make compensation. But section 109 is quite different from that. It is "until any works to be constructed under the authority of this Act in the Whitechapel district, are so far completed as to be assessed or liable to be assessed." To what? not generally, but, "to an amount equal to or greater than the aggregate amount of the gross rateable value of the same lands, houses, buildings and property, for the twelve months immediately preceding the passing of this Act." That quite distinguishes the operation of section 109 from the operation of the judgment in The Queen v. The Metropolitan District Railway Company (2). There is an express provision for the Whitechapel district. With respect to other parishes, the railway is to be completed upon the whole system, of which the returns will be increased in each parish by reason of the whole being at work. It may be said that if this were a long line it would be unreasonable, but if the Legislature has prescribed it, it must be done. With reference, however, to this line which was only to connect the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway with the Great Eastern Railway, the observation does not arise.

I think that, following what seems to me to be the plain grammatical construction of section 128, the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench was right, the decision of the Court of Exchequer wrong, and that the latter decision, now before us, ought to be reversed.

Judgment, therefore, will be entered, for the plaintiffs for 310l. 4s. 3d.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Attorneys-Hawks, Willmott & Stokes, for plaintiffs; Bristows & Carpmael, for defendants.

A pauper, while in the receipt of relief, brought an action in this Court, and signed judgment for a sum of money. After he had ceased to receive relief, the judgment debtor paid him the judgment debt:Held, that the judgment was a valuable security for money belonging to" the pauper, within 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103. s. 16, so as to enable the guardians of the relieving union to recover from the pauper the relief given during the twelve months prior to the proceeding for the recovery.

SPECIAL CASE stated on appeal from the Bow County Court of Middlesex.

The defendant was a pauper chargeable by law to and receiving relief for himself, his wife and family from the plaintiffs, without intermission, from October, 1867, up to and including the 16th of May, 1872, when he received 12s. During this period he sued the St. Katherine's Dock Company in the Court of Exchequer in respect of an injury caused by the company's negligence, and recovered a verdict for 3001., damages, and costs, as between attorney and client, at the sittings for Middlesex after Hilary Term, 1872, leave being given to the Dock Company to move the Court on a point reserved. Such proceedings were commenced and prosecuted with the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The Dock Company moved the Court accordingly within the first four days of Easter Term, 1872, but the Court refused the rule, and the verdict stood, and judgment was signed on the 13th of May, 1872.

The sum of 4641. 3s. (being 3001. for damages, and 1647. 38. for costs) was on the 18th of May, 1872, paid by the Dock Company to the defendant's attorney, who, on the 20th of May, 1872 (being four days after the defendant had ceased to receive relief from the plaintiff's), paid to the defendant 2901., being the amount due to him after payment of the attorney's costs. The defendant having re

fused to satisfy the claim, the plaintiffs brought an action in the County Court on the 1st of August, 1872, under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103. s. 16 (1), to recover 197. 198., being the amount actually and properly expended by them during the twelve months prior to the action in the relief of the defendant, and his wife and family.

On the hearing the Judge of the County Court gave judgment for the defendant.

The question for the Court is

Whether the judgment so recovered by the defendant against the dock company was a valuable security for money in the pauper's possession or belonging to him within the meaning of the section so as to enable the guardians to sue for the 197. 19s. If yes, judgment to be entered up for the plaintiffs for 197. 10s. If no, judgment to be entered up for the defendant.

Philbrick, for the plaintiffs.-A bill of exchange or a bond is a security, à fortiori a judgment. A verdict, before judgment, for unliquidated damages, is not attachable under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 61-Jones v. Thompson (2), but a judgment has always been attachable. Under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. ss. 13, 14, judgments operate as charges on land on stock and shares, and section 16 speaks of them as a "security."

G. S. Griffiths, for the defendant.-To bring the case within s. 16 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103, the security must have belonged to the pauper for the whole year prior to the action. It was not "valuable" till after the pauper had ceased to receive relief, for it was not realised, and it might have produced nothing.

[CHANNELL, B.-But we must look to the fact that it turned out to be valuable.]

(1) "Where any pauper shall have in his possession or belonging to him any money or valuable security for money, the guardians of the union or parish within which such pauper is chargeable, may take and appropriate so much of such money, or the produce of such security, or recover the same as a debt before any local Court, as will reimburse the said guardians for the said amount expended by them, whether on behalf of the common fund, or of any parish in the relief of such pauper during the period of twelve months prior to such taking and appropriation, or prior to such proceeding for the recovery (as the case may be)

(2) E. B. & E. 63; s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 234.

KELLY, C.B.-The object of the section was to prevent frauds on the guardians by paupers who had means of their own. Now long before the judgment was obtained it was probable that the defendant would have a large sum of money coming to him, but that alone would not bring the case within the statute. Fortunately, however, three days before he ceased to receive relief as a pauper, he became entitled to a judgment for 3001. It could hardly be said that he had the judgment " in his possession," but it certainly "belonged to" him within the meaning of the section.

