mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that, if he does the act, he will do wrong and receive punishment, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibility for criminal acts. "If, then, it is proved, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree, that, for the time being, it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it." Now, without stopping to comment on the inaccuracy of calling the act of an insane man "the involuntary act of the body," when we know, from almost daily observation, that these acts are often the consummation of plans laid and pursued with wonderful sagacity and art, we see that the distinguished judge recognizes the existence of a partial insanity which does not release from responsibility. And yet, in the same charge to the jury from which we have just quoted, he says that the state of delusion may indicate to an experienced person, "that the mind is in a diseased state; that the known tendency of that diseased state of the mind is to break out into sudden paroxysms of violence; so that, although there were no previous indications of violence, yet the subsequent act, connecting itself with the previous symptoms and indications, will enable an experienced person to say that the act was the result of the disease." Now this is all that we contend for; and until it can be shown that there are distinct forms of insanity, some of which never manifest themselves in violence, it would seem that the doctrine of the passage just quoted should make it imperative on every judge to order an acquittal of the prisoner whenever the jury are satisfied of the existence of insanity. For if all the forms of mania have been known to result in acts of violence, on what principle shall we refer the violent act sometimes to the disease, and sometimes to the wickedness of the accused? Such an inconsistency in the administration of justice leaves the lives of men at the mercy of the obtuseness and obstinacy of juries, or to the candor of a professional man who has a favorite theory to support. Nor is it an objection to this position, that crafty criminals will find it easy to simulate insanity of some sort, and may by this means go free, though the phase of the disease assumed be the remotest possible from all connection with the act done. To say nothing of the general principle, that the possibility of its abuse is no argument against the adoption of a just rule, we have the fact that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to simulate the disease so well as to deceive one experienced in observing its peculiarities. So difficult is it, that we may regard it as impossible for the pretended condition of mind to be successfully maintained in any case, if brought under the observation of a skilful practitioner. At all events, the danger of deception, if any there be, might easily be guarded against by the adoption of suitable regulations for bringing the supposed offenders under the superintendence of men skilled in insanity, whenever there is difficulty in determining whether the disease exists or not. It remains for us now to consider the nature and sources of the evidence which is admitted in courts on the inquiry as to the sanity or insanity of persons charged with crimes. In the trial of ordinary issues, as every one knows, witnesses are allowed to testify to facts only, leaving the inferences from those facts to be drawn by the jury. Opinions formed from the knowledge of facts, however correctly and justly, cannot be offered by the witness. For example, if the question be whether a party to a suit has paid an account, the witness may not say that he believes, from circumstances which came within his observation, that the account is paid. He must confine his testimony to the facts which he knows, leaving the jury to say whether or not these facts tend to show payment. There are, however, many subjects which lie beyond the experience of men in general, and about which they are unqualified, without assistance, to form judicious opinions. Such are questions as to the proper management of particu lar branches of business, requiring peculiar experience and skill, as, for instance, the management of a ship at sea. Such, too, are all questions of science, which are understood only by those whose attention has been specially devoted to the subject. Where a person dies suddenly, a jury would be unable to say whether the death was caused by poison or by some disease of a vital organ, unless aided in forming their opinion by a medical man. In all cases of this description, where a peculiar experience or extraordinary acquaintance with a particular branch of knowledge is requisite to arriving at an intelligent answer to the question raised, the law recognizes the propriety of admitting the opinions of those who are skilled in the matter, -experts, as they are called, — to go to the jury as evidence. And the question of sanity or insanity comes within this rule. As we have seen, physicians only — and, we might add, comparatively few physicians have such experience and skill in this subject as to fit them to express an opinion in difficult cases. In a delicate matter, requiring for its full apprehension an intimate acquaintance with the action of the sane mind, and careful and extensive study of the operations and manifestations of the mind when diseased, it is clear that the ordinary physician is little better qualified to express an opinion than any other sensible and educated person. It has been the practice, however, to receive the opinions of all physicians whose testimony may be offered, and often, no doubt, to the injury of the party on trial. It is too often the case, that medical witnesses think more carefully of themselves than of the man about whom they testify. They may have a theory of their own to support, and the opportunity is too precious to be lost, though the current of authority may be totally against the positions they assume. It may be, and often is the case, that the examination turns in a direction which they did not anticipate, and they answer questions at random or by guess, rather than confess their inability to reply with accuracy, thus, to save a reputation, hazarding a life. Indeed, nothing is more common, in the examination of medical witnesses, than to see the weight of testimony destroyed, even when correct in the main, by this over-anxiety of the witness to seem to know everything connected with a subject, in the details of which the examining counsel, by preparation for the emergency, is enabled to catch 30 NO. 165. VOL. LXXIX. him tripping; and so the reputation is damaged by the effort to protect it, at the same time that justice may be cheated of its due. There is another difficulty in the way of arriving at the truth. In most cases the opinion of the medical witness is founded entirely on the facts narrated by the acquaintance of the party on trial, and by those who chanced to come in contact with him near the time when the supposed offence was committed. From what has been already said, it is plain that the more obvious symptoms of insanity only are apt to be observed by those who have no familiarity with the subject, and are not watching for indications of the disease; so that evidence as to the conduct and appearance of the accused, we may reasonably suppose, is in most instances very different from what would be given by a professional observer of the same acts and manifestations. Many things which the superintendent of an asylum would note as important, would pass unregarded by the casual observer; and many things which the casual observer would ascribe to temporary passion, the professional man might find to be conclusive proof of a diseased state of mind. The very tendency which we all have to refer every act to a cause, would induce the unprofessional observer to regard particular acts as ebullitions of momentary feeling, merely because he had nothing else to refer them to; while the physician would see them to be the result of madAnd who can tell what coloring this reference to passion, already made by the witness, may give to his account of the act and the circumstances attending it? True, there are many cases in which the indications of the diseased state of mind are so clear, that there is little danger of error. But the number is by no means small, in which the truth can be reached only by laborious and critical investigation. It would therefore seem that the ends of justice would be more efficiently served, if the supposed subject of the disease could be placed under the care of some physician or physicians competent to form a correct opinion as to his state of mind, for a period of some duration previous to the trial. Then there could be little or no danger that pretended insanity would save the guilty from punishment, or that the unhappy victim ness. of disease would suffer for an act done while under the prevailing influence of that disease. The law would be vindicated whenever it had been infringed by a responsible person, and the officers of the law would be saved from doing injustice to the innocent. A practice somewhat of this description has obtained in France. As trials are now conducted in this country, a terrible responsibility is laid on medical witnesses called to testify as to the sanity of persons whom they have never seen before; and, founding whatever conclusions they reach on such unsatisfactory evidence as we have above described, they pronounce an opinion with less opportunity for an accurate diagnosis than they would demand before writing a common prescription. It becomes them, therefore, to be modest in asserting the correctness of the result of their inquiry, unless they are certain of having mastered the subject in their previous study. They are introduced as the only men qualified to settle the question raised. The jury have a right to be guided by the decision which they shall give, and will not be slow to avail themselves of the opportunity to thrust the responsibility off their own shoulders. How important, then, both to the state and to the accused, that the decision be wisely made, and how regardless of all duty must he be who assumes to settle the question, while conscious that he is not rich in that experience and observation which alone can entitle his solution of the problem to respect! |