manner. leader. ignored two important points, one of which depends upon the other. The The first of these is the growing importance, on which Mr. White so Times effectively dwelt, of the auxiliary armament of battle-ships. The second, which depends on this, is the desire of naval officers-a very natural and laudable desire-for a maximum of offensive power. In fact, the whole question, as Lord Charles Beresford put it with sailorlike directness, is one of "armour or armament." Increase of armour means decrease of armament; increase of armament means decrease of armour. Sir Edward Reed concentrates his attention on the protection of the ship against destruction in one particular The naval officer very properly concentrates his attention. on the destruction of the enemy's ship by any means in his power. The latter believes that he can either destroy his enemy or compel him to surrender by the effective use of his auxiliary armament, supplementing the slower but in certain contingencies more destructive use of his heavy armour-piercing guns; and the judicious naval constructor meets his demands by giving him an auxiliary armament practically equal in weight, as Mr. White points out, to the total weight of armament proposed for the Fury, which was designed by Sir Edward Reed in 1870, and completed by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby as the Dreadnought. You shall have no such auxiliary armament, says Sir Edward Reed in effect, because if you do your armoured protection must be so much reduced as to render your ship liable to destruction by the auxiliary armament of the enemy. In other words, in order to secure redundant protection against only one of the contingencies of a naval engagement, the offensive efficiency of the ship is fatally crippled, and many other contingencies equally probable and quite as serious are still left unprovided for. The danger on which Sir Edward Reed concentrates his whole attention is hardly at its worst greater than the danger of destruction by a torpedo, or of the penetration of the ship by a shell below the armoured belt. But these dangers must be encountered, even on Sir Edward Reed's principles, and the naval officer will take them and others as part of the day's work and the day's risk if he finds himself provided with a ship designed according to his requirements. In fine, Sir Edward Reed's ideal seems to be a battle-ship in which the offensive powers are reduced to a minimum by the development of one particular element of defensive power to a maximum. That is not the kind of ship which would satisfy British officers, nor, unless we are very much mistaken, is it the kind of ship in which the country is prepared to send its men to sea." Observations of the compiler on Mr. White's paper. Armour versus armament. Armour a partial defence from injury of the gun. V. The first consideration in building ships should be to keep them afloat in the face of any fire which might be brought against them; and they should be of such construction that the small armaments of the enemy should never be able to destroy them. That had been the ground of the whole of his public agitation against such ships. He revived the point because it seemed that the question of armament was given the first place in the deliberations of the naval officer. In effect, as Lord Charles Beresford concisely stated it, the question that was before the meeting was that of armour versus armament. If Sir Edward Reed could by an increased weight of armour guarantee immunity from destruction, it might be worth while to make a sacrifice in the offensive power; but no such immunity can be given. Armour affords protection only against the gun; it gives no defence against the not less formidable risks of injury from the torpedo, the ram, or the manifold perils of navigation. Sir Edward Reed contends that without increasing the weight of armour a better defence might be obtained by a different distribution of armour. He advocates the removal of the armour now used for protection internally, and the placing of it upon the sides in wake of the battery and round the water line. If a design embodying these views were submitted to criticism, weak points would probably be shown. This at least is certain, that in the French ships with all-round belts, the weakness resulting from the absence of a stoutly plated athwartship bulkhead forward, giving protection from a raking fire, needs no demonstration. The present writer has devoted no inconsiderable amount of time and attention to a comparison of the various methods of protection adopted in our own and foreign navies. The study of the subject has been singularly barren of conclusions. It is certain that there is no absolute best. Every design is a compromise, and falls short of ideal perfection. Under no system can anything more be obtained by the use of armour than a partial defence from injury by the gun. It is presumptuous to differ from the general opinion of the naval profession, but in the admitted necessity of having to make a choice between protection of the water line and protection of the men at quarters, it seems open to question whether the latter should not claim the first consideration. That ships would be riddled in action in their upper works in a close action is certain. That they would be struck at the water line is doubtful. There are means of protection other than armour for the water line. There is no means Wholesale of protection other than armour for the men at the guns. to the hull and machinery. The Government may justly plead that in the preparation of the new designs