) that there should be no British officers as permanent Residents in the country, and that the Government of India should be represented at Cabul by Residents limited to natives of India. Yet these words of Lord Canning are so quoted in the paragraph now under review, as to make them apply to the one feature of sending "British Agencies" and British assistance, and to suggest that it was of the sending of these Agencies that he spoke when he hoped that the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan, as then regulated, might remain "upon a permanent footing." The effect of the paragraph, therefore, is to give an impression which is the reverse of the facts. For this purpose, Lord Canning's words are altered. His words are, "a footing similar to that on which they are now placed." The altered words are these: "might remain on a permanent footing similar to that upon which the above-mentioned engagement had placed them;" the "above-mentioned engagement" being that for the sending of the so-called "British Agencies." And this alteration of Lord Canning's words is all the more open to censure because there is another paragraph in the same Minute in which he declares that "it should be our object to convince the Government and people of Afghanistan that we have no desire to send a single Englishman, armed or unarmed, into their country, except with their own goodwill."*

Afghan Papers, Feb. 25, 1878.

The next paragraph (four) of the Viceroy's Narrative contains another very curious misstatement of a striking feature in the same transaction. So anxious was the Government of Lord Canning to respect the extreme tenderness and jealousy of the Afghans in respect to even the temporary presence of British officers, that the fourth Article of the Treaty of 1857 went out of its way to make the somewhat extreme declaration regarding the officers sent to superintend the outlay of British money, that "they will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul Government." The Viceroy, in his narrative, asserts the exact contrary," their duty being simply to give advice when required."

Having got so far, the Viceroy, in the next paragraph (5), advances a step farther, and says, "It must be observed, however, that although the residence of a British Mission at Cabul formed part of the stipulations agreed to in 1857, this step was not enforced by the British. Government." First we have had the temporary deputation of British officers to an army called a "British Agency," and now we have it swollen into "the Residence of a British Mission at Cabul."

In order still farther to recommend the new policy, the Viceroy tells us that the measure taken in 1857 of sending officers to Afghanistan met with reasonable success." The Viceroy here contradicts, without a word of notice, what his predecessor had stated on behalf of the same Government in whose name Lord Lytton was then speaking. The Government of India, under Lord Northbrook, had, less than three months before, pointed out that the measure taken in 1857 did not meet with even reasonable success-that the officers had themselves testified to the awkwardness of their position, and that the presence of any British officers in Afghanistan, unless placed there with the cordial and hearty consent of the Ameer, would be both humiliating and useless.†

There is, however, one admission made in the fifth paragraph of the Viceroy's Narrative which is important. "With the exception of the last-mentioned provision (Article VII.), the obligations of the Treaty of 1857 were contracted for a special and limited purpose, which has long since lapsed with the lapse of time." This is correct. It is to be noted for future use. All the Articles of the Treaty of 1857 dropped with the cessation of the subsidy, except the seventh Article. That Article came into operation when the others fell into abeyance. The withdrawal of all British officers "from the Ameer's country," and the establishment at Cabul of an Agent, who was not to be a European,-this was the stipulation which alone survived the rest.

Taken together, and in connection with their obvious purpose, these representations, in respect to the precedent set by the Treaty of 1857 upon the policy in dispute, constitute as complete a perversion of facts as can well be conceived.

I pass now to another great transaction of which the Viceroy's Narra

* Afghan Papers, 1878, p. 160.

+ Ibid., p. 155.