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Sir Wil

liam Armstrong's letter.

Rifled guns.

Whit

worth's views.

confidence, and to whom the designs hereinafter mentioned will be referred for opinion and report:

"LORD DUFFERIN AND CLANDEBOYE, K.P., K.C.B., Chairman. SIR WILLIAM THOMSON, LL.D.

ADMIRAL GEORGE ELLIOT.

REAR-ADMIRAL RYDER.

REAR-ADMIRAL HORNBY.

REAR-ADMIRAL W. HOUSTON STEWART, C.B.

REV. DR. WOOLLEY.

PROFESSOR RANKINE, LL.D., F.R.S.

W. FROUDE, Esq., F.R.S.

CAPTAIN HOOD, R.N.

CAPTAIN GOODENOUGH, R.N.

G. W. RENDEL, ESQ., C.E.

PETER DENNY, ESQ.

G. P. BIDDER, ESQ., C.E.

T. LLOYD, Esq., C.B.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PASLEY, R.E., Secretary."

In the following July the Committee reported.

After dealing with the several types and classes of ships which had been specially referred to them, they said:

"Sir William Armstrong, in an important letter which he addressed to Lord Dufferin on the 3rd of March, and of which a copy is annexed, says: Even now the Elswick Company would not hesitate to accept orders for rifled guns of 14 inches calibre, throwing shot of half a ton weight with a charge of two hundredweight of powder, and to pledge their reputation on the success of the undertaking.' He adds, that 'there are good reasons for inferring that no thickness of iron less than 20 inches, supported by a backing corresponding to that used in the Hercules, would have any chance of offering the required resistance' to such a gun. Another very

Sir Joseph eminent authority, Sir Joseph Whitworth, in the paper with which he has favoured us, says that he is prepared to undertake to make a gun of 11-inch bore which shall penetrate armour 16 inches thick at 1000 yards, and that, for protection against a 13-inch bore gun, the armour would require to be not less than 24 inches thick.

Committee's

opinion.

"We see no reason to doubt that it is within the resources of science to construct guns of the power described, whilst it is certain that no first-class sea-going ship of war of manageable size can be made to carry complete armour protection of anything like 24 inches in thickness, nor do we feel at all confident that even this thickness,

It

if attained, would permanently continue to be impenetrable. remains, then, to consider whether, when these probabilities become accomplished facts, ship armour will retain any value, or whether it ought not rather to be abandoned as a mere costly encumbrance.

Sir Wil

strong on

Sir William Armstrong contemplates and recommends the reduction of armour plating to a minimum, or even its total abandonment. liam ArmHis opinion, and the grounds on which it is based, are entitled to armour question. great respect, and have received our best and most careful consideration. But we have found ourselves unable to arrive at the same conclusion.

versus un

"After making every allowance for the disadvantages that attend the use of an enormous dead weight of very costly armour, which, after all, is not absolutely impenetrable to certain special guns, we cannot lose sight of the indisputable fact that in an action between an armour-clad and an unarmoured ship (assuming that they carry guns Armoured of equal power), the former has, and must have, an immense ad- armoured vantage in being able to penetrate the sides of her adversary at ships. a distance at which she is herself impenetrable; and, further, in being able to use with effect those most destructive projectiles common' shells, which would fall harmless from her own armoured sides.

"Even assuming that absolute impenetrability to shot proves to be unattainable, it is still our opinion that the time has not come to throw off armour altogether, but that it is necessary that the first ranks of our ships of war should continue to carry armour of as great resisting power as possible.

Use of

armour

should be

continued.

means

"Before quitting this part of our subject, we desire to remark that, although, as before pointed out, there are serious difficulties in the way of increasing to any very material extent the thickness of armour applied in the usual manner to sea-going ships, viz., in the form of a complete belt around the ship from stem to stern at the water-line, besides local protection for guns, men, &c., it is not by Other any means certain that some method may not be devised of securing the arthe requisite reserve of buoyancy by other means than armour moured possible. plating. Were this accomplished, the area of the armour might be diminished, and its thickness increased in a corresponding degree. The ship would then comprise a very strongly plated central citadel, Central surrounded and supported by an unarmoured raft constructed on a ship and cellular system, or containing some buoyant substance such as cork, which, without offering any material resistance to the passage of projectiles, would not be deprived of its buoyancy by penetration.

"In the absence of any practical experience of the effect of large

citadel

unarmour

unaaft.

Batteries left unarmoured

in largest ships.

Effect as to quickfiring

guns.

High explosives.

French

revert to battery

armour.

Commit

tee's views

shells or of torpedoes upon such a structure as that which we have in view, it is impossible to say with confidence that the object aimed at would be thus attained; but, if it were, consequences of so much. importance and value would follow, that we think it right to indicate this line of enquiry as worthy of experimental investigation.

"The anticipations of the Committee as to the increase in artillery power were fully realised.

"As a matter of fact, the thickest and best armour in any ship is, according to official estimates, perforable by all guns exceeding in power the French guns of 51 8 tons.

