charter.

wrote, we may freely admit that this celebrated document formed a sort of military charter for the localization of the defences of the Military Empire. For if the British Islands were to be properly and efficiently defended by local works and local military forces, so could every separate part of the Empire be defended by like local means. So also could each town, port, estuary, or coast entrepôt, be kept scatheless from the enemy's touch by military and local means.

*

And the converse of the proposition might, on the same grounds, be defended. If the security of our own communications across the water could not be maintained, if those of the enemy could not be destroyed, the whole value of communications by sea was lowered. It followed that more stress must be laid upon the local powers of resistance of each item of territory composing the British Empire, and less attention should be paid to the defence of the communications between these items. Communications were not of the essence of Imperial defence; it was lucky for the Empire that they were not, for they could not be preserved in war. This appears to me to be the kernel of the military thought for The "The absence of the fleet" was the major very many years past. premiss, not only in military writings on imperial defence, from that wonderful and stirring romance-the Battle of Dorking-through all its imitations and through all the serious papers which military men years have put forth. Not only so, but it was the same when views passed into acts of expenditure on defensive arrangements. The Navy was at first quite neutral on the subject, a great portion of the Navy is neutral still. It generally held that it was in no way concerned with military expenditure. It laughed a little at the easy disappearance of the naval forces, either to the bottom by means which were miraculous in their effects-if that which is contrary to all ex

As an instance, I quote from a paper by Captain Stone read at the United Service Institution, with Lord Wolseley in the chair, on January 18. "My premiss is that the possession of Naval arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations must practically decide the question of Naval supremacy; that such supremacy is absolutely essential to our existence as a nation; and that the way to secure it is to fortify and arm our own arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations in such a fashion as to enable them to resist an enemy's attacks, and at the same time to give a free hand to the Navy to attack those of the enemy with such force as may be available, after providing for the patrolling of our principal trade routes." And then the line, or atmosphere, of thought generated by this enunciation of principles culminates in such an idea as the following: "The case of Sevastopol is even more instructive, affording as it does an actual parallel to cases with which we may ourselves have to deal in the event of an invasion of our territory." That is to say, that the complete loss of command of the sea, and the placing of it absolutely in the hands of our enemies, is not recognized as a death-blow to the Empire, so long as spots of territory can be kept intact.

kernel of the

military thought for some

past.

Royal Commission of 1859-60.

perience is miraculous-or by decoy and delusion which rested on the slender basis of an argument historically sound so far as it regarded sailing ships only. But when the Navy laughed, it did so in its sleeve, and the military mind was allowed to pursue the train of thought it had fallen into, with very little check indeed from the naval mind, which ought to have been busy with friendly and useful criticism. The Navy went further sometimes, and directly countenanced the military theory that it could neglect communications with the vital points of territory if only each point were rendered individually secure. It to a great extent took up the simple idea which has everything on the surface to recommend it, and can hardly be shaken by anything but exceedingly close reasoning, that the local security of a mercantile port would always free the ships which would otherwise be necessary for its protection. The idea may have been the outcome of establishing as a fundamental principle the minor value of communications by sea. The Navy itself was becoming permeated by the idea that in the next naval war it would have something to do which was not concerned in maintaining communications. What the something else was, has I believe to this day been left undefined. The full idea was promulgated by the Royal Commis sion of 1859-60, where the enormous sums to be spent on the local defences of Portsmouth, Plymouth, the Thames, and the Medway, were recommended and justified on the plea that the country would never stand the expense of maintaining a Channel fleet suthciently powerful to cover these ports, and therefore to preserve their water communications. Yet, had we not allowed ourselves to fall into the strategical errors which we in our mistaken unconcern had permitted to the military mind, we could never have stopped at that point. If the country would not provide a Channel fleet sufficient to cover these ports, what followed? What was meant by not providing a Channel fleet sufficiently powerful for the purpose? Was it meant that with all our forces assembled in the Channel we should still be too weak, or was it supposed that the something else which was not to be named would prevent such concentration? It is perhaps indisputable that it was the latter condition which was implied. But if so, then it was assumed that the communications over water of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames were to disappear, and might disappear without great harm, provided these three points were themselves made secure from capture and occupation. Sir John Colomb, for the first time, and I believe alone, ran a tilt

It is now scarcely conceivable that such an argument could ever have been put forward except in joke.

against all these ideas in his pamphlet of 1867, and especially in the following passages:

"The distribution of the forces for the protection of our Commerce is a most im- Sir John portant, and, at the same time, a most difficult problem to solve. The magnitude of Colomb's this national requirement is only equalled by the difficulty of meeting it with the pamphlet of 1867. means at our disposal. Like everything else upon a gigantic scale, it can only be accomplished by the proper application of general principles. Now, in all naval and military operations, whether offensive or defensive, there is a golden rule, to neglect which is certain ruin; it is the fundamental law which applies to all warfare, and is simply this that the success of all operations depends upon the disposition of the forces in such a manner as will best secure the base of operations, and ensure safety and freedom of communication. Knowing this to be true, it remains with us to show how far it can be acted upon, and applied to the object in view.

"To determine the base of operations we look at a commercial chart, which is nothing more or less than a map of the world, showing the tracks of thousands of ships passing and re-passing from one part of the globe to another. We know that on the proper distribution of our forces depends the safety of these innumerable vessels, and that this involves the prosperity, nay, the very existence, of the British Empire in time of war. It is in reality the income of the nation which is thus scattered broadcast over the ocean. On examining this chart, it appears that all the tracks radiate from one point-the Channel-and that there by far the greatest number of laden ships are collected. One half of all the ships we are to protect are at and round this point. The Channel is the key of the position, the vital spot to secure against surprise, and it must ever be the base of our naval operations throughout the world.

"Now, the same law to which we have referred exists with equal force in all commercial enterprises. The base of all mercantile operations is money; investments may be regarded as the advanced posts of monetary warfare. freedom of communication depends the safety of the enterprise.

Upon the

"Take, for instance, one of the great banks which lately failed. We are told the cause of the disaster was that the capital, i.e., the money, was locked up; the power to call in the advanced posts to the relief of the base, or capital, was wanting; the lines of communication were cut off by pressure from without, and the whole monetary edifice fell to the ground.

"We may look upon the Empire as an immense commercial speculation. The base of operations is English money which is laid out in investments in all parts of the world. Upon the freedom of communication the commercial existence of the Empire depends. From this point of view, the greatest calamity which can befall this gigantic enterprise is that pressure from without which would threaten to cut off the greatest number of its communications. That danger may, any day, assume a very visible form in the shape of a powerful foreign fleet in the Channel. The capital of the greatest commercial enterprise in the world could not be more effectually locked up than by the suspension of 'imports' and 'exports' which would, as a consequence, follow such a contingency.

"For the reasons we have briefly given, it is evident that the safety of the Channel must be maintained; and that it is worse than useless to distribute the forces for the protection of our commerce over various parts of the world, while the base of our Naval operations, the most vital spot in our commercial system, remains insecure. As this involves the employment of a large sea-going fleet for Channel service only, it is advisable to ask the question, Will not a fleet sufficient for this purpose be equal to the task of protecting England from invasion?"

The two

opposing ideas.

Strategic centres.

Commissioners of 1859-60.

The argument in these passages is very clear, and, if it is true and complete, it must govern the whole strategy and art of defence of a maritime Empire.

In such defence there must always be the two opposing ideasthat of the defence of each spot of territory apart from all the rest; and that of the defence of the water connecting the spots of territory considered, with the spots of territory, as a whole. It may easily be held, indeed often is held, that the two ideas are not antagonistic, but can be embodied and acted on, side by side. I believe such an argument cannot be sustained. As a fact, we know the thing is not so. No agreement has ever been come to in this Empire of ours as to how far the defence of spots of territory shall be carried, or how far their safety shall be left to be determined by the security of their communications. All we recognise in practice is that there is not anywhere in the Empire a spot which has sufficient local defence, and this is equally the case with such great strategic centres as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Gibraltar, and Malta, as with such lesser centres as Albany and Thursday Island. No doubt, opinion is not unanimous. There are high authorities who consider Portsmouth and Plymouth overdone with works; and in the last number of this Annual the great expenditure on Bermuda and Dover was condemned. But still, in the result, it is found that the argument of local defencelessness always prevails, and expenditure everywhere goes on in recognition of it. But never, I believe, is expenditure undertaken except on the basis of the failure of communications. That is to say, never are the land defences, or even perhaps the strictly local naval defences, intended to combine in any way with the general naval defence. This is invariably supposed to be absent; that is to say, the communications are, at any rate for the time, supposed to be cut.

The question appears to be whether there is any other way of The Royal considering it. The Royal Commissioners of 1859-60 were unable to combine the two ideas of defence, and their justification of the very heavy expenditure on the fortifications of Portsmouth and Plymouth rested on the sole ground that the defence of their sea communications "would involve the necessity of retaining in the Channel, for purely defensive purposes, a fleet equal to any which could be brought against it, not only by one European State, but by any probable combination of maritime powers, &c." It was not as the complementas it has been put by distinguished officers-of the defence of the communications that the great defensive works were to be taken in hand, but on the clear understanding that this would be abandoned

altogether. The local defence of the spots of territory was the alternative and opposing system of defence, and not the completion or adjunct of the other-the defence of the communications. Sevastopol Sevastomay possibly afford us an illustration in point. When the British pol. prepared to undertake its capture or destruction, there was attached to the port a very considerable fleet. The port itself was also strongly fortified and heavily garrisoned. The naval defence would have been complete if it had been able to prevent the landing at a distance from the port; failing to do or to attempt this, it collapsed, and the ships became useful for nothing but to be sunk so as to bar the entrance to the harbour. The port finally fell to the possessor of free water communications. But it would not have fallen, for the invading expedition could not have started, had the Russian water communications been complete, and had those of the British been interrupted. After the siege was established, there was a certain threatening by the Russian steam ships which remained protected by the fortifications within the harbour to interfere with the naval operations of the British. But evidently such attempts have either nothing to do with the present argument, or tend to confirm the view that the local defence of the spot of territory, and its defence by the preservation of its communications, are not concomitant. The threats Threats of of the Vladimir, such as they were, corresponded only to proposed Vladimir. sorties of the garrison, and so far formed a part of, and were subordinate to, the land defences only.

the

Sevastopol forms the converse of the lines of Torres Vedras. Sevastopol fell when attacked by sea and by forces resting on the sea; Torres Vedras successfully resisted when invested by land, but Torres with its communications by sea intact. In both cases it was the Vedras. holder of the sea communications who succeeded. But it was the sea communications which formed the complement of the Duke of Wellington's works; while in the case of Sevastopol the works stood alone.

The case of Gibraltar is again analogous to that of Torres Vedras, Gibraltar. and the converse of Sevastopol and of all successful attacks from the sea, while it has differentiating features from the defence of the Lisbon territory. In 1780 this fortress was nearly starved out because the British had allowed its communications by sea to be cut. It must have fallen, had not Rodney, in January, 1780, restored those communica- Admiral tions, and re-victualled the place. But next year it was the same thing Rodney. again. Gibraltar was on the point of being starved out, when Admiral Admiral Darby. Darby relieved it with a convoy of 100 store ships in 1781. But both these attempts were desultory, and neither resulted, nor were intended