The Resistance experiments. Sir Ed ward Reed. Respective provinces of the naval architect and the naval officer. placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower, and with 5-in. armour on the sides protecting the deck from the direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft. "These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top of the belt in the new designs. It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater thickness than 5-in. steel, and more strongly backed. This is perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size of the ship. "The Board of Admiralty, and the officers called into council, had in their possession, when considering this question, the most recent and complete experimental data obtained by firing against the Resistance, with guns of various calibres (including quick-firers), projectiles of all patterns, and explosives of different kinds. "With this information in their possession, the Admiralty pronounce the thin armour above the belt to be satisfactory,' and give effect to that decision in the designs. Sir Edward Reed, in his letters to The Times and elsewhere, challenges this decision, and uses very strong language in its condemnation; but, so far as I am aware, he can have no experimental data to go upon, and his objections seem to rest on purely hypothetical assumptions of what kind and extent of damage is likely to happen to a ship, lightly armoured above the belt, when she comes under the fire of an enemy's guns. Apart from any expression of personal opinion, I would submit that it is for the naval architect to prepare alternative plans, showing possible dispositions of the protective material, within the limits of weight available in a design. Having done this, it is not his province, but that of naval officers, to determine from their knowledge of gunnery, what are the nature and extent of the damages likely to be done in action, and to choose that disposition of the armour which they consider has the balance of advantage. This is the course which has been followed by the Admiralty in dealing with the disposition of the armour on the new designs. "From passages occurring in Sir Edward Reed's letters and elsewhere, it seems that he doubts whether the First Lord and his advisers, who made the selection, understood what they were doing. I leave it to these gentlemen to answer for themselves, if they think it necessary; and anyone who will read through the Parliamentary papers will be able to judge whether any answer is required. I think that none is needed on the face of the published documents. Fair state- ment of ward Reed's! "It is, I believe, a fair statement of Sir Edward Reed's views to say that his chief objection to the proposed arrangement of armour in the new designs, as compared with the Trafalgar, is that the thick armour on the side rises only 3 ft. above water, instead of 11 ft. as views. designed for the Trafalgar, and about 10 ft. as completed. He speaks of 'stripping a wall of armour 8 ft. high off the sides of the proposed battle-ships'; although in another place he is good enough to admit that the 5-in. armour which rises 9 ft. above water is better than nothing, but it is a miserably inefficient substitute for the 18-in. armour, which (as compared with the Nile and Trafalgar) has been stripped off.' And yet, again, he says:- These ships are in principle, in so far as the defensive armour of the hull is concerned, neither more nor less than ships of the universally condemned Admiral class.' armour belt in Admiral class and in the new designs. "Taking the last statement first, I wish to challenge its accuracy, Extent of and to point out the essential differences between the Admiral class and the new designs, in the matter of the defensive armour of the hull.' In the Admirals the thick armour belt extends over about 40 to 45 per cent. of the length, as against 66 per cent. in the new ships. Above the belt in the Admirals cellular sides, extensive subdivision and coal form the only protection; in the new ships these arrangements are supplemented by the long lightly armoured citadel above described, and the broadside is made secure against all the smaller natures of quick-firing guns, as well as against many of the most destructive projectiles from much larger guns, to a height of 9 ft. above water-practically to the same height as the thick armour goes in the completed Trafalgar, and over as great a length amidships. Surely these are differences of the highest importance. They involve a very large expenditure of weight and money in new ships, as compared with the Admirals, and add greatly to the defence. Yet they are practically ignored by Sir Edward Reed; whose condemnation of the proposed arrangements has regard almost exclusively to the fact that the thick armour is to rise only 3 ft. above water. "He objects to the adoption of narrow water-line belts of thick Narrow water-line belts. The pith of the whole question. Foreign navies. armour in battle-ships generally, although I understand him to favour the use of such belts in cruisers. His contention, shortly stated, is that with such narrow belts there is a great risk that the damages done to the sides above the belt in action will speedily cause the ships to become unstable (in the transverse sense) and to reach a dangerous condition. Now, clearly this is a matter which turns chiefly, if not solely, upon the estimate that may be formed of the damage likely to be done in action. It is not a question of an abstruse nature, involving elaborate and scientific calculations of stability. Everyone can see that if a ship originally of high freeboard, carrying great weights of armament and