Then the question is whether the judgment was a " valuable security for money' within the section. It was argued that the section meant only a negotiable security such as a mortgage, but this would be giving a very limited meaning to the words, and would not carry into effect the intention of the legislature. We must give a large and liberal-at the same time a reasonable-interpretation to the statute. I think a judgment is in every sense a security to a creditor for pay. ment of his claim. It may be assigned and turned into money. For many purposes it is a security, and in this instance it was de facto a valuable security. Why then should we hesitate to hold that this is a case within the section? I think it is within the express words. The judg ment must, therefore, be set aside, and judgment entered for the plaintiffs.

66

CHANNELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. I am not sure that the verdict itself was not a security"-defeasible in the event of the Court granting and making absolute the rule, but as soon as the Court refused the rule nisi, no longer defeasible.

PIGOTT, B.-I am of the same opinion. A judgment is a security, but it was urged that it is not necessarily a valuable security, because it might be against a pauper defendant. But we must look further and see whether it is not "valuable." The facts in this case shew that this judgment was valuable. Therefore I think this judgment was both a "security for money" and "valuable within the section.

CLEASBY, B.-I have no hesitation in deciding that this judgment is a "valu

and

By the Metropolis Local Management Acts, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120. s. 105, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102. s. 77, the costs of paving a new street under the compulsory powers of the former Act are payable by the owners of the land and houses abutting upon forming the street, and are to be apportioned by the vestry or district board of works:-Held, that strips of land belonging to a railway company abutting upon a street, and kept and used for the sole purpose of repairing the arches of the railway viaduct, were chargeable to the costs of paring the street under the Act, as was also land used only as a buttress for the railway embankment, and to allow for slippings from it.

CASE stated by a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

The appellant is the secretary of the Hammersmith and City Railway Company, and the respondent is the clerk of the vestry of the parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington.

The appellant was summoned for having neglected to pay the vestry, or the respondent, the sum of 541. 10s. 11d., charged upon the appellant as the owner of land abutting upon a street known as St. Mark's Road, in the parish of Kensington, in respect of paving works to be carried out under the provisions of the Metropolis

Local Management Act, 1855, and the other Acts of Parliament amending the

same.

At the hearing the following facts were proved or admitted

St. Mark's Road was formerly an occupation road for horses and carts leading to Notting Barn Farm, and also a public footpath, but of late years buildings have been erected and a street formed. On the 2nd of August, 1870, the vestry duly passed a resolution that the St. Mark's Road was not paved to the satisfaction of the vestry, and that it was necessary and expedient that the carriage ways and footpaths thereof should be paved throughout the whole breadth thereof, in pursuance of section 105 of the Metropolis Local Management Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and section 77 of the Metropolis Local Management Amendment Act, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102 (1).

The appellant, as the secretary of the Hammersmith and City Railway Company, is the owner of land consisting of two portions abutting on St. Mark's Road, one portion being on the west side of the road, and having a frontage of ten feet, the other portion being on the east

(1) By the Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120. s. 105, "In case the owners of the houses forming the greater part of any new street laid out or made, or hereafter to be laid out or made, which is not paved to the satisfaction of the vestry or district board of the parish or district is situate or made, be desirous of having the same paved, as hereinafter mentioned, or if such vestry or board deem it necessary or expedient that the same should be so paved, then and in either of such cases such vestry or board shall well and sufficiently pave the same, either throughout the whole breadth of the carriageway and footpaths thereof, or any part of such breadth, and from time to time keep such pavement in good and sufficient repair; and the owners of the houses forming such street shall, on demand, pay to such vestry or board the amount of the estimated expenses of providing and laying such pavement, &c." By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77, Where any vestry or district board shall, under the powers given by the 105th section of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, have paved or be about to pave any new street, the owners of the land bounding or abutting on such street shall be liable to contribute to the expenses or estimated expenses of paving the same, as well as the owners of houses therein, provided that it shall be lawful for the vestry or district board to charge the owners of land in a less proportion than the owners of house property, should they deem it just and expedient so to do, &c."

side of the road, and having a frontage of seventy-three feet.

The surveyor, for the time being, of the vestry had estimated the amount of the expenses for providing and laying such pavement, and apportioned the amount chargeable against the owners of the two pieces of land at the sum of 7l. 18. 11d. for and in respect of the piece situate on the west side of the road, and at the sum of 471. 9s. for and in respect of the piece situate on the east side. Notices of the resolution and apportionment, and demanding payment of the sums respoctively, were duly posted and served by the respondent upon the appellant.

The Hammersmith and City Railway crosses St. Mark's Road on an arch at a height of 16ft., and is carried in the direction of Hammersmith on brick arches. From the east side of the road the railway is carried on an embankment, the foot of such embankment projecting from 40ft. to 50ft. from the line of the arches.

It was also proved that the portion of land on the west side of the road forms part of a strip of an uniform width of 10ft., which is kept and solely used for the purpose of repairing the arches of the viaduct. It was also proved that the embankment on the east side of the road formed part of the railway, and acts only as a buttress or support thereto, and could not be used for any other purpose. The space situate between the foot of the embankment and the wall is land purchased by the company to allow for the slippings of the embankment, which have actually taken place, and are likely to recur, owing to the peculiar nature of the soil.

