but small; for the Russian peasant, although he detests his social superiors, and is easily excited to fury against the officials who render his very existence a burden to him, can never be persuaded to conspire against his Emperor. So it came to pass that some of the Nihilistic agents got heartily thrashed by the moujiks, whilst others were unceremoniously laid hold of and handed over to the authorities. Since April 14 the Nihilists have been undermining their own ground, for no decent Russian feels any sympathy or compassion for regicides. The Russian people is strongly addicted to coquetting with socialistic ideas; but its eyes have been opened to a great many fallacies within the last twelve months. The Moderate malcontents feel that they have been pushed backwards, step by step, by the Intransigents, and that, day by day, they have lost ground; so they have turned upon their more uncompromising accomplices. At present a breach divides these two factions, whose mutual attitude is almost hostile. The Moderates have come to the conclusion that they have been betrayed into conniving at enterprises of which they disapprove, and the Radicals look down with utter scorn upon their former confederates. This split in the conspirators' camp has shorn the real revolutionary party of more than half its original numbers. But is the danger thereby diminished? Certainly not-or, more correctly, not yet; for the Radicals have contrived to get possession of all the funds gathered together by the associations in their entirety; and, as long as their money shall last, so long may their infernal machines be dreaded, the influence of ready cash in Russia being enormous. For these Radicals-the men who arranged and sanctioned the Moscow outrage-there is no turning back. Their only prospect is an alternative of gallows or suicide. Of this they are well aware. They know what destiny awaits them, and are, therefore, resolved to fight to the end, exhausting every resource at their disposal, and to finish by selling their lives as dearly as possible. They are, indeed, desperate and terrible ruflians, who will not shrink from incendiarism on a vast scale or from wholesale murder when driven into a corner."

What the Nihilists, properly so called, desire and work for is not a constitution, or a reform of any kind, but universal anarchy. Their game, in fact, is to prevent reform by frightening the Government into a policy of reaction and violent repression. Their only chance lies in deep and wide-spread misery and discontent. But they have overshot their mark, and alienated what Professor Arnaudo calls "the revolutionary party," but which I should prefer to call the party of reform.

Prince Bismarck's present object is to form such a coalition as shall prevent a Russo-French alliance. His purpose would be gained if he could frighten the English Government into the Austro-German alliance. The spectre of Russian Nihilism, with its terrible consequences, is accordingly furbished up in the English edition of "Russia before and after the War." We are assured that Nihilism denotes "the seemingly incurable decomposition of the Russian State and Society." But "if it were only a question of the greater or less probability of a violent internal cataclysm, then the rest of Europe might afford to contemplate the struggle as spectators who had no interest in its issue. But such is not the case." For "if all other remedies are found of no avail," as the author wishes us to believe they will be, then "an attempt will be made" by the Russian Government, "after the wellknown French method, to occupy the feverish elements of society by a foreign war." But Prince Bismarck's solicitude for the welfare of Europe has provided a remedy :

"So long as the Austro-German alliance can reckon on seeing its policy of peace, which constitutes its raison d'etre, supported by an English Government, strong at home and respected abroad, whose influence with France is powerful enough to wean or to deter her from an armed coalition with the Northern Empire, even the most warlike Russians are forced of necessity to keep still. But if, on the other hand, an unhappy fate should will that a revolution in Russia should be accompanied by a relapse of England into indifference to Continental interests, then the first result of this would be that France, deprived of the counsels of her English neighbours, would reach her hand to Russia for an alliance; and the next result, that the whole of Europe would be taught to know, what only a few know at present, that the revolution now imminent in Russia implies a terrible danger to European peace and civilisation."

There is no "revolution imminent in Russia." But if for "Russia" we substitute "Germany," the warning, though overcharged, would not be altogether ill-timed. I do not believe that a revolution is imminent in Germany any more than in Russia. But I do believe that the political atmosphere of Germany is in its lower strata so charged with the germs of revolution that, partly to purify it and partly to counteract French hostility, Prince Bismarck himself is not at all unlikely to try the expedient with which he credits Russian diplomacy—namely, "to occupy the feverish elements of society by a foreign war."

