PART I. CHAPTER I. IMPERIAL DEFENCE. REAR-ADMIRAL P. H. COLOMB. defence. WITHIN the last few years the minds of both soldiers and sailors have The study been steadily at work on the study of Imperial Defence, and though of imperial it cannot be said that many canons relating to that subject have been universally accepted, it is not to be doubted that all our ideas on the inatter are clearer than they were. Not only so, but month by month the points of difference have been defined, have narrowed the issues, and cleared the controversial field. I may be pardoned, perhaps, for assigning to my brother, Sir John Colomb, the leading part in laying Sir John down and continually differentiating the governing principles of Colomb. Imperial Defence. He took up the study more than twenty years ago, at a time when it had not been touched; and in his first gave the writers on the pamphlet, The Protection of.our. Commerce, and Distribution of our War Forces Considered,' which was published in 1867, may be fairly His said to have given the key-note to all the subsequent discussions. He pamphlet followed up this paper with a number of others, all clinging closely key-note. to the main principles first enunciated, while working out the subordinate grouping of the details which were necessary to make a complete scheme. Many military writers have contributed to the Military elucidation of the great subject, but it has been a misfortune that, as a rule, military men have closed their eyes to the long series of subject. principles within which it is necessary to work, and have treated their own proper functions in plans of defence as if there were nothing outside them, nothing limiting or governing the details. With many of them the local defence of the land of each locality has Some of been the be all and end all of their purview; they have very gene- the rally agreed that the communications between localities separated by water has been no part of their business to study or consider, and they have adopted the position that the idea of such existing com their B PART I. CHAPTER I, IMPERIAL DEFENCE. REAR-ADMIRAL P. H. COLOMB. WITHIN the last few years the minds of both soldiers and sailors have The study been steadily at work on the study of Imperial Defence, and though of imperial it cannot be said that many canons relating to that subject have been universally accepted, it is not to be doubted that all our ideas on the inatter are clearer than they were. Not only so, but month by month the points of difference have been defined, have narrowed the issues, and cleared the controversial field. I may be pardoned, perhaps, for assigning to my brother, Sir John Colomb, the leading part in laying Sir John down and continually differentiating the governing principles of Colomb. Imperial Defence. He took up the study more than twenty years ago, at a time when it had not been touched; and in his first pamphlet, The Protection of.our. Commerce, and Distribution of our War Forces Considered,' which was published in 1867, may be fairly His said to have given the key-note to all the subsequent discussions. He pamphlet followed up this paper with a number of others, all clinging closely key-note. to the main principles first enunciated, while working out the subordinate grouping of the details which were necessary to make a complete scheme. Many military writers have contributed to the Military : elucidation of the great subject, but it has been a misfortune that, as a rule, military men have closed their eyes to the long series of subject. principles within which it is necessary to work, and have treated their own proper functions in plans of defence as if there were nothing outside them, nothing limiting or governing the details. With many of them the local defence of the land of each locality has Some of been the be all and end all of their purview; they have very gene- views. rally agreed that the communications between localities separated by water has been no part of their business to study or consider, and they have adopted the position that the idea of such existing com gave the writers on the their B of Wel munications must be ignored. This erroneous method of dealing with the question-for the moment we suppose open communications we alter all the conditions of the problem-seems really to have The Duke originated in the Duke of Wellington's famous letter, improperly published in 1847, not so much in the words of the letter itself, as in a curious consensus of determination to drop the limiting words used in the letter as if they had never been there. And yet the limiting words on the one side, and the very small addition to our means of military defence against invasion asked for (and long ago doubled) on the other, were of the very essence of the Duke's thought. This is what the Duke said to Sir John Burgoyne : lington's famous letter. Duke You are aware that I have for years been sensible of the alterations produced in maritime warfare and operations, by the application of steam to the propelling of ships at sea. This discovery immediately exposed all parts of the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could approach at all, to be approached at all times of the tide, and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled, from all quarters. We are in fact assailable, and at least liable to insult, and to have contributions levied upon us on all parts of our coast; that is the coast of these, including the Channel, Islands, which to this time, from the period of the Norman Conquest, have never been successfully invaded. I have in the above words represented our danger. We have no defence, or hope of defence, excepting in our fleet. But as we stand now, and if it be true that the exertions of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for our defence, we are not safe for a week after the declaration of war. . In that space of coast" (that is, between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill) "there are not less than seven small harbours or mouths of rivers, each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and therein land his cavalry and artillery of all calibres, and establish himself and his communication with France.” I have printed what I consider to be the limiting conditions of the Limiting conditions. Duke of Wellington's alarmed views in italics; from which it appears that, could he have been assured by the naval officers of that day either that the fleet was sufficient to provide for our defence, or that it could prevent a French force landed on our coast from maintaining its communications with France, his alarm would have subsided. But even when he was far from being assured on these points, he professed that he would be amply satisfied with additions to our military forces which have long been exceeded. Taken apart not only from the limiting expressions, but from the immense changes in all the conditions which have come about since the Duke |