they have been guided by the advice of those who should be most consulted. They have called in council the gallant officers whose duty it would be to fight their country's battles on the sea. In the execution of the designs the responsibility must rest with the Constructors of the Admiralty. None abler than those now serving have ever been employed in the department. It is not for civilians and laymen to guide the policy of the country in a technical matter. If I may offer any words of criticism, they shall be directed, not to what is included, but to what is omitted from the programme. I would urge that the provision for the necessary auxiliaries of the great battle-ships is inadequate. The powers of our floating fortresses would be developed out of all proportion to the increased cost, by grouping around them those armoured rams so Armoured strongly recommended by the naval officers of the United States, omitted who have had the most experience of naval warfare since the from the introduction of steam. It would seem desirable to multiply in gramme. much greater numbers than is at present proposed those seagoing torpedo vessels which are equally valuable for defence and for attack. There may be some who find it difficult not to follow Lord Armstrong in the disfavour with which he views the armoured class. They cannot, he urges, be made invulnerable. Their cost is enormous. This much, at least, is certain, that it cannot be satisfactory to commit our fortunes in the great perils of an action at sea to squadrons consisting of a few large and powerful but most vulnerable ships. Our Navy should consist of many ships. Excess of cost compels undue restriction of numbers. rams new pro VI. SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMPILER IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THE My Lords, I am unwilling to allow this debate to close without expressing my great satisfaction that the proposals for which the Bill makes provision have been brought forward by the Government. Viewed in the light of the experience gained in the interesting Naval recent nœuvres proved. Standard for the Navy. The de signs of the What the Manoeuvres of last year, it is certain that our naval position is not Naval Ma- sufficiently assured. It is difficult to fix the standard of strength for the British Navy upon a satisfactory basis. The First Lord of the Admiralty has laid it down that we ought to be equal or superior to of strength any two Powers. Looking to the amount of our mercantile tonnage, looking to the interests we have at stake as a Colonial Power, we should scarcely be aiming too high if we resolved to maintain our strength and our rate of progress and construction at double those of the next strongest Navy to our own. If this were our settled policy it would tend to discourage, rather than to stimulate, a rivalry in expenditure. There are indications that such a result might be anticipated in the Estimates recently brought forward for the year 1890 by a neighbouring Power. Passing from the amount of construction proposed in the new programme to the designs, I think that new ships. the Government have pursued a course which must command general approval. They have consulted not only the able Naval officers now serving at Whitehall, but the officers outside the department who have had the most recent experience in the command of fleets. their chief professional adviser they have in Mr. White a naval architect of the highest ability. I will not trouble the House with criticisms of designs which have been matured by able experts. As the compiler of a naval annual, I have had frequent occasion to study and compare the designs of ships, British and foreign. I have seen no design in any class which could be accepted as perfect. Every ship of war is a compromise. A gain in offensive or defensive power is inevitably balanced by a loss in manoeuvring qualities. In a large navy you must have all types represented. If you build big ships, you must group nimble auxiliaries around them. The firstclass battle-ships you are about to lay down will cost £1,000,000 sterling. They represent the most effective combination of power which the ingenuity and skill of the present day can contrive; but they are not invulnerable. A squadron of such ships blockading an enemy's ports full of torpedo boats would be in a position of great peril in darkness and in fog. For the protection of those great floating fortresses we must build sea-keeping torpedo vessels in numbers largely in excess of the present proposals. In a naval action armoured rams would give invaluable support to large ships. In the smoke and confusion the guns of the heavy ships would tend to become less reliable weapons, and the chances of dealing a fatal blow with the ram and torpedo would be greater. These considerations will, I think, impress every thoughtful naval administrator with the conviction that the programme of construction now pro In a large navy all types of ships must be represented. be pro posed, necessary as it is and bearing every mark of ingenious and able design, will by no means supply all that is needed to complete the Navy. A large flotilla of sea-keeping torpedo vessels and What numerous armoured rams are indispensable auxiliaries, and it should ships must be the duty of those who take an interest in the Navy to press for the construction of those auxiliaries in future years. Cruisers are absolutely necessary, and the new programme, I am glad to see, will give us a strong reinforcement of fast and efficient vessels." vided in addition to those named in new programme. Р |