No time to be lost in making Navy efficient-Effect of war on our
commerce if the Navy be weak-England's seaboard her frontier-
What the defeat of England's Navy would mean-Parliamentary
votes insufficient-We should have such a fleet as would render
invasion impossible-The consequence of the loss of command of
the sea
Admiral Sir Arthur Hood's observations on the supplementary report
of the Committee-Does not agree with the Committee-Admiral
class-Minotaur-Not necessary to force a heavy battleship in a
heavy sea as it is in a cruiser-Thin and thick armour-Opinion
of the Admiral class, Conqueror, Hero, Mersey class, Arethusa,
Archer, and Rattlesnake classes
Engine-room and signal staffs-Strain on the steam reserves-Com-
mittee necessary-How engine-room complements are determined
-Signalmen-Resumé of Committee's views as to number of
ships-Vessels left out of consideration by Committee-Com-
mittee's programme, Sir A. Hood's observations thereon and
views as to commissioning ships abroad-Observations of Lord
George Hamilton..
Coaling experiment-Orders to commission nine ships-Other vessels
commissioned-Evolutions-Steam tactics-Squadron broke up—
M. Weyl's remarks-Committee's report-Effective strength of
men in barracks to be raised-Insufficiency of subordinate officers
-Tonnerre, Furieux and Fulminant-Operations-Organisation
of crews efficient-Ships and steam machinery in good order
Ships engaged-Tactics-Admiral's report