"Between 1871 and 1885 the growing power of the gun made it appear to all designers of war-ships to be desirable to remove the armour from the front of the broadside batteries in the designs of even the largest ships. The gun was so superior in power to any armour which could be spread over the sides of the ship that it was thought better to have no armour than to have frightful débris driven into and across the batteries from the wreck of the defending walls.

"But the surrender of the armour on the faces of the batteries encouraged the attack of quick-firing guns and of light shells. These would have been comparatively powerless against even thin armour. "Against the unarmoured sides of the large battle-ships they are now very formidable.

"Then came melinite and dynamite shell, which were difficult to explode behind armour, but which could be sent through unarmoured sides to burst among the guns at the batteries with most destructive effect.

"In view of this attack by quick-firing guns and by high explosives in light projectiles, the French have reverted to armour on the batteries of two of their latest ships; and this is their answer to the question of the Committee of 1871.

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"They say armour cannot be abandoned-the fiery rain of small shell, and the volcanoes of melinite and dynamite cannot be endured in the batteries.

"They were prepared to accept the wreck of the armour under the pounding of heavy projectiles, rather than the enemies which the unarmoured sides have called into existence.

"The Committee, when they put the question referred to above, declined, as we have seen, to accept the abandonment of armour for the guns.

"Their argument is as perfect to-day as when it was written. We still hold. have only to put for 'common shell' the names of the modern projectiles which have compelled the French to use armour again.

"The Committee were distinctly in favour of the retention of armour for the purposes for which it was first introduced, viz., to protect the guns' crews against shell fire.

"What they were doubtful about was the use of a complete belt of armour at the water-line.

"For this they suggested a substitute. They considered that it was Raft body. not by any means certain that some method may not be devised of securing the requisite reserve of buoyancy by other means than armour plating. Were this accomplished, the area of the armour might be diminished and its thickness increased in a corresponding degree.

"Now let us see what has been done in England, and in France particularly, in view of these recommendations of 1871.

"France has taken the following course in her largest ships :-
"(a) Removed the armour from the sides above the belt, and
thrown the batteries open from end to end of the ship to
the lightest projectiles.

"(b) For the heaviest guns the French Navy has protected the
revolving and elevating gear and magazine communications.
by armour; but has not protected by armour the men who
load the guns, nor the breech of the gun at the moment of
loading.

"(c) France has continued the use in the largest ships of a complete belt of armour from stem to stern at the water-line. "Great Britain has acted differently:

"(a) Armour has been removed from the sides above the belt, but is retained at the ends of the batteries to protect them from raking fire. There are armoured bulkheads or traverses across the batteries of all the large British ships. In two of the most recent large ships, Victoria and Sans Pareil, there is thin armour on the sides over the secondary battery.

"(b) In the heaviest guns the loading party and the breeches of the guns are always protected by armour.

“(c) An attempt has been made to secure the requisite reserve of buoyancy by other means than armour plating.' The belt of armour has been retained, but it is incomplete, and does not cover the ends of the ship, and in these ends

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the other means' referred to by the Committee have
been adopted.

"In order to make this somewhat difficult matter clear, let us thoroughly understand what an armour belt is.

Armour

belt.

Its extent.

Position of

thick deck.

Packing.

Effect of

shells on packing.

Loss of

"It is a belt on the sides of the ship, covering that portion of the skin of the ship which would be alternately wet and dry as the ship pitched and rolled and heaved in a moderate sea; it is the portion of the ship otherwise said to be the part "between wind and water.

"It rises some three or more feet above the water in a very large ship, extends some 6 feet under water along the middle of the ship, and should be still farther under water at the bow and stern.

"As a matter of fact its depth at the stern is always less than it is amidships—a grave defect in armour belting, which is universal and incurable.

"With this arrangement of armour it is considered that there will generally be difficulty in planting a shot below the belt.

"I have myself seen hundreds of feet of the bottoms of large ships, below their belts, as they have slowly lifted in an Atlantic swell, and quick-firing guns may be expected to find out this weakness.

"Above the belt the whole area of the deck which bounds and connects its upper edges is exposed to depressed or plunging fire. Such shot perforating the deck within the 8000 or 10,000 feet of its area, may find some vital part. This deck is therefore made as strong as possible.

"Now, according to the view of the Committee, this strong deck might have been at the lower edge of this alternately wet and dry belt-the water zone. It would be safer there, as against attack from above; and it might be covered by a solid mass of some packing material, 'some buoyant substance, such as cork,' as they say.

"This would then form a solid mass, say 9 feet thick in places, extending from the under-water deck to some point above the water-line. Penetration of this by projectiles would lead to the admission of water into the channels they formed in the packing material.

"So far as such channels or furrows were below the water-line, the water admitted would necessitate an infinitesimal farther immersion of the ship so as to preserve the same total displacement of water as before. Shells would on bursting blow out masses of the raft, and, when these holes or depressions filled with water, there would be a corresponding increase of immersion.

"The practical retention of the buoyancy and of the original waterbuoyancy line of the ship would depend upon the relation between the bulk of the whole raft and the bulk of the holes made beneath the water-line into which the sea could find its way.

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There would be some 30,000 cubic feet of the material in a war

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