'It was further admitted by the surveyor for the vestry that the amounts estimated as chargeable against the owners of the two pieces of land was so estimated in respect of the whole frontage of the two frontages of 10ft. and 73ft. respectively.

Under the above circumstances, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was not liable to contribute to the expenses in respect of his ownership of either of the portions of land, on the ground that they were mere strips of land forming part of and appertaining to the railway, and necessary for its maintainance; that there was no separate ownership apart from the railway; and that the

appellant was not chargeable under the before-mentioned Acts as owner of the railway. It was further contended that even assuming the appellant to be chargeable in respect of his ownership of so much of the land on the east side of the road and at the foot of the embankment he was not chargeable in respect of the embankment itself or any portion of it, and that therefore the amount claimed in the summons could not be recovered, and the summons must be dismissed.

The magistrate found as a fact that the portion of land on the western side of the road was used with the railway, and necessary for the repairs thereof, and further, that about one half of the portion of land on the eastern side of the road was simply a buttress or support to the embankment, and was of opinion that neither portion thereby lost its character of land, and therefore made an order that the appellant should pay the sum in the summons mentioned and costs.

The question for the opinion of the Court is whether the appellant is liable to pay the sum of 54l. 10s. 11d.

Lopes (R. E. Webster with him), for the appellant.—The land in question ought not to be charged with the cost of paving the street. The object of the Legislature was to make the benefit to be derived from paving the new street the test of liability, and here there is no such benefit. In Angell v. The Vestry of Paddington (2) it was held that land attached to a church was not liable to be rated, shewing that where it is possible the Court will put a limit to the ordinary construction of the word "land" as used in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 120. s. 77.

Prentice (Beresford with him), for the respondent, was not heard.

Per Curiam (COCKBURN, C.J., and BLACKBURN, J.). There is nothing to take the land in question out of the express words of the Act.

Judgment for respondents.

Attorneys-Young, Maples & Co., for appellants; J. & M. Pontifex, for respondents.

(2) 37 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 171.

By the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (10 Vict. c. 27), s. 74, "the owner of every vessel shall be answerable to the undertakers for any damage done by such vessel or by any per1 son employed about the same, to the harbour, dock or pier; and the master or person having the charge of such vessel, through whose wilful act or negligence any such damage is done, shall also be liable to make good the same, &c., provided always that nothing herein contained shall extend to impose any liability for any such damage upon the owner of any vessel where such vessel shall, at the time when such damage is caused, be in charge of a duly licensed pilot, whom such owner or master is bound by law to employ, and put his vessel in charge of."

A vessel, by inevitable accident, struck against a pier and thereby damaged it:

Held, that the owner of the vessel was answerable for damages under the section, the proviso making an exception where the vessel is in charge of a pilot, but no exception in case of damage done by inevitable accident.

CASE stated by justices for Woodbridge, Suffolk, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

A complaint was preferred by Charles Samuel Tovell (the respondent), against John Dennis (the appellant), under sections 74 and 75 of the 10 Vict. c. 27, charging that, on the 26th September, 1871, Dennis was the owner of a vessel called The Ava, which vessel, at or near Landguard, in Suffolk, did damage to the pier and works of the Harwich Harbour Conservancy Board, to the amount of 501., by striking violently against the pier and works, and breaking and destroying divers parts of the same, the vessel, at the time such damage was done, not being in charge of any duly licensed pilot, contrary to the statute; and upon the hearing the appellant was orNEW SERIES, 42.—MAG. CAS.

dered to pay to the Harwich Harbour Conservancy Board the sum of 501.

Upon the hearing of the complaint it was proved on the part of the respondent and found as a fact, that the vessel, The Ava, plaint, and it was proved on the part of did the damage as alleged in the comthe appellant that the damage was the result of an inevitable accident caused by stress of weather, and did not arise from any wilful act or negligence of the master or other persons in the vessel, and it was contended therefore on the part of the appellant, that he was not liable to pay to the Harwich Harbour Conservancy Board the amount claimed for damage so done.

The justices, however, being of opinion that the appellant became liable under section 74 of the 10 Vict. c. 27 (1), to pay the Harwich Harbour Conservancy Board the sum of 501. for the damage so done, whether the damage was the result of inevitable or unavoidable accident or otherwise, gave their determination against the appellant in the manner before stated.

The question for the opinion of the Court is, whether the damage to the pier and works, being the result of an inevitable accident, caused by stress of weather, and not arising from any wilful act or negligence of the master or other persons in the vessel, the appellant became liable to pay to the Harwich Harbour Conservancy Board the amount

(1) By the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 10 Vict. c. 27. s. 74,-The owner of every vessel or float of timber shall be answerable to the undertakers for any damage done by such vessel or float of timber, or by any person employed about the same, to the harbour, dock or pier, or the quays or works connected therewith, and the master or person having the charge of such vessel or float of timber through whose wilful act or negligence any such damage is done, shall also be liable to make good the same, &c., provided always that nothing herein contained shall extend to impose any liability for any such damage upon the owner of any vessel where such vessel shall at the time when such damage is caused be in charge of a duly licensed pilot, whom such owner or master is bound by law to employ and put his vessel in charge of.

F