armour aloft, could be brought down, by the rapid and wholesale destruction of her upper works, to a virtual freeboard of 2 to 3 ft. (the height of the thick armour belt above water), while those great weights of guns and armour, &c., still remained aloft, she would reach a dangerous condition, and would be readily capsized. On this point there can be no difference of opinion. Moreover (as I pointed out several years ago in a published correspondence with Sir Edward Reed), this element of danger, if it really exists, is not sensibly affected by carrying the narrow belt throughout the length instead of stopping short of the extremities. Here, then, lies the pith of the whole question. Are such extensive damages likely to be done in action, and to be of a character that will virtually throw open to the sea the portions of the ships lying above the narrow armour belts ? Is it to be regarded as impossible to keep ships thus armoured from capsizing under fire? What has been the general verdict of naval authorities on this matter, as evidenced in ships actually built? "Reference to the diagrams already used in connection with the dispositions of armament gives the answers to these questions. It will be seen that in the recent battle-ships of nearly all foreign navies, belts of thick armour as narrow as, or narrower than, those condemned by Sir Edward Reed have been and are being adopted. Up to date, in most foreign ships, these narrow belts have not been associated with as effective a cellular construction of the sides as is possessed by the Admirals and other belted ships of the Royal Navy. Nor has coal protection been similarly cared for and made possible at the sides above the belts. Much less has there been provision hitherto in foreign ships of lightly armoured citadels above the belt, such as are proposed for the new ships. It is true that many of these foreign ships have belts going to the bow and stern; but that fact does not affect our present discussion, and it may be assumed, from what has been done and is doing abroad, that naval and professional authorities there, as well as at home, do not share the apprehensions expressed by Sir Edward Reed. By common consent his estimate of the serious risks inevitable with narrow belts is not endorsed. "Below I give a tabular statement showing the character of the water-line protection in a number of British and foreign ships, and the vertical distances to which the armour is carried above and below the designed load water-line. "It is perfectly obvious from this table that so far as the belt proper is concerned, the new ships are on practically the same footing as recent ships built in this country and abroad. But, I must repeat that they have above the belt a lightly armoured side, which most foreign ships have not. They are to be armoured, in fact, to 9 ft. above water, as against 2 to 3 ft. in most foreign ships; the total depth of armoured side is to be 15 ft., as against 7 to 84 ft. in some Narrow armour of the largest foreign ships. Relatively to those ships, therefore, the new designs clearly occupy a good position; and that is the true test. In passing, it will be noted from the plates already referred to belts asso- that narrow belts have in nearly all cases been associated with dispositions of armaments placing the guns and their armour protection high above water and far apart. ciated with armaments carried high above the water. Depth of armour below water-line diminished. Risks to ships below the armour. Risks compared. "I do not desire to enter into any lengthy explanation of the reasons which have led to this general adoption of narrow armour belts. Probably the chief reason is to be found in the fact that from the outset the depth to which armour has been carried below water has been very moderate. "In recent years this depth has been somewhat diminished, as will be seen from the table, both absolutely and in relation to the beam of ships. Of course, it may be argued that the depth of armour below water ought to have been increased as ships became larger and broader. That is a separate question, and just now we are concerned chiefly with matters of fact, and with comparisons of our ships with foreign ships. As a matter of fact, armour protection goes to a moderate depth below water in all cases. Consequently, it is quite possible, and in fact quite common, for the lower edge of the armour to be emerged, either by a very moderate inclination of the ship, or by her motion through still water, or by the movement of waves along her sides, or by her rolling in a seaway; as well as by many possible combinations of these circumstances. This emergence of the armour involves the exposure of the unprotected bottom, and chance shots entering below the armour may destroy the ship, and inevitably will cause damage that must be practically irremediable under the circumstances of action, and must result in the entry of large quantities of water into the vessel, even though she may be kept afloat by her water-tight subdivisions. "The unarmoured under-water portions of the sides and bottoms of war-ships are, moreover, exposed to serious damage in action by submarine torpedoes and by ramming; but it is unnecessary to dwell on the point. "Contrast with these undoubted risks, the risks involved in damage to the sides immediately above the armour belt, and also above the normal water-line. The consequences are clearly not so serious in many respects. Something may be done towards stopping or limiting the inflow of water when the damage is done above water. There is no head of water to deal with, as when the bottom below the armour is broken through. The projectiles which enter have opposed to |