Compiler's
views as
to the
kind of

ships
which
should be

built.

Torpedo

rams.

Disuse of sails.

near the bow and stern, would seem an essential feature in any method of protection. The absence of such bulkheads is a weak point in the French ships.

At the time when the Inflexible was in progress the compiler strongly advocated the construction of ships of a less displacement. He has seen no reason to change the opinion then expressed. The compiler is no advocate for the construction of second-class vessels by a first-class Power. He would deprecate the construction for the English line-of-battle of ships of slow speed, thinly armoured and weakly armed. He would, however, observe that while the improved and large types proposed by the Admiralty are probably the best that could be designed for naval combat with the gun, they cannot be equally recommended for doing battle with the torpedo and the ram. Side by side with the big gun-carrying ships, auxiliary vessels should be laid down, their vitals well protected by armour, their only weapon the ram and the torpedo, the latter fired from stoutly armoured positions. The heavy ships would be greatly strengthened, and at a relatively small cost, by armoured torpedo-ram auxiliaries. If the big ships should be built, so also should the small. If the gun is the first of naval weapons, the ram and the torpedo should not be neglected.

We pass from protection to a less difficult topic. It is painful to an old yachtsman to watch the rapid disappearance of spars and sails from the ships of war of all nations. The modern view of this subject is well put in an article taken from the Army and Navy Journal of New York.

"It is not to be denied that there is a certain amount of sentiment connected with the retention of sails, and that there is a question that with their abolition the 'true and tarry seaman' will disappear. But there need be no fear that seamanship, and that of a high type, will be required in the future to perform the various duties that will be necessary to make the battle-ship of the day as formidable to her enemies as was the line-of-battle-ship of the past. If it should be feared that a race of seamen trained in sailless ships will be wanting in courage, a glance at the deadly character of the instruments of destruction with which they have to deal should dispose of this thought. A recent writer has playfully suggested that it might be well to set the men to 'hammer sensitive fuzes into filled shell,' if it were desired to provide them with what might be considered an employment sufficiently dangerous to train them to courage.

"The feeling that sail exercises should be reduced to a minimum, and that sail power must yield to the inevitable, is growing very

agreement as to sails

rapidly in the English navy. On the occasion of two recent lectures before the Royal United Service Institution, one on Mastless Ships General of War,' by Captain Fitzgerald, the other on 'The Composition of a Modern Fleet,' by Commander Campbell, there was almost entire unanimity in this regard by both writers and speakers, one wellknown officer going so far as to say that 'sails were sinful.'

"In our own service the problem is, of course, somewhat different; but, with the possibility of petroleum as the fuel of the (not distant) future, the necessity for sail power will grow still less than at present is the case. Machine and quick-firing guns would make short work of those who should be unfortunate enough in time of action to be exposed while fishing the foremast' or answering the call of 'port main rigging shot away.' Though our new vessels will show a diminution of sail power, yet the square rig is dying a very lingering death; let us hope that some action on the part of the Navy Department will soon put it out of its misery."

being obwar ships.

solete for

power necessary for vessels

used for

the police of the seas.

While sail power is undoubtedly a thing of the past for battle-ships Sail and their auxiliaries, it ought not to disappear in cruisers for the police of the seas. The small cruisers, which may from time to time be required to make long passages, should be efficient under sail. We have a recent instance of the helpless condition to which a small vessel wholly dependent upon steam may be brought. The Army and Navy Gazette recently published a letter from a correspondent, describing the arrival of H.M.S. Firebrand at Manilla, thirty days out from Singapore, and twenty-three from Labuan, without coal or water, and with only ten days' provisions remaining on board.

On the sea

one has

only

In concluding the present chapter, we may offer a few observations of a general character. And, first, it is admitted by every authority that it is beyond the ingenuity of man to contrive a perfect, that is to say, an impregnable ship of war. If we turn to the ablest experts in the French navy, they tell us, in the words of Admiral Bourgeois, that sur la mer rien n'est absolu; on a seulement des chances." If we chances. turn to the officers in our own service who have given the fullest consideration to these questions, we are cautioned, to use the words of Captain Fitzgerald, that the utmost that can be accomplished is to insure to ourselves the greater number of chances. "We must ever bear in mind that it is simply a question of chances. There is no absolute safety possible, nor anything approaching it, in any design of war-ship."

best

The best we can do for the British Navy is to strengthen it with Gun the every weapon. The gun, in the view of our best authorities, is still the principal weapon of the Navy. It has the longest range and the

K

weapon

surest aim, and is the least affected by the varying conditions of weather at sea.

