as the instrument of perception, but through the influence of an evil disposition, affecting, not its condition, but its exercise. The depravity of the understanding, therefore, is rather but a branch of that of the heart, in which the root of the evil is planted, and the bitter fruits are borne in every department of the man.

If any should conceive that depravity destroys, or even weakens, our powers of action, it will be desirable for them to recollect what our powers of action are. We have shown that these are no other than our intelligent faculties; the question, therefore, is, whether a wrong disposition destroys or weakens the intelligent faculties. That it perverts them in actual use we allow, and that it sometimes leads to sinful courses which weaken, or even destroy them; but it must be allowed, on the other hand, we think, that the intelligent faculties are not necessarily destroyed, or even weakened, by a wrong disposition. Wicked men have still the use of their reason, and some of them in a pre-eminently powerful degree, though associated with dispositions evil enough to ally them with infernal beings. In whatever degree, or from whatever cause, the rational faculties are impaired, in an equal

degree we most readily admit our power to be diminished.

The perplexity and difficulty which have been thrown into discussions such as those which are now before us, by the use of ill-adapted or ill-defined phraseology, or by neglecting to distinguish the strict from the analogical use of words, must be the author's apology for dwelling so long on these introductory matters. When a subject is either intricate in itself, or has become so through unskilful management, nothing is more conducive to its successful investigation than definitions and distinctions. In these, indeed, the very crisis of the argument lies. The differences that occur in the details of it frequently throw the disputants back upon some more general topic; so that until these are understood and agreed upon, the course of subordinate reasoning is perpetually broken, and can never be satisfactorily prosecuted. The author intends and hopes to use all his principal terms strictly in the meaning he has assigned to them, and to adhere rigidly to the principles of mental and moral philosophy which he has laid down. Such of his readers as may agree with him in these, will form agreeable companions to him in his course, and he has a cheerful hope of gaining their acqui

escence in his conclusions; but to what purpose should any go further, who dissent from these axioms? To such readers his reasonings must always appear fallacious, and objections continually arise, throwing us back on points which should have been previously determined. The decision of the religious argument is involved in the principles of moral philosophy from which we set out, and all who may differ from the author upon these, he requests to proceed no further, but to apply their thoughts to the reconsideration of them: for if the difference should be irreconcilable here, it would be sure to be so every where else, and it would be better to part at once, with mutual expressions of candour and good-will, than to prolong a discussion which may irritate, but cannot convince. Should they choose to continue their perusal of this little work, he hopes they will do him, not the favour, but the justice, to recollect the sense he has given to his own terms, that, at all events, whatever they may think of his arguments, they may judge fairly of his consistency. If any should prefer passing by the general argument altogether, the author will meet them again with pleasure on the plain and decisive ground of scripture testimony.

AFTER these brief explanations, we come to the question before us: namely, Whether, in harmony with the admitted necessity of the Spirit's influence, it can be maintained that man has power to repent without his aid.

Let it he unctly remembered, that we affirm man to have no disposition to repent, but, on the contrary, a most extreme aversion to it; his heart being desperately wicked. But, according to the definition we have given, power is altogether different from disposition, and implies nothing respecting it. It is simply the possession of means, which is compatible with disposition of any kind.

The question, therefore, comes to this: What are the means necessary to repentance, or to induce an entire change of mind towards God?

They are, first, The opportunity of becoming acquainted with truths adapted and sufficient to produce such a change. For the considera

tion of suitable topics is the only method of effecting a change of any kind in our disposition, nor can a change be reasonably expected further than adequate reasons are shown for it.

Secondly, A state of the understanding physically sound, competent to discern the true import of the matters presented for consideration. This is obviously indispensable.

Thirdly, A proper connexion between the understanding and the heart, so that there may be no obstruction to the influence of the truths discovered.

These appear to be all the means necessary to repentance; and it may safely be affirmed that, under these conditions, consideration would infallibly produce it. If it would not, it must be either, 1, because the reasons presented are insufficient; or, 2, because the understanding could not discern them; or, 3, because the action of the understanding upon the heart was obstructed: all which things are contrary to the suppositions made. It requires to be shown, therefore, whether these conditions do meet in the case of a sinner or not.

First, then, Has the Most High presented to a sinner any just and sufficient reasons for repenting? We feel as though the very ques