The formal organization of the Socialistic movement in Germany is only ten years old; yet at the last elections it polled half a million votes. It possesses fifty newspapers, besides other appliances for active propagandism, and has its representatives in the German Parliament. Some of its leaders are remarkable for intellectual ability and organizing talent, and, unlike Russian Nihilism, it has spread its roots far and wide among the masses. The spirit which animates the Social-Democrats may be inferred from the following extract, which I quote from their principal organ, the Social Democrat:

"They who have taken heaven from the people must give them the earth. . .. When the priesthood bowed the neck of mankind to its superstitions, at least it gave to the suffering sons of man the kindly hope of another and a better world. In all the misfortunes of life-in sorrow, need, and sickness-a sweet hope was still left to a believing mind. But what is now the case? There are still poverty and privation, sorrow, need, and sickness. And these are artificially enhanced and heaped upon one class, while the pleasures and good things of the world continue to enrich the other. What, then, have the favoured of human society to offer to those millions, through whose sickness, increased by poverty and care, they enjoy the pleasures of life? We tolerate no half measures, no evasions. . . . Ye wretched Pharisees! who have deprived the people of the consolations of Faith, where then is your logic? The logic of history is sterner than yours; the people have done with heaven, and now they claim the earth."

It is easy to imagine the effect of such teaching on a population so prepared for it by poverty and misery as is the population of Germany. But Prince Bismarck, as I have already noted, has boasted that the army is "the truest representative" of the Monarchy, and it may therefore be thought that the esprit de corps of an armed nation will hinder the spread of revolutionary Socialism. Vain calculation! It is precisely

in the fact that the Germans are now an armed nation that the danger of the situation lies. History shows that standing armies may be dissevered by caste prejudices from all sympathy with their non-militant countrymen. But the army, as a military caste, cannot long survive universal conscription and short service. And as armies are dissolved in nations, and nations advance in knowledge, the day will inevitably arrive when the soldier will claim a voice in determining the justice of the cause for which he is bidden to take his neighbour's life and risk his own.

"War's a game which, were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at."

The Socialists of Germany have always proclaimed that they are democrats first and Germans afterwards. Where is this to end? The army of Germany has ceased to represent either the Prussian monarchy or the German kaisership, except in so far as these represent the feelings. and aspirations of the nation. The German army is, in fact, the German nation. It follows that when we are discussing the dissemination of Socialistic principles and ideas among the German people, we are, in fact, discussing their dissemination in the army. The Socialists could desire no better contrivance for the propagation of their doctrines than the conscription and the three years' service. Multitudes of young men who, but for this, would never have heard of Socialism, return to their villages and become centres of radiation for the democratic evangel. If Prince Bismarck means to arrest the growth of Socialism in Germany, it is plain that he has no time to lose. Is it certain that ten years hence the German Chancellor of that day will be master of the situation? Does not every counsel of prudence dictate to Prince Bismarck the policy of anticipating events?

But how? His present object apparently is to endeavour to form a league of the Conservative elements throughout Europe against Socialism and against France, which, as a Republic, cannot help affording a most potent moral support to democracy everywhere. Whether his ostentatious hostility to Russia is genuine or only assumed must be a matter of surmise. It is probably a mixture of both. He would not be sorry to pay her out for balking him in his designs against France in 1875. But though implacable in his resentment, he knows how to subordinate private feeling to public policy, and there are indications of his desire to come to terms with Russia. But Russia has no special temptation to barter her freedom of action for a German alliance. Her acquisitions under the Treaty of San Stefano have been secured to her by the Treaty of Berlin. On this subject there is a prevalent misapprehension in this country which it is well to correct. It is commonly believed that the Treaty of Berlin gave immense dissatisfaction throughout Russia. But that way of putting it does not state the whole case. The Eastern Question divided the Russian people into two parties the party which, in a loose sense, may be called the official party, and the party which claims to be par excellence the "national "

party. Of the former St. Petersburg is the head quarters, and Moscow of the latter. The claim of the "national" party is to develop the nation on a Slavonic type. Different races, they say, develop different types of civilisation. The Teutonic is different from the Latin; the Slavonic is different from both. One race cannot build itself on the model of another, however excellent that other may be in its own place; and all such attempts must result in a mongrel growth, which only caricatures both races and represents neither. The "Nationalists" of Moscow complain that ever since the time of Peter the Great the Russians have, for the most part, been mere imitators of Western manners and civilisation. "If it rains in Paris," says one of their satirists, "we put up our umbrellas on the Neva." To this imitation of Western models they attribute much of the mischief in their system of government. The bureaucracy of Germany, in particular, is their special aversion. With a view, therefore, to accelerate this regeneration of their country, the Russian "Nationalists" aim at uniting all Slav peoples in the bonds of a common brotherhood. Thus only, they think, can they acquire that dignity and self-respect in which their slavish imitation of foreign models has hitherto made them deficient.

It

Such is the idea which lies at the root of what is commonly called Panslavism, and it will be seen at once how different it is from the common impression of it. It is not an aggressive movement. aspires to no conquests of foreign territory. On the contrary, it prefers that the Slav race should consist of several independent nationalities, each with its own characteristic features, but all bearing a common family likeness.

When the news of the Bulgarian atrocities reached Russia the "Nationalist " party came at once to the front and proclaimed a crusade of Liberation. The enthusiasm was irresistible, and carried away the Government.

The author of "Russia Before and After the War" is explicit on this point.* "The Court and higher bureaucracy," he says, (6 were against the war from the beginning," and it was accordingly "delayed for nearly a whole year." "People of rank and station set their faces against the movement kindled by the Servian war and the bands of Russian volunteers in that campaign." "So emphatic was the disapproval of the Servian revolt expressed by the ruling circles at the capital during the winter of 1876-77, that the Moscow Nationalists. formally renounced their hope of an understanding with Prince Gortchakoff, and joined with the volunteers, who, on their return from the Timok, were treated with marked disfavour and forbidden to wear their Servian uniforms, in protesting against the Government for deserting the sacred traditions of Russia."

To the "Nationalist " party, therefore, the Treaty of San Stefano was extremely distasteful, because it gave back again to bondage a part

*See pp. 297-299. The remarkable volume of O. K. (“Russia and England from 1876 to 1860") bears similar testimony from another quarter.

The

of the population which Russian blood and treasure had set free. Government of Russia, however, was well satisfied with the Treaty of Berlin-better satisfied probably than with the Treaty of San Stefano. It is beyond a doubt that the interests of Russia, as distinct from the interests of the Christians of Bulgaria and Macedonia, are far better served by the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin than by those of the Treaty of San Stefano.

The Russian Government therefore has no special inducement to hamper its freedom of action in the future by any entangling engagements with Prince Bismarck. Is it possible that Lord Beaconsfield's enigmatical reference to "the presence, not to say ascendancy, of England in the councils of Europe" points to an English alliance with Austria and Germany? That would explain the extraordinary interest which the German Press is taking in our General Election. Should the Liberals return to power, Prince Bismarck and his Austrian ally know that they must henceforth pull their own chestnuts out of the fire. Prince Bismarck would thus be checkmated in his first combinations against German Socialism and French revenge.

What would probably be his next move? To relieve in some way the pressure of the military system will soon become an absolute necessity. With France pacified, the task would be comparatively easy. While France is unappeased there can be no reduction, but rather an increase, in the burdens of the German people. If France cannot be crushed or cowed, is there any way of pacifying her? The annexed provinces cannot be restored? German sentiment and pride forbid that. Is there no possible compensation? Prince Bismarck has on more than one occasion shown much generosity in disposing of other people's property. I have already referred to his insidious suggestions to the Emperor Napoleon about Belgium. But the Emperor of the French knew that the annexation of Belgium would involve him in a breach with England; and he cherished a belief, amounting to a kind of superstition, that the stability of his throne and dynasty depended on his good understanding with England. He therefore sounded Prince Bismarck as to the possibility of annexations on the Rhine as a set-off against the aggrandisement of Prussia. Here is the French Ambassador's report of Prince Bismarck's answer :—

"You desire," said he, "an impossible thing. You wish to take the Rhenish provinces, which are German. Why do you not annex Belgium, where the people have the same origin, the same religion, and the same language as yourselves? I have already caused that to be mentioned to the Emperor. If he enters into my views, we would assist him to take Belgium. As for myself, if I were the master, and I were not hampered by the obstinacy of the King, it would be already done."

Comte de Goltz, moreover, the Prussian Ambassador at the Tuileries, dropped hints upon the subject which circulated pretty freely in diplomatic society at the time.

Is it not probable that these tactics will be renewed if France cannot be conciliated in any other way? Holland and Belgium have already