The armament which will be found the most effective will consist, not of a few guns of the heaviest calibre, but of many guns of moderate calibres. This, at least, is the conclusion drawn by the comTorpedo. piler after hearing the arguments on both sides as put with such clearness by Mr. White in his paper read at the Mansion House.

The ram.

"There are not wanting advocates of the view that the risks of failure incidental to these mechanical appliances are too serious to be accepted, and that guns have outgrown the necessities of the naval service. They point to the comparatively long time occupied in loading a very heavy gun, to the unavoidable uncertainty of naval gunnery, and to the enormous value of a single discharge, which may mean a miss.' They consider that for the naval service a much greater number of lighter guns would be preferable, because of the increased number of discharges possible in a given time, and the consequent increase in the number of hits. They draw attention to the fact that comparatively light guns of long range and great accuracy, which can be worked by hand, are capable of perforating most of the armour carried by war-ships at the range which is considered a fair fighting distance; and that on the large unarmoured areas of most armoured ships the shell fire of lighter guns (including quick-firing and machine guns) would be effective. On the other side of the debate it is urged that in active service so many circumstances make against the effectiveness of gun fire that a large margin of power is desirable; that a single successful shot or shell from the heavier guns would produce enormous damage; and that the association of a powerful secondary armament with the heavier guns fully meets the case. Having stated both sides, I leave the matter, only adding that in the latest ships, both English and foreign, while heavy guns are to be carried, they are not the heaviest available."

The French navy has produced many able writers on naval strategy. All describe the battles of the future as a succession of charges by the opposing ships. If this be the mode of fighting, our superiority in manœuvring qualities will be of primary importance. The ram will probably do more than the gun to decide the result. In fighting with the ram small ships must have a decided advantage over big ships.

As the Navy must be armed with every weapon, so it is necessary that ships of all the effective types should be included in our programme of building.

In the construction of ships for the purposes of war, it is inevitable that the best design should be a compromise. After years

devoted to the consideration of the conflicting views of experts, the dominant feeling in the mind of the compiler is one of sympathy with the Government, which has to take a decision upon the expenditure of vast sums of public money, under the guidance of counsellors widely divided in their views. It is some relief to know that the administrations of other powers are in the same difficulty, and that, of all the battle-ships built since the introduction of armour, there is not one which, being in sound condition, can yet be regarded as obsolete.

torpedo

In the programme of shipbuilding lately propounded by the Govern- Armourod ment, the armoured torpedo ram has not been included. The type a has been strongly advocated by officers of much experience in war.

Lord George Hamilton's speech.

Lord

Northbrook's programme.

CHAPTER VII.

I.

THE NEW SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME,

HAVING reviewed the shipbuilding of the past year, we are brought to a consideration of the extended programme submitted to Parliament by Lord George Hamilton in the present Session.

The plans and the circumstances which have led up to the proposals of the Government will be most satisfactorily explained by reproducing the speech delivered by Lord George Hamilton in the House of Commons on 7th March, 1889. As reported in the Times, he said:

"The resolution which I shall have to propose clearly brings to the mind of the Committee the object with which it is made. It is made for the purpose of giving effect to repeated declarations made by different members of the Government that the time has now arrived, in their judgment, for the survey of our naval establishments with a view of materially increasing their strength. Four years ago an almost similar motion was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty under the Administration of the right hon. member for Mid Lothian. Lord Northbrook then proposed largely to augment the normal shipbuilding programme, to add to the number of guns, and generally to make large additions to ways and means. That programme, which has been known as the Northbrook programme, is practically complete. I wish to say nothing about it except from an administrative point of view. The peculiarity attending its execution has been that ships have been built much more rapidly than it was anticipated they would be, and they have been kept waiting in some cases for months and in other cases for years for guns or gun-carriages and machinery. I think we shall all agree that one of the first duties of any one connected with naval administration is to try and reduce to the smallest limits the amount locked up in incomplete and useless ships. There can be no object in accelerating the shipbuilding process if ships are to be kept waiting for long periods of they have time for their guns. Therefore, early last year my right hon. friend their guns. the Secretary for War gave very close attention to the subject, with a

No object in building ships quickly if

to wait for