Personality, the beginning and end of metaphysics [by A.W. Momerie]. |
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Página 16
... attributes , each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence . " This definition , though Spinoza calls it an intuitive idea , and a simplicissima veritas , is really so far from being simple or intuitive , that , if ever ...
... attributes , each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence . " This definition , though Spinoza calls it an intuitive idea , and a simplicissima veritas , is really so far from being simple or intuitive , that , if ever ...
Página 18
... attributes of substances — a proposition which is by no means axiomatic , and which is only another way of stating his original definition . As an instance of circular reasoning , take the following proposition : " The more of ...
... attributes of substances — a proposition which is by no means axiomatic , and which is only another way of stating his original definition . As an instance of circular reasoning , take the following proposition : " The more of ...
Página 19
... attributes anything has , the more real it is , or the more it exists ; and hence God , being absolutely infinite , must have an infinity of attributes , and so exist absolutely . " At the best , this argument only proves that if there ...
... attributes anything has , the more real it is , or the more it exists ; and hence God , being absolutely infinite , must have an infinity of attributes , and so exist absolutely . " At the best , this argument only proves that if there ...
Página 93
... , from what we actually feel in one sense to what , in suitable positions , we might feel in the others . When we attribute whiteness to snow , we say that a particu- lar sensation belongs to a group , the remainder of PERSONALITY . 93.
... , from what we actually feel in one sense to what , in suitable positions , we might feel in the others . When we attribute whiteness to snow , we say that a particu- lar sensation belongs to a group , the remainder of PERSONALITY . 93.
Página 94
... attribute all our sensations to an external cause . But even these sensations are within us and it is inconceivable how any num- ber of associated internalities can ever produce the idea of externality . It seems to me that it is from ...
... attribute all our sensations to an external cause . But even these sensations are within us and it is inconceivable how any num- ber of associated internalities can ever produce the idea of externality . It seems to me that it is from ...
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Personality, the Beginning and End of Metaphysics [By A.W. Momerie] Alfred Williams Momerie Sin vista previa disponible - 2015 |
Personality, the Beginning and End of Metaphysics [By A.W. Momerie] Alfred Williams Momerie Sin vista previa disponible - 2016 |
Términos y frases comunes
able absolutely infinite absurdity action admitted Anaxagoras apprehend argument from design assumed atoms attribute Bain's believe brain called capable cause Cogito ergo sum cognition Comte conception connection denied desire difference doctrine of necessity Dr Carpenter evolution existence experience explain external world facts of consciousness Ferrier forces freedom Hegel Hence Herbert Spencer human Hume imagine impressions inconceivable intelligent J. S. Mill Jonathan Edwards knowledge latter laws Lewes looseness or indifference maintain manifest Mansel means memory mental merely meta metaphysics mind motion movements muscles Natural Selection nature necessary necessitarian never ontology origin ourselves perceive permanent ego phenomena philosophy physical physiologist pleasure present principle produce Professor Bain proved psychology rational reason recognised reflection regard remember result rience sciousness seems seen sensation sense sentient sequence Spinoza subject and object substance succession supposed supposition theory things thought tion true truth ultimate universe volition voluntary WILLIAM BLACKWOOD word motive writers τὰ
Pasajes populares
Página 43 - FLOWER in the crannied wall, I pluck you out of the crannies, I hold you here, root and all, in my hand, Little flower — but if I could understand What you are, root and all, and all in all, I should know what God and man is.
Página 35 - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Página 47 - The baby new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is prest Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that 'this is I:' But as he grows he gathers much, And learns the use of 'I,' and 'me,' And finds 'I am not what I see, And other than the things I touch.
Página 100 - ... placed so many valves without design ; and no design seemed more probable, than that since the blood could not well, because of the interposing valves, be sent by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent through the arteries and return through the veins, whose valves did not oppose its course that way...
Página 82 - ... any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now, more than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.
Página 105 - Design argument is not drawn from mere resemblances in Nature to the works of human intelligence, but from the special character of those resemblances. The circumstances in which it is alleged that the world resembles the works of man are not circumstances taken at random, but are particular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have a real connection with an intelligent origin, the fact of conspiring to an end.
Página 72 - We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a "velleity," as it is called in the schools), even on that side on which it did not settle.
Página 100 - ... many parts of the body were so placed, that they gave free passage to the blood towards the heart, but opposed the passage of the...