REMARKS AS TO PERSONNEL. The result of these operations as regards the personnel of the navy is one with which England has every reason to be satisfied; it shows that the fine qualities of professional knowledge, energy, skill, and devotion to duty are as present as ever, and that, so far as their Now equal numbers go, the officers and men of the British navy may be traditions. depended upon to do their duty, when the time of trial comes, in a manner consonant with its best traditions. to best Arduous nature of The hard and trying work required from the officers and men of the work. the blockading squadron during a fortnight of incessant movement, calling for the exercise of the utmost vigilance, especially at night, was performed in a manner deserving the highest praise, and it is no small result that this duty was discharged from the time of the establishing of the blockade until the close of the operations without the occurrence of any single accident worth recording, though, to perform it effectively, many risks had necessarily to be run. Strain on blockaders. Officers and men strange to their ships. Engineering staff. Work in torpedoboats. It was not known to any but the Admirals of the blockaded force that the attempt to break the blockade would not be made before the night of the 3rd August, so that the strain upon the blockaders was never relaxed. In this respect the blockaded squadrons had the advantage, as they would have had in real war, for the Admirals had it in their option to husband their resources, especially in coals, and in sparing their personnel night work at will. The work of harassing the enemy outside was, nevertheless, fully kept alive from first to last. The officers and men in many of the vessels employed on these services were entire strangers to the ships they were appointed to, some of which had not even passed their final contractors' trials, and it is no small merit that they were so well handled under such circumstances. The services of the engineer officers in charge of the machinery, and of the engine-room staff of these new ships, seem to call for special commendation. The reports from the Admirals on both sides engaged in the recent operations, relative to the share taken by the torpedo-boats, are most satisfactory as regards the work done by officers and men, and fully show what services may be expected from the lieutenants and junior officers of the fleet when the time of trial of their high qualities is brought to the test of war. The narrative of Lieutenant Henry B. Jackson, commanding the torpedo flotilla off Berehaven, is specially interesting and deserving of notice. MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS. Employment of Deck Hands in Stoke-holds. We would call attention to the fact of the large amount of deck hands employed in the stoke-holds of many of the ships engaged in the late manœuvres, which would point to a deficiency either in the complement, the quality of the stoker, or to inexperience; and from what came under our own personal observation as Commanders-inChief on foreign stations, when ships were recommissioned abroad, we are inclined to attribute it to inexperience, as there was no doubt as to the great improvement in the stoking after a few months' practice. It is unnecessary to go into details; they are fully given in the reports of the Admirals commanding the respective squadrons. The Warspite is the strongest case. When breaking the blockade Warspite. on the 3rd August at 16 knots speed, thirty-six deck hands were sent to assist in the stoke-holds at a time when in real war every man would be required at his station for battle. Harbour of Refuge at Filey. The question of employment of convict labour (on the completion of the extension works in the Royal Dockyards) in the construction of harbours of refuge has been the subject of discussion for many years. The Committee desire to express their opinion that such labour, when available, could not be more advantageously employed than in the construction of a harbour at Filey, which would, in the event of war, prove a strategical centre of the first importance in the North Sea. Flag of Truce (irregular use of). The Committee think it right to call attention to the irregular use of a flag of truce by the ships of B squadron. Once, when No. 50 torpedo-boat-a prize to the Calypso-displayed it without authority for the purpose of facilitating her running the blockade of Lough Swilly by its means. Secondly, by the Curlew, which hoisted a flag of truce when carrying a despatch from the Admiral of B2 to the Admiral of A2. The former had left Lough Swilly in the Rodney on the previous night; but, in order to deceive the enemy, his flag was hoisted on board the Black Prince-a perfectly legitimate ruse-but it appears irregular to use a flag of truce under such circumstances. The Committee fully concur with the remarks made by the Admiral of A2 squadron, viz., "that no taint of suspicion should attach to official communications passing between officers, even in the position of belligerents," under cover of a flag of truce. Naval Officers on Retired List, &c., writing in the Newspapers. The Committee also wish to call the attention of their Lordships to the habit of naval officers on half-pay or the retired list, who have been permitted to take passage in ships of the squadron, taking advantage of their position and authority as naval officers to write in the public journals criticizing the manœuvres. It is well known that no person attached to a particular corps or ship can give a correct account of operations as a whole, only a limited part of which can come under their own view. Their accounts are necessarily incorrect, misleading to the public, most unjust to those conducting the manœuvres, and injurious to the service. We think that officers who are guests on board Her Majesty's ships on these occasions should be placed under the same restrictions as those on full pay with reference to communications with public journals, &c. (Signed) W. M. DOWELL, Admiral. CHAS. W. DICKINSON, Secretary. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE NAVAL MANOEUVRES. SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS. 6th December, 1888. SIR, I am to acknowledge the receipt of the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into all the circumstances connected with the late Naval Manœuvres, as contained in the reports received from the Admirals in command of the squadrons engaged. 2. My Lords desire to express to you, as Chairman, and to request that you will convey to Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, K.C.B., and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Wm. Richards, K.C.B., their Lordships' thanks for the report. 3. My Lords will be glad if the Committee will supplement their previous report by favouring their Lordships with their opinion on the two following points : I. On the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of the respective squadrons. II. The general conclusions to be drawn from the recent operations. To Admiral I am, Sir, SIR WM. DOWELL, K.C.B. Your obedient Servant, (Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR. Whether experienced. OPINIONS ON THE BEHAVIOUR AND SEA-GOING QUALITIES OF, OR SEA-GOING QUALITIES, &C. No weather appears to have been experienced by any of the vessels engaged in the recent manœuvres which afforded opportunities to either the flag officers or the captains in command of judging as to their behaviour or sea-going qualities under conditions of either strong wind or heavy sea. The Committee feel, therefore, in the reports from these officers, they have not sufficient data wherewith to give a decided opinion on these points, especially in the case of the large ironclads and cruisers. We have, however, carefully read and considered all the papers above referred to, and, from the information obtained therefrom, report as follows: Unsuit RODNEY-BENBOW-COLLINGWOOD. So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders them unsuitsea-going able as sea-going armour-clads for general service with the fleet, as iron-clads. their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is necessary to force them against a head sea or swell. able as Benbow. Defective fittings of bower anchors. On the only occasion on which the Collingwood experienced any considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20° each way; this does not make it appear as if the Admiral class will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather. They are said to be "handy" at 6 knots and over. In the Benbow much difficulty was experienced in stowing the bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels, more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of improved Martin's. Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles leak badly, and that the mess deck is made uninhabitable whenever the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this defect